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Fire support for defensive
operations can be described in terms of a defensive framework
presented in FM 100-15. This framework shows corps and divisions
using five complementary elements:
-
Deep operations in the
area well beyond the FLOT.
-
Security force operations
forward and to the flanks of the defending force.
-
Defensive operations in
the main battle area.
-
Reserve operations in support
of the main defensive effort.
- Rear operations to retain freedom of action in the rear area.
Success in the defense depends
on the careful planning and execution, as required, of fire support
simultaneously in deep, close, and rear operations. Each of the
five elements of the defensive framework must be considered when
determining fire support requirements.
As in the offense, corps and
division commanders normally ensure adequate fire support for
defensive operations by retaining some assets and allocating others
to subordinate units. The four basic tasks of fire support provide
the guiding principles:
-
Support forces in contact.
-
Support all aspects of the
battle plan.
-
Synchronize fire support.
-
Support and sustain fire support.
Supporting forces in contact
usually means providing support for close operations. If done
correctly, this task ensures the survivability of friendly forces
and the freedom of maneuver. The various fire support assets support
forces in contact in various time-tested roles and missions. The
field artillery supports forces in contact in the defense by performing
its traditional roles of close support, counterfire, and interdiction.
The Air Force operations of CAS and SEAD are specifically intended
to support forces in contact, although BAI normally directly affects
ground maneuver forces.
Supporting the force commander's
battle plan means retaining sufficient assets for any possible
contingency. Fire support assets for the rear and deep operations
must be identified. Doing this task gives the force commander
the means to attack high-payoff targets whose destruction, neutralization,
or suppression is necessary for overall mission success. The vagueness
of the initial situation in the defense dictates that the force
commander maintains more centralized control of his fire support.
This is done at first by keeping more assets under his immediate
control or by assigning FA units tactical missions that retain
fire planning, priority of fires, and position authority at higher
levels. This ensures responsiveness by those units in massing
and shifting of fires.
The synchronization of fire
support at corps and division is essentially a command function.
The FSCOORD is responsible for helping the commander integrate
all fire support with the appropriate battlefield operating systems.
A fire support synchronization methodology is found in the decide-detect-deliver
approach to targeting and battle management. The successful use
of this methodology enables the commander to attack the right
target with the best weapon at the right time. Thus, the force
commander can take the initiative in selecting, locating, and
attacking high-payoff targets.
Fire support for defensive
operations must be sustained through all phases of the operation.
Fire support systems must be survivable without degradation of
availability.
Specific fire support attack
and acquisition systems are allocated through the normal practices
such as field artillery organization for combat. Assets will be
allocated to--
-
Provide deep fires to disrupt,
delay, and destroy enemy follow-on forces before they can engage
friendly forces.
-
Provide counterfire to destroy,
neutralize, or suppress the enemy's indirect-fire weapons.
-
Provide SEAD to suppress enemy
air defense weapons immediately before and during flight by friendly
aircraft within the area of operations.
-
Disorganize, delay, and disrupt
critical enemy elements before the attack.
-
Use both lethal and nonlethal
attack means to apply constant pressure to the enemy's command
and control structure.
-
Acquire and attack high-payoff
targets throughout the battlefield.
-
Provide fire support synchronized
with maneuver and command and control countermeasures (C2CM)
in the conduct of deep operations.
-
Retain centralized control
of fire support resources in order to concentrate fire at the
decisive place and time.
-
Provide fires to support counterattacks.
The allocation of nuclear
fires is discussed in detail in FM 100-30. The table below summarizes
the roles of nuclear weapons in defensive operations.
Deep operations begin before
the enemy closes with the corps or division and continue throughout
the battle. Deep operations are used to effect closure times of
follow-on elements and to create windows of opportunity for destructive
actions against them. A successful deep operation may cause the
enemy commander to change his attack plan because it disrupts
his flow of echelons as they move toward the FLOT.
Fire support assets for deep
operations are allocated by determining the friendly area of greatest
vulnerability and predicting where the enemy will conduct his
main attack. Specific considerations include the following:
-
The provision of adequate
fire support to achieve operational objectives.
