Military

For clarity, this portion of the narrative is broken into sections covering immediate command response and reporting, medical response, and post-incident response and investigative activities.

All levels of command were quick to respond and were very effective following the incident.  As Range Safety Officer (RSO), Captain Jasper quickly assessed the situation and began to take control, aided by Master Warrant Officer Whitehall and Warrant Officer Bolan.  He sent the Casualty Situation Report to the 3 PPCLI BG Command Post; ordered a helicopter medical evacuation request to be sent (it had already been done); gave instructions for the security perimeter that was then set up around the area; organized searches to identify remains and equipment; and stayed behind to take charge of the personnel who were completing the search and recovery. Within TF Rakkasan            , a Crisis Action Team was convened within three hours of the incident.  Prior to that, various levels of command had already made arrangements for explosives ordnance disposal personnel, the DMART, the CFNIS, and site security.

With respect to notification of the chain of command, it is the judgement of the Board that correct and expeditious procedures were followed.  Almost immediately, the 3 PPCLI Rear Party was notified by direct call from the theatre alerting them to the general nature of the incident.  The Commanding Officer of the Rear Party, Major S. Bland, was immediately informed, as was the Land Force Western Area (LFWA) Headquarters and then the Commander 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG), Colonel S. Beare, who was on exercise at Canadian Forces Base Suffield.

At 22:43Z, TF Rakkasan Commander, Colonel                , notified the Commander of Coalition Joint Task Force Afghanistan, Major-General Hagenback, of the incident. Subsequently, the Coalition Force Land Component Command Headquarters, based in          , was notified.  They then notified Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida.

Shortly after 01:00Z on 18 April 2002, the names of the casualties were transmitted to the Rear Party, with a temporary hold on releasing the names to the NOK, until the Commanding Officer of the BG had spoken to the Commander 1 CMBG.  As the details on each deceased and injured soldier were being confirmed by Rear Party staff, the Commanding Officer of the Rear Party formulated a plan to inform all NOK of both the injured and deceased.  Given the emotional and time-sensitive nature of this task, a notification team was quickly assembled at Rear Party Headquarters.

News of the incident was known by media sources and as a direct result, there was increased pressure on the Rear Party to complete all notifications.  The LFWA Public Affairs Officer announced that a news release would be forth coming at 22:00 hrs Mountain Daylight Savings Time.  Shortly before 02:00Z 18 April (20:00 hrs on 17 April 2002 in Edmonton, approximately 4 ½ hrs after the bomb explosion), authority was granted to the Rear Party to commence notifications of the NOK.

Concurrently, the 3 PPCLI BG made its formal notification to the Canadian and Coalition chains of command by including the Op APOLLO National Command Element (Tampa), the Commander of Op APOLLO (Tampa) and the NDCC as addressees on a Significant Incident Report (SIR 004).  This SIR was transmitted at 03:37Z, 18 April, approximately 5 hours after the bomb explosion.  A copy of the same SIR was sent to LFWA at 03:58Z on 18 April. 

Generally, each notification team consisted of a senior officer (from the PPCLI where possible) and a Padre.  All notifications were conducted in person, which ensured a caring, sensitive approach to impart the news of the tragedy.  Within the Edmonton area, the Commanding Officer of the Rear Party performed two notifications of death, while the Commander of LFWA and the Area G1 Management (LFWA Personnel Branch) each performed one notification of death.  Within the Edmonton area, a regimental officer from the LFWA Headquarters conducted notification of injury with the assistance of the Senior Brigade Chaplain.  Outside of the Edmonton area, notifications of death or injury to both primary and secondary NOK were conducted by regimental officers or RCMP officers with padre support where possible.

The notification process was complete at approximately 09:00Z 18 April (03:00 hrs local Edmonton time), 11 hours and 34 minutes after the incident.

The on-site medical response was exceptionally good.  As part of the pre-deployment training, all soldiers had received first aid training.  Immediately after the explosion, non-injured soldiers began to provide "buddy first aid" in a timely and effective manner. Dedicated medical support to the live-fire exercise was provided by three Medical Assistants (Med As), operating from a Light Support Vehicle Wheeled (LSVW) ambulance.  Within approximately 90 seconds, two of the Med As were providing the injured with advanced first aid and life saving measures in order to prepare them for evacuation.  The third Med A brought the ambulance closer to the casualties and then quickly began taking care of patients. 

In particular, Corporal De La Bourdonnaye (Med A) has been credited with saving the life of Sergeant Ford by using a tourniquet when pressure dressings were not sufficient to stop bleeding.  Sergeant Wilson (Med A) checked the treatment provided by the other Med As and by the first aiders, treated patients himself, triaged patients for both treatment and evacuation priority, and provided information to the chain of command for the casualty report.  The bodies of the deceased were covered and guarded to ensure that evidence was protected and, more important to all of the soldiers, to treat their fallen comrades with respect and dignity.

