Military

This section presents a detailed analysis of the flight operations that took place within the Afghanistan Combined Operations Area (COA), as related to the events that occurred at the Tarnak Farm Range near the KAF, in Afghanistan, on 17April 2002.  The analysis will deal mainly with the activities of the key Coalition aircraft involved in the incident, and will touch briefly on mission preparation issues, rules, regulations, and special instructions that existed at the time.  Content of this section is based upon evidence collected by the Board, testimonies received under oath, exhibits submitted, and information supplied by the CIB according to formal protocol.

Aircraft and Units Involved

Based on the material reviewed, the events that took place in the airspace above the KAF including the Tarnak Farm Range involved the following significant Coalition members (of the call signs shown below) on the air side:

Callsign	Unit Type	Details
Coffee 51 Coffee 52 [Collectively called Coffee 51 Flight]	F-16 Fighter Aircraft	Each armed with four GBU-12 Laser-LGBs
	E-3B/C AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control platform; controlling authority for Coffee 51 Flight
	KC-135 Tanker	Awaiting Coffee 51 Flight in a pre-designated area to conduct air-air refuelling (AAR)
	Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) located at	Central controlling authority for all airspace in the region; under command of the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC)

Although other airborne assets were present in the vicinity, none of them were involved in the events that took place at Tarnak Farm.

Coffee 51 Flight was under the tactical control of            prior to, during and after the events that took place in the Tarnak Farm area.  This E3-B/C AWACS platform was on-station approximately      nautical miles (nm) east-southeast of the KAF.  The tanker controller, responsible for the coordination between fighter aircraft and air-to-air refueling (AAR) assets, was aboard this aircraft and was in direct communications with Coffee 51 Flight.

Pre-Incident Mission Details

                     , 17 April 2002, Coffee 51 Flight took off from                                                    tasked to conduct an on-call interdiction mission in the northeastern section of Afghanistan.  In this role, Coffee 51 Flight was to transit to the assigned area, loiter for      hrs, and then return to its home base.  A KC-135 tanker aircraft call sign                  was assigned to support this mission with pre- and post-strike AAR.   The refueling was to take place in an area located approximately      nm southwest of the Tarnak Farm / KAF area. 

Evidence and mission logs confirm that Coffee 51, after its pre-strike AAR, proceeded deep into Eastern Afghanistan to an area approximately        northeast of Kandahar.  At 21:16Z, Coffee 51 Flight was returning from their tasked area of operations and was approximately 32 nm east-northeast of the Kandahar area.  The formation was at approximately                                proceeding in a southwesterly direction.  At that point, Coffee 51 Flight was preparing to rendezvous with its fueling aircraft,            , then located approximately        from their position.   By that time, the two F-16s had been airborne for approximately                      

In preparation for the planned AAR, the formation switched from a tactical Strike Control frequency to an administrative Tanker Control frequency, primarily used for traffic and air-to-air refueling coordination.  This is significant because it marks a transition from the combat phase to the transit phase of the mission, both physically in terms of communications used, and psychologically in terms of the pilots' expectation of the nature of activity they would be facing.  From that point onwards, all significant action that was captured by various on-board recording devices occurred on two frequencies;                      frequency used for administrative Tanker Control activities, and                      frequency used by the two F-16 aircraft for cockpit to cockpit communications that was not monitored by anyone else involved.

Kandahar Area Events

To better describe the air events that took place around the Kandahar area, a detailed diagram of the F-16 flight paths has been created based on          radar returns and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  of both F-16's involved.  This reconstruction can be found at Annex H and will aid in interpretation of the following events.  In addition, Annex I contains the transcript of all the radio communications made by the stations involved taken from the audio portions of the above tapes. 