-
The destruction of high-payoff
targets in enemy follow-on forces.
-
The delivery of SEAD to support
tactical air.
-
The potential use of Army
aviation as a means of providing deep fires.
-
The use of AFSOs to facilitate
fire support coordination and execution during operations.
-
The use of chemical weapons
to delay enemy follow-on forces, disrupt C2, and deny
critical facilities and assets (when use of these weapons has
been approved).
-
The use of nuclear fires to
destroy enemy follow-on forces, C2 facilities, and
other high-value targets such as surface-to- surface missiles
(when use of these weapons has been approved by proper authority).
The decide-detect-deliver
targeting methodology is used to plan and execute fire support
for deep operations in a defensive situation just as it is used
for the offense. (Refer to Appendix B and FM 6-20-10.)
Within the AirLand Battle
defensive framework, security forces perform one of two functions:
screening or covering force operations.
Screening force operations
for the offense and defense are similar and require the same fire
support considerations as discussed in Chapter 4.
Covering force operations
in the defense differ from those in the offense in that an enemy
attack is expected. Corps and division commanders plan to use
the advantages of the defender to defeat the enemy. To exploit
these advantages, the covering force must provide the force commander
with a developed tactical situation that allows the MBA forces
to establish and execute a successful defense. Specifically, the
covering force occupies a sector far enough forward of the FEBA
to--
-
Protect the MBA units from
surprise.
-
Allow the MBA forces time
to prepare defensive positions.
-
Prevent delivery of enemy
medium-range artillery fires against MBA units.
-
Deceive the enemy as to the
location of the main defensive positions.
-
Defeat a specified-size force
or exact a specified percentage of damage to first-echelon forces.
The level of command for controlling
covering forces depends on the width and depth of the area, communications
capabilities, available control headquarters, and the number of
units in the covering force. Normally, corps and divisions control
their own covering force operations. MBA brigade control of covering
forces is less desirable. It takes away assets from the MBA, is
difficult to control, and complicates reporting.
Fire support tasks for security
forces are as follows:
-
Engage the enemy early to
strip away his reconnaissance elements. Specifically, these recon
elements must not infiltrate and slip through the covering force.
Early fires also help force the enemy to deploy his attack formations.
-
Assist maneuver in moving
and disengaging.
-
Provide SEAD to allow attack
helicopters and Air Force aircraft to attack. Destroy air defense
radars located by EW.
-
Engage engineer mobility detachments
to reduce the enemy's engineer mine-clearing capability before
he arrives in the MBA.
-
Mass fires that will delay,
disrupt, or limit the enemy's advance.
-
Integrate fire and obstacle
plans, and ensure obstacles are covered by direct observation.
Normally, security forces
operate at consider-able distances from their main force and have
only minimum maneuver combat power. Additional combat power must
be provided to security forces in general and to covering forces
in particular, This is done through decentralization of fire support
assets. Decentralized fire support provides the responsive firepower
needed to--
-
Make up for the lack of maneuver
in relation to the large covering force area.
-
Cause the enemy to deploy,
thinking he has made contact with the MBA forces.
-
One DS artillery battalion
for each battalion-size maneuver element in the covering force.
-
Nonstandard tactical missions
to MBA artillery units to make them responsive to the covering
force artillery headquarters.
-
The preponderance of other
fire support assets to the covering force. For example, UAV, CAS,
EW, AFSOs, and TACAIR recon assets must be responsive to the covering
force.
Covering forces may operate
at great distances from the MBA forces. Therefore, it may be very
difficult to provide adequate support by only assigning a tactical
mission. Problems of command and control may dictate a change
to the normal command relationship. This is particularly true
when covering forces are spread across a wide frontage or throughout
a deep zone. The method of attachment depends on the control of
the covering force. If the covering force is being controlled
by the MBA headquarters, attachment of FA forces is not necessary.
Normally, this is not the case and the covering force has a controlling
headquarters of its own. Likewise, a covering force artillery
headquarters may be designated. This is often done by attaching
an FA brigade to the covering force. The FA brigade headquarters
then becomes the force artillery headquarters, and the FA brigade
commander is the FSCOORD for the covering force.
