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When the BCT deployed to Bosnia, it did so without most of its organic equipment because the BCT assumed responsibility for the various pieces of equipment already in-country (M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley) as part of the process of transfer of authority. To ensure that unit stay-behind vehicles remained in fighting shape, the division signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the installation Directorate of Logistics (DOL) for an Operational Maintenance and Storage Plan (see Appendix B). The MOU covered maintenance actions such as weekly maintenance, equipment exercise, annual services, physical security, and storage and processing. The year-long contract, which covered the deployment of two BCTs, cost the division over $2 million. Although the equipment was maintained during the deployment, it was not fired or maneuvered in a field environment.

After redeployment, repair parts flow was slow in keeping up with demand. During the BCT's deployment, the division's Main Support Battalion (MSB) assumed direct support (DS) for stay-behind equipment. When the BCT returned from Bosnia, its Forward Support Battalion (FSB) was slow in reintegrating back into its DS role on the installation.

During the reintegration training period, training distractions (month-long corps red cycle, O/C and OPFOR support for other BCTs) diminished time available for training. Among other things, this came at the expense of shortened equipment recovery periods. Although unit equipment operators and maintenance personnel worked extremely hard to maintain equipment readiness rates, less time for maintenance corresponded to lower standards and lower quality services.

Maintenance Plan for Stay-Behind Equipment

Most of the BCT's equipment did not deploy to Bosnia with the unit. The division contracted the installation's DOL to provide critical and periodic maintenance activities, and specific systems checks. Although the division overall was satisfied with the work performed by DOL, maintenance leaders (Bn XOs and BMOs) felt that room existed for improvement.

• Greater oversight of maintenance contract. Bn XOs and BMOs interviewed noted that various stay-behind equipment had delinquent services and that some maintenance actions performed were inadequate. Memorandums were published that defined responsibilities of the various parties involved in stay-behind unit maintenance (see Appendix C for one BCT's MOI on Stay-Behind Equipment Maintenance). The MOI stipulated the duties of the division G4, the division Inspector General (IG), DOL, the Bde Maintenance OIC/NCOIC, the BCT, the Direct Support Unit (DSU), and Division Materiel Management Center (DMMC). When fully enforced, the MOI could have ensured greater oversight of contracted maintenance.

• Changes required for future maintenance contracts. Maintenance leaders felt that the contract should have stipulated that unit services be spread out more evenly. Without this stipulation in the contract, DOL often performed all required services for a given battalion at the same time. This meant that future annual services would all become due at the same time, instead of phased as they should be.

The maneuver battalions relied almost completely on DOL for maintenance on their stay-behind equipment. Each left a very small rear detachment to support maintenance requirements in garrison. The battalions took the majority of their maintenance personnel to Bosnia to maintain the equipment in theater. This equipment included wheeled vehicles, such as High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 2-1/2-ton trucks and 5-ton trucks, as well as Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and Abrams tanks.

The DS artillery battalion maintained a more robust rear detachment, especially in maintenance personnel. Since the artillerymen performed mainly a force protection mission, using wheeled vehicles and on foot, the artillery battalion left its tracked vehicle mechanics in garrison to maintain its fleet of M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers. This enabled the battalion to maintain its prime combat equipment in top condition.

The division's maintenance strategy also included enhanced services on several types of equipment including the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMMT). The BCT's deployment afforded DOL an opportunity to work on these pieces of equipment as part of the installation's rebuild program without adversely affecting readiness posture.

Finally, the BCT requested and received permission to freeze its Authorized Stockage List (ASL), and Prescribed Load List (PLL) of maintenance parts during the deployment in Bosnia. According to Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 710-2-1, Using Unit Supply System, both the ASL and PLL must be demand-supported to keep these repair parts in stock. With its equipment remaining in garrison, the unit could not correctly reflect demand. Similarly, unit maintenance leaders also suggested that units request and receive permission to freeze PLL during NTC rotations in which a unit does not use its own equipment. This also skews demand support of PLL.

Speeding Up Repair Parts Flow after Redeployment

The FSB deployed with the BCT to Bosnia to provide DS logistics. While the BCT was deployed, the MSB assumed the responsibility for all DS work order transactions and class IX requisitions for stay-behind equipment.

Upon redeployment, the FSB experienced problems in reintegrating back to providing DS for the entire BCT. Unit-Level Logistics System (ULLS) operators at all levels had to learn or re-learn installation procedures.

Because of the importance of having the supply and maintenance systems up and running immediately upon the return of the BCT, the FSB ensured that its advance party set up the conditions for success. The FSB also needed to have a ramp-up and recovery period.

Costs of Shortened Equipment Maintenance Periods

The BCT devised a sound training model for organizational maintenance that encompassed the eight-step training model and lane training. The maintenance lane training was designed to increase individual and collective task proficiency. The following six lanes were trained, each one reaching across various levels of maintenance:

The cornerstone of the training program was leader certification. At the 10 level, this included training and certification of company commanders, executive officers, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, supervisors, and operators. At the 20 level, the program sought to train and certify battalion motor officer (BMO), battalion motor technician (BMT), battalion motor sergeant (BMS), team chiefs, and mechanics/PLL clerks.

Unfortunately, training distractions compressed the training timeline and precluded the maintenance lane training. Many of the maintenance headaches encountered could have been avoided with the execution of the lane training. Supervisors, operators, and mechanics inexperienced in maintenance procedures for the M1A2 could have been certified during the maintenance lanes prior to operating and maintaining the tank.

Shortened recovery periods between training events contributed to bad maintenance habits and high rates of controlled substitution. The short time periods allotted to repair broken equipment because of high OPTEMPO exacerbated a slow repair parts flow problem, and small PLL stock. Most units found themselves conducting controlled substitutions on a daily basis to keep up with equipment readiness requirements. This rewarded poor maintenance habits as maintainers, operators, and supervisors abandoned standard maintenance management techniques in favor of quick fixes. Although controlled substitution is a valid technique for repairing broken equipment with parts from another deadlined vehicle, the urgency of repairing equipment can easily lead maintainers into taking multiple parts from one deadlined piece of equipment to fix others.

Similarly, reduced time allotted to maintenance also lowered standards and reduced the quality of services. Most of the maintenance leaders interviewed admitted that unit maintainers lowered standards to meet training requirements, although not below the minimum acceptable standards. Operating at minimum standards increases the risk that a catastrophic incident may occur.