At 21:20Z, the        radar picture shows Coffee 51 Flight roughly      nm to the southeast of the KAF.  At around 21:21Z, based on the testimony of Major          , Coffee 51 Flight made an unrecorded radio call to            stating that they had observed some form of ground fire.  The aircraft commander of            , listening on the same frequency, stated in his personal written account that Coffee 51 Flight had reported that they saw tracer fire, and that they asked if they should turn back and mark the position.  As confirmed by                  account and by the testimony of the AWACS Mission Crew Commander's (MCC) in charge of the mission aboard                  , the marking of the position was acknowledged and duly authorized.  This meant that                   had received the initial report of a visual contact of interest, and that they had cleared Coffee 51 Flight to alter its course to more precisely identify the position of interest on the ground.  According to            , during that same time period, Coffee 51 also informed            that they had ordnance available to drop.  The exact wording of that statement is unknown.

By 21:22:38Z, the time at which the recording equipment was turned on in both F-16's, the two aircraft had already turned toward the north and evasively split themselves approximately four to five nm apart.  Coffee 51 (the lead aircraft in the F-16 formation) established himself in a                                                                                                                                                                                                          Of note, there was little ambient or artificial light in the surrounding area.  The moon had already set, creating a very dark night environment.  The sky was clear with excellent visibility in all directions and very little ambient moisture was present.  Consequently, the tracer fire originating from Tarnak Farm was visible to Coffee 51 Flight at the altitude they were transiting the area (Testimony, CIB interview with Master Sergeant            , Vol 12, Tab 36).

At that same time, Coffee 52 (the wingman aircraft in the F-16 formation), having received implied authorization from            to deviate from the original track, was in the process of visually marking the target                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Once the target designation was complete, Coffee 52 initially began to establish himself in a            pattern similar to Coffee 51.

During the next four minutes, Coffee 51 remained in a shallow right hand turn at an average speed of        Knots Indicated Airspeed (KIAS) and an average altitude of                  No extraordinary maneuvers or any type of evasion were performed.  Throughout the entire engagement, the lead pilot remained busy discussing the situation with his wingman and trying, with the use of his targeting                      pod, to identify a location on the ground that matched what his wingman was describing.  During that four-minute period, Coffee 51 basically flew a single arcing orbit around the Tarnak Farm range area, at an average range of            nautical miles from the point on the ground where the soldiers were firing on the Tank Stalk range.

Coffee 52s flight path over same time interval is irregular, flown at a slower average speed and a lower average altitude than his lead.  Like Coffee 51, Coffee 52 did not maneuver his aircraft in an aggressive fashion (that would reflect defensive threat reactions) at any time during the subsequent three minutes.  Judging by the flight inputs, the work being done with the targeting pod, and the radio calls made, it seems apparent that Coffee 52 spent considerable time focusing his attention outside the cockpit at the observed ground fire below (which was in fact the planned night live fire exercise).

A few seconds after his transmission at 21:25:04Z, Coffee 52 initiated a sharp right-hand turn                                           His starting speed was            , with an altitude of                                                                        with the bomb release occurring at the very limit of the release envelope.  The lowest altitude he reached during this process was                                as measured by Coffee 52's                      The recovery was to level flight, with no clear attempt to gain additional altitude.

For the 45 seconds following the explosion of the bomb, Coffee 52 arced around the point of impact in a shallow right hand turn with his                      to the target area.  During this time he was in a slow climb, which placed him just above                      by the time the "Scram South!" directive call was passed by                  .  Prior to this transmission, no real attempt was made by either of the F-16 aircraft to leave the target area in an expeditious manner.

This is surprising, considering the pilot's earlier assessment that the perceived threat necessitated invoking self-defence.  As per the testimonies of other F-16 pilots from                      senior members of the CAOC and the CFACC's instructors, Coffee 51 Flight should have immediately sought to distance themselves from the perceived threat, both in range and altitude as soon as possible after the GBU-12 LGB had guided to impact.  By contrast, it is only when ordered by the AWACS to depart the area, nearly five minutes after initially entering the perceived threat area, that Coffee 51 Flight finally starts building separation between them and the Tarnak Farm range.

At 21:27Z, after approximately five minutes of maneuvering above the Tarnak Farm range, the formation steered to rendezvous with                  to begin AAR.  Once the refueling phase was completed, Coffee 51 Flight returned to its home base without further incident.

