Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Washington -- The following document, entitled "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq: a Summary of Biological, Chemical, Nuclear and Delivery Efforts and Capabilities" was prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, co-director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

(Mr. Cordesman has copyrighted the document and reserves all rights to it. He has granted permission for republication and translation by USIS posts and local press abroad. On title page of any republication, credit author and source.)

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Delivery Systems

Prior to the Gulf War Iraq had extensive delivery systems incorporating long-range strike aircraft with refueling capabilities and several hundred regular and improved longer-range Scud missiles, some with chemical warheads. These systems included:

-- Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers. -- MiG-29 fighters. -- Mirage F-1, MiG-23BM, and Su-22 fighter attack aircraft. -- A Scud force with a minimum of 819 missiles. -- Extended range Al-Hussein Scud variants (600 kilometer range) extensively deployed throughout Iraq, and at three fixed sites in northern, western, and southern Iraq. -- Developing Al-Abbas missiles (900 kilometer range) which could reach targets in Iran, the Persian Gulf, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus. -- Long-range super guns with ranges of up to 600 kilometers.

Iraq also engaged in efforts aimed at developing the Tamuz liquid fueled missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers, and a solid fueled missile with a similar range. Clear evidence that at least one design was to have a nuclear warhead.

Iraq attempted to conceal a plant making missile engines from the U.N. inspectors. It only admitted this plant existed in 1995, raising new questions about how many of its missiles have been destroyed.

Iraq produced or assembled 80 Scud missiles it its own factories. Some 53 seem to have been unusable, but ten are still unaccounted for.

Had designed work underway for a nuclear warhead for its long range missiles.

The Gulf War deprived Iraq of some of its MiG-29s, Mirage F-1s, MiG-23BMs, and Su-22. Since the end of the war, the U.N. inspection regime has also destroyed many of Iraq's long-range missiles.

Iraq, however, maintains a significant delivery capability consisting of:

o HY-2, SS-N-2, and C-601 cruise missiles, which are unaffected by U.N. ceasefire terms.

o FROG-7 rockets with 70 kilometer ranges, also allowed under U.N. resolutions.

o Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery.

o Experimental conversions such as the SA-2.

Iraq claims to have manufactured only 80 missile assemblies, 53 of which were unusable. UNSCOM (the United Nations Special Commission) claims that ten are unaccounted for.

U.S. experts believe Iraq may still have components for several dozen extended-range Scud missiles. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all but 6-16 of 819 Scud assemblies shipped to Iraq before Gulf War.

In addition, Iraq has admitted to:

o Hiding its capability to manufacturing its own Scuds. Iraq built 80 Scud type missiles, although 53 were unusable. Ten of its Scud missile engines are still unaccounted for.

o Developing an extended range variant of the FROG-7 called the Laith. The U.N. claims to have tagged all existing FROG-7s to prevent any extension of their range beyond the U.N. imposed limit of 150 kilometers for Iraqi missiles.

o Experimenting with cruise missile technology and ballistic missile designs with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers.

o Flight testing Al-Hussein missiles with chemical warheads in April 1990.

o Developing biological warheads for the Al Hussein missile as part of Project 144 at Taji.

o Initiating a research and development program for a nuclear warhead missile delivery system.

o Successfully developing and testing a warhead separation system.

o Indigenously developing, testing, and manufacturing advanced rocket engines to include liquid-propellant designs.

o Conducting reseach into the development of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) for the dissemination of biological agents.

o Attempting to expand its Ababil-100 program designed to build surface-to-surface missiles with ranges beyond the permitted 100-150 kilometers.

o Importing parts from Britain, Switzerland, and other countries for a 350 mm "super gun."

o Starting an indigenous 600 mm supergun design effort.

o Starting additional long-range missile programs, with ranges of 900, 2,000, and 3,000 kilometers.

U.S. and U.N. officials conclude further that:

o Iraq is concentrating procument efforts on rebuilding its ballistic missile program using a clandestine network of front companies to obtain the necessary materials and technology from European and Russian firms.

o This equipment is then concealed and stockpiled for assembly concomitant with the end of the U.N. inspection regime.

o The equipment clandestinely sought by Iraq includes advanced missile guidance components, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes, specialty metals, special machine tools, and a high-tech, French-made, million-dollar furnace designed to fabricate engine parts for missiles.

o Jordan found that Iraq was smuggling missile components through Jordan in early December, 1995. These included 115 gyroscopes in 10 crates, and material for making chemical weapons. The shipment was worth an estimated $25 million. Iraq claimed the gyroscopes were for oil exploration but they are similar to those used in the Soviet SS-18 ICBM. UNSCOM found some gyroscopes dumped in the Tigris.

o U.S. satellite photographs reveal that Iraq has rebuilt its Al-Kindi missile research facility.

o Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the U.N. sanctions regime.

o The fact the agreement allows Iraq to continue producing and testing short range missiles (less than 150 kilometers range) has meant it can retain significant missile efforts.

o The SA-2 is a possible test bed, but UNSCOM has tagged all missiles and monitors all high apogee tests.

