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Personnel challenges contributed to the task of planning and executing reintegration training after redeployment from Bosnia. Heavy turnover of personnel, especially in key leadership positions, drained units of much-needed experience during the trainup process.

At the leader level, personnel turnover had the negative impact of taking away a large portion of the unit's experienced trainers. Unit leaders, after all, have the primary responsibility for effective training. FM 25-101 states that NCOs have the primary responsibility for training the individual soldier, sections, squads, teams and crews while officers have the primary responsibility for collective training. With such heavy reliance on unit leaders for effective training, personnel turbulence presented a huge challenge in planning and executing reintegration training after redeployment. New leaders faced not only the task of being trainers, but also had to learn their new duty positions.

At the soldier level, personnel lost during the reintegration training period took with them their training experience since redeployment. Units had to repeat training on individual, squad, team, crew, and collective tasks for replacement soldiers that reported to the unit during the reintegration training period. Although personnel turnover is a fact of life in the military, wholesale turnover of soldiers during reintegration training taxes the unit's ability to properly integrate new replacements.

Frequently, new replacements did not bring with them the same wealth of experience as the soldiers they replaced. Within the installation, the BCT competed with other units for replacement soldiers. Although the BCT had high priority for replacements since it was to assume the FORSCOM Division Ready Brigade (DRB) at the conclusion of its reintegration training, another unit preparing for deployment to Kuwait received even higher priority. As a result, the BCT was short of some personnel in low-density Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Shortages in motor sergeants had an adverse impact on vehicle and equipment readiness for training, while shortages in Personnel Administration Center NCOs increased incidents of finance and personnel problems, which distracted soldiers from training.

The reintegration training period was filled with great amounts of stress for the soldiers and their families. Most personnel in the unit had already gone through four months of trainup for Bosnia, and six months of deployment. After two weeks of block leave, they conducted another nine months of hard training for an NTC rotation followed by DRB assumption three months later. The unit was challenged to keep morale of unit soldiers and their families up through various morale-building programs. An indicator of the success of these programs may be found in the unit's ability to meet its re-enlistment goals. Although retention goals were met, it was only through extraordinary efforts from re-enlistment NCOs and other unit leaders, especially CSMs, that made this possible.

Key Leader Turbulence

The BCT experienced turbulence in key leaders especially at the mid and senior NCOs and officers. The unit lost many E6s/E7s during the reintegration training period as a result of reassignments. Priority of reassignments gave units no latitude to delay the loss of these NCOs, a key link in training junior enlisted soldiers and officers. Officer and NCO position changes created ripple effects on the unit as well. At the end of a four-month trainup and a six-month deployment, the majority of BCT officers and some NCOs rotated to other assignments for the purpose of professional development. Changes at the top required changes at the bottom, as junior leaders moved up to fill vacated leadership positions. Up to half of the tank commanders (TCs) in most tank companies were new. Leaders at all levels experienced steep learning curves.

Rapid Loss of Personnel at the end of the Personnel Stabilization Period

The end of the personnel stabilization period during reintegration training period also challenged leaders. The Army afforded unit personnel one month of stabilization for each month deployed. After a six-month deployment, many soldiers became eligible for PCS during the reintegration training period. With block leave after redeployment, and permissive TDY and leave periods in conjunction with PCS, the BCT could count on these soldiers to be available for four to five months during the reintegration period. As a result of the stabilization policy, units experienced large personnel turnover during a very short period of time during the peak of reintegration training. One battalion lost 38 soldiers in one month. This wholesale loss of experienced personnel meant that units had to build new teams and train large numbers of new soldiers and leaders during the reintegration training process. Since the BDE only recently fielded the M1A2 Abrams tank, many replacement personnel were not previously qualified to operate the new tank and needed to receive New Equipment Training (NET). However, the tight training timeline forced the unit to provide some replacement personnel with on-the-job training (OJT) only.

Shortage in Low Density MOSs

The BCT did not have top priority for replacement personnel during reintegration training period. It competed against other units on the installation that were preparing for other contingencies, such as rotations to Kuwait. Although the BCT never went below USR personnel readiness of standards, the replacement personnel generally did not have the same experience level as those lost to reassignment. There were also shortages in low density MOSs. These included Battalion Motor Sergeants, Personnel Administration Center (PAC) NCOs, 31U30, 54B20, 92Y20, 11M40, 19K40, and 13B40.

Meeting the Challenges

To overcome these challenges, senior BCT leadership realized that they must develop their own junior leaders. The BCT did not have top priority in filling low density MOSs, such as senior NCO positions (mainly E-7s) because of competing installation priorities. More junior leaders had to assume positions of greater responsibility. E-4s and E-5s often provided continuity for units after the departure of more senior leaders. They provided the bridge for simple, but important, aspects of training such as the installation procedures for conducting gunneries. Units quickly sent E-4s with leadership potential to PLDC to fill NCO vacancies. This effectively filled some of the unit's leadership vacancies. However, the costs of placing junior NCOs in more senior leadership positions included an extremely steep learning curve in their development, inadequate experience for them to make consistently sound decisions, and inadequate counseling and mentoring of their soldiers.

