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Despite the division's training strategy of pre-deployment and deployment actions, maneuver units still suffered degradation in METL proficiency. This was not at all unexpected given the rigors of daily peace support operations and the demand in time and resources required to successfully execute the peacekeeping mission, still the division's first priority during its deployment. However, many of the peace support operations tasks helped to sustain certain METL skills.

To understand why maneuver unit proficiency in the METL tasks diminished, we must examine the conditions the BCT encountered while operating in a peace support environment. The FORSCOM BCT deployed with three maneuver battalion task forces to Bosnia, each one assigned an area of responsibility (AOR). Habitual slice elements deployed with the BCT. These included a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, and a forward support battalion. While the BCT headquarters (HQ) was located at Eagle Base in Tuzla, the three battalion task forces and support units operated from five other camps within Bosnia: Commanche Base, Camp Demi, Camp Dobol, Camp McGovern, and Camp Bedrock. Each camp varied in size based on mission requirements of the unit stationed at the camp, and, resultantly, each also varied in available training resources (i.e., simulation equipment and small arms range facilities).

Training During Peacekeeping Operations

While conducting peacekeeping operations, the BCT focused on the following tasks:1

• Force protection (FP). This was a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week operation. It included (but was not limited to) base camp guards at gates, tower guards, roving patrols, individual measures by all personnel in the AOR, improvements of FP measures, disposal of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and confiscating weapons and munitions.

• Presence patrols. This was the "bread and butter" of the task force and battalions in Task Force Eagle (TFE). These were done to establish and maintain the presence of well-trained, well-armed, competent and professional soldiers throughout the AOR.

• Monitoring of Entity Armed Forces (EAF) training and movements. EAF military units had to request permission to move their units to different cantonment areas and/or to conduct training. These training events included maneuver training, basic soldier skills training, crew and unit dry-fire training, and crew and unit live-fire training. These events must be monitored by Stabilization Force (SFOR) patrols. Likewise, SFOR monitored movement of EAF troops or weapons.

• Monitoring of demining operations. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) requires the EAF to perform demining operations. Direct Support (DS) SFOR engineer units monitored the demining to ensure that it met the definition of "effective effort" and that it was performed to standards.

• Weapons Storage Site Inspection (WSSI). The GFAP also calls for all EAF weapons and munitions to be stored in given locations and to be verified by SFOR forces. Every Weapons Storage Site (WSS) in the AOR must be periodically inspected against a list of weapons and munitions. If discrepancies occur and cannot be satisfactorily explained, an equal number of weapons or munitions can be seized and destroyed.

• Convoy escort. Logistics convoys, SFOR troop movements by bus, or any other friendly vehicular movement required an escort by SFOR soldiers in accordance with a prescribed number of vehicles and crew-served weapons.

• IO. The BCT was a key player in the IO campaign. Commanders, platoon leaders, and soldiers talked regularly to mayors, police chiefs, school directors, and common citizens. CA teams met with local officials to obtain feedback on needs and problems of the community. PSYOP teams worked with schools, refugee centers, and local officials. CI teams solicited information from local officials. PAO personnel worked with local radio stations to set up interviews and provide messages for public information.

Some "pluses" did exist in sustaining readiness (see Figure 1) as a result of performing peacekeeping tasks. Staff skills in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) improved with continual practice in routine daily operations. Unit leaders conducted daily leadership labs while performing their normal everyday tasks such as presence patrols and WSSI. Combat Service Support (CSS) units practiced their wartime maintenance and sustainment tasks.

What becomes clear in reviewing the list of peacekeeping tasks is that maneuver METL tasks were not part of the everyday routine for the BCT. Crew readiness suffered without live-fire opportunities while leader readiness degraded without practice in collective combined arms tasks. Unit training readiness in METL tasks suffered the greatest degradation, as units did not have the time nor the resources to conduct much more than opportunity training, mostly on individual training tasks.