Chemical Weapons

In revelations to the U.N., Iraq admitted that, prior to the Gulf War, it:

o Maintained large stockpiles of mustard gas, and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun.

o Produced binary Sarin filled artillery shells, 122 mm rockets, and aerial bombs.

o Manufactured enough precursors to produce 70 tons (70,000 kilograms) of the nerve agent VX. These precursors included 65 tons of choline and 200 tons of phosphorous pentasulfide and di-isopropylamine.

o Tested Ricin, a deadly nerve agent, for use in artillery shells.

o Had three flight tests of long range Scuds with chemical warheads.

o Had large VX production effort underway at the time of the Gulf War.

The destruction of the related weapons and feedstocks has been claimed by Iraq, but not verified by UNSCOM. Seems to have had at least 3,800 kilogmms of V-agents by time of war, and 12-16 missile warheads.

The majority of Iraq's chemical agents were manufactured at a supposed pesticide plant located at Muthanna. Various, other production facilities were also used, includng those at Salman Pak, Samara, and Habbiniyah. Though severly damaged during the war, the physical plant for many of these facilities has been rebuilt.

Iraq possessed the technology to produce a variety of other persistent and non-persistent agents.

The Gulf War and subsequent events:

o U.N. inspection regime may have largely eliminated these stockpiles and reduced production capability.

o U.S. experts believe Iraq has concealed significant stocks of precursors. It also appears to retain significant amounts of production equipment dispersed before or during Desert Storm and not recovered by the U.N.

o Iraq has developed basic chemical warhead designs for Scud missiles, rockets, bombs, and shells. Iraq also has spray dispersal systems.

o Iraq maintains extensive stocks of defensive equipment.

o The U.N. maintains that Iraq is not currently producing chemical agents, but the U.N. is also concerned that Iraq has offered no evidence that it has destroyed its VX production capability and/or stockpile.

o Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the U.N. sanctions regime.

Recent UNSCOM work confirms that Iraq did deploy gas-filled 155 mm artillery and 122 mm multiple rocket rounds into the rear areas of the KTO during the Gulf War.

These weapons had no special visible markings, and were often stored in the same area as conventional weapons.

Iraq now has the technology to produce stable highly lethal VX gas with long storage times.

May have developed improved binary and more stable weapons since the Gulf War.

Has attempted to covertly import precursors and production equipment for chemical weapons through Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan since the Gulf War.

Biological Weapons

Had highly compartmented "black" program with far tighter security regulations than chemical program.

Had 18 major sites for some aspect of biological weapons effort before the Gulf War. Most were non-descript and have no guards or visible indications they were a military facility.

The U.S. targeted only one site during the Gulf War. It struck two sites, one for other reasons. It also struck at least two targets with no biological facilities that it misidentified.

Systematically lied about biological weapons effort until 1995. First stated that had small defensive efforts, but no offensive effort. In July, 1995, admitted had a major offensive effort. In October, 1995, finally admitted major weaponization effort.

Iraq has continued to lie about its biological weapons effort since October, 1995. It has claimed the effort is head by Dr. Taha, a woman who only headed a subordinate effort. It has not admitted to any help by foreign personnel or contractors. It has claimed to have destroyed its weapons, but the one site UNSCOM inspectors visited showed no signs of such destruction and was later said to be the wrong site. It has claimed only 50 people were employed full time, but the scale of the effort would have required several hundred.

The August 1995 defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Majid, formerly in charge of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, revealed the extent of this biological weapons program.

Reports indicate that Iraq tested at least seven principal biological agents for use against humans.

o Anthrax, Botulinum, and Aflatoxin known to be weaponized.

o Looked at viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Examined the possibility of weaponizing Gas Gangrene and Mycotoxins. Some field trials were held of these agents.

o Examined foot and mouth disease, haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox virus.

o Conducted research on a "wheat pathogen" and a Mycotoxin similar to "yellow rain" defoliant.

o The "wheat smut" was first produced at Al Salman, and then put in major production during 1987-1988 at a plant near Mosul. Iraq claims the program was abandoned.