In witness statements there is some difference of opinion as to whether the helicopter casualty evacuation was timely.  The helicopter medical evacuation (medevac) was requested 10 minutes after the explosion.  It was on site at Tarnak Farm 27 minutes later and after 17 minutes on the ground it departed with five patients.  Three patients on stretchers and two ambulatory patients were transported to the US surgical facility at the KAF.   The Board considers this response time to have been within the expected standard.

Ground casualty evacuation was carried out using a Bison armoured ambulance, escorted by two Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) Coyotes. Following the helicopter evacuation, this ambulance evacuated the remaining three casualties to the 3 PPCLI BG Unit Medical Section at the KAF.  The LSVW ambulance remained at the Tarnak Farm Range with two Med As while a sweep of the area was being conducted.  The ground ambulances were used in a manner that was organized, well thought out and timely.  Transport of the three priority 3 casualties by ground ambulance was completely appropriate.

A review of the medical documentation showed that the medical care that was given at the KAF was timely, appropriate and of a very high standard.  Of those patients evacuated by helicopter to the US surgical facility, two went directly to surgery and three were assessed, treated and admitted.  Surgical specialists in the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) in Landstuhl, Germany credit the US surgeon in Kandahar with saving Sergeant Ford's leg by performing a technically difficult vascular procedure.  The remaining three patients evacuated by ground ambulance went to the Canadian Unit Medical Station, where they were seen by a Medical Officer.  Two of the patients were treated and returned to duty and the third was sent to the US Surgical Facility for further tests and treatment. 

All patients seen at the US military Surgical Facility were medically evacuated to the LRMC in Germany on 18 April 2002.  The patients were transported by an American C-17 Globemaster aircraft which had an Intensive Care Unit configuration.  The American aeromedical evacuation team included a physician.  A review of the medical records showed that the in-flight medical care was both appropriate and thoroughly documented.  A Canadian Medical Assistant (Corporal De La Bourdonnaye) also attended the patients as a medical escort.      

The patients arrived in Ramstein at approximately 2200 hours local, on 18 April.  They were met by Major McLeod (the Medical Officer at the Canadian Forces Support Unit Europe in Geilenkirchen, Germany), a US vascular surgeon, and specialized medical teams.  Sergeant Ford underwent surgery for vascular and eye injuries, Corporal Paquette went to the Intensive Care Ward, and the rest of the patients went to the ward.  Treatment was provided by specialists in the areas of Anaesthesiology, Surgery, Neurosurgery, Orthopaedic Surgery, Internal Medicine, Ophthalmology, and Ear Nose and Throat Surgery.  The process was very thorough and all the patients were extremely well cared for. 

Patients were monitored for their psychological well-being, and underwent Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD).  Throughout this period, Major McLeod was able to keep both the families and the chain of command up to date as to the soldier's condition.  On 23 April 2002, the patients were discharged to the care of Canadian Forces Aeromedical Evacuation personnel and were medically evacuated to Canada aboard a Canadian Forces CC-150 Polaris aircraft.

Within the 3 PPCLI BG at Kandahar, the CISD Peer Support Response Team was immediately activated, meeting "A" Company personnel when they returned to camp at about 23:30Z.  Personnel were provided with the information that was known at the time and a brief overview of the range of normal reactions following a traumatic event. One peer was assigned to the FST and one to the morgue in support of the casualty collection teams and soldiers concerned about their friends.  They were assisted by two US Mental Health Specialists. 

The personnel of  "B" Company and "C" Company were debriefed early on 18 April 2002.  Individual and group defusing was done with the personnel who had been involved in the "clean-up" at Tarnak Farm.  Then, 48 hours after the incident, peer support personnel were debriefed and reassigned as required for further defusing and debriefing activities. 

With respect to on-scene investigation, a Canadian Forces National Investigative Service (CFNIS) representative, Captain J. MacEachern, was on-scene within three hours of the incident and began a taped, on-site interview with the RSO (Captain J. Jasper).  By coincidence, the United States Army Europe Disaster Mortuary Affairs Team (DMART) was in Kandahar on an unrelated investigation.  By 24:00Z 17 April 2002, two DMART team members, the Armed Forces Regional Medical Examiner (Dr.                ) and DMART Chief of Search and Recovery Team (Mr.                ), were in discussion regarding a formal request from the Canadian Forces for medical legal and forensic investigation support at the scene to conduct a scene investigation and search and recovery of the remains. 

With the immediate approval of Commander TF Rakkasan, the DMART team deployed to the range to conduct an on-site investigation under control of the CFNIS Officer.  By all accounts, the support provided by the DMART was exemplary, independent of the fact that their proximity allowed them to be on-scene by 01:30Z 18 April 2002. 

In addition to the DMART investigation, 3 PPCLI BG quickly identified the requirement for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support.  After the casualties had been evacuated, it was identified that damaged explosive portions of the                and fragmented                had been found.  Because of this hazard, the final sweep of the area was stopped.  Again, support was provided in a very timely manner by TF Rakkasan, and an EOD Team completed the clearing process by 03:32Z on 18 April 2002.