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The Brigade Combat Team deployed to Bosnia with many of its normal attachments, including its direct-support Field Artillery battalion. While deployed, the battalion conducted various peacekeeping functions, including presence patrols, base security and weapons storage site inspections. The tasks that the individual artillery soldiers performed were MOS immaterial. There was very little time and even fewer assets to allow for any kind of Field Artillery-specific training. Upon returning to home station, the soldiers of the battalion faced the daunting task of retraining themselves. Additionally, the battalion had to be prepared to go to the National Training Center (NTC) in March and, more importantly, assume the mission of Division Ready Brigade (DRB) immediately following its NTC rotation.

Challenges

The field artillery battalion encountered numerous challenges in planning and executing its reintegration-training plan.

• Pre-Reintegration Training Level. During its deployment, the battalion had very little time to conduct Field Artillery-specific training. Battalion soldiers performed base security, weapons storage site inspection, mine clearing, and convoy escort duties. There were three AFCS Trainers available in theater, one with each of the three firing batteries. Only one of the devices actually worked the entire time while one never functioned. Furthermore, even if the equipment had been available for training, the unit had very little time to actually conduct any type of planned training based on the continuous demands of peacekeeping operations. The METL tasks and subtasks in which the battalion lost proficiency included:
  • Synchronizing fire support.
  • Moving, Surviving, Delivering fires and Acquiring targets.
  • Conducting digital operations.

• Timeline. The most restrictive factor facing the battalion was the relatively short timeline. Its leaders had basically seven months to train an entire battalion from the a low training level to USR C1. Under normal circumstances, based on the leadership's estimates, this task would have taken about a year to accomplish.

• Block Leave. Upon the battalion's redeployment from Bosnia, its soldiers were afforded the opportunity to take leave. There was no collective training planned during that period.

• Taskings. During the training period, the battalion was tasked with a Corps Red Cycle (Installation Support) and a DIVARTY Red Cycle. Corps Red was particularly intense and for all practical purposes stopped training completely. DIVARTY Red Cycle was not as intense but still removed many soldiers from the training in which they needed to participate.

• Changes of Command. During the training period, the battalion participated in numerous changes in command, which distracted from the training time. Specifically, these were division, brigade, DIVARTY, and battalion changes of command. This requirement disrupted the training environment not only because of the support required for the actual ceremony, but also because new commanders had differing focuses and philosophies of training and leadership.

• Workday time. The installation had very restrictive times for training. The post had specific requirements for training and any deviations from these required chain-of-command approval. Training on weekends was strictly forbidden. These constraints, coupled with a six-month separation from families, created a serious problem as soldiers fought to balance between quality of life and quality of training.

• New soldiers. During the trainup for the Bosnia rotation and during the rotation itself, the battalion received 167 new soldiers. Many, if not most, of these came directly from their Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and had no experience in a howitzer section at all. Once they joined the battalion, they did not have the opportunity to gain any experience for almost a year because of the deployment. As a result, their skill level was very low once they began training with their sections.

The Plan

Faced with the challenges discussed earlier, the battalion formulated a plan for reintegration training that incorporated existing gunnery tables.

• Paladin Gunnery Tables. The field artillery battalion employed the Paladin Gunnery Tables that had been previously developed by DIVARTY as the basis for the training plan . These 20 tables began at the most basic individual skills and increased in complexity and scope to include battalion-level collective tasks. Most of the leadership within the battalion agreed that the gunnery tables were adequate for the purpose of retraining the battalion to USR C-1 readiness levels.

  The battalion employed a pyramid certification plan in which the Battalion Commanders and Command Sergeant Major certified the Battalion Master Gunner. The Master Gunner, as the executive agent for the battalion command team, certified all platoon sergeants as evaluators for unit evaluations. Using three trained evaluators, the battalion command team then certified all gunners and section chiefs through a battalion certification program.

• Certification and Qualification. The battalion senior leadership certified all of its leaders through a series of safety tests and gunners' test. To be allowed to perform a specific role, that person had to be certified in that role by the battalion leadership. In some cases, that required pulling section chiefs from one gun to perform as chief on another gun to allow that gun to participate in the next phase of training.

• Four-day Recovery Plan. The battalion utilized a four-day personnel and equipment recovery plan which the unit normally exercised immediately upon returning from a field exercise. The battalion was usually able to set aside four days for recovery, but, on occasion, compressed the phase into three days to participate in mandatory combined arms training with the BCT as it trained up for the NTC.

Execution

In executing the plan, the unit found itself short on available training time. In balancing the training time available against training and operational requirements, it relied on all leaders to properly conduct recertification training.

• Lack of Time for Retraining. The battalion was able to execute all phases of the training plan despite lacking sufficient time to conduct an in-depth retraining phase. The leadership at all levels agreed that time for retraining and recertification must be programmed. The schedule was so tight between events that often step eight in the training process was conducted in conjunction with other training, e.g., battery dry-fire training during TF EXEVALS. Along with tasks required by the tactical plan, other training deficiencies were addressed by battery-level teams. If a section failed, the battalion master gunner worked with the battalion and evaluated the sections (under CSM scrutiny) until they met standard.

• Lack of Time for Cross-Training. Another side effect of this "whirlwind" training environment was the inability to cross-train soldiers within sections.

• Relaxed Time Standards. There were some cases in which the MTEP time standards were not fully enforced as long as all of the other required tasks were completed successfully. In other words, if a section failed to certify only because of its failure to meet the MTEP required times, the battalion considered them certified. At no time was this relaxing of the standards allowed to compromise safety. The battalion commander, in concert with the DIVARTY commander, made the decision to do this based on the belief that gunnery times would improve with repetition as long as procedures were performed properly. All sections in the battalion achieved safe certification within the time standards one year after the unit returned from Bosnia.

Results

The battalion successfully prepared for its NTC rotation and later assumption of DRB designation. It could have been more prepared if the battalion had not had to compress its reintegration training timeline. The compressed timeline forced the unit to eliminate planned retraining. This resulted in many sections working many long hours to meet the standards.

Interestingly, the battalion's leadership did not cite any family hardship problems during this intense training period. Although the battalion had just returned from a six-month deployment and rolled straight into a very demanding training schedule (in which the soldiers spent an inordinate amount of time in the field) followed immediately by an NTC rotation and then DRB assumption, the leadership did not cite morale as a problem. In fact, most of them said that soldier morale was very high. There was no evidence of increased instances of domestic violence, drug or alcohol abuse, or absence without leave.