Documents and Special Instructions

In order to get a clear understanding of all the planning and coordination elements involved in the air campaign part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), a thorough review of key documents was completed very early in the inquiry.   These included the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and the Airspace Control Order (ACO) in effect at the time, and the supporting Special Instructions (SPINS).  These are the main documents used by aircrew in the operational theatre for purposes of mission tasking, planning, coordination and execution.

Air Tasking Order -                         ATO          for 17 Apr 02 (Vol 10, Tab 8), contained all of the details required by Coffee 51 Flight to carry out their mission, and was valid for the period of                      18 April 2002.  After its initial release (most likely around 17:00Z on 16 Apr 02 to allow for mission planning and to update any SPINS), ATO                  underwent up to seven changes, each affecting the ATO version currently in effect.  Change number 4 (Vol 10, Tab 8), although the most significant amendment for Coffee 51 since it changed the mission from Close Air Support (CAS) to On-call Interdiction, (XINT), had no impact on the incident.

Airspace Control Order -                                  ACO              for 17 Apr 02 (Vol 10, Tab 9) contained all airspace control details that had to be used or considered by all participating aircrew in order to effectively and safely carry out their mission.  Published daily to adapt to the ongoing ATO-tasked missions for the particular period, the ACO is a living document that needs to be consulted in order to safely and effectively adhere to the numerous Airspace Control Measures (ACMs) in effect.  Similar to the ATO process, up to three changes were released modifying that original ACO        none of any significance to Coffee 51 Flight's mission.

Within ACO          the following important information was available for mission planning by all Coalition aircrew prior to their missions:

• A Terminal Movement Area (TMA) was in effect for the Kandahar area for the period.  It extended to                                           Aircraft operating within this area were to contact the KAF tower in advance of entry;

• A          was in effect for Tarnak Farm at location 31 27 18 N, 65 49 39 E.  Its size was                                                               The        was identified as a "Small Arms Range" and was quoted as "not continuously active".  Kandahar tower was to be contacted for status: and            

• A Terminal Control Area (TCA) was in effect for the Kandahar area at the beginning of Feb 02.  It consisted of a                      around the airport of Kandahar, extending from                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  No details were given on the radio procedures to be applied.

Special Instructions:  The SPINS, updated regularly, were also available to all aircrew to guide them in the conduct of their mission.  SPINS are theatre-specific and were written specifically for OEF.  Updated daily via the ATO and Weekly SPINS Updates, they contain essential information indispensable for the conduct of the mission.  The following aspects of the 17 Apr 02 SPINS were significant:

•                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

• The SPINS remind aircrew that information on          would be published in the daily ATO/ACO or promulgated by a variety of other means, including alerting by AWACS or other C2 agencies.                                                                                                                                                       would be published in the daily ACO;

• The SPINS explain in detail how Surface-to-Air Fire (SAFIRE) sightings will be reported.  Since the events around the Tarnak Farm area were triggered by a SAFIRE occurrence, the article is reproduced in Annex J;

• They explain in detail the rights and the conditions under which aircrew may use armed force in self-defense.  Again, the relevant article is reproduced in Annex J;

• The SPINS cover defense against Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), stating that aircraft always have the right of self-defense against AAA,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

• The SPINS also deals with the minimum operating altitude in Afghanistan for fixed wing aircraft.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

• It discusses how friendly positions would be transmitted in situation where Close Air Support (CAS) would be required.  This portion indicates that specific land force entities were responsible for providing friendly positional data updates on a daily basis for inclusion into the ATO or as required as the ground situation changes.  It also describes the procedure by which changes would be provided to the CAOC Director of Combat Operations (DCO), and communicated to AWACS            

• Appendix 4 of the SPINS discusses procedures to follow with the airfields in Afghanistan.  For the KAF, the traffic procedures listed confirm that all aircraft transiting Kandahar area are to maintain two-way radio contact with Ground Control Approach (GCA) when operating between                      of the airfield, and that they are to contact Kandahar Tower directly if intending to operate within              and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

Mission Planning

From the testimonies reviewed, it quickly became evident to the Canadian Board that AWACS and F-16 aircrew knowledge about the presence of the Tarnak Farm Range near the Kandahar Airport was lacking.  In the case of the 170^th Fighter Squadron, the F-16 unit deployed to                                to which the F-16 aircrew belonged, a Mission Planning Cell (MPC) was in charge of the mission planning process.  Led by aircrew from the unit and manned according to a rotation schedule, the MPC had the responsibility of reviewing and consolidating the information from the ATO, the ACO and the SPINS in order to create mission data readily available to the aircrew.  The MPC was assisted in this process by the unit intelligence section, who also contributed to the preparation of the mass briefings given to the aircrew prior to each mission.