Artillery supporting covering
forces should represent those cannon and rocket systems supporting
the MBA forces. This helps deceive the enemy as to the location
of our MBA.
The field artillery supporting
covering forces must be as mobile as the force it supports.
The keys to successful fire
support planning for the defense, and particularly for the covering
force, are staff interactions throughout the targeting process
and the correct application of IPB and TVA. (See FM 6-20-10.)
Initial planning should be as detailed as possible to exploit
the advantages the covering force has when operating over familiar
terrain with prepared defenses. Since the enemy has the initiative,
predictive planning for all courses of action is necessary. Once
execution begins, flexibility through detailed contingency planning
is required to allow response to the unexpected.
Positioning of FA elements
is a critical part of the detailed planning that must occur. A
thin maneuver covering force may have to travel a greater distance
to react to an enemy threat. Field artillery units may have to
move laterally, forward, or to the rear to support the changing
tactical situation. This requires detailed planning and rapid
coordination on the part of the FSCOORD (FSO).
Fire support coordinating
measures in the covering force should be permissive in nature
to open the battlefield to responsive fire support. This can be
done by planning successive, on-order CFLs as close to friendly
troops as possible.
Crucial to the covering force
battle are planning, coordinating, and executing the battle hand-over.
As the battle progresses, a rearward movement will occur eventually.
Maneuver units and their FSCOORDs must ensure that needed information
gets back to the MBA units. Items such as targets, targeting information,
status of covering force units, ammunition status, and requirements
for positioning must be current. Positioning information is particularly
important if control of the battle is to be passed smoothly to
the MBA force. Handing over the
battle and the corresponding rearward passage of lines are difficult
operations that require a massive planning effort. One of the
key elements of the battle hand-over is the change of command
and control of fire support. Control of indirect fires passes
to the MBA force as the covering force hands over the battle.
The hand-over is sequenced one sector at a time until the entire
security force has been withdrawn. Management of this operation
is critical, since the confusion of combat may cause some covering
force units to pass through different units than originally planned.
Detailed coordination between the passing and stationary force
commanders and FSCOORDs is essential.
Similarly, the assumption
of on-order tactical missions by the passing force FA units is
difficult to manage. On-order missions must be carefully planned
to facilitate the likely nonlinear battle hand-over.
Execution of combat service
support for security operations must be in concert with the overall
operation. The CSS must be coordinated with tactical operations
in the rear and in the MBA.
Sustainment of security operations
is a corps responsibility. When nondivisional units are given
the mission, corps support command (COSCOM) assets directly support
these units. When divisions conduct security operations with division
assets, the corps sustains the division in its habitual reamer.
Only those CSS assets immediately
essential to the operation should be positioned forward in the
security area (fuel, ammunition, medical, and limited maintenance).
These assets should be withdrawn when no longer required or when
the risk of their loss becomes unacceptable.
The MBA extends from the FEBA
back to the rear boundary of the brigade for the division and
to the rear boundary of the division for the corps. Normally,
most of the defending force is deployed in the MBA to defeat the
enemy's main attack. Since the decisive defensive battle is often
fought in the MBA, that is where forces are concentrated. The
mission of the MBA forces of the corps covers the entire spectrum
of operations. Thus, while the corps as a whole may be engaged
in defensive operations of the MBA, units within the corps area
(divisions, brigades, and task forces) may well be conducting
any or all of the following operations:
-
Defend - control a limited
area or position.
-
Delay - control an enemy.
-
Attack - enemy- or terrain-oriented.
-
Security and economy-of-force
tasks.
-
Forward and rear passage of
lines.
-
Movement to contact.
-
Bypassed operations and/or
encircled operations.
Fire support in the MBA is
used to or destroy attacking forces. The slow, stop, enemy is
detected early and attacked continuously with all available fire
support means. Fires across the entire front force the enemy to
deploy early into his attack formation. Fires in the economy-of-force
areas are dense enough to slow or divert his supporting formations.