The defection prompted Iraq to admit that it:

o Imported 39 tons of growth media for biological agents obtained from three European firms. Accordng to UNSCOM, 17 tons remains unaccounted for. Each ton can be used to produce 10 tons of bacteriological weapons.

o Imported type cultures which can be modified to develop biological weapons from the U.S.

o Had a laboratory- and industrial-scale capability to manufacture various biological agents includng the bacteria which cause anthrax and botulism; aflatoxin, a naturally occurring carcinogen; clostridium perfringens, a gangrene-causing agent; the protein toxin ricin; tricothecene mycotoxins, such as T-2 and DAS; and an anti-wheat fungus known as wheat cover smut. Iraq also conducted research into the rotavirus, the camel pox virus and the virus which causes haemorrhagic conjunctivitis.

o Created at least seven primary production facilities includng the Sepp Institute at Muthanna, the Ghazi Research Institute at Amaria, the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, and facilities at Al-Hakim, Salman Pak Taji, and Fudaliyah. Accordng to UNSCOM, weaponization occured primarily at Muthanna through May, 1987 (largely Botulinum), and then moved to Al Salman. (Anthrax). In March, 1988 a plant was open at Al-Hakim, and in 1989 an Aflatoxin plant was set up at Fudaliyah.

o Research on aflatoxin began in May 1988 at Al Salman, where the toxin was produced by the growth of fungus aspergilus in 5.3 quart flasks. The motives behind Iraq's research on aflatoxin remain one of the most speculative aspects of its program. It is associated with fungal-contaminated food grains, and is considired non-lethal. It normally can produce liver cancer; but only after a period of months to years and in intense concentrations. There is speculation, however, that a weaponized form might cause death within days and some speculation that it can be used as an incapacitating agent.

o Manufactured 6,000 liters of concentrated Botulinium toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax at Al-Hakim during 1990; 5,400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute from November 1990 to January 15, 1991; 400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at Taji; and 150 liters of concentrated anthrax at Salman Pak. Produced 1,850 liters of Aflatoxin in solution at Fudaliyah.

o Produced 340 liters of concentrated clostidium perfringens, a gangrene-causing biological agent, beginning in August 1990.

o Produced 10 liters of concentrated Ricin at Al Salam. Claim abandoned work after tests failed.

o Had at least 79 civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biological weapons production still extent in 1995.

o Took fermenters and other equipment from Kuwait to improve effort during the Gulf War.

Extensive weaponization program:

o Had test site about 200 kilometers west of Baghdad, used animals in cages and tested artillery and rocket rounds against live targets at ranges up to 16 kilometers.

o Armed 155 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets with biological agents.

o Conducted field trials, weaponization tests, and live firings of 122 mm rockets armed with anthrax and Botulinum toxin from March 1988 to May 1990.

o Tested ricin, a deadly protein toxin, for use in artillery shells.

o Iraq produced at least 191 bombs and 25 missile warheads with biological agents.

o Developed and deployed 250 pound alumirum bombs covera in fiberglass. Bombs were designed so they could be mounted on both Soviet and Frencm aircrart. They were rigged with parachutes for low altitudes drops to allow efficient slow delivery and aircrart to fly under radar coverage. Some debate over whether bombs had cluster munitions or simply dispersed agent like LD-400 chemical bomb.

o Deployed at least 166 R-400 bombs with 85 liters of biological agents each during the Gulf War. Deployed them at two sites. One was near an abandonded runway where it could fly in aircrart, arm them quickly, and disperse with no prior indicion of activity and no reason for the UN to target the runway.

o Total production reached at least 19,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum (10,000 liters filled into munitions); 8,500 liters of concentrated Anthrwc (6,500 liters filled into munitions); and 2,500 liters of concentrated Aflatoxin (1,850 liters filled into munitions).

o Weaponized at least three biological agents for use in the Gulf War. The weaponization consisted of at least 100 bombs and 15 missile warheads loaded with Botulinum. There were at least 50 R-400 air-delivered bombs and 10 missile warheads loaded with anthrax; and 16 missile warheads loaded with Aflatoxin, a natural carcinogen. The warheads were designed for operability with the Al-Hussein Scud variant.

o Moved production of Aflatoxin to Fudaliyah in 1989, and produced 481 gallons of toxin in solution between November, 1988 and May, 1990. Developed 16 R-400 aflatoxin bombs and two Scud warheads. Conducted trials with ailatoxin in 122 mm rockets and R-400 bombs in November 1989 and May and August 1990. Produced a total of 572 gallons of toxin and loaded410.8 gallons into munitions.

o Developed and stored drops tanks ready for use for three aircraft or RPVs with the capability of dispersing 2,000 liters of anthrax. Development took place in December 1990. Claimed later that tests showed were inefftive.

o Found, however, that Iraqi Mirages were given spray tanks to disperse biological agents. Held trials as late as January 13, 1991. The Mirages were chosen because they have large 2,200 liter belly tanks and could be refueled by air, giving them a long endurance and strike range.

o The tanks had electric valves to allow the agent to be released and the system was tested by releasing simu1ed agent into desert areas with scattered petri dishes to detect the biological agent. UNSCOM has video tapes of the aircraft.

o Project 144 at Taji produced at least 25 operational Al Hussein warheads. Ten of these were hidden deep in a railway tunnel, and 15 in holes dug in an unmanned hide site along the Tigris.

o Equipped crop spraying helicopters for biological warfare and held exercises and tests simulating the spraying of anthrax spores.

o Biological weapons were only distinguished from regular weapons by a black stripe.

