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In April 1998, the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) was selected as the force provider for Stabilization Force (SFOR) rotations 4 (September 1998 to March 1999) and 5 (March 1999 to September 1999). While the division headquarters and various support elements would support both rotations, two of the division's three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) would provide the bulk of forces for each six-month rotation. By March 1999, the first BCT from the division had completed its rotation and redeployed to Fort Hood, TX. The division created a reintegration training model to retrain both BCTs (the second having relieved the first in Bosnia) to fight and win in a Mid-Intensity Conflict (MIC) after peacekeeping operations. The division used the Unit Status Report (USR) C1 rating and readiness to assume the Forces Command (FORSCOM) Division Ready Brigade (DRB) as the standards to gauge the success of the training model and BCT's warfighting readiness. To help establish a doctrinal basis for future units that will have to conduct similar retraining, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to assist in collecting lessons learned from the training model.

Purpose

This study shares 1CD's lessons and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) on return to readiness with the U.S. Army. Central to this is an evaluation of the reintegration training model developed by the division. The study will also update some of the information contained in the CALL Special Study, The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness. The findings may support TRADOC doctrine writers with much needed data on developing the basis for future reintegration training after peacekeeping operations.

Methodology

Two combat arms officers from CALL conducted a series of interviews with key leaders and staff from the first BCT that completed reintegration training which included the Aviation Brigade. The interviews were conducted at the completion of the reintegration training process with separate interviews at brigade/battalion, company, and platoon levels. Leaders at all levels were eager to share their challenges and provide their professional comments on what worked and what did not work. CALL also used archive material, such as Quarterly Training Briefs, Command Briefs, and SOPs as sources of data. CALL also reviewed the Stabilization Force Procedural Guide, written by the Camber Corporation as a result of its contract with III Corps to create a "how-to" guide for future units supporting Bosnia peacekeeping operations. This document is available in the CALL restricted database to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel.

CALL developed a collection strategy during an initial visit in November 1999 after a series of interviews with key division and brigade (BDE, Division Support Command (DISCOM), and Aviation Brigade) trainers. During this visit, CALL determined that, for the most part, combat support and combat service support units had practiced most of the items from their mission-essential task list (METL) while deployed in Bosnia. The skills of combat and the combat engineer units in executing their METL tasks diminished since they were not trained in Bosnia.

As a result, CALL's collection efforts focused on the following areas:

• Maneuver training lessons.
• Aviation training lessons.
• Field Artillery training lessons.
• Maintenance lessons.
• Personnel lessons.

In assessing each of the focus areas, this study provides background information, and then discusses the plan, the challenges, the execution, the results and the lessons. It is important to note that CALL did not focus on engineer, intelligence, or signal areas during this collection effort.

Reintegration Training Model

The division developed a training strategy, which involved actions before, during and after deployment, to sustain its High Intensity Conflict (HIC) proficiency as high as possible throughout the operation (see Figure 1). Without this training strategy, the division expected the BDEs' warfighting METL proficiency to diminish during the course of the pre-deployment trainup and the actual deployment.

The most pressing requirement during pre-deployment was conducting gunnery exercises. Otherwise, the unit was consumed with preparation tasks for the Bosnia deployment. Likewise, METL training opportunities, while deployed, competed with an abundance of peacekeeping tasks. Most sustainment training focused on individual soldier skills such as physical training, and marksmanship.

In post-deployment actions, the division adopted a phased approach similar to the one described in the CALL Special Study, Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness. The CALL report described the seven phases of return to readiness, along with time requirements and common issues for each phase (see Table 1). Since the majority of 1CD's equipment did not deploy to Bosnia, the unit integrated the "Transportation of Equipment" phase of return to readiness with its "Recovery" phase (see Figure 2).

The division's training model timeline allotted 189 training days to the BCT (see Figure 3). For a more detailed breakdown of the days planned for each event, see Appendix A. It used a series of "gates" to validate training at each level with the ultimate objective of being combat ready to assume the FORSCOM DRB. The 189 days allotted for the post mobilization training should be considered as the bare-bones approach. If your unit expects many training distracters, more time should be allocated. The following were the echelons and their respective "gates:"

• Crew - gunnery table VIII.
• Platoon - gunnery table XII.
• Company team - linked lanes.
• Battalion TF/BCT - battalion external evaluation (EXEVAL) and fire control exercise (FCX), followed by a National Training Center (NTC) rotation.
• Division - Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Exercise.

The training model conformed to the principles of training discussed in FM 25-100 (See Figure 4). Although the principle of "Train to Sustain Proficiency" was not listed in the figure, the division's step-by-step approach to training (from individual to progressively higher collective tasks) would allow units to practice lower-level tasks during higher-level training events.

A large number of personnel departed immediately following return to home station. This huge turnover of personnel compounded the problem of training as complete staff systems were recreated. Staff and leader proficiency was far below what normally exists at a regular unit as it begins its ramp-up for a rotation at NTC.

To successfully execute the reintegration training model, the BCT integrated the eight-step training model into each training event. The eight steps, specified in the Corps and Division Commanders' Training Guidance, are: