Military

General

This section presents a detailed analysis of ground activities prior to, during, and after the 17 April 2002 incident.  The analysis will briefly describe pre-deployment preparation, review the ground situation in Afghanistan at the time, and then will explore relevant aspects of troop disposition and command and control in and around the KAF, the main operating base of TF Rakkasan.  The narrative will then address pre-exercise preparation and training, the conduct of the live-fire exercise up to the bomb impact, and ground activities in the immediate aftermath of the event.  Content of this section is based upon evidence collected by the Board, testimonies received under oath, exhibits submitted, and information supplied by the CIB according to formal protocol.

Pre-deployment Preparation

At the time of the September 11 terrorist attack, 3 PPCLI was already tasked as the Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) BG, maintaining a high level of readiness at all times.  The Key Company was at 72 hours notice to move and the Main Body was at 10 days notice to move.  In October and early November, plans were initiated for the deployment of the IRF (L) BG to Afghanistan.  The potential employment options were for security or combat tasks.  Several missions were considered, with the final decision made in late December, to deploy the 3 PPCLI BG for potential combat tasks.

Prior to the BG's deployment to Afghanistan, Level Four/Five/Six Collective Training was conducted from September-December 2001. The 3 PPCLI BG was declared "Operationally Ready" by the Commander Land Force Western Area, on 31 October 2001.  Specifics of this process can be found in the supporting material under Director Land Force Requirements (Plans) Training Summary dated 19 April 2002 (Vol 12, Tab 47).

The BG Reconnaissance Party departed Ottawa en route to Afghanistan on 11 January 2002, arriving in Afghanistan on 14 January. The BG began deployment to Kandahar on 3 February 2002, while "C" Company deployed to Kandahar on 8 March. The BG, less C Company, was declared "Operationally Ready" by the 3 PPCLI Commanding Officer on 12 February 2002. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) authorized full employment on 15 February. "C" Company would be declared "Operationally Ready" later in March.

The 3 PPCLI BG was placed under "Operational Control" of an American Brigade, Task Force Rakkasan. Initially the BG was employed as the KAF Security Force. The BG participated in combat operations from 2-18 March, with elements participating in Operation ANACONDA and the BG (less one infantry company and the reconnaissance squadron) participating in Operation HARPOON.  During Operation HARPOON, 3 PPCLI personnel engaged in a very arduous, high-altitude reconnaissance in force to clear Al Quaida and Taliban forces.

Afghanistan Ground Situation

After the completion of Operation ANACONDA on 23 March 2002, the Commander of TF Rakkasan elected to rotate his battalions (including 3 PPCLI) through the brigade tasks of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Early in April 2002,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

During the previous four to six weeks the                                had encountered a series of hit and run night attacks (small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars). Therefore night fighting skills would be of great importance to the deploying Canadian troops. In order to develop and refresh acquired night fighting skills, "A" Company planned and coordinated, a section level, night live-fire training exercise on the Tarnak Farm Range, 17 April 2002 (see Annex D).

The primary intent of the Night Live Fire Exercise was to build on the existing night-fighting skill sets to ensure soldiers were comfortable with using their equipment to its full extent.  Using battle simulation targeting (pop-up targets), the range included a tactical scenario to build on section level instinctive shooting techniques, and incorporated section and platoon support weapons in an anti-armour role from a completely separate range for added realism. 3 PPCLI BG soldiers were equipped with                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

It is normal practice for military units in an operational theatre to conduct training that will enhance or maintain required skill sets.  A six-month tour (or longer) is an extremely long period to deploy without incorporating a plan to refresh skills that can deteriorate over time.  This practice is common in all modern armies; Canadian soldiers trained this way during the Second World War and have conducted training in the Balkans operational area for over a decade (Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, OMM,CD (ret'd), Training To Fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army, 2^nd ed. May 2001).

Pre-Exercise Preparations

The Tarnak Farm Range (Annex E) was a former Al Qaeda training area, and had been used by Coalition Forces since late 2001. The range was established to provide a venue for tactical training scenarios, including live-fire manoeuvre using small arms, heavy machine guns, anti-armour weapons, and mortars. This was not the first time the 3 PPCLI BG had used these ranges - they had been conducting safe, comprehensive, realistic training, consistent with the tactical realities of the theatre, since February.

In accordance with the Tarnak Farm Range Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the 3 PPCLI Training Officer submitted the Range Request Form for consideration at the weekly Resource Planning Conference.  In addition, the "A" Company Second in Command (2 I/C), Captain Jasper, completed the requirements listed in the Range Planners Check List, details of which can be found in the Tarnak Farm Range Standing Orders.  The Range SOPs do not delegate any responsibility to the unit for coordination higher than the Task Force, or with the Coalition Force Air Component Command; this was and is, clearly a US responsibility.  The Task Force had established a          and was confident that proper Airspace Control Measures had been coordinated with the Air Component. (Testimony of                                          29 April 2002 and Colonel                      30 April 2002). 

