UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

CHAPTER 2

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AT CORPS AND DIVISION

This chapter outlines the critical actions that must occur during the fire support planning process. A tactical scenario explains what these actions are and how they must occur within the context of a tactical situation. The situation is presented as a snapshot view of an army corps engaged in a mature theater of operations. After describing the corps decision cycle, targeting guidance, and general corps situation, the scenario focuses on the fire support planning that occurs in one of the committed divisions fighting the close battle. Although AirLand Battle doctrine stresses the importance of the corps role in the operational and tactical levels of warfare, the actual fire support planning procedures work in a similar manner at corps and division. Several important aspects of AirLand Battle must be examined as part of the corps fire support planning process. These include:


Planning Principles

Fire support planning is the continuous process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fire support. This chapter lays out the sequence of planning for corps and division fire support in a realistic manner in terms of time and situation. This chapter takes the reader from the time the commander receives a mission to the production of an operation order (OPORD). It concentrates on the coordination between the FSCOORD, the G2, and the G3 that takes place during the fire support planning process. The user should keep the following principles in mind:

  • Start planning early, and plan continuously.

  • Exploit all available targeting assets.

  • Consider the use of all available fire support means, both lethal and nonlethal.

  • Follow the commander's targeting guidance.

  • Select and use the most effective attack means.

  • Provide adequate fire support.

  • Avoid unnecessary duplication.

  • Provide for the safeguarding and survivability of friendly forces and installations.

  • Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support.

  • Furnish the type of support requested.

  • Consider airspace coordination.

  • Coordinate fire support with other combat power multipliers.

  • Provide rapid coordination.

NOTE: These principles are amplified in FM 6-20.

Scenario

The 10th (US) Corps is to be deployed with two divisions forward, an armored division in the north, a light infantry division in the south and a mechanized infantry division in reserve. The corps mission is to defend its sector and to defeat the first-echelon divisions in the main battle area (MBA) and the second-echelon division and combined arms reserve with deep fires and maneuver. One division in contact is augmented with an armored cavalry regiment; the other, with an armored brigade. The corps reserve has an on-order mission as a counterattack force.

Opposing the corps is a combined arms army (CAA). The army first echelon consists of three motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) on separate avenues of approach. The army second echelon consists of a tank division and an independent tank regiment (ITR). The tank division will be used as an exploitation force; and the ITR may be used to defeat counterattacks, or it may be employed as an additional exploitation force. The assessed mission of the combined arms army is to seize river crossings and overrun air bases in the 10th (US) Corps rear.

Decision Cycle

The commander and staff use the decision-making process to arrive at and to execute tactical decisions. The decision cycle is designed to direct staff functions to provide a coordinated operation plan (order) to achieve the mission in accordance with the commander's concept of the operation and his intent.

The commander and his staff must begin planning and coordination as soon as practicable. Often, time becomes the most critical factor facing the commander and staff in the decision-making process. The cycle begins with receipt of higher headquarters guidance 96 hours before execution time of the contemplated operation. To ensure that subordinate commanders have enough time for planning, the corps staff must use no more than one-third of the available time to develop and disseminate their plan.

The commander and staff exchange information about the mission, and the staff gives the commander information about the current situation. After that briefing, the corps commander issues his planning guidance to the staff. His guidance normally includes attack guidance, priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and his maneuver planning guidance.

The commander's concept is of major importance to the plans cell. Keying on enemy forces and not specific areas on the battlefield, the corps commander and staff use the concept, together with target value analysis (TVA) and IPB, to determine high-payoff targets and attack guidance. The commander's attack guidance is the basis for target data collection, target development, and attack decisions. Attack execution may remain under centralized control for specific operations such as SEAD, Lance, and electronic warfare ambushes or BAI attacks. Other missions such as electronic countermeasures or counterfire may be centralized.

The attack guidance format at corps separates close and deep operations into three areas of concentration:

  • Enemy divisions in contact. These are the responsibility of the corps or division in contact. The corps gives support to the divisions; but it may take direct control of certain operations such as counterattacks, corps-directed SEAD, or cross-FLOT insertions.

  • Enemy follow-on divisions. The primary area of responsibility falls beyond the division area of operations out to the limits of the corps area of influence. Corps depends on fire support, air power, and nonlethal methods for the attack of follow-on forces in this area.

