Type 051 Luda - Origins
In the late 1960s, when the cloud of nuclear deterrence was overshadowed by China ’s land-based strategic nuclear missiles was seriously inadequate, and the launch preparation time is long and the maneuverability is poor. Therefore, under the policy of not committing to using nuclear weapons first, it is difficult to form an effective deterrent capability for deterring China's nuclear countries. Based on this grim form, China began to develop strategic nuclear submarines in the 1960s to form a submarine-based nuclear counterattack force to maintain sufficient counterattack capabilities and deter potential nuclear opponents.
When formulating submarine-based strategic nuclear forces in the 1960s, the Chinese navy ’s sea-making capabilities were far from meeting the requirements. Especially at that time, China had not obtained detailed hydrological data of the Yellow Sea. Therefore, when nuclear submarines crossed the shallow sea of ??nearly 1,200 kilometers from the base, there were not many optional deep-water troughs that entered the deep sea outside the continental shelf. The appropriate strategy for the Chinese navy is to obtain wartime control of the sea in this shallow water area, and expel the hostile and anti-potential forces of other countries.
In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the submarine-based nuclear strategy, in the early days of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese navy pursued the principle of "air, submarine, and fast" based on the country's actual economic and technological conditions, that is, the development of fighter jets, submarines, and speedboats. Therefore, a large number of surface warships are equipped with light and small speedboats and frigates, and they lack large destroyers and frigates. After the national strategic adjustment of the navy in the 1960s, in order to effectively ensure the need for deep-sea voyages of nuclear submarines and the deployment of long-range intercontinental missiles to test offshore vessels, China put the task of developing new destroyers on the agenda.
The most powerful original combat capability of the Chinese Navy is known as the "Four King Kong". The 07 destroyers ( "Anshan" level), in addition to four pre-World War II vintage destroyer built in the United Kingdom and Japan. No matter the quantity or the technical level of shipborne weapons, there is no ability to protect nuclear submarines from being attacked by anti-submarine attacks in the vast area between the territorial sea line and the continental shelf. Therefore, the main purpose of China's construction of the first-generation destroyer is to establish the sea-making capability from the territorial sea to the first island chain.
Another strategic consideration for building a strong sea-making capability is to gain an advantage over the KMT naval surface ships. From 1949 to the 20 years before the construction of the "Luda" class destroyer, the Chinese navy has been in a weak position in comparison of warships across the strait. The Kuomintang has nearly 20 destroyers, and only a few old destroyers of the PLA Navy cannot compete. Therefore, the PLA Navy destroyers usually only operate in the near-shore waters and suffer from the Kuomintang When navies attack high-risk sea areas, they usually need to use coastal radar and aviation forces for alert. In view of the above situation, only by relying on the strength of the country to build a large number of large surface ships can only change this power contrast, can we completely gain the advantage of the KMT navy.
In the mid-1960s, many Chinese sovereign islands in the South China Sea were invaded by South Vietnam and other countries. At that time, the PLA Navy lacked the ability to control these remote territories and territorial waters. Although the Type 037 submarine hunting submarine was built for patrol in the South China Sea in the mid-1960s, the Type 062 escort boat that undertook the nation ’s territorial waters patrol was small in tonnage and poor seaworthiness, and could only reach the waters of the Xisha Islands. Farther sovereign islands were still out of control. After 1966, China's Type 65 frigate began service, although the seaworthiness and full-load displacement of 1700 tons can meet the patrol of the distant waters of the South China Sea.
However, the weapon system had only artillery and anti-submarine rocket deep ammunition, which had fallen behind in the early design. The PLA Navy's 65-type frigate is only an attempt and transition model, and it is not ready to build in large quantities. Therefore, only destroyers equipped with larger tonnage can further strengthen the control of the South China Sea.
In 1957, with the efforts of many parties, China obtained some Soviet Type 56 destroyers technical design plans and documents. At the same time, the Navy has set up a research institute, began to explore the development work destroyer program. February 1959, the Navy proposed the idea of the development of new missile destroyers, the first machinery industry ship product design The first room of the institute completed the sketch design at the end of the year. On this basis, the Naval Research Department put forward the tactical technical requirements for the development of missile destroyers. Considering that the tactical technical requirements are more advanced, it is difficult to develop at one time. The imitation work has been arranged, and it is proposed that the development of the destroyer be divided into three steps: (1) use the 56-type technology designed by the Soviet Union to design the hull, install a missile launcher, and modify the general layout appropriately; (2) put the active duty Two main guns of the 07 type ship and one rear torpedo launcher were dismantled, and the missile launcher was modified to conduct launch tests to gain experience.
In 1960, China's national economy encountered temporary difficulties. For various reasons, the development of the destroyer could not be included in the plan. Considering the complexity of the development technology of the destroyer, the high cost, the long period of equipment imitation, and the special requirements for major equipment that need to be pre-arranged, with the support of many parties, the navy leadership obtained the consent of the General Staff, and in the case of extremely difficult national financial resources, In 1962, 8 million yuan was allocated for the imitation of the key supporting equipment of the destroyer. By the end of 1965, various imitation equipment had achieved different degrees of progress, laying the foundation for the launch of the destroyer in 1966.
In the mid-1960s, in order to meet the needs of intercontinental missiles for full-sea escort and alert testing, the Central Military Commission approved the development of the first-generation missile destroyer on its own. For design tasks, Li Fuli and Pan Jingying presided over the design work.
After demonstration, preliminary research and preliminary design, the overall plan of the ship was selected. Its standard displacement was more than 3,000 tons, using high-parameter, high-power steam power equipment; the main weaponry was two triple-ship ships and a missile launcher and Missile weapon system, dual 130mm, dual 57mm and other caliber artillery systems, two 12-barrel rocket-type deep-water bomb weapon systems; equipped with sonar, radar, communication, navigation and other observation equipment and command and control systems.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