The BCT attempted to maintain proficiency in METL tasks by using various Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS). These devices can increase combat readiness by providing greater, more effective training opportunities while saving or avoiding training costs. TADSS systems, placed at each base camp to facilitate training (see Figure 2), included the following:

• Conduct of Fire Trainer (COFT). Each Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer (MCOFT) (for M1A1 and M2) and Advanced Gunnery Training Simulator (AGTS) (for M1A2) consists of a gunner and commander station, an instructor/operator station and integrated visual, audio and computer subsystems. Computer-generated images are presented to the gunner and commander through the optics of the tank/BFV fire control system. COFT is capable of training individual and collective operational procedures, target acquisition/identification, target engagement and adjustment of fire using primary or alternate fire control equipment.

• Digital Display Tabletop Trainer (D2T2). This trainer allows baseline and sustainment training on M1A2 critical computer systems such as the Commander's Integrated Display (CID), Gunner's Display and Control Panel (GDCP), and Driver's Integrated Display (DID). It enables single or multiple tank crews to train all aspects of IVIS (Inter-Vehicular Information System) to include sending and receiving reports.

• Engagement Skills Trainer (EST). The EST is a multipurpose marksmanship-training device that contains a variety of training scenarios and supports various weapons including the M9, M16, M249 SAW, M203, AT4, and MK-19. This trainer was not available until just prior to the BCT's redeployment.

The BCT, as a whole, conducted little training on these devices because the unit focused on conducting peacekeeping tasks. Units found it challenging to maintain the unit/crew integrity required to conduct worthwhile training using TADSS.

Reintegration Training Model

Despite the best efforts of the BCT, its skills in maneuver METL tasks eroded at all levels, from individual through unit collective. The loss of skills, coupled with anticipated personnel changes in various positions, required a progressive reintegration training program, beginning at the individual level. Figure 3 shows the training timeline employed by the BCT to achieve warfighting readiness after redeployment.

In keeping with the Corps Commander's and Division Commander's policy of no weekend training with very specific exceptions, the model included only one weekend training event. Appendix A shows the specific time requirements for each event of the training model, which adds up to 189 training days. Including weekends and holidays, this is equivalent to 230 calendar days or 33 weeks.

The training model used a building block approach beginning with individual training. For the BCT, this phase not only included Common Task Training (CTT) and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training, but also "Re-NET" in the M1A2, whereby the two armor battalions received a second iteration of New Equipment Training (NET) during the individual training phase. These two battalions had previously undergone NET just before the units' deployment to Bosnia. The third battalion received NET during the fielding of its new M2-ODS (Operation DESERT STORM) model BFVs during the individual training period. During this same period, the unit also worked on soldier/equipment services.

The brigade then administered the Bradley Gunnery Skills Test (BGST) and Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test (TCGST) to meet pre-gunnery requirements. The first gunnery focused on basic gunnery techniques and engagements, intermediate engagements, and culminated in Table XI. At the completion of gunnery, the BCT conducted platoon and company Situational Training Exercises (STXs), each one preceded and followed by training on the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). This would allow units to train on collective tasks at the simulator prior to, and correct deficiencies after, the STX.

The next training event, the Task Force External Evaluation (EXEVAL), was preceded by a JANUS exercise and followed by the Brigade Fire Control Exercise (FCX) and sustainment gunneries on Tables VII, VIII and XII. Further CCTT training and JANUS exercise after the Brigade FCX allowed for any final retraining prior to the National Training Center (NTC) deployment. The 189-day trainup period ended with the completion of the deployment phase.

Training Challenges Encountered

The training model was well planned and provided a doctrinally sound basis for reintegration training. Of course, as with most plans, this one also encountered challenges that detracted from its success. Time was a critical factor in the level of success of the training. Brigade leaders felt that the 189 days allotted for the training would have been ideal had training distracters not disrupted it. Nevertheless, the reintegration timeline, even with distracters, was sufficient to allow the unit to regain its METL proficiency. However, the result was a lowered quality of training and confidence that soldiers and leaders alike held in their training, or as one battalion commander noted, caused a "dip in the band of excellence." The bottom line is that the unit trained to time and not to standard. This was because of the lack of time and the numerous distracters. The training distracters included:

• Three BCTs preparing for NTC rotations in quick succession. Within a period of nine months, all three of the division's BCTs completed a rotation at the NTC. This required vast amount of resources. Units were tasked to provide observer/controllers (O/Cs) and opposing forces (OPFOR) to support sister BCTs during their STXs and EXEVALs. However, supporting BCTs often had its own scheduled NTC preparation training, which reduced the amount of support it could offer. Subsequently, units conducting training were forced to be more self-supporting since they often had to provide many of their own O/Cs and OPFOR. This also created conflict as units competed for available ranges.

