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3. NIMA in Context
3.1
The National Security Context
When the Soviet Union
exited the world stage left, the US national security community breathed
a momentary, collective sigh of relief. The elation was, however, short-lived.
Despite the clamor of the popular sentiment for a "peace dividend," the
challenges to our national security, perhaps less immediately life threatening,
became more numerous, more diverse, and, in some ways, more difficult.
Emerging threats notwithstanding,
the United States drew down its military and intelligence capacity as
it traditionally had done after resolution of each preceding conflict.
The Gulf War was but a satisfying interlude to "demobilization" through
which we coasted on our residual military strength and our accrued intelligence.
What should have been an object lesson on the wisdom of investing in capability
became, instead, the rationale for continued disinvestments because of
the lopsidedness of the Gulf conflict.
There were two lessons
learned, and subsequently reinforced, one by the policymakers and the
public, the other by military planners.
Policymakers and the
US public--having seen the vision of miraculously light American casualties
and minimal collateral damage--forced "rules of engagement" to become
excessively stringent (and overoptimistic). There is wishful endorsement
of the kindest, gentlest, "zero-zero" warfare--zero American lives lost,
zero collateral damage.
Military planners
evolved Joint Vision 2010 (now 2020) that placed immense faith
in the ability of the intelligence community to deliver on the military
desire for continued information superiority, indeed, "dominance".
Consequently, a substantial
"contingent liability" was levied on intelligence, at a time when intelligence
capabilities were still being diminished apace. The result, to paraphrase
a popular motion picture, is that political and military thinkers are
writing checks that the Intelligence Community cannot cash!
In 2020,4
the nation will face a wide range of interests, opportunities, and challenges.
This will require diplomacy that can effectively advance US interests
while making war a less-likely last resort, a military that can both win
wars and contribute to peace, and an intelligence apparatus that can support
both. The global interests and responsibilities of the United States will
endure, and there is no indication that threats to those interests and
responsibilities, or to our allies, will disappear.
Three aspects of the
world of 2020 have significant implications for our statecraft, our Armed
Forces, and the Intelligence Community that underpins both. First, the
United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with
a variety of regional actors. Transportation, communications, and information
technology will continue to evolve and foster expanded economic ties and
awareness of international events. Our security and economic interests,
as well as our political values, will provide the impetus for engagement
with international partners. For the engagement to be successful, no matter
the playing field or the opponent's rules, our commercial and diplomatic
"forces" must be fully informed and constitutionally prepared to prevail
short of war, while our military must be prepared to "win" across the
full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate
with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary,
with government agencies and international organizations.
Second, potential
adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial base
and much of the same technology as the United States. We will not necessarily
sustain a wide technological advantage over our adversaries in all areas.
Increased availability of commercial satellites, digital communications,
and the public Internet all give adversaries new capabilities at a relatively
low cost. We should not expect opponents in 2020 to engage with strictly
"industrial age" tools--information-age tools will be the key to our effectiveness.
Third, we should expect
potential adversaries to adapt as our capabilities evolve. We have superior
conventional warfighting capabilities and effective nuclear deterrence
today, but this favorable military balance is not static. We have the
best intelligence and most fully informed statecraft. In the face of such
strong capabilities, the appeal of asymmetric approaches and the focus
on the development of niche capabilities by potential adversaries will
increase. By developing and using approaches that avoid US strengths and
exploit potential vulnerabilities using significantly different methods
of operation, adversaries will attempt to create conditions that frustrate
our US diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities.
The potential of such
asymmetric approaches is perhaps the most serious danger the United States
faces in the immediate future--and this danger includes long-range ballistic
missiles and other direct threats to US citizens and territory. The asymmetric
methods and objectives of an adversary are often far more important than
the relative technological imbalance, and the psychological impact of
an attack might far outweigh the actual physical damage inflicted. An
adversary may pursue an asymmetric advantage on the tactical, operational,
or strategic level by identifying key vulnerabilities and devising asymmetric
concepts and capabilities to strike or exploit them. To complicate matters,
our adversaries may pursue a combination of asymmetries, or the United
States may face a number of adversaries who, in combination, create an
asymmetric threat. These asymmetric threats are dynamic and subject to
change, and the United States must maintain the capabilities necessary
to successfully anticipate, deter, defend against, and defeat any adversary
who chooses such an approach. To meet the challenges of the strategic
environment in 2020, our diplomacy and our military must be able to achieve
full spectrum dominance.
3.2
The Collection Context--FIA
The Commission observes
that the FIA-era increase in imagery of more than an order of magnitude
does not, in and of itself, imply a need for a proportionate increase
in exploitation capacity. Some increase may be needed, but an N-fold increase
in imagery does not necessarily translate into an N-fold increase in information
content, particularly when the additional imagery capacity is used to
more frequently "sample" the same target for activity analysis, or indications
and warning (I&W). Watching grass grow does not take a lot of exploitation.
