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LPA Kanimbla - Modifications

In early 1994 a funded study was contracted to Australian Defence Industries to determine the modification options to meet Australian capability requirements. Following modification each ship, later to be designated Amphibious Transports (LPA), was to be capable of:

• carrying helicopters, landing craft and 450 troops over a range of 6000km
• lodging the troops ashore over the beach
• supporting the troops in the field for up to 14 days
• providing appropriate command and control
• providing medical facilities for the task

The ADI study considered a number of definitive capability work packages for each ship which included:

• provision for helicopter landing spots forward and aft for both day and night helicopter operations
• installation of bilge keels to reduce the amplitude of the ship's roll
• increased stowage for aviation fuel to support helicopter operations
• provision for mixed gender accommodation arrangements for 650 personnel (450 troops and 200 crew)
• installation of a helicopter shelter capable of storing four Army Black Hawk helicopters
• installation of a crane for loading and unloading Army LCM8 watercraft
• installation of a medical facility in one ship to provide for initial wound surgery and medium and high dependency nursing of the wounded
• installation of three dual purpose training classrooms / Army briefing room facilities
• improving Army command, control and communication facilities
• installation of an elevator between decks to transfer helicopters and Army vehicles
• installation of a side door and ramp for unloading cargo at port facilities
• installation of a navigation training bridge for officer training

In June 1994 Government approved funding of $55m for Joint Project 2027 Phase 2 modification work. As the capability requirements for the ships were further refined and prioritised it became apparent that all proposed modification packages could not be accommodated within the existing approved project cost. A strategy to undertake as many of the high priority modifications as possible within the approved cost was adopted with the remainder deferred until a later refit. The organisation of the modification work into work packages, related to capability outcomes, allowed a flexible approach to funding constraints.

Defence acquisition processes were largely driven by a 'window of opportunity' offered by the USN decommissioning of the LSTs. The LPA Project is an 'opportunity buy' that reflects many of the high-risk features which typify this type of acquisition. At the time of procurement of the vessels there was:

• no defined operational requirement;
• no detailed inspection of the vessels undertaken;
• no life cycle costing carried out;
• nor was any comprehensive risk analysis undertaken.

As a result there was an underestimation of the scope of work required and the time it would take to perform, and insufficient project contingency allocated. The Defence Acquisition Review Board (DARB) did not review the project until November 1998, after the Acting Inspector-General raised a number of issues for immediate consideration. Whilst RAN reviewed the LPAs through the Chief of Navy Advisory Committee and the Deputy Chief of Navy established a Round Table to progress matters, there was no authoritative joint Defence organisation approach to decision making until the establishment of the Amphibious Transport (LPA) Delivery Team in July 1999.

Manoora undertook an extensive refit during 2004, allowing the vessel to carry the heavier M1 Abrams.