LPA Kanimbla - Maintenance
The LPA story is a protracted and not always happy one. Many of the seeds of the problems faced in 2010 were sown long ago. While the situation became unpalatable, the decision to invoke an operational pause was correct and necessary. Had this not occurred it would not be unreasonable to predict an increased risk of a serious accident.
Royal Australian Navy's Amphibious Ships performed to a high standard, with both Landing Platform Amphibious' (LPA) performing well. In 2005 MANOORA completed her refit and work ups quickly to meet all her operational commitments. All subsequent maintenance support activities were within schedule and budget and her physical condition has continued to improve. MANOORA will be providing direct support to security arrangements for the Commonwealth Games, Melbourne. HMAS KANIMBLA was the workhorse and star for the RAN in 2005. The ship successfully provided SE Asia support post the tsunami and the Nias Island earthquake relief. The ship is currently in refit and is expected to return to duty on time and within budget.
The team that kept these ships performing at their best was located in the historic setting of Garden Island on Sydney's foreshore. The Amphibious and Afloat Support Systems Programs Office (AASSPO) was established on 11 September 2000 as a result of the decision to amalgamate the Defence Acquisition Organisation, Support Command Australia and the National Support Division to form the Defence Materiel Organisation. AASSPO provides in-service support to HMA Ships TOBRUK, WESTRALIA, SUCCESS, MANOORA, KANIMBLA, the Landing Craft Heavy-class, the sail training ship YOUNG ENDEAVOUR and the Army marine equipment fleet. The SPO is part of Maritime Systems Division (MSD) and has around 80 staff in Sydney, Cairns and Perth led by Director Joseph Blansjaar.
When it was established, the SPO followed the popular business model with the work of the SPO split across three functional areas: sustainment, enabling, and in-service generation. While these functions are still carried out, management reorganised the SPO along product lines by merging the sections so that each platform is managed by a Ship Manager with direct responsibility for in-service generation and sustainment functions. Plans are underway to complete this merger by embedding finance/purchasing officers with the "troops on the ground" so they can be supported with Enabling expertise.
The term "sustainment" covers the full range of Integrated Logistic Support (ILS), corrective and preventive maintenance, maintenance engineering and changes to planned maintenance. Sustainment is the 'pointy-end' of the AASSPO's business. The in-service generation function of ship management focuses on the configuration maintenance, data management, configuration identification and change, engineering change, configuration status accounting and configuration audits for new equipment. Enabling provides business management and reporting, financial management, people management, administrative support, procurement, contracting and quality management.
In addition to its responsibility for Navy's ships, the SPO takes care of Army marine amphibious capability, which supports the Army's water-borne equipment. While a primary role is to provide expert advice this unit also manages Reports on Defective or Unserviceable Material, actions engineering change proposals and maintains the register for Army marine assets.
The Integrated Material Support (IMS) Contract provides HMA Ships SUCCESS, TOBRUK, KANIMBLA and MANOORA with long term integrated logistic support to ensure they are safe, reliable and fully prepared to meet ongoing operational commitments, whilst at the same time, reducing the logistic cost of ownership. Kvaerner Oil and Gas Pty Ltd is the preferred tenderer and will be responsible for delivering a range of services including designing work programs for the logistic support the provision of overall engineering and maintenance support. The IMS Contract is expected to reduce this cost significantly over the life of the contract. The desired solution is to be achieved by a single prime contractor delivering operational capability in Sydney and any deployment area.
This type of contract is another example of the DMO's initiative to become a modern integrated Defence materiel business, closely aligned and partnered with industry. In addition, the innovative contracting strategy for the project will provide an incentive for the contractor to generate cost savings and other efficiency improvements by linking profit levels to the company's performance against criteria. The initiative also includes implementing an annual cost reduction program and rewarding provider proposed initiatives that improve performance.
When the LPAs were purchased a complete set of logistics products was not acquired. It is likely it did not exist within the US Navy. Accordingly the baseline to manage maintenance and configuration was inconsistent and not readily usable. During the conversion Project this proved problematic and on completion an updated set of logistic products still did not exist and the foundation for future maintenance support and configuration management was weakened. Later problem thus stemmed, in part, from the initial purcbase of the vessels in a poor state. Conversions of ex-USN Newport class amphibious ships by Australia required a considerable amount of restorative maintenance and significant modernisation to tailor them for the Australian requirement. The cost was extremely high with the final conversion cost price in the region of A$200M per ship. Efforts to remediate this shortcoming over the years never properly succeeded through lack of resources or pressure to keep the ships running to meet emerging operational requirements.
In 2009 the Chief of Navy initiated a new concept called the Seaworthiness Board, a concept modelled on the successful Airworthiness Board implemented by RAAF some years ago. It serves as a long overdue means of providing an independent review of maritime systems outside the dedicated Safety Management System. This review provides the Chief of Navy, in his role as the ADF Sea Worthiness authority, with an independent verification that he can safely operate a ship in its intended role, contributing directly therefore to the safety of our people. The sorry state of the ships came to light in September 2010 when the Seaworthiness Board reviewed the LPAs.
The Seaworthiness Board revealed a significant level of aggregated risk for the LPAs as a result of shortcomings in areas including manning levels, training loads, experience,maintenance, integrated logistic support and configuration management. Subsequent to that board the Chief of Navy directed that the ships enter an operational pause in late September 2010.
A review of the factors resulting in that decision identified systemic and cultural problems. There was evidence of a 'can do' and 'make do' culture, a lack of conformance to assurance processes, a perception that surface ships are not subject to the same level of risk as submarines and aircraft, a perception that LPAs were second tier ships and that there were insufficient resources to address shortcomings. The Seaworthiness Board provided a focus on the situation that was not previously evident through the complex Naval operating and regulatory systems. The awareness of the situation, the ability to resolve the deficiencies within the life of the LPA Class and Navy's governance obligations led swiftly to a decision to cease any further investment in Manoora and concentrate all efforts and resources on Kanimbla.
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