The Commission notes,
elsewhere, that there are outstanding requirements, endorsed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and not satisfied by FIA as currently baselined.
Among these, military users of imagery, especially the US Army, argue
for the importance of direct theater downlink (TDL). Of course, the argument
goes beyond just the "downlink" of imagery, which is effectively accomplished
with only minimal delay, today, via communications satellites. Rather,
the argument is, a regional commander should be "apportioned" the space
reconnaissance assets as they are in view of his theater of operations.
However, National technical means, FIA included, have not been designed,
heretofore, to accommodate this requirement. To modify the electro-optical
imaging design would substantially reduce the available imaging time over
theater as the satellite traded off imaging operations for communications
operations.
The Commission notes,
in passing, that at least one of the commercial satellites5
is actually a TDL design. Its tasking instructions and deposit of imagery
are done by "regional operations centers" (ROCs), and inasmuch as the
commercial vendor is anxious to sell "imaging minutes on orbit" the US
military could experiment, today, with this concept, and "pay by the minute"--i.e.,
without capital investment or long-lead programming and budgeting. Cryptographic
provisions to guarantee theater privacy are already in place.
3.3
Commercial Imagery
 On
September 24, 1999, Space Imaging successfully "launched" the world's
first commercial one-meter imaging satellite, IKONOS. The US government
was a positive factor in this endeavor, despite some national security
reservations, and Presidential Decision Directive 23 codified US policy
on foreign access to remote sensing capabilities. Space Imaging was granted
a license that permitted it to sell commercial imagery at a resolution
of one meter, among others.
While the importance
of resolution is often overstated, improved resolution clearly allows
new information to be extracted from an image. As imagery resolution moves
from the tens of meters to one meter and below, military applications
move beyond terrain analysis, through gross targeting, to precision targeting,
bomb damage assessment, order-of-battle assessment, to technical intelligence
findings.
The Commission endorses
the move to allow US companies to move to higher resolution as required
by the competition and demanded by the marketplace. It will demonstrate
continued technical superiority and signal US government intent to keep
US companies in the forefront. It will raise the bar, discourage others,
and impose new barriers to entry. More importantly it will open up new
markets for satellite imagery now the exclusive province of airborne photography.
And the vastly improved, immediately visible resolution characteristics
will substantially improve "eye appeal," capturing the imagination of
the public, and especially the imagination of those from whom the new
applications will flow. The vitality produced by this change cannot be
overstated--this energy will fuel the next generation of NIMA-relevant
COTS technology.
Until recently, NIMA
has been a captive customer for satellite imagery provided by the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), whose raison d'etre is building and operating
satellites, pure and simple. Because of government internal accounting
practices (planning, programming, and budgeting) the NRO has a capital
budget to build satellites that is loosely derived from requirements that
NIMA voices on behalf of its consumers.6
Once the satellites are built and launched, there is no attempt to recover
sunk costs. Even operating costs for the imaging constellation, ground
processing, and exploitation are not recovered. Imagery acquired from
US "National technical means" is a free good.7
However, use of commercial imagery either by NIMA or by its consumers
directly is not a free good; operating budgets must accommodate any imagery
purchases from Space Imaging and/or its competitors. In a sense, notes
the Commission, commercial imagery providers face competition from an
established behemoth with deep pockets that gives away its wares.
The US government,
Defense and Intelligence, and/or NIMA have not requested that the Congress
appropriate substantial funds for commercial imagery. Notwithstanding,
the Congress has successively appropriated "extra" monies for NIMA to
purchase commercial imagery (and, presumably, value-added imagery products).
The Commission is disappointed that NIMA has been slow to articulate a
commercial imagery strategy that Defense and Intelligence would endorse.
The Commission is more distressed by an announcement promising $1 billion
for commercial imagery purchase, which has subsequently proved to be so
much fiction.
Footnotes:
4
This section paraphrases and elaborates upon the "Strategic Context" of
Joint Vision 2020.
5
IKONOS, the newest imaging satellite launched and operated by Space Imaging,
Thornton, Colorado.
6
"Consumers," not "customers," because, as we shall see, they do not "pay"
for products in the conventional sense--no unseen hand of Adam Smith operating
here!
7
But, because it is free and (therefore) heavily oversubscribed, it is
rationed by an elaborate, dynamic prioritization scheme that is accused
by some of being politicized as well as cumbersome.
Foreword
| Executive Summary and Key Judgments
| Introduction | NIMA
from the Beginning
NIMA in Context | Two-and-a-Half
Roles for NIMA | The Promise of NIMA
NIMA and Its Stakeholders |
NIMA and Its "Customers" | Is There a "National
vs Tactical" Problem?
NIMA and Its Peers and Partners | NIMA
and Its Suppliers | NIMA Management Challenges
NIMA's Information Systems | NIMA
Research and Development
NIMA and Its Information Architecture | Recommendations
| Appendix A
Appendix B | Glossary
of Terms
Table
of Contents | Home | PDF
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