Military

This section provides extensive amplifying detail surrounding the Board's primary findings, according to the assigned Terms of Reference attached at Annex A.  Each finding consists of a narrative summary leading to one or more concluding statements.

Beyond the introductory narrative included here and the extensive detail contained within the full report, the Board has concluded that the members of 3 PPCLI BG who were undertaking live-fire training at the Tarnak Farm Multi Purpose Range on the night of the incident had done nothing wrong by way of coordination procedures or safety regulations. 

By contrast, it has been determined that a number of issues were involved in this incident.  In particular, it was determined that the mission planning process used by the 170^th Fighter Squadron was deficient, in that it unnecessarily filtered ACM material which, had it been present for Coffee 51's mission, might have prevented fratricide from occurring.  Furthermore, it was determined that the manoeuvres performed by Coffee 51 Flight, in reaction to the perceived threat caused by the live night fire exercise at Tarnak Farm, was directly causal to the fratricide incident.

Perhaps most central to the tragedy was the simple, initial fact that Coffee 52 did not recognize the observed ground fire event as a surface-to-surface training exercise, instead perceiving it as enemy surface-to-air fire.  This failure of perception was the initiating factor that started the ensuing sequence of missed cues and hasty, imprudent actions that led to the premature release of the weapon.  Expectation appears to have played a significant role, in that Coffee 52 incorrectly identified elements of a dismounted infantry section as an AAA weapon system, when in fact no such system actually existed at that location                                of Coffee 52 at Vol 10 Tab 14).  Although impossible to confirm, it would seem by the testimonies received by the CIB that there was some discrepancy in the briefed threat levels (see testimony of Captain            Lieutenant Colonel           and Brigadier General Wood).  Regardless, given the complex nature of the ground order of battle and the widely dispersed friendly forces                                           aircrew should have erred on the side of caution in attempting to discern the type and source of observed ground fire.

Additionally, the failure of Coffee 51 Flight to transmit the required information for the SAFIRE event to              either prevented or delayed a more accurate decision by controlling authorities.  In particular, due to poor technique, Coffee 52 failed to properly "mark" the target area during his          designation, and was thus unable to relay the coordinates of the observed ground fire in his SAFIRE report. This lack of information impeded the AWACS and CAOC from potentially correlating the SAFIRE report with the night live fire exercise being conducted at Tarnak Farm.

The incomplete mission planning information provided to Coffee 51 Flight and           exacerbated the deteriorating situation.  Specifically, neither the F-16 nor the AWACS aircrew were aware of                                          the Tarnak Farm Range.   The result was that the crew of                , lacking or unaware of this essential data, did not transmit this vital airspace coordination information to Coffee 51 Flight in order to enhance their decision-making process. 

In summary, with respect to the circumstances of the incident, it is the overall conclusion of the Board that had Coffee 51 Flight transmitted a complete and accurate SAFIRE report, and had either the F-16 or the AWACS aircrew known of the existence of the Tarnak Farm Multi Purpose Range Complex and                      this knowledge may have dramatically altered the decision making process thereby precluding the fratricide incident.