When he masses, his formations must be attacked repeatedly and
effectively with massed fires to reduce his momentum. Deep fires
against the attacker's follow-on forces keep them from influencing
the immediate battle.
Fire support tasks in defense
of the MBA are as follows:
-
Mass fires to canalize and
stall enemy forces, increase engagement, and destroy attacking
elements.
-
Isolate enemy first-echelon
elements by attacking follow-on forces.
-
Support friendly strongpoints.
-
Support obstacles to slow
breaching attempts.
-
Suppress enemy air defenses.
-
Help support rear operations
by fire.
-
Provide counterfires.
-
Deny the enemy use of chosen
avenues of approach.
-
Suppress and obscure enemy
overwatch positions.
-
Force enemy armored vehicles
to button up and slow down.
-
Support counterattacks, or
conduct counterattacks by fire.
-
Provide an economy-of-force
measure that augments maneuver assets and frees them for other
critical areas.
-
Mass fires on enemy avenues
of approach.
-
Coordinate TACAIR to engage
major armor formations and follow-on forces.
-
Support disengagements of
maneuver elements and repositioning to subsequent battle positions.
-
Reinforce obstacles by use
of FASCAM.
Fire support for the MBA battle
is allocated with priority to the most vulnerable area. Usually,
this area coincides with the enemy's most likely avenues of approach
and main attack. While fire support for the defense in general
is most responsive when centrally controlled, the most vulnerable
area of the MBA must be weighted more heavily with immediately
responsive fires. Reinforcing field artillery, immediate CAS sorties,
EW, and targeting assets can be used to provide responsive support
to forces bearing the brunt of the enemy's attack.
Fire support for the MBA must
be allocated as early in the estimate process as possible to allow
commanders enough planning time. The proper integration of IPB
and TVA gives commanders the best guess on likely enemy
courses of action. This analysis is then used to prepare contingencies
for the main battle. The covering force develops the situation
and dictates which contingency should be executed. Appropriate
fire support must be allocated for each of these contingencies.
As much fire support as possible should be centrally controlled
to facilitate a quick and smooth transition into any contingency
plan. Fire support under centralized control allows the force
commander to quickly shift combat power without moving maneuver
forces.
At first, FA units may be
positioned in forward supplementary positions in the MBA to allow
for deeper fires. Supplementary positions should be--
-
Along routes that facilitate
displacements into the main battle area.
-
Selected to provide good cover
and concealment to minimize their vulnerability to enemy air attack.
The key to good combat information
is knowing how the enemy will attack and knowing what to expect.
For corps and divisions, FSCOORDs and their staffs are excellent
information sources. Also, the field artillery has excellent combat
communications by which to transfer this information.
In the MBA, radars should
be focused on the enemy's main effort. This is where the enemy
can be expected to concentrate his indirect-fire weapons. Weapons-locating
radars should be positioned to maximize lateral coverage immediately
forward of the MBA.
As MBA forces are repositioned to meet an enemy main effort, target acquisition elements also should be repositioned, Displacement of these resources should be staggered so that some coverage is always available.
AFSOs can provide target acquisition
and can cue other TA systems. The AFSO also can hand off and designate
targets for Army aviation and Air Force attack.
The handoff of the battle
from covering forces to MBA forces is a critical point in the
defense. Effective command and control is especially important
to ensure a smooth changeover and continuous and effective fire
support. Communications must be established between MBA and covering
forces before control of the battle changes. This is best achieved
when MBA force artillery monitors the nets used by covering force
artillery before the battle hand-over.
Radio communications should
preclude the following:
-
Covering force artillery having
to change frequencies at a critical time.
- Issuing additional SOI extracts to units in the covering force. This reduces the possibility of SOI compromise.
-
Early use of the MBA nets
and possible detection by enemy jammers or direction-finding equipment
before the MBA fight.
The heavy use of friendly
aircraft may be needed during combat operations. Enemy air defenses
must be suppressed to let friendly aircraft operate in the airspace
above or near those defenses and their associated equipment and
facilities. This requires a coordinated effort between air and
land elements to locate enemy facilities and to plan and execute
SEAD operations with all available lethal and nonlethal means.