The exercise planners developed the range practices based on the "A" Company operational tasks and the Commanding Officer's guidance to OCs (Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Stogran, 29 April 2002).  The subsequent conduct of the live fire exercise was consistent with established regulations, as directed by the Canadian Forces (Canadian BGL 381-018-001-TS/000 DAT 2001) and Task Force Rakkasan Tarnak Farm Range SOPs.  

Conduct of the Exercise

At approximately 1505Z, 17 April 2002, "A" Company departed Kandahar Airfield (KAF) en-route to the Tarnak Farm Range, 4.5 km to the southwest.  The convoy consisted of five Medium Logistics Vehicles, an ambulance and escort vehicles.  The convoy arrived at the range at approximately 1530Z, at which time "A" Company began to prepare the range.

The night live fire exercise was to be conducted on two separate and independent ranges running simultaneously.  In the Corral area, a Close-Quarter Combat Range had been established, with the approach through Wadi South.  Wadi East (the site of the incident) was both the line of approach and the firing line for the Tank Stalk Range.  The Officer In Charge (OIC) of both ranges was Major Hacket, Officer Commanding (OC) "A" Company.  The Range Safety Officer (RSO) for the Close-Quarter Combat Range was Captain Jasper, 2 I/C "A" Company, while the RSO for the Tank Stalk was Sergeant Leger, from company headquarters. 

The Company Sergeant Major, Master Warrant Officer Whitehall, supervised the Administrative Area.  He was responsible for controlling the form-up of relays and the movement of soldiers forward to meet up with the RSOs to start the range process.  The Company Quartermaster Sergeant, Warrant Officer Boland, was responsible for ensuring that all participants had the required amount of ammunition to conduct the range activity. 

Overall, the conduct of both live-fire ranges was in accordance with Task Force Rakkasan Tarnak Farm Range Standard Operating Procedures.  Training also adhered to the Canadian publication BGL 381-001-TS/000 DAT 2001 (Training Safety), with two minor exceptions.  During the preparation of range traces, Weapon Ricochet Danger Area Templates were not utilized when range arcs were prepared.  Secondly, during preparation of the                                at the ammunition point, electric detonators were inserted before moving forward to the range and remained inserted during the conduct of the range.  The detonator should not be inserted in the           until the time that the weapon will be used (BGL 320-010 FP-001 Mines and Booby Traps, Vol 13, Tab 55).  These omissions played no role in the incident itself.

The Close-Quarter Combat Range

The Close-Quarter Combat Range incorporated primary and secondary weapons allocated to each individual within "A" Company, depending on their position within a section.  These included the                                                                                                     .  All engagements were conducted in Wadi South, a drainage ditch traveling east to west parallel with the perimeter wall of the former Al-Queda terrorist training camp. 

Under the supervision of Captain Jasper, two to five soldiers would move through the ammunition collection point to a designated start line in Wadi South.  From this point the soldiers would engage targets as they appeared while moving west through the wadi and up to the Corral.  The RSO was there only to intervene in case of safety violations; not to control fire.  The pop-up targets were installed in the wadi and the Corral, and incorporated small explosive charges to simulate enemy fire.  Once the tactical movement from the wadi into the Corral had been completed and all targets had been engaged and weapons were cleared, soldiers were debriefed, and returned to the administrative area. This process took about 30 minutes.

The Tank Stalk Range

Under the supervision of the RSO, Sergeant Leger, the Tank Stalk Range employed heavier platoon and section weapons,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 .

The range was conducted in Wadi East, the drainage ditch running north to south and intersecting with Wadi South at the ammunition collection point.  Sergeant Leger controlled the movement of the section weapons detachment from the administration area, through the ammunition collection point, to the start line in the Wadi East, facing north.  The total ammunition allocated for each serial of the Tank Stalk Range was:

Upon being directed to commence, sections were to move north in the wadi until the first target was presented.  This was a "Figure 11" (man-sized) target at the top of the wadi, which simulated a guard detecting and firing upon the detachment.  The first man in the detachment was to engage the target.  The position of the target indicated that the section had advanced as far as safety allowed up the wadi.  The section would then climb the sloping walls of the wadi, tactically deploy as laid out previously by the section 2 I/C, adopt firing positions, and await fire orders (see Annex F). Orders would then be passed, indicating target, weapon selection, and rates of fire.