Various testimonies received by the CIB revealed disturbing information concerning the quality of the MPC process.  As an example, it is evident (based on testimonies by intelligence and MPC personnel from the 170^th Fighter Squadron) that the ACO breakdown responsibilities were not clearly understood by the individuals involved in the mission planning process.  This led to an inefficient process and significant oversights. 

Since everyone in the unit involved with the ACO felt the document was cumbersome and difficult to work with, the unit relied very heavily on a software package called                      to graphically brief the ACO content to the users, and prepare the maps that were carried by the aircrew in their Smart Packs.  Many testimonies have confirmed that, although                      facilitates the representation of the ACO, the volume of the information is often unmanageable and can lead to confusion.  For this reason, several witnesses have confirmed that all the information on the airspace below                       was intentionally removed from the mission data given to the aircrew in order to simplify the information provided in their mass briefs and flight maps. 

This fact alone contributed significantly to the lack of knowledge of the Tarnak Farm range and its associated            .  Pilots flew their missions with no depicted             on their tactical map mainly because "the MPC cell decided that you cannot plot all those and have it be usable" (as per the testimony given by Captain                  , Vol 12, Tab 34). Although the Tarnak Farm range was the area of interest for this inquiry, the same lack of knowledge applied to most of the ranges located in Afghanistan.

The mission planning process used by the AWACS detachment was similar to that used by the fighter forces.  Because of very long mission duration and the limitations imposed by the crew duty day, the aircrew and controllers on board the AWCS had to rely on the support of a mission planning team to prepare the data required for their mission.  Again,                                 software was used extensively, albeit with the text versions of all pertinent documents carried aboard the aircraft for consultation.  As acknowledged by the AWACS MCC (Major            ) the mission planning team would filter some of the airspace coordination to make it a little bit more user friendly for the mission.

As in the previous case, testimonies received confirms that most of the AWACS crew members were not aware of the Tarnak Farm Range,                                          or the activity that was taking place at the time.

It is common knowledge that ACOs and ATOs have never been easy to work with.  Their size and the intricate airspace coordination that is contained within, reflect the complexity of modern airspace battle management requirements, a fact of life that has to be dealt with in modern aerial conflict.  Nevertheless, it is clear that in this instance, a possibly arbitrary decision within the MPCs of disparate units to filter information led to the unintended consequence of excising critical mission data.  Regrettably, such unintended oversights were not detected due to the lack of a feedback loop to ensure that key elements did not slip through the cracks.

In addition to the deficiencies in the mission planning process described above, the Board noted other factors that led to the F-16 aircrew flying combat missions with incomplete knowledge of the mission area.  With respect to crew rest and mission planning, several testimonies have confirmed that due to the extreme mission length the aircrew never prepared their own missions.  Rather, the MPC prepared and briefed the mission to the aircrew, who would only arrive at the unit in time to attend their mass brief.  This practice resulted in the aircrew only having a minimal amount of time to study the mission and brief themselves on key points before proceeding to their jets.  Consequently, many F-16 pilots adopted the practice of attempting to digest the mission material during their transit to the mission area (often under night conditions).

With respect to general mission and document knowledge, a scheduled familiarization visit to the CAOC for new aircrew in theatre was not common practice.  The purpose of this visit, as seen in other operations such as in the Balkans, is to increase the individual's knowledge of the theatre, his understanding of the various mechanisms in place to support him, and to give the CAOC leadership the chance to reinforce the key messages such as the Commanders Intent and the ROE.  From the testimonies received, the board members suspect there was no procedure in place, either at the unit level or above, to ensure that all aircrew were familiar with or clearly read all the documents at their disposal to effectively carry out their missions.