Usually, the land force management of SEAD fires is centered at
the division main FS cell; however, SEAD planned, managed, and
executed echelons.
Normally, SEAD is planned
at the division main FS cell or below. Targets of concern to the
air elements are processed here and assigned to appropriate fire
support or EW agencies.
Because fire support is limited,
the force commander must indicate his priority for SEAD targets.
The FSCOORDs plan accordingly.
Individual requests by flight
leaders (pilots) for SEAD support are treated as targets of opportunity
(immediate targets).
Counterpreparation fires may
be used if the maneuver commander desires. These fires are designed
to break up enemy preparations for the attack and the continuity
of his attacking elements. Acquisition resources and targeting
efforts are directed toward detecting enemy forward elements,
indirect fire support means, observation posts, command posts,
and reserves. Counterpreparations are fired when the enemy attack
is imminent.
The corps commander has the
principal responsibility for operational planning and execution
of nuclear fires. He develops and issues his planning guidance.
The planning effort must then be focused on these contingencies
and developed into the corps nuclear package. The package contains
division subpackages that include nuclear fires delivered by the
division artillery, Air Force, and supporting FA brigade. The
corps main FS cell must know the status of all nuclear-capable
delivery units.
The primary purpose of reserves
in the defense is to preserve the commander's flexibility. The
reserve is the commander's main means of deciding a battle in
progress or of affecting future operations. The commander should
decide the mission, composition, and size of the reserve on the
basis of his estimate of the situation.
Reserves may be air or ground
maneuver units. When the reserve is committed, all available fire
support will be used to support it. The committed reserve becomes
the main effort of the commander, and all combat power is concentrated
there by the force.
In the mobile defense, the reserve is relied upon to strike the decisive blow. When conditions favor counterattack, the main effort shifts to the reserve, which then strikes with overwhelming combat power. The FSCOORD helps by integrating the available fire support.
Commanders can use reserves
to--
-
Counterattack to exploit enemy
vulnerabilities (flanks, support units, and unprotected forces
in depth).
-
Reinforce forward positions.
-
Block penetrating enemy forces.
-
React to rear area threat.
Fire support tasks for the
reserve are as follows:
-
Plan fires to support the
commitment of the reserve during movement.
-
Plan fires to strike at objectives
in depth as enemy dispositions are revealed. This is to support
the committed reserves and to break up the enemy's coordination
of the attack in the area defense.
-
Plan fires on the enemy's
flanks and rear where counterattacking forces are committed in
the mobile defense.
-
Plan deceptive fires to deceive
the enemy into thinking the reserve is committed elsewhere.
-
Plan for fire support coordinating
measures such as a restrictive fire line in case of converging
forces in the mobile defense or a restrictive fire area to safeguard
strongpoints in the area defense.
-
Plan to rearm, refit, and
refuel organic and supporting fire support before assuming on-order
missions.
In organizing the artillery
for combat and in allocating other fire support, consideration
must be given to the following:
-
A plan for the use of fire
support organic to or habitually supporting the reserve force
until it is committed.
-
Providing adequate support
to the force at the time of commitment.
-
Factors of METT-T.
-
Commander's estimate of the
situation.
-
Commander's intent.
Once the reserve is committed,
organic and habitually supporting field artillery is augmented
by other lethal and nonlethal fire support. Nuclear weapons also
may be considered as reserves and set aside for eventual commitment
if their use has been approved by proper authority.
Unnecessary changes in organization
and time-consuming movements should be avoided to ensure adequate
support for the committed reserve. Timely fire support planning
ensures timely support. The use of an FA brigade headquarters
as a fire support planning agency for the counterattacking force
should be considered. This would free the division artillery of
this task.
Corps or division rear operations
in a defensive posture require increased vigilance against the
more pronounced threat to our rear area. Rear operations are situational
and are planned for as a contingency. They are waged as the need
arises and with the intensity necessary to meet the threat level.
Attempts to disrupt or destroy command and control, combat support,
and combat service support activities can be expected. Operations
in the corps rear must be planned to deal with levels I, II, and
III threats.