• Corps Support (Red) Cycle. Despite efforts by the division to obtain relief from a month-long Corps Red Cycle, the BCT retained this tasking during a critical month in the reintegration training period. The unit's red cycle occurred in June, concurrent with key individual training events, the foundation for future training. The support cycle coincided with SARP, CTT, NET and Re-NET, equipment services, BGST, TCGST, and gunnery.

As a result, many junior leaders felt that they did not receive adequate time from their commanders to train their soldiers to achieve proficiency in individual/crew/team tasks before commencing training on collective tasks. This caused a ripple effect in training as units attempted to learn individual and collective tasks simultaneously, weakening the building block of the training.

• Train to Maintain. Most of the BCT's equipment did not deploy to Bosnia with the unit. The division contracted the installation's Directorate of Logistics (DOL) to provide critical and periodic maintenance activities, and specific systems checks. Although the division overall was satisfied with the work performed by DOL, the BCT still had to accomplish various maintenance actions on non-deployed and deployed equipment during reintegration training. Factors, such as loss of experienced maintenance personnel and operators, and inadequate time available for maintenance recovery after training events, degraded the overall unit equipment readiness. A detailed discussion of maintenance challenges is in Chapter 4.

• Personnel turnover. Heavy turnover of personnel, especially in key leadership positions, drained units of much needed experience during the trainup process. Turnovers occurred as a result of position changes as officers and NCOs moved for professional development, and end of post-deployment stabilization period. The experience lost from personnel turnover forced units to enter NTC preparation at a lower entry level than for a normal NTC preparation. A detailed discussion of this topic is in Chapter 5.

Executing the Training Plan

After a six-month deployment in a stable peacekeeping environment, leaders had to eliminate the peacekeeping mindset and reinstill the warrior ethos back into soldiers. Presence patrols, WSSI, and SFOR peacekeeping Rules of Engagement (ROE) were things of the past - proficiency in maneuver METL tasks, MOS skills and fieldcraft had to be reacquired.

Re-NET for M1A2 and NET for M2-ODS were key components of the BCT's individual training because of the unit's unfamiliarity with the new pieces of equipment. Senior leaders felt that the re-NET for the M1A2 was essential because the BCT lacked institutional knowledge on the new tank. Gunneries conducted after the Re-NET/NET helped the battalions to pull together as a team. Many junior NCOs who had previously received the NET felt that the time allotted for Re-NET would have been more wisely spent if they were allowed to conduct their own crew training.

Leaders at all levels agreed that the re-NET training could have been better executed. The training Program of Instruction (POI) was aggressive but the execution and standards varied considerably between instructors. BCT leaders also felt that the training needed to be more responsive to the unit's needs, one that related with the unit's training plan. One company commander recommended that the training be more focused on troubleshooting faults while one tank commander (TC) felt that the Re-NET should have focused on crew specific tasks as opposed to everything. Because of concurrent red cycle taskings, only TCs and gunners attended the training. They were then required to conduct chain teaching with other crewmembers. This was not the most effective method for conducting Re-NET for tank crews and NET for BFV crews.

Training distracters presented challenges for the BDE to overcome. Nevertheless, division and the BCT did its best to deal with the impact of these challenges.

The BCT sought to make itself more self-supporting to make up for the shortage of resources available at the installation to prepare three BCTs for rotations at the NTC. Because of shortage of available personnel to serve as O/Cs and OPFOR, the BCT rotated its battalions through periods of support as sister battalions conducted training. During its time as the support unit, the battalion provided OPFOR and O/Cs for the other two battalions in the BCT. Normally, the support unit designated a subordinate unit that needed additional training (retraining) to serve as OPFOR. The support battalion was primarily responsible for providing the BCT's other support manpower requirements.