  • Enemy follow-on army. This relates to the corps area of interest. In this area, the corps nominates targets to theater army for inclusion in its campaign.

The 10th Corps received a mission for planning to defend in sector against elements of a Soviet front. Both the corps commander and the staff conducted a hasty mission analysis. Then the corps commander issued planning guidance to the staff. His guidance included initial PIR and attack guidance as follows:

"Our mission is to defeat the first-echelon CAA of the front in our sector. Since the enemy may commit the army by echelon, plan for using the forward divisions to defeat the first-echelon divisions. We must identify the location of the main effort early so we can effectively counter it. Our intel must also watch for the timing and locations of commitment of the follow-on army to the CAA. We cannot allow it to commit while we're still fully employed with the CAA, If it becomes a threat, delay it 24 hours. Work up some options in accordance with the guidance, and provide a recommendation in 12 hours."

Having received the above planning guidance, the staff begins staff estimates, initial coordination, and course-of-action development. The FSCOORD and his planner, in conjunction with the G2, G3, ALO, Army aviation, engineers, EW, ADCOORD, and logistics, make a fire support estimate for each course of action, to include tentative attack guidance.

Approximately 64 hours before the operation the corps plans officer presents the staff's courses of action and recommendations to the commander for decision.

After receiving the corps commander's decision, the staff issues a warning order and begins preparing an OPORD. The fire support planner prepares the Fires paragraph of the fire support annex and the fire support task organization portion of the OPORD. (See Appendix D.) He continues close coordination with those staff sections listed above to ensure that the plan remains synchronized with the developing situation.

As the corps planners complete and publish the OPORD, it is transferred to the divisions about 50 hours before execution. The OPORD is modified as the situation dictates.

Division Commander's Actions on Receipt of the Mission

Tactical planning begins with the assignment of a mission or with the commander's recognition of a requirement. In this case, the light division commander has been assigned his mission. On return to the division, and before conducting his mission analysis, the commander needs information from his staff. In particular, he requires the G2's analysis of the battlefield areas (see FM 34-l). He will also ask for information from other staff members so he can analyze the mission and determine its key elements. He must deduce--

  • What must be done.

  • What tasks are specified in the mission.

  • What implied tasks are required to accomplish the mission.

After studying the corps OPORD and the battlefield area analysis and analyzing the threat, the division commander identifies the purpose of the division operation and the corps commander's intent. He then identifies the specified and implied tasks in the OPORD. He further identifies the tasks that are essential to the accomplishment of his mission. The division commander then restates the division mission and gives planning guidance to his staff.

FSCOORD's Actions on Receipt of the Mission

While the division commander is conducting his mission analysis, the FSCOORD makes his preliminary analysis of the fire support mission. He studies the corps OPORD, keying on his specific areas of responsibility. He must identify specified and implied fire support tasks that are in the OPORD as well as factors that must be considered when planning courses of action with the G3.

Factors that should be considered when developing offensive and defensive courses of action are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. As the FSCOORD is collecting information that will affect the performance of the fire support mission, he should list them under the METT-T headings as discussed below.

Mission

The mission statement used in the estimate should be a brief statement of the commander's intent and should detail all specified and implied tasks. The value of the estimate largely depends on the correct definition of the mission, which should give, in simple terms, a full picture of the desired result. If the mission statement is wrong, the commander's intention may not be achieved.

NOTE: At this stage, the FSCOORD does not have the commander's restated mission to use. However, he does have the corps OPORD. From this, he deduces the tasks to be performed by the division and for which he must provide fire support.

Enemy

Most of the required Threat information comes from the division G2 and the intelligence annex to the corps OPORD (which the FSCOORD should have). A field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) is in the division fire support element. Through him, the FSCOORD should give the FS cell a continuous flow of information from the G2's IPB and the situation development and target development processes. The FSCOORD also gets enemy information from the commander's planning guidance when he issues it. The type of Threat information the FSCOORD must get from the G2 is outlined in FM 6-20-10.

Terrain and Weather

The corps G2's analysis of the battlefield area, begun long before hostilities, provides most of the terrain and weather effects on the enemy and friendly courses of action. The division G2 uses the corps G2's analysis, supplemented by IPB information pertinent to the division. The analysis includes contributions from the engineer's terrain study, climatological studies, and weather forecasts. The FSCOORD must obtain, through the FAIO, comprehensive terrain studies and weather forecasts. He considers how these factors affect weapon systems employment for deep, close, and rear operations.