Aircrew Pre-Flight Training and Medical Status

After reviewing the various documents describing the training and qualifications of both pilots of Coffee 51 Flight, the board members have no doubt that these individuals were fully qualified to execute the missions expected of them.  Major          (Coffee 51) was an experienced command pilot with over 3100 hours of military flying time, 1700 of which were on F-16 fighters.  His qualifications included Instructor Pilot, Mission Commander, Supervisor, and Supervisor of Flying in the 183^rd Fighter Wing.  By way of responsibilities, he was the Commanding Officer of the 170^th Fighter Squadron based at                                                              Armed with a very solid background, his wingman, Major                  (Coffee 52), was seen as a key individual who possessed above average flying capabilities as well as outstanding qualifications and fighter experience. With over 3000 total hours of military flying time, Major                   had completed both the United States Navy Top Gun Course as well as the United States Air Force Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, for which he later became an instructor.  In addition to these impressive qualifications, he also had over 200 contingency hours to his credit.  Consequently, he had been assigned as the Chief of the MPC.

Copies of the medical and dental records of the pilots of Coffee 51 (Major              ) and Coffee 52 (Major                   ) were thoroughly reviewed by the CIB Medical Advisor (Lieutenant-Colonel                      - Vol 13, Tab 41).  He reported that for both pilots there were no significant pre-existing medical, dental, or mental health conditions and both had current flight physicals at the time of the incident.  Both pilots were medically qualified to fly.  There was no evidence that human factors (personal habits and behaviour patterns) contributed to the incident.  Blood and urine tests and a drug screen done after the incident were normal for both pilots, with the only remarkable result being a low level positive in Major                  drug screen that confirmed his stated use of  "Go Pills".

"Go Pills" or Dexedrine have been in use by the United States Air Force for over 30 years to manage fatigue and increase alertness in pilots.  The use of "Go Pills" is strictly regulated and requires thorough ground testing to evaluate the benefits that each pilot derives and to determine if there are any side effects that would negate the benefits of using the this pharmaceutical.  In accordance with set policies, Major              and Major              were ground tested and both were without side effects and were medically cleared for operational use of "Go Pills".

It was the assessment of the CIB Medical Advisor that the operational use of the "Go Pill" had no adverse effect on the Coffee 51 Flight aircrew (Vol 13, Tab 41).  Along with this it was stated (Vol 13, Tab 42) that acute fatigue may have been a minor contributing factor in the incident but that cumulative fatigue did not appear to be a factor.

The medical and dental records of Major                  (AWACS Mission Crew Commander), Captain                  (AWACS Senior Director), and Technical Sergeant                   (AWACS Weapons Director) were examined by a flight surgeon at Tinker Air Force Base who concluded that none of the three had any significant pre-existing medical, dental, or mental health conditions, all had current flight physicals, and all were medically qualified to fly as AWACS aircrew. 

Mission Execution - Coffee 51 Flight

When both pilots observed the ground activity near the Kandahar airport, the weather conditions were very favorable for an air-to-ground mission with no obstructions to visibility.  At approximately 21:21Z (Major                  testimony), Coffee 51 Flight initiated the report of a SAFIRE event to AWACS.    With no recording available at that time, the communication that took place for the following minute or two is unclear.  What is certain from the testimonies received is that a request to mark the location of the activity by Coffee 51 Flight was granted by                                                                                                                                                                                                          

A thorough review and analysis                                reveal information that conflicts with the testimonies of the pilots.  In written testimonies, (twice by Major                  ), it is clearly stated that the actions taken by the pilot were because he felt himself and his flight lead (Major                  , call sign Coffee 51) felt threatened by what appeared to be surface-to-air fire from below.  That said, neither aircraft was flown as if there was any threat below. 