The U.N. claims that Iraq has offered no evidence to corroborate its claims that it destroyed its stockpile of biological agents after the Gulf War. Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of the U.N.'s sanctions regime.

U.N. currently inspects 79 sites -- five used to make weapons before war; five vaccine or pharmaceutical sites; 35 research and university sites; thirteen breweries, distilleries, and dairies with dual-purpose capabilities; eight diagnostic laboratories.

Retains laboratory capability to manufacture various biological agents includng the bacteiia which cause anthrax, botulism, tularemia and typhoid.

Many additional civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biological weapons production.

Nuclear Weapons

Inspections by U.N. teams have found evidence of two successful weapons designs, a neutron initiator, explosives and triggering technology needed for production of bombs, plutonium processing technology, centrifuge technology, Calutron enrichment technology, and experiments with chemical separation technology. Iraq had some expert technical support, includng at least one German scientist who provided the technical plans for the URENCO TC-11 centrifuge.

Main nuclear weapons related facilities were:

o Al Atheer - center of nuclear weapons progrrm. Uranium metallurgy; production of shaped charges for bombs, remote controlled facilities for high explosives manufacture.

o Al Tuwaitha - triggering systems, neutron initiators, uranium metallurgy, and hot cells for plutonium separation. Laborory production of UO2, UCL4, UF6, and fuel fabrication facility. Prototype-scale gas centrifuge, prototype EMIS facility, and testing of laser isotope separation technology.

o Al Qa Qa - high explosives storage, testing of detonors for high explosive component of implosion nuclear weapons.

o Al Musaiyib/Al Hatteen - high explosive testing, hydrodynamic studies of bombs.

o Al Hadre - firing range for high explosive devices, includng FAE.

o Ash Sharqat - designed for mass production of weapons grade material using EMIS.

o Al Furat - designed for mass production of weapons grade material using centrifuge method.

o Al Jesira (Mosul) - mass production of UCL4.

o Al Qalm - phosphate plant for production of U3O8.

o Akashat uranium mine.

Had three reactor programs:

o Osiraq/Tammuz I 40 megawatt light-water reactor destroyed by Israeli air attack in 1981.

o Isis/Tammuz II 800 kilowatt light water reactor destroyed by Coalition air attack in 1991.

o IRT-5000 five megawatt light water reactor damaged by Coalition air attack in 1991.

o Iraq used Calution (EMIS) centrifuges, plutonium processing, chemical defusion and foreign purchases to create new production capability after Israel destroyed most of Osiraq.

o Iraq established a centrifuge enrichment system in Rashidya and conducted research into the nuclear fuel cycle to facilitate development of a nuclear device.

o After invading Kuwait, Iraq attempted to accelerate its program to develop a nuclear weapon by using radioactive fuel from French and Russian-built reactors. It made a crash effort in September, 1990 to recover enriched fuel from its supposedly safe-guarded French and Russian reactors, with the goal of produced a nuclear weapon by April, 1991. The program was only halted after Coalition air raid destroyed key facilities on January 17, 1991.

o Iraq conducted research into the production of a radiological weapon, which disperses lethal radioactive material without initiating a nuclear explosion.

o Orders were given in 1987 to explore the use of radiological weapons for area denial in the Iran-Iraq War.

o Three prototype bombs were detonated at test sites -- one as a ground level static test and two others were dropped from aircraft.

o Iraq claims the results were disappointing and the project was shelved but has no record or evidence to prove this.

o U.N. teams have found and destroyed, or secured, new stockpiles of illegal enriched material, major production and R&D facilities, and equipment -- includng Calution enriching equipment.

o UNSCOM believes that Iraq's nuclear program has been largely disabled and remains incapacitated, but warns that Iraq retains substantial technology and established a clandestine purchasing system in 1990 that it has used to import forbidden components since the Gulf War.

o Iraq still retains the technology developed before the Gulf War and U.S. experts believe an ongoing research and development effort continues, in spite of the U.N. sanctions regime.

o A substaitial number of declared nuclear weapons components and research equipment has never been recovered. There is no reason to assume that Iraqi declarations were comprehensive.

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