Troops Available

At this stage, the FSCOORD is mainly concerned with ensuring that all fire support resources available to the division are considered throughout the development of the courses of action. He researches the corps OPORD to ascertain the following:

  • Assigned, attached, and OPCON maneuver units available for commitment.

  • The corps field artillery organization for combat and priority of support.

  • The allocation of air support.

  • Combat service support resources available for the operation.

The G3 works on a similar list against which the FSCOORD should compare his own. Once developed, this force list is a constant for each course of action developed by the G3. It does not preclude the FSCOORD from requesting additional resources at a later date, if required.

Time

The only information available for the FSCOORD to use at this stage comes from the corps OPORD. The OPORD may include the corps commander's requirements for when area reconnaissance can begin, when the force is to have completed the preparation of division defensive areas, movement timings, anticipated phase timings, or the time by which the force must be ready in all respects. As the planning process progresses, the FSCOORD will gain more information that will allow him to consider the time factor in relation to the tasks outlined in Appendix A, Section III.

Commander's Planning Guidance

Once the commander has completed his mission analysis, he restates the mission and issues his planning guidance to the staff for their consideration when preparing individual staff estimates. Among other things, his guidance should include information of particular concern to the FSCOORD on the following:

  • His perceptions of the most dangerous types of targets. The FSCOORD should group these as follows:

      º Close support.

      º Counterfire.

      º Interdiction.

      º SEAD.

      º Offensive counterair.

  • What he expects the fire support system to contribute to the operation in the way of--

      º Supporting forces in contact.

      º Providing fire support that is immediately responsive to the force commander.

      º Synchronizing with the scheme of maneuver.

      º Sustaining the fire support effort.

  • Specific constraints on the employment of fire support resources.

Example Mission Restatement and Guidance

An example of how the division commander may go about restating the mission and issuing planning guidance is discussed below.

Commander's Intent. The commander's intent is stated as follows:

"I intend to defend well forward in sector with a strong covering force in order to defeat the MRD and set the preconditions for offensive operations."
Restated Mission. The restated mission is:

"On order, the division establishes a covering force east of the BLUE River. On D-day, H-hour, conducts defensive operations in the security area and the MBA to destroy the first-echelon assault regiments. Defends in sector in the highly restrictive terrain west of the BLUE River to hold the second-echelon regiments in place as a fixing force in front of the corps counterattack by the 22d Division. Supports corps offensive plan on order."

NOTE: The restated mission now becomes the basis for the commander's and staff estimates. It is paragraph 1 of these estimates, whether oral or written. During the estimate process, the restated mission may be refined and changed as required. The commander makes the final decision on what the mission statement will contain.

Constraints. The commander also noted the following constraints from the corps OPORD:

"Use of the ACR is restricted to the covering force operation and defense of the intermediate position.

"No ground maneuver across the RED River is authorized without approval from corps headquarters."

FSCOORD'S Considerations. Based on the commander's planning guidance, the factors discussed below are samples of those the FSCOORD would consider during planning.

The FSCOORD would consider destruction of the enemy fire support system before he has the bulk of his artillery within range of our defensive positions. This means that deep target acquisition and attack of counterfire targets before and during the covering force operation must be considered. Also, the FSCOORD should consider the possibility of a night infiltration into the enemy flank to interdict his C3 and lines of communication (LOCs). The FSCOORD coordinates with the G2 to focus surveillance and target acquisition assets to locate and identify Threat second-echelon units. Once the units are identified, the attack decision is confirmed, depending on the situation at the time. Nuclear fire plans must be submitted to corps well in advance to facilitate execution by reinforcing corps artillery.

In general, the FSCOORD concentrates planning efforts initially on the covering force and intermediate position battles. Then he focuses on coordinating the MBA defense. He also should consider using the division aviation brigade to attack high-payoff targets in depth. In this type of operation, ammunition stocks must be pre-positioned for each phase of the operation. The division is responsible for supply of ammunition to artillery units organic to the separate armored brigade and the ACR. The FSCOORD coordinates with the G4 to ensure that the required ammunition can be positioned in time.

