9. NIMA and Its Peers and Partners
NIMA could not begin
to serve its customers without the active collaboration of other departments
and agencies, as well as commercial suppliers. All of USIGS is not NIMA
and NIMA is not all of USIGS. NIMA does and must rely on others. Maximizing
the benefit of alliances within and without government is the only smart
way for NIMA to do its business.
9.1
How NIMA Is Viewed by Industry
Industry is generally
concerned with NIMA's long-term vision and architecture, business and
contracting practices, and maturity of partnership. Although NIMA has
taken steps to identify an architecture for the United States Imagery
and Geospatial Service (USIGS), many in the industry contend that the
requirements are more prescriptive than necessary. Furthermore, the architecture
cannot replace a vision of how NIMA sees itself, especially what it considers
to be its own core capabilities.
The industry contends
that NIMA is an unpredictable business partner and hints that it may lose
the support of its industry partners as their commercial opportunities
mature and overtake the business base currently provided by NIMA.
NIMA has many contracts
to support its geospatial requirements, but the industry contends that
they are of short duration, unpredictable schedule, and limited in scope
and funding. Additionally, only a select number of prequalified prime
contractors provide a limited production capability and only to supplement
concurrent NIMA capabilities.
The production contracts
are subject to provision by NIMA of source data, which may or may not
be provided in a timely manner. The industry contends that because of
the unpredictable availability of source data, arcane business practices,
and burdensome contracting regulations, it is unable to provide real-time
feedback to its end-consumers (i.e., NIMA's customers).
Some in industry believe
NIMA performs most of its own information technology work--services, R&D,
and integration--when most of it could easily be performed by the private
sector. Of greatest legitimate concern to the private sector (and to the
Commission) is an apparent NIMA penchant for the government and the contractor
to jointly integrate various functional and mission-related hardware
and software tools. Contractor preference, not surprisingly, would be
for NIMA to contract out the entire process as a turnkey service.
Almost all the foregoing
applies to NIMA's geospatial production. So far, NIMA has had minimal
interaction with the private sector on matters of imagery analysis, even
though some in the industry contend that NIMA could profitably offload
some long-term analysis work to contractors. The Commission believes that
this may be worth pursuing, especially for the more esoteric, science-based
exploitation.
9.2
NIMA and the Other INTs
As the lead agency
for imagery and geospatial information, NIMA has an important role to
play in collaborative efforts across agencies. NIMA comes to the fore
on two counts: first, it is the presumptive USG leader in setting standards
for imagery and geospatial processes; second, NIMA "owns" the geospatial
construct which is the most likely touchstone for collaboration among,
and fusion of, the INTs.
The Commission notes
with satisfaction that NIMA strives to play a constructive role in interagency
and commercial fora that seek to set standards for the mechanics of transmitting
and storing imagery, and to advance the art and practice of GIS and related
disciplines, including, for example, standards for compression and storage
of video. NIMA needs to be a leader--but also a listener--in the Open
GIS Consortium (OGC). NIMA's objective must be to ensure that USG needs
are well served by industry standards. Standards set in disregard of the
commercial market do not generally serve the long-term interests of the
government. The Commission is fond of the definition that "industry standards
are products that ship in volume."18
With respect to collaboration
and fusion of the various collection disciplines, or INTs, the Commission
believes that NIMA should hold a premier place because it "owns" the geospatial
construct. NIMA provides the logical context for fusion of SIGINT, especially
ELINT, with imagery. And SIGINT, despite its own suffering, can add considerable
value to imagery's contribution.
As previously mentioned,
the coming availability of commercial imagery, and associated COTS processing
and exploitation tools, threatens continued US information dominance.
Note, however, that there are no current plans (nor market demand) for
commercial SIGINT. Successful integration of the various INTs, therefore,
may provide the United States the competitive edge it requires in order
to fulfill Joint Vision 2010/20.
However, there does
not appear to be a full-fledged, coherent effort to converge SIGINT with
imagery (a process that we used to call, "fusion").19
Among the questions that should be answered without delay are two. Where
in the stream from collection to end-use should this convergence be applied?
And whose responsibility is it to drive the convergence?
A likely answer to
the "where" question is that the convergence should be effected as far
"upstream" in the collection-processing-exploitation process as possible,
but enabled all the way down to the end-user. In this case, as elsewhere,
the Commission observes that what should be a continuum from NIMA to ultimate
end-user actually has a discontinuity--NIMA services the higher echelons
(as "national" customers), while the Services architect and provision
echelons below. There must be an architectural function that subtends
both the designs of NIMA (more generally, of the "national" systems) and
the last tactical mile designed by the respective services. ASD(C3I) must
acknowledge responsibility for end-to-end architecture and take more forceful
cognizance of the discontinuities that exist.
To whom should we
entrust execution of the Imagery-GIS-SIGINT fusion? Against all odds,
the Commission feels the answer may well be NIMA. Other usual suspects
include NSA and NRO. True, ELINT has traditionally displayed itself geospatially.
True, the NRO and the SIGINT enterprise each have more dollar and engineering
resources than NIMA. True, NIMA is a new organization striving to fulfill
its promise. True, NIMA does not yet inspire confidence in others (and
may lack confidence, itself). Still, the Commission argues, the responsibility
is logically NIMA's. Why? Because the geospatial construct is the obvious
foundation upon which fusion should take place.
Ineluctably, most
military "business processes" are planned and executed within a geospatial
reference framework. Within the National Security Community, NIMA "owns"
that framework. It sets the standards, and provides the controlled base
data. It provides the integration platform for data from other intelligence
sources. As a consequence, NIMA should be empowered to specify the "desktop"--the
way in which users interface with, request and manipulate data of all
sorts.20
For nearly every task, the screen is the map and thus the point-and-click
entry to nearly all information. This desktop metaphor closely matches
two-and-a-half of the three critical questions any analyst or operator
asks: namely, "What is happening here? Where are the...?" Even most "When...?"
questions can be posed within this contextual framework, providing that
all data are "time-tagged," as the Commission argues, elsewhere, as they
should be.
9.3
NIMA and Foreign Government Activities
The Commission was
surprised and impressed by the extent to which NIMA's MC&G relationships
with foreign governments yielded cartographic data that offset considerable
cost that NIMA would otherwise incur
Footnotes:
18
Thought to be attributed to Scott McNealy, Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer, Sun Microsystems, scottg.mcnealy@sun.com.
19
There are efforts--referred to variously as "cross-cueing," "tip-off,"
etc. However, this differs from the fusion for analysis and decisionmaking
envisioned here.
20
However, the Commission acknowledges that the Defense Information Services
Agency (DISA) may have a "process" claim to the desktop specification
that equals NIMA's "substantive" imperative.
Foreword
| Executive Summary and Key Judgments
| Introduction | NIMA
from the Beginning
NIMA in Context | Two-and-a-Half
Roles for NIMA | The Promise of NIMA
NIMA and Its Stakeholders |
NIMA and Its "Customers" | Is There a "National
vs Tactical" Problem?
NIMA and Its Peers and Partners | NIMA
and Its Suppliers | NIMA Management Challenges
NIMA's Information Systems | NIMA
Research and Development
NIMA and Its Information Architecture | Recommendations
| Appendix A
Appendix B | Glossary
of Terms
Table
of Contents | Home | PDF
|