Bases or base clusters are
responsible for their own defense against level I threats. The
best defense involves aggressive preparation of fighting positions,
use of camouflage, sound and aggressive guard and security procedures,
well-rehearsed reaction forces, and evacuation plans. Often, the
planning and reaction time is minimal. Defeat of a strong level
II force requires the use of a response force and may require
support by indirect fire.
The commander must allocate
combat forces to defeat level III threat forces. This tactical
combat force normally is a brigade equivalent at corps and a battalion
equivalent at division. Fire support for the TCF should be provided
for by an on-order DS mission for an artillery unit. This requires
the force artillery to plan positioning of units in anticipation
of that requirement. Other fire support means available may be
naval gunfire, TACAIR, and Army aviation. Army aviation is particularly
well suited for providing rear operations fire support because
of its ability to observe the target, its mobility, and its firepower.
Rarely will there be enough
fire support assets available to satisfy the needs of deep, close,
and rear area operations at the same time. The availability and
timely use of fire support in rear operations are critical to
the commander's overall battle plan. Rear operations are important
to sustain the MBA forces and to ensure freedom of action throughout
the area of operations.
With few exceptions, indirect-fire
assets should not be employed against a level I threat or against
those level II threat forces that can be defeated by base or base
cluster units or by the response force. These threats are usually
individual or small-unit operations, are of limited scope and
duration, and provide too fleeting a target for successful engagement
by indirect-fire assets. However, Threat forces beyond base or
base cluster self-defense capabilities may require the use of
indirect-fire assets.
Operations in the rear of
division or corps areas will have a profound effect on the conduct
of close and deep operations. Therefore, such operations
must be anticipated and plans must be devised to defeat the rear
enemy. All operational plans, to include fire support for rear
operations, are passed through the tactical chain of command to
the rear CP.
The forces already on station
are responsible for fighting the rear battle initially. The immediate
problem for the force commander in providing fire support assets
for rear operations is how to synchronize his limited resources
at the right time and place. Considerations that affect the allocation
of fire support for rear operations are as follows:
-
The reduction of fire support
to the main battle effort.
-
The suitability as determined
by the overall tactical situation.
-
The responsiveness of the
available weapon systems.
-
The precision and collateral
damage effects of the weapon systems.
-
The communications nets available
to facilitate fire support activities.
-
The availability of observers
to identify targets and adjust fires.
The FS cell is responsible
for continuous evaluation of fire support assets available for
rear operations. A prioritized list should be developed and coordinated
with the operations cell of the rear CP. As close and deep operations
change the status of these fire support assets, this list must
be updated.
The same fire support assets and fire support coordinating measures applicable to offensive rear operations apply to defensive rear operations. (See Chapter 4.)
The principles of fire support
planning and coordination in the rear areas do not differ significantly
from those in the forward areas. There is, however, a difference
in the facilities available. Rear CPs have only limited manpower
and limited communications facilities. Nevertheless, if a level
III attack occurs, or if a level II attack against high-priority
units cannot be neutralized by base, base cluster, or response
forces, the rear area may temporarily assume an importance greater
than that of the close operations. Fire support planning and coordination
channels should be able to provide rapid application of fires
in the rear. This requires fire support personnel to advise the
rear operations commander; and it requires communications in order
to plan, coordinate, and call for fire support.
The nature of command and
control in rear operations varies with the echelon of command.
Since there is no dedicated rear area fire support net, the operations
cell must establish and disseminate the communications procedures
to be used by rear area elements for planning and requesting fire
support. Although they are not all-inclusive, the operations
cell should consider the following options:
-
Rear area operations net (FM).
The operations net may become overloaded, thus reducing fire support
responsiveness.
-
Multichannel communications
system (or MSE, when fielded).
-
One net from a dedicated fire
support agency (such as a field artillery or attack helicopter
battalion). This option provides maximum responsiveness but is
not practical until the fire support agency is dedicated, not
just on order.
-
A spare or alternate net identified
to be used as a rear area fire support net.
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