Possible Courses of Action

During his mission analysis, the commander may have considered some possible courses of action. If so, he would state them at this point. In this example, the division commander gave the staff courses of action to consider. The G3 is responsible for developing at least one other alternative for comparison. An explanation of how he goes about this task and the part the FSCOORD must play are in Appendix B. In the meantime, there is much the FSCOORD and his staff can do to begin the fire support estimate, to prepare to help the G3 in his development of the courses of action, and to prepare the subsequent analysis of those courses of action.

Staff Actions

While the G3 and G2 are collecting information from the IPB for use in development of courses of action, the FSCOORD and his staff must continue collecting information and listing the factors of METT-T that will affect the provision of fire support. The FSCOORD should have gained an initial appreciation of the situation from the intelligence annex to the corps OPORD, the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, and the division G2's situation and target development processes. These processes give the commander and staff the intelligence needed to fight the AirLand Battle. Each is a distinct task, yet both must be integrated totally to provide an accurate picture of the battlefield. Both tasks incorporate IPB and focus on the commander's areas of operation and interest. The G2 uses IPB to produce a description of enemy force disposition on the battlefield in terms of location, size, type, direction and rate of movement, and activity.

Situation Development

Situation development provides an estimate of enemy intentions in the following form:

  • Knowledge of the weather and terrain throughout the areas of operation interest.

  • Knowledge of the enemy, to include:

      º Organization.

      º Equipment.

      º Tactics (how he fights).

      º Strengths and weaknesses of his dispositions.

      º Capabilities, limitations, and patterns of particular units.

      º Operational, technical, and human weaknesses.

      º Intentions.

      º Probable reactions.

Target Development

Based on situation development, target development is the process of providing direct combat information, targeting data, and correlated targeting information to commanders and fire support means. It gives the commander timely and accurate locations of enemy high-payoff targets that are predicted to impact on current or projected operations. Targeting data must be accurate enough to support effective attack by fire, maneuver, or electronic means. (The target numbering system is discussed in Appendix E.)

Staff Estimates

Once the commander has given his guidance and the courses of action have been developed, the staff can begin to prepare estimates. It must be kept in mind that the different staff elements and the personnel associated with them have widely disparate functions and responsibilities and that they are often separated by great distances. Therefore, for successful mission accomplishment, they must effect constant coordination and keep each other aware of the requirements.

The G3 is the focal point during the estimate process, and he is responsible for ensuring coordination between the different staffs. The ways in which the different estimates affect the fire support estimate are outlined in FM 6-20. Here we will discuss only the fire support estimate.

Fire Support Estimate

The fire support estimate is an informal procedure that yields a dynamic mental process that may or may not be written down by the FSCOORD. It helps him to integrate and synchronize the employment of fire support resources within the fire support system and with the force scheme of maneuver.

The fire support estimate is a realistic appraisal of the effort required to support the operation. It serves as a basis for identifying priority fire support requirements.

Any variable which could affect the mission is a factor. Before starting the estimate, all relevant information must be collected from all available sources. Once this information has been assembled and the factors that could affect the plan have been identified, they should be listed and arranged in priority. Examples of the factors that may be considered are as follows:

  • The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions.

  • The availability of field artillery resources, including cannons, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRSs), missiles, ammunition (conventional, nuclear, and chemical), and target acquisition assets.

  • The availability of other fire support resources, including mortars, NGF, tactical air support, and Army aviation support. Also included are EW and other intelligence-controlled surveillance assets.

  • In the attack, the enemy dispositions (including frontage and depth), the degree of protection afforded the enemy, objectives for subordinate forces or units, the number of phases, and the likely frontage and depth of the assault. These will affect the allocation of fire support resources to subordinate units.

  • In the defense, the mission of the covering force, the frontage and depth of the main battle area, the contingencies for counterattack, and considerations for deep and rear operations.

  • The speed of movement to contact and withdrawal.

  • In light forces, the force antiarmor plan.

  • Courses open to the enemy artillery commander; especially his most probable course of action, These are derived from the intelligence estimate and knowledge of enemy artillery doctrine, Consideration of this factor results in--

      º The probable enemy artillery plan.

      º Enemy artillery vulnerabilities.

      º Enemy nuclear and chemical capability and posture.

      º Any information requirements on enemy artillery which have significant influence on the tasking of weapons-locating sensors.

      º The allocation of resources, weapons, and munitions for counterfire.

      º Measures to reduce the vulnerability of our force.

      º The recommended counterfire priorities for each phase of the battle(by the designation of critical friendly zones and enemy weapon systems).

