LPA Tobruk - Management
Neither HMAS MANOORA nor HMAS KANIMBLA were decommissioned for the work to be carried out at Forgacs Dockyard. Under the contract, Forgacs Dockyard is responsible for specific work packages, the DAO manages modification work and repair and refit work on behalf of the Support Commander, and the Maritime Commander has responsibility for the Ships and work performed by the RAN crews. As contract work was written in terms of specifications for individual tasks there appears to be no-one who is responsible for overall Ship's systems.
The particular characteristics of the LPA Project have given rise to a number of influencing factors, which do not sit well with normal DAO project management arrangements. Process issues such as concept development were actually addressed in the reverse order of what would normally be expected in an acquisition project. The nature of the conversion activity, split funding and cost capping, when combined with time pressures and the element of working with the unknown, have created significant problems for the Project.
Overall management of the Project within Defence has been poor. Despite the circumstances described above, the Project has reflected a normal management framework with the emphasis on managing inputs along established organisational lines. Little concession has been made to the unique nature of task. Defence's internal administrative arrangements, particularly as a result of the multiple funding arrangements, have contributed to cost increases and schedule slippage. Funds for the Project came from at least six different sources within Defence. In effect each of these represented an interface that required management and co-ordination in its own right.
In practice the division of funding between the DAO and SCN has caused the most problems. This was also a finding in the first Inspector-General's report, which recommended that funding be provided from one source. The report found numerous examples of breakdowns in processes, a blurring of accountability, and confusion and disagreement in relation to funding responsibilities between the Project and SCN.
In 1996 the Deputy Chief of Navy (DCN) established a Management Board (Round Table), at the 2 star (Rear-Admiral) level, so that important LPA Project issues could be elevated for consideration by senior management. The Inspector-General's second report found that it was difficult to exercise effective management and control over the Project outcome because of the multitude and strength of external influences.
Usually over 30 representatives attended the Round Table, many with different interests, priorities and points of view. In turn, the Round Table was integrated with a number of other Working Groups which developed issues before they were elevated to the Round Table.
The DCN Round Table went some way towards addressing the need for a more lateral management structure for the Project, however it was an informal group, inhibited by the necessity of relying on representatives from interested organisations, working along established functional lines to achieve an effective outcome. The Inspector-General's second report considered that direct management action needed to be taken at a higher corporate level to overcome some of the internal administrative processes and resource issues that were affecting the Project.
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