The large influx of new personnel also created an urgent requirement to qualify new crews. Command Sergeants Major worked with other units on the installation to plug in crews for gunnery. As the unit formed new tank and BFV crews, they were sent out to qualify as quickly as possible.

Morale Programs for the Health and Welfare of Soldiers and their Families

Leaders employed several morale programs to set the conditions for success for reintegration training. Programs were designed to promote the health and welfare of soldiers and their families by balancing family and unit reintegration training. Some of these programs were implemented during deployment in Bosnia such as a chaplain reunion briefing for all soldiers, early redeployment of soldiers with family problems, and providing telephone calling cards to soldiers with family problems. After redeployment to garrison, a five-day depressurization period was scheduled followed by two weeks of block leave, then company picnics, and finally a reintegration ball. Units also minimized weekend training while providing compensation time when it was unavoidable.

The base camp chaplains conducted Redeployment Reunion Briefs for all soldiers, married and single, before redeployment. The briefs focused on preparing soldiers mentally and emotionally for reunion with spouses, children, and other loved ones.

Also while deployed, some unit leaders issued calling cards to soldiers with family problems back home. These calling cards were donated by veterans organizations for the benefit of deployed soldiers. This allowed soldiers to discuss family problems with loved ones without running up high long distance phone bills.

Upon redeployment, the BCT scheduled a five-day soldier recovery period (see Figure 1 for list of daily activities). The recovery period allowed leaders adequate time to recover personnel and equipment properly, and fix personnel and finance issues. Leadership also viewed the five days as a depressurization period for the soldiers, allowing married soldiers to slowly re-enter family activities. Daily accountability formations prevented soldiers from excessive celebration and gave them time to adjust to their garrison environment. Leaders believed that the recovery period was essential in reducing the incidence of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol and spousal abuse. Some junior NCOs interviewed stated that they did not know the reason for what they felt was an excessively long recovery period.

After the soldier recovery period, two weeks of block leave were scheduled. This period afforded soldiers the opportunity to use leave accrued while in Bosnia and to spend quality time with their families. The distinct advantage was that leaves taken during the block leave period do not interfere with unit training. However, from many soldiers' perspectives, the block leave came at an inopportune time since children were not yet out of school. As a result, families were often not able to get away from the local area.

Attempting to integrate families into the bonds formed by the soldiers during the Bosnia deployment, many units organized unit picnics and balls. Picnics were normally held at the company level and included spouses and children. Some battalions held balls to provide soldiers and their spouses/guests a more formal occasion to celebrate their reunion.

To balance family and training time, the division's policy of no training on weekends was followed. This was a quality of life and predictability issue for soldiers. The BCT scheduled only one weekend training event for company team lanes. Although this turned 189 training days into approximately 230 calendar days, this slower, more deliberate training pace was essential for the long-term morale and welfare of the unit.

The training pace was rigorous nevertheless. So rigorous, in fact, that many soldiers and leaders indicated that they did not have time to participate in installation sports activities. While in garrison, many units use these sporting events, such as football and softball, to build unit esprit de corps.

Re-enlistment: Making Mission

Retention is often a good indicator of how well soldiers feel the Army and their units treat them. Judging by the success in meeting its retention goals, soldiers felt that the BCT had adequately taken care of their needs. Brigade and battalion CSMs, however, indicated that making mission was no easy task, especially after the six-month deployment to Bosnia.

During the last month of each quarter, the CSMs became re-enlistment NCOs. They interviewed each re-enlistment-eligible soldier to identify his desires and then called Department of the Army to work out future assignments. This is an extremely time-consuming process, especially given what the CSMs noticed as higher assigned unit retention goals than in recent past. The CSMs also noted that in the past soldiers desired to re-enlist to stay on the installation. However, at present, more soldiers desired to re-enlist for other duty locations.

Other Considerations

With the numerous rotation of units into the Balkans and other peacekeeping contingencies, some soldiers found themselves permanently changing station from a unit that recently redeployed from one peacekeeping operation into another unit that is slated for deployment. The small size of the Army and the number of contingency operations may make this unavoidable. Nevertheless, unit leaders must be sensitive to this situation and how it can adversely affect retention and the long-term welfare of the Army.

The BCT identified soldiers that had recently returned from deployments to Bosnia and Kuwait and worked diligently to exclude them from the deployment. During an interview with about 100 leaders from the platoon level, one soldier indicated that he had permanently changed station from a unit deployed to Bosnia to Ft. Hood, TX, where he deployed to Bosnia again. Of course, any policy of restricting back-to-back deployments must be weighed against the unit's mission requirements, but it is a point that leaders must consider.