  • The enemy EW situation.

  • The identification of high-payoff targets (derived from TVA and IPB).

  • The commander's information requirements (derived from the intelligence estimate).

  • The availability and condition of roads, trails, and likely position areas. This leads to the coordination of movement and position areas with the operations staff.

  • Ammunition consumption factors (type and quantity), pre-positioning requirements, and priority of combat service support (CSS).

  • The effects of survey and meteorological (met) upper air data and forecast weather conditions on the ability to guarantee timely and accurate fire support (to include weapon and target acquisition assets).

  • The reliability and range of communications.

  • The time required for positioning and technical preparation to engage targets.

  • The time to be ready to support the operation.

  • Development of an initial nuclear analysis based on preclusion-oriented target analysis methodology.

  • Formulation of corps nuclear packages or division subpackages (area, yield or number of weapons, time) for each contingency as identified by the G3.

  • Allocation of nuclear weapons for corps packages and division subpackages.

  • Development of plans to prevent collateral damage.

  • Development of a schedule of nuclear strikes in a package area. This includes preinitiation avoidance and joint scheduling of nuclear targets.

  • Target-oriented method of target analysis using latest intelligence for refinement of aimpoints.

  • Transmission of warning order to nuclear-capable units alerting them of pending nuclear strike(s).

  • Maintenance and revision of Threat list as current intelligence becomes available.

  • The availability of nuclear weapons at firing units.

  • The distribution of and accountability for these nuclear weapons.

Mission

As mentioned earlier, the mission statement in this case is that of the division to be supported. The FSCOORD also should list the constraints that were noted from the corps OPORD, commander's planning guidance and intent, and known factors that could affect performance of the mission.

Situation and Courses of Action

Tactical Situation

The FSCOORD must know the intended dispositions of the major elements of the supported force at the beginning of the operation and at those stages of the operation when reassessment of fire support tasks may be required. He gains this information during the G3's development of each course of action and from resultant sketches. The FSCOORD should establish any special fire support requirements needed at the beginning of the operation and at each subsequent stage. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the target development process, and the scheme of maneuver provide the factors to be considered by the FSCOORD and his staff when producing a fire support plan. The IPB and the target development process are the responsibility of the G2, who is also charged with the dissemination of the data they provide. The FSCOORD plays a vital part in the target development process by conducting TVA and advising on the most suitable fire support assets with which to attack specific targets, For more detailed information, refer to FM 34-1 and FM 6-20-10.

Tactical Courses of Action

The commander's restated mission and planning guidance may indicate a number of possible courses of action for the scheme of maneuver. If not, they are developed during the G3's operations estimate and passed on to other staff. The FSCOORD must consider the factors that affect each course, in turn, to determine whether it can be supported effectively with fire support. Examples of factors that should be considered in the defense and offense are given in Appendix B.

Logistics and Communications

Factors that affect fire support logistics and communications will arise during consideration of other factors that affect the mission. These should be listed and resolved during the planning process. Occasionally, a separate estimate may be necessary to determine whether a particular course of action can be supported logistically.

Analysis of Courses of Action

The FSCOORD and the other staff officers must work together to analyze the courses of action. The FSCOORD should have already prepared for the analysis stage by examining each course of action as explained above. During the joint consideration of factors affecting each course of action, these personnel war-game each course against probable enemy actions to see how the battle will progress. They visualize the battle in depth to determine how deep attacks can support the plan. They fight each action up to and including mission accomplishment to determine the risks involved and the probable success of each course. The FSCOORD's previous assessment of the courses may cause him to advise against those that prove to be impractical from a fire support point of view. To do this, he must mentally--

  • Attack emerging targets with the most effective system.

  • Determine the tasks and requirements for all fire support resources.

  • Consider proper distribution of assets for close support of maneuver elements, for counterfire, for interdiction, and for SEAD.

  • Visualize the indirect-fire-unit movements required to follow the battle flow.

  • Consider logistic needs and their impact on the battle.

As the war gaming progresses, the FSCOORD formulates a list of advantages and disadvantages of each course from a fire support point of view. Then each course of action is listed and followed by a concise statement of its advantages and disadvantages.

Comparison of Courses of Action

After the analysis, the G3, G2, and FSCOORD compare the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action to determine which promises to be most successful. The result of this consideration is a recommendation to the commander to be used as a basis for deciding his concept of the operation.

