Iraq Special Weapons - References
- Report to the President Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 31 Mar 2005
- Iraq Survey Group Final Report Central Intelligence Agency 30 Sep 2004 -- " Given Iraq's investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD. (...) Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date. (...) Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable (...) In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."
- 1Key Findings of the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction 30 Sep 2004 [PDF]
- Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies Australian Goverment 22 Jul 2004 -- "The report of this inquiry - Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies - considers the effectiveness of the intelligence community's current oversight and accountability mechanisms and the delivery of high quality and independent intelligence advice to the government, and includes case studies on Iraq."
- Butler Report: Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction United Kingdom Committee of Privy Counsellors 14 Jul 2004 [PDF 1 MB]
- REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ Select Committe on Intelligence 09 Jul 2004 [PDF Version 23.4 MB] Conclusions [PDF Version 1.89 MB]
- Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Australia Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Released on 01 Mar 2004 -- "there is a considerable difference between having an interest in preserving a programme or a desire for particular weapons and actually having deployable weapons."
- Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G. by Lord Hutton The Hutton Inquiry 28 Jan 2004
- Statement by David Kay: Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) 02 October 2003 - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Iraqi weapons of mass destruction - Intelligence and Assessments UK Intelligence and Security Committee Sep 2003 -- "The purpose of this Report is to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications. This Report does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct." [PDF 600 Kb]
- The Decision to go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 2002-03, Volume I United Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee July 7, 2003 -- "This Report seeks to establish whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, within the Government as a whole, presented accurate and complete information to Parliament in the period leading up to military action in Iraq, particularly in respect of weapons of mass destruction. The focus on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is because their removal was the Government's prime objective." [PDF 1.03 Mb]
- Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction Remarks as prepared for delivery by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet at Georgetown Universit 5 February, 2004 -- "I have come here today to talk to you-and to the American people-about something important to our nation and central to our future: how the United States intelligence community evaluated Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade, leading to a National Intelligence Estimate in October of 2002. I want to tell you about our information and how we reached our judgments. I will tell you what I think-honestly and directly."
- Unravelling the Known Unknowns: Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq British American Security Information Council 25 Jan 2004 -- BASIC has today released a major research report that reviews the accumulated evidence of Iraq's suggested possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and concludes that the rationale for overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime was bogus.
- WMD in Iraq Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 07 Jan 2004 -- The following is taken from a new Carnegie study, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications. This report attempts to summarize and clarify the complex story of WMD and the Iraq war. It examines the unclassified record of prewar intelligence, administration statements of Iraq's capabilities to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and the evidence found to date in Iraq.
- NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION [EXCERPTS] October 2002 -- As Released by The White House on July 18, 2003 -- "We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)"
- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL HOLDS BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ JULY 18, 2003 -- The National Intelligence Estimate is the work product of about six intelligence agencies that pulled together all the information -- this is a particular one with regards to the weapons of mass destruction program of Saddam Hussein, as you see. It is titled "Iraq's Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction."
- CIA Statement on Recently Acquired Iraqi Centrifuge Equipment Central Intelligence Agency 26 Jun 2003
- Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program Defense Intelligence Agency Released in June 2003 -- The declassified section on Iraq's chemical warfare program from the September 2002 classified Defense Intelligence Agency study. [PDF 82 Kb]
- Transcript: Background Briefing on IAEA Nuclear Safeguards and the Tuwaitha Facility 05 Jun 2003
- Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants Central intelligence Agency 28 May 2003
- Transcript: Briefing on Weapons of Mass Destruction Exploitation in Iraq 07 May 2003
- FACT SHEET: Historic Review of UNMOVIC's Report on Unresolved Disarmament Issues U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE March 10, 2003
- Transcript: Powell: "Iraq: Still Failing to Disarm" US Department of State 05 Mar 2003
- General Hussein Kamal UNSCOM/IAEA Briefing UNSCOM/IAEA 22 August 1995
- Iraq's Hidden Weapons: Failing to Disclose and Disarm US Department of State 27 Feb 2003
- Remarks to the United Nations Security Council by Secretary Colin L. Powell State Department 14 Feb 2003
- Remarks to the United Nations Security Council by Secretary Colin L. Powell 05 Feb 2003 -- "We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? "
- Iraq Failing To Disarm: PDF of the Secretary's Presentation to the UNSC 05 Feb 2003 [PDF 1.13 Mb]
- Iraq - Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation UK Foreign Commonwealth Office 03 Feb 2003
- Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Speech on Iraq Disarmament 23 Jan 2003
- What Does Disarmament Look Like? 23 Jan 2003
- "Why We Know Iraq Is Lying," by Condoleezza Rice 23 Jan 2003 Washington File
- Apparatus of Lies: Saddam's Disinformation and Propaganda (1990-2003)
- State Department Cites Gaps in Iraq Weapons Declaration Washington File 19 Dec 2002
- DoD Briefing on Iraqi Denial and Deception 08 Oct. 2002
- Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs Central Intelligence Agency - 04 October 2002
- Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Blair's Report
- Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government" September 24, 2002
- CLINTON'S REPORT ON IRAQ'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS 06 November 1998 -- The Iraqi government continues to insist on the need for rapid lifting of the sanctions regime, despite its clear record of noncompliance with its obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions.
- Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs U.S. Government White Paper, February 13, 1998 - Enough production components and data remain hidden and enough expertise has been retained or developed to enable Iraq to resume development and production of WMD. Iraq maintains a small force of Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect biological and chemical weapons production.
- Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq: a Summary of Biological, Chemical, Nuclear and Delivery Efforts and Capabilities 11/13/96 -- by Anthony H. Cordesman, co-director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons
- Now Is a Good Time to Revisit Saddam's Nuclear Capability Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley, International Herald Tribune, March 5, 1998
- NCI Report: Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues Steven Dolley, NCI Research Director, February 19, 1998 NCI Warns that Saddam May Have Active Nuclear Weapons Program - The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) warned that contrary to the widespread belief that Iraq's nuclear weapons program no longer poses an immediate threat, evidence collected by United Nations inspectors in fact points to an active, advanced program that poses a clear and present danger.
- IRAQ's WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE 1997 GULF CRISIS By Laurie Mylroie MERIA Middle East Review of International Affairs ISSUE #4 JANUARY 1998 The crisis precipitated by Iraq's October 29 decision to expel American members of the UN Special Commission [UNSCOM] working there brought to public attention the very serious danger posed by Iraq's continued possession of large stockpiles of biological and chemical agents. As the crisis made clear, Saddam Hussein wants economic sanctions lifted even though he retains those weapons.
- HOW SADDAM ALMOST BUILT HIS BOMB Al J Venter Janes Intelligence Review December 1997
- Could Iraq Build an Atomic Bomb Today If It Were Able to Buy Fissile Material? Transcript of Q&A with Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, then-Executive Chairman of UN Special Commission on Iraq, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, June 10, 1997
- "Iraq: How Close to a Nuclear Weapon?" Edwin S. Lyman, November 14, 1995
- "Who Says Iraq Isn't Making a Bomb?" Paul Leventhal and Edwin Lyman, International Herald Tribune, November 2, 1995
- Iraq's Crash Program to Build A-Bomb Should Come as No Surprise, NCI Finds, NCI press release, August 26, 1995
- Has Iraq come clean at last? by DAVID ALBRIGHT and ROBERT KELLEY Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists November-December 1995 Summary: The past four-plus years have been frustrating for Western nuclear sleuths who have tried to get the whole story of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The Iraqis have cooperated at times, especially when backed into a corner. But in general, they have stalled, obfuscated, covered up, and even lied about the extent of the program. The latest revelations about the program quickly followed the defection in early August of Gen. Hussein Kamel, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein.
- Engineer for Hire By David Albright Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists December 1993 Summary: Iraqi oil money was used to buy both hardware and expertise from Western nations, particularly Germany, in a fruitless effort to build a nuclear weapon. Here is the story of Bruno Stemmler, engineer for hire.
- A Proliferation Primer By David Albright Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists June 1993 Summary: Iraq's nuclear potential has often been exaggerated, sometimes to justify military action, and at other times to bolster U.N. inspection efforts, but the Gulf War did unmask a determined, well-funded nuclear-weapons program that had largely escaped detection. If the war had not led to the program's destruction, Iraq might soon have had its first nuclear weapon.
- Myth-Building: The "Islamic" Bomb By Pervez Hoodbhoy Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists June 1993 Summary: The "Islamic bomb" is roughly understood to be a nuclear weapon acquired for broad ideological reasons-a weapon that supposedly belongs collectively to the Muslim ummah or community and, as such, is the ultimate expression of Islamic solidarity. Concern about the Islamic bomb is at the heart of the intense effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Muslim countries.
- Supplier-spotting By DAVID ALBRIGHT and MARK HIBBS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jan/Feb 1993 Summary: Iraqi officials finally admitted, during the fifteenth inspection visit of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in November, that they had been researching gas-centrifuge enrichment of uranium at Rashidiya, on the northern outskirts of Baghdad, rather than solely at the Tuwaitha nuclear research center, as Iraqi officials had previously insisted.
- Iraq's shop-till-you-drop nuclear program by DAVID ALBRIGHT and MARK HIBBS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists April 1992 Summary: Many different companies and individuals were involved. Inwako. The centrifuge The complex links among companies and individuals are only part of the puzzle. In the background, however, are more important differences about how to get to the bottom of Iraq's nuclear program.
- IRAQ: It's all over at Al Atheer by DAVID ALBRIGHT and MARK HIBBS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists June 1992 Summary: Iraq allowed the destruction of Al Atheer, a complex under construction 40 kilometers south of Baghdad, considered the Iraqi equivalent of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which developed and assembled the first atomic bombs during the Manhattan Project.
- Iraq's bomb: Blueprints and artifacts By David Albright Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January-February 1992 Summary: After more than half a year of investigating Iraqs clandestine nuclear program, U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found the biggest remaining piece of the puzzle: details of Iraq's effort to design and develop a nuclear explosive device.
- IRAQ Truth and fiction in the Iraqi nuclear story By DAVID ALBRIGHT and MARK HIBBS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists October 1991 Reports
- Iraq's nuclear hide-and-seek. By David Albright and Mark Hibbs Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September 1991 Vol. 47, No. 7
- U.N. COMMISSION SIFTS THROUGH RUBBLE By JIM WURST Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September 1991
- Hyping the Iraqi bomb. By David Albright and Mark Hibbs Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March 1991 Vol. 47, No. 2
- Iraq and the bomb: Were they even close? By David Albright and Mark Hibbs Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March 1991 Vol. 47, No. 2
- IRAQ AND THE RULES OF THE NUCLEAR GAME Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January 1991
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