For example, the area of interest was approached in a routine fashion with the lead aircraft establishing himself in a                      at approximately                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Although the SPINS permitted him to descend below 15,000 ft AGL to perform the "mark", such a descent is considered highly imprudent (as indicated through several testimonies) given the nature of the perceived threat.  If indeed a plausible threat had been present under his position,                                                                                                                                              would not have been a safe maneuver to undertake, as this would have unnecessarily exposed him to a greater degree of threat.  Rather, he should have achieved either increased separation from the perceived threat to perform the             designation by moving outside the probable, maximum threat range and altitude, or instead used another designation technique to achieve the "mark" as had been accomplished by his lead, Coffee 51.

After the attempt at marking the target was completed, both aircraft maneuvered around the observed SAFIRE location in a calm and relaxed fashion.  Coffee 51 remained above                      while Coffee 52 remained at approximately                      During the final few minutes preceding 21:25:10Z, time at which Coffee 52 claimed self-defense, no calls with regards to a ground threat, muzzle flashes or missile firing were made by either pilot.  Similarly, the aircraft radar warning receivers remained quiet.  Both aircraft continued to circle the observed area and no attempts were made at creating a safe distance between what was observed on the ground and their location.  No chaff or flares were used and no directive calls were made by either pilot to instruct the other to leave the area or to defend against possible enemy fire.   In general, no attempts were made by any of the aircrew to evade the perceived threat they were observing.  As confirmed by the testimony of Col David C. Nichols (Commander of the 332^nd Air Expeditionary Group), should there have been a situation of enemy fire below Coffee 51 Flight, it is certain that Coffee 52 exacerbated the situation by his maneuvering, and would have forced himself into a self-defense situation (an endangered? situation) had there been a real threat.

During the period of time the flight remained in the Tarnak Farm area, several other aspects are worth discussing.  With respect to SAFIRE reports, testimonies confirm that, prior to weapon release, the aircrew most likely failed to complete the report as per the format described in the SPINS, section 5 paragraph 9.4 (S).  The category of the SAFIRE was never transmitted and the exact position of the SAFIRE and the F-16 aircraft (Coffee 51 Flight) were never clearly stated.  Consequently, very little or sporadic information was available to            to help in the decision making process. 

The SAFIRE report was partially completed after the event.  In that incomplete report (category of SAFIRE missing), the aircrew reported that the top of the observed trace was in the vicinity of 10,000 ft AGL.  Testimony provided by a KAF-based helicopter pilot flying in the local vicinity at the time of the night live fire exercise estimated that, at most, the top of the ricochets observed went no higher than 1000 ft AGL.  Many testimonies received from individuals experienced with the use of night vision goggles confirmed that ranges and heights are very hard to evaluate at night, and that a great deal of experience is required to accurately estimate the height of observed phenomena.  It is very likely that the apex of the tracers observed by Coffee 51 Flight appeared much higher than reality.  That said, since neither aircraft took evading action, that height was still most likely well below their comfort level for observed AAA.

 Mission Execution -                               

The radio communications transcript at Annex G depicts the involvement of                       in the process.  Transcripts of the communication between                   and                   (the CAOC) on                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   reveal that there were multiple communication exchanges between them from 21:22:40Z and the time of impact.  These exchanges reveal that                  , according to its prescribed responsibilities, was reporting the event to higher authorities in order to get the proper clearances for the requests made by Coffee 51 Flight.  Testimony by the night time CAOC Director (Brigadier-General Wood) confirmed that in such cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

On the night of 17 April, this request process was ongoing between                       and                      .  Unfortunately,the call made by                   at 21:26:11Z relaying                       direction to Coffee 51 to "disengage" from the area came in ten seconds after the bomb impacted, and only two minutes after                      was made aware of the SAFIRE report.  The MCC on board the AWACS repeatedly limited the actions of Coffee 52, even in the face of multiple requests to employ weapons in the observed area.  Based on a "hunch" that there were "friendlies" in the area of Kandahar and the fact that the described threat was inconsistent with his impression of the threat level and usual tactics, the MCC negated all requests for weapon employment until the self-defence call was made.  The instant that call was made, the MCC, with good reason, felt he could not influence the issue any further, or at least until the self-defence situation was resolved.