The BCT's inability to obtain relief from a month of Corps Support Cycle compressed the timeline available for training. To further minimize the impact of reduced training time, the BCT maximized its use of multi-echelon training techniques. FM 25-101, Training the Force, defines multiechelon training as the simultaneous training of more than one echelon on different tasks. As an example, while platoons deployed to the field for their STX training, the battalion headquarters also deployed for training in the MDMP. Every mission had some type of battalion mission involvement, mainly in the form of battalion mission analysis. Similarly, all combat trains simultaneously deployed to support units in the field. Meanwhile, the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) set up in a field site to support each battalion training event.

The brigade commander noted that multi-echelon training had some negative aspects. Commanders and staffs were new and relatively inexperienced and prone to mistakes in the wake of post-deployment personnel changes. Although new commanders and staffs learned during these training events, they often caused friction with other elements as they committed numerous mistakes during the learning process. Commanders must be careful to ensure that the friction does not hurt the intended subjects of the training.

As the training progressed, BCT leaders realized that they had overestimated their training proficiency in many tasks. Although junior leaders should have been proficient in troop-leading procedures (TLPs) after conducting almost daily presence patrols and WSSIs in Bosnia, those missions had become routine in a stable, peacekeeping environment. They were also conducted without tanks/BFVs. As a result, proficiency in TLP required for armor/mechanized infantry operations was at lower levels than anticipated. Leaders at all levels needed to be sensitive to changing requirements for training and had to be flexible in altering the training plan. Although time was not available for major changes, leaders must affect changes when and where possible, often by on-the-spot mentoring.

The compressed training timeline forced leaders to execute training rather than to manage it. According to FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training, the training management cycle requires planning, execution, and assessment after the METL is developed. To maximize time available to execute training, units often minimized the amount of time spent on planning and assessment. This allowed more training time for units but made the training less efficient. Though commanders must decide what should be the optimal balance of time allotted for planning/execution/assessment, they must also ensure that junior leaders learn proper training management. If this cannot be done during the reintegration training, it should be included in the unit's Officer Professional Development (OPD) program and Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP) following the reintegration training period.

The division planned to use a TADSS strategy in conjunction with training "gates" to enhance training effectiveness and efficiency. TADSS would help the various crews/platoons/company teams/battalion task forces/BCT/division train up for their respective gates (see Figure 4). The BCT used AGTS/COFT to certify TCs/Bradley Commanders (BCs) for gunnery.

In the execution phase, the BCT found itself under-resourced in personnel and time to conduct the training properly. As noted previously, training distracters, such as red-cycle taskings, prevented the right TCs/BCs and gunners and TC/BC-gunner teams from achieving optimum training using the AGTS/COFT.

The BCT also had to retrain its battalion and brigade battle staffs. The unit planned to use the Battle Staff Training System (BSTS) to train and certify staff members on core and position specific tasks. The BSTS is a paper-based and computer-based interactive multimedia instruction training system with training support packages for the commanders and individual staff officers of the armored and mechanized infantry at battalion and brigade levels. The training support packages use multimedia lessons consisting of text and interactive multimedia instruction (IMI) to train individual staff members on tasks required for the various staff functions at battalion and brigade. The battalion and brigade staffs lacked the available time to fully implement this program. Some leaders believed that some of the information contained in the training system was outdated.

As part of its trainup process for the NTC, the BCT attended the center's Leader Training Program (LTP). The LTP provides an enhanced training opportunity for brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs, and maneuver company commanders to prepare for combat. The program concentrates on warfighter focus, team building, battle command, SOP development, and developing TTPs. The brigade commander felt, in hindsight, that this was an extremely worthwhile program for commanders and their staffs that should have been scheduled earlier in the reintegration training period. It would have provided an O/C training package earlier for commanders and their staffs to make improvements. Lack of funds and concurrent gunnery training limited the participation of company commanders.

The overarching lessons learned are that training time allotted for the unit's return to readiness must be fenced and protected and training must be conducted to standard and not to time.

__________

Endnote:

1. SFOR Procedural Guide, Book 6 - Mission Execution, p. 6-2-46 to p. 6-2-47, Camber Corporation.