Targets were engaged according to standard operating procedures using night vision sights.  For weapons without night sights, targets were designated with tracer from machine gun fire.  At the end of each serial, the RSO would clear all weapons.            would then be set to cover the section's withdrawal down the wadi to the south.  The detonation of the         marked the end of each section's participation.  The section was then debriefed and returned to the administrative area.  The entire Tank Stalk exercise was planned to take about 35 minutes per serial.

Conduct of Live Firing

One communications were established between the range and the 3 PPCLI Command Post, the TF Rakkasan Tactical Operations Centre, and the KAF Tower Sentry at approximately 16:01Z, permission was granted for the ranges to start live fire.  The exercise began with a weapons zeroing practise to confirm the accuracy of the troops'                     prior to beginning the simultaneous conduct of the Close-Quarter Combat Range (15 serials planned) and the Tank Stalk Range (7 serials planned).  The serials participating on the ranges were all part of "A" Company.

The exercise proceeded without interruption until 20:35Z, when the KAF Control Tower imposed a "Check Fire" through the Control Tower Sentry due to an inbound transport aircraft.  The "Check Fire" was cancelled at 20:51Z, after the transport aircraft had landed, and firing resumed.  At 21:15Z, the Close-Quarter Combat Range had just completed the current serial and personnel were in the process of moving off the range.

On the Tank Stalk Range, 3 Section, 3 Platoon, "A" Company were moving to their firing positions under the command of Master Corporal Clark, 3 Section 2 I/C.  Allowing the 2 I/C to direct section fire is normal practice, providing him with valuable experience should he have to assume the command role.  Sergeant Ford, the actual Commander of 3 Section, accompanied the section on the range. 

The 3 Section Tank Stalk range began at approximately 21:15Z with Corporal Paquette firing approximately three or four bursts from his                 into the "Figure 11" target.  These rounds would have been fired from the bottom of the wadi toward the top of the wadi; the tracer would have traveled at a sharp angle into the sky.  The section then deployed along the top of the wadi, facing west according to the diagram at Annex G, and began engaging the near tank target with anti-armour weapons and machine gun fire.  For those section weapons without night sights, the tank target position was indicated with tracers.   

During the next ten minutes, 3 Section would fire one                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

Between 21:10Z and 21:20Z, a flight of two American helicopters approaching Kandahar Airfield from the east observed weapons at the Tarnak Farm Range, approximately six miles from their flight path.  The fire was described by the helicopter mission commander, Major          , as small arms fire, with two bright flashes, approximately two seconds apart, followed by more small arms fire. The fire was described as "surface to surface" ground fire and the rate of small arms fire was described as constant. Some ricochets were observed with the highest burnout between 500ft and 1000ft Above Ground Level (AGL), as estimated by the TF Rakkasan helicopter pilots.

Analysis of the weapons systems being utilized, as well as witness testimony indicated that the range would likely have appeared very active initially, with the rate of fire tapering off after the first few minutes.  The range would have been clearly visible from the air, however the weapon systems used presented no threat to high-flying aircraft.  The maximum burnout for the tracer rounds used is                .  The maximum range for the      and      machine guns, even in an anti-aircraft role, is                      , respectively.  The      and the      would display a flash signature when fired, as well as upon impact with the tank target.  The maximum templated ranges of these weapons are                      respectively.  The anti-tank weapons would not display what could be described as a tracer.  It should be emphasized that all weapons were being fired in the surface-to-surface mode, not surface-to-air.

The rate of fire was reduced during the latter minutes leading up to the incident to conserve ammunition and ensure target indication for the          .  During the last two minutes prior to the bomb impact, the rate of fire on the range had slowed dramatically and could be described as sporadic. Range participants stated the above in their testimony.

At approximately 21:21Z, at the same time the transiting F-16s were observing and reporting the ground fire to the AWACS, some members of "A" Company reported hearing jets fly overhead.  3 Section continued to fire, not knowing what was transpiring in the skies above them.

Bomb Impact

3 Section fired its fifth        round at 21:24:50Z                      Less than 15 seconds later, Coffee 52, now manoeuvring less than five nm to the south of the firing,                                that he had sighted men on a road and what looked like an artillery piece on the road and was under anti-aircraft fire.  Invoking the right of self-defence, he initiated his attack almost immediately, releasing the weapon less than 35 seconds after invoking self defence Rules of Engagement (ROE). 

The bomb impacted at 21:26:01Z, just as Sergeant Leger was climbing up the west wall of the wadi behind Corporal Dyer and Private Smith, the crew of the                  .  When the bomb exploded, the 3 Section firing position was engulfed by a large flash, followed by a blast/heat wave and a cloud of smoke and dust.  Some members of "A" Company reported hearing a jet fly at low level over the company position immediately after or coinciding with the impact of the bomb.  Personnel standing in the administrative area and near vehicles took immediate cover to avoid a possible second attack. 