Recommendation

The FSCOORD translates the recommended course of action selected by the G3, G2, and himself into a recommendation that normally is presented informally. It is actually a statement which addresses the following:

  • Allocation of fire support resources.

  • Artillery organization for combat.

  • Command and control relationships.

  • Priority of effort.

Commander's Concept of the Operation

After all courses of action have been war-gamed and analyzed and their advantages, disadvantages, and risks have been identified, the commander decides which course of action to follow. He then states his concept of the operation in his completed estimate, Included are his decisions on who performs elements of the mission and his intent during all phases of the operation. His concept and intent form the basis for paragraph 3a, Concept of Operation, in the operation order. The commander's staff, to include the FSCOORD, now have the necessary information to examine their areas of responsibility in detail and to prepare operation plans and/or orders for the commander's approval.

Discussion of Concept of Operation Paragraph
This is a statement of the commander's intent which expands why the force has been tasked to do the mission stated in paragraph 2. It tells what results are expected; how these results facilitate future operations; and how, In broad terms, the commander visualizes achieving those results (force as a whole). The concept is stated in enough detail to ensure appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. The who that will accomplish the concept of operation will be in subparagraphs to paragraph 3a. Style is not emphasized, but the concept statement should not exceed five or six sentences written or personally approved by the commander. If an operation overlay is used, it is referenced here; however, the concept statement must be present as paragraph 3a and on the overlay.

After the concept of the operation has been formalized, the G3, G2, and FSCOORD produce a tentative high-payoff target matrix. This matrix provides further guidance to the elements engaged in targeting and allows them to prioritize the acquisition and engagement efforts. The FSCOORD also must finalize--

  • The allocation and positioning of fire support assets.

  • Plans for the provision of target acquisition assets, survey, and met support to subordinate units.

  • Logistic support for subordinate units.

Orders and Plans

An operation order is a commander's directive to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. For clarity and efficiency, these orders follow a specific format as described in FM 101-5. Fire support directives are published as discussed below.

Fire Support Plan

The fire support plan contains the information necessary for understanding how fire support will be used to support an operation. It is a subparagraph of paragraph 3 of the OPORD. It should include a subparagraph for each type of fire support involved. Nuclear fire support and chemical fire support usually warrant their own subparagraphs under fire support. Appropriate fire support liaison representatives prepare their respective paragraphs. The FSCOORD combines these subparagraphs into the fire support plan. If the fire support plan includes a target list, it reflects only those targets the commander thinks are critical to his operations. See Appendix D for an example of a division fire support plan. The FSCOORD must also ensure that the fire support plan gives enough commander's guidance to ensure sufficient information is available for FA automatic data processing (ADP) systems (for example, all commander's criteria inputs for the tactical fire direction system [TACFIRE]).

Annex to the OPORD

If the operation requires lengthy or detailed plans or if paragraph 3 becomes unwieldy, a fire support annex to the OPORD may be prepared. It amplifies the instructions in the fire support plan.

Appendixes to the Annex

Specific support plans for each type of fire (FA support plan, air support plan, nuclear support, support plan, and chemical support plan) are prepared, as needed, to amplify the fire support plan.

Enclosures to an Appendix

Depending on the plan, overlays, target lists, and schedules may be attached for clarity and amplification.

Target Overlay. This overlay is a display of targets, fire support coordinating measures (see Appendix F), and positions for indirect-fire weapons. The planner uses it to help resolve duplication, evaluate the adequacy of planned support in relation to battle plans, and determine the most appropriate unit(s) to attack each target.

Target List. This is a compilation of targeting data prepared in support of an operation. It contains data extracted from the target list work sheet. It contains only targeting data required for the computation of technical firing data. Automatic data processing also provides a fire plan target list.

Schedule. Schedules contain the same information shown on the scheduling work sheets. However, schedules are in a format that is easier to duplicate and transmit to firing units. Automatic data processing provides targets for the schedule of fires.

Changes. Any changes to TACFIRE SOP may be attached as an enclosure.

Tabs to Enclosures

Tabs to enclosures may include sensor taskings for--

  • Moving-target-locating radar (MTLR).

  • Weapons-locating radar (WLR).

  • Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

  • Aerial fire support observer (AFSO).

  • Observation posts (OPs).

  • Combat observation/lasing team (COLT).

NOTE: The complete fire support planning sequence is shown in the flow chart.




NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list