Early Soviet Developments
The "miniaturization" of nuclear charges made it possible to create the 8U69 tactical atomic bomb of low power (5 kt) , which was intended for the first Soviet supersonic fighter-bombers Su-7B launched in 1960. Presumably, it could also be carried by the MiG-21S fighter in a special version of the E-7N. On the eve of the Caribbean crisis (autumn 1962), in addition to ballistic and front-line cruise missiles, the Il-28A light bombers with a corresponding ammunition load of tactical atomic bombs transported to Cuba. They were quite capable of delivering a nuclear strike on the territory of the United States.
The Soviet military and political leadership decided that the saturation of US troops in Europe TNW creates a fundamentally new balance of forces on the continent. Strong measures were taken to create and deploy numerous types of Soviet TNW. Already in the early 1960s tactical missiles T-5, T-7, "Luna" began to arrive in the troops. Later, non-strategic nuclear arsenal included medium-range missiles RSD-10, R-12, R-14, medium-range bombers Tu-22, Tu-16, tactical missiles OTR-22, OTR-23, tactical - R-17 , "Point", nuclear artillery caliber 152 mm, 203 mm and 240 mm, tactical aircraft Su-17, Su-24, MiG-21, MiG-23, and sea-based weapons.
The standard nuclear bomb of the Soviet front-line aviation at the time of the collapse of the USSR was the 30-kiloton RN-40. Its carriers are MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighters, as well as, apparently, Su-17 and MiG-27 fighter-bombers. In addition, the RN-28 nuclear bomb was created, which could be delivered to the target by deck-mounted attack aircraft of the vertical take-off and landing of the Yak-38, based on heavy Kiev-class aircraft carrying cruisers. The stock of such bombs on the Soviet ships of this type was 18 pieces - quite enough to destroy a small country.
For the use of tactical nuclear bombs at high supersonic speeds were intended reconnaissance bomber MiG-25RB (maximum speed of 3000 km/h). The pilots of fighter-bomber aviation "worked out to the most automatic the performance of the most responsible combat mission - a single drop of nuclear bombs from a dive at an angle of 45 degrees immediately after the combat turnaround in the afterburner. Unlike the Americans, who almost intended to shoot every Soviet tank individually with guided missiles, we looked at such things more widely: two "special bombs" - and the tank regiment was gone."
The US tended to assume that it enjoyed an enduring technological advantage and that the Soviet Union woul not act to eliminate that advantage. After the Soviets began large-scale deployments of nuclear artillery in the mid-1970s, no study was done of the implications of the Soviets eliminating the previous NATO advantage in nuclear artillery. The Oregon Trail study was flawed with a similar assumption of a NATO monopoly in nuclear artillery; on those terms, nuclear artillery appeared to favor the defender, but this is not clear if both sides had such weapons.
On the tactical or battlefield level, NATO once possessed an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons systems and warheads. In some quarters that superiority has been considered one of the primary pillars in the deterrence of the overwhelmingly superior Soviet conventional forces. The Soviet Union was deploying dual capable 203 mm and 240 mm artillery. According to the Secretary of Defense, nuclear capable artillery was only deployed in the Soviet Union. However, Soviet nuclear artillery could easily be moved to support nuclear operations against NATO. Air Vice-Marshal Menaul estimated in 1980 that the Soviet Union had 150 of the 203mm guns/hovitzers with a nuclear capability. It was reasonable to assume that as a minimum the Soviets had deployed at least as many 240mm guns/howiters.
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