The bomb struck near the Western lip of the wadi, heading roughly 055 degrees at an impact angle of at least      degrees from the horizontal.  The impact point was to the left of the                      crew and to the right of Private Green.  Sergeant Leger, Corporal Dyer, and Private Smith were killed in place; the force of the blast threw Pte Green's remains some distance to the southeast.  The rest of the section as well as two other members of the company received blast and shrapnel-related injuries; specific details can be found in the Findings portion of the report.

Post-Impact Activities

Immediately following the explosion, company personnel assessed the situation and began taking appropriate action.  Triage, first aid, and accounting for personnel were the priorities.  A radio report was sent at 21:27Z to the 3 PPCLI Command Post, stating that fast air had attacked the company position.  Simultaneously, the KAF Control Tower Sentry imposed a "Check Fire" with Call Sign Zero attempting to pass the order to "A" Company.  This second tower-initiated "Check Fire" was in fact related to an outbound C-130 transport aircraft, departing from KAF, and not to Coffee 51 Flight.

At 21:35Z, the Task Force Rakkasan                      confirmed on its net that the F-16 aircraft had felt threatened and had dropped ordnance on Task Force Devil (the brevity codeword for "A" Company, 3 PPCLI).  During this period "A" Company continued to provide updates on the casualty situation.

At 21:36Z, TF Rakkasan initiated call-out of the Air Medical Evacuation helicopter; they would be airborne and en-route within 20 minutes of notification.  Around this time, the first reports of fatally injured casualties were transmitted to the 3 PPCLI Command Post.  The Air Medical helicopter arrived at Tarnak Farm at 22:03Z, and an additional ground ambulance was dispatched from KAF at 22:14Z.  Air Medical Evacuation departed Tarnak Farm with two priority 1, one priority 2 and two priority 3 patients at 22:20Z and arrived at KAF by 22:24Z.

The OC of "A" Company stopped the search activity by his troops of the incident site due to the danger from unexploded ordnance at 22:24Z.  His intent was to secure the site in preparation for the investigation.  At 22:35Z, OC "A" Company reported that there were a total of four priority "4" casualties, and that all casualties were from 3 Platoon.  Note that the 3 PPCLI BG consistently used "priority 4" to refer to a fatality; this is technically not correct (see Glossary).  The decision was then made to redeploy all "A" Company personnel to KAF, except for key leadership, who would remain at the Range to control the incident site.

By 22:48Z, the OC "A" Company was able to confirm that all "A" Company personnel are accounted.  The remaining 3 priority 3 patients were moved to KAF by Bison ambulance at 23:05Z.  The casualties were reported as follows:

An Explosive Ordinance Demolitions (EOD) Team was requested through the chain of command at 23:24Z.  The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) Officer, Capt MacEachern, arrived at Tarnak Farm at 23:45Z, escorted by Coyote reconnaissance vehicles.  In addition, TF Rakkasan dispatched additional American troops to secure the site and to relieve "A" Company of this task.  These personnel arrived at Tarnak Farm at 00:26Z on 18 April 2002.  The EOD Team and an American Disaster Mortuary Affairs Response Team (DMART) arrived at approximately 01:30Z and immediately began forensic investigation work under the control of the CFNIS Officer.  At 05:44Z an American Criminal Investigation Division Team departed KAF to support the CFNIS Team. 

At 06:39Z, all remaining "A" Company personnel departed Tarnak Farm, escorting the remains of the four priority "4" casualties.  Other Canadians who remained at Tarnak Farm Range were either conducting or supporting the investigative work.  By 11:32Z on 18 April 2002 all of the priority "1", "2", and "3" casualties (less Corporal Brennan and Master Corporal Clark, who remained in Kandahar) had departed KAF via US Air Medical Evacuation, en-route to Landstuhl, Germany.

Summary

The Tarnak Farm Range was a former Al Qaeda training area, and had been used by Coalition Forces since late 2001. The range was established to provide a venue for tactical training scenarios, including live-fire manoeuvre using small arms, heavy machine guns, anti-armour weapons, and mortars. This was not the first time the 3 PPCLI BG had used these ranges - they had been conducting safe, comprehensive, realistic training, consistent with the tactical realities of the theatre, since February.

The 3 PPCLI BG completed all required coordination procedures. The Range SOPs do not delegate any responsibility to the unit for coordination higher than the Task Force, or with the Coalition Force Air Component Command, this was and is, clearly a US responsibility. The Task Force had established                      and was confident that proper coordination had been completed with the Air Component.

The Range SOPs were appropriate and consistent with Canadian regulations for the conduct of a live fire range. Further, the actions taken by "A" Company and the BG Staff leading up to and during the conduct of the live fire training were in accordance with the Range SOPs.