Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)


"In wartime, truth is so precious that
she should always be attended by
a bodyguard of lies."
Winston Churchill

North Korea unveiled posters depicting its ballistic missile striking the White House. The North’s official Korean Central News Agency on 17 August 2017 revealed six propaganda posters upholding the regime’s earlier threat to attack the US. The posters depict the North’s Hwasong-14 missiles attacking the White House and smashing the phrases “sanctions resolution," “a preventive war," and “a military option." They were seen as an expression of Pyongyang’s determination not to succumb to UN Security Council sanctions or U.S. presidential security adviser Herbert McMaster’s recent remarks on the U.S.’ preparations for a preventive war against the North.

DPRK New Missiles - 15 April 2017

On 15 April 2015 North Korea held its big military parade to mark the 105th anniversary of the birth of regime founder Kim Il Sung. The regime showed off several new missile designs. Halfway through the two-and-a-half hour military parade that took place in Pyongyang on Saturday, North Korea showed off its next-generation military hardware. One commentator said "This is the first time North Korea has ever displayed such a range of their missile arsenal. We can see from today that North Korea's missile technology has advanced far more than we had previously thought."

This is North Korea, so the fact that a "missile" is on display does not necessarily mean they are operational, or even that that they are in development. One observer suggested "I'm also sure that the missiles are not ready yet, but it doesn't matter. What matters is that North Korea is now developing ICBM's. It might take a little more time than they want to, but there is no show of just models to deceive anyone." But this is silly. During the 1960s, the Soviets were quite fond a dragging their rockets [aka "Rattling Their Rockets"] through Red Square. It turned out that possibly half of the displayed rockets were not what the West believed them to be. Frequently, the Soviets displayed prototypes that had lost competitions, while hiding the winning design that had entered production.

The North Koran's paraded far many more missile designs than can practically be produced in meaningful numbers. At least three variants of the Hwasong-13 have been glimpsed, but there is no reason to believe that more than one would enter production.

The North for the first time publicly showcased its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as what appeared to be a new type of ICBM. "It's presumed to be a new ICBM. It seems longer than the existing KN-08 or KN-14 ICBMs," a South Korean military official told Yonhap, after the intercontinental ballistic missiles along with the Pukkuksong-2 SLBMs were paraded in front of the country's leader, Kim Jong-un. Many of these "missile" were most likely simulators used for training purposes, and some may be fakes.

The North Korean People’s Army publicly displayed for the first time its new long-range road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles during the military parade in Pyongyang on 15 April. The missile of the new road-mobile intercontinental systems is carried in a large canister that completely enclosed the missile mounted on an eight wheels trailer. There is no precise information about this missile system. “It’s presumed this is a mock-up new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The new ICBM looks like a Chinese DF-31.“, said South Korean military officials.

Hwasong-? - Transporter

This vehicle has not been previously seen, and was only poorly seen on the Day of the Sun in 2017. The tractor-trailer rig is new for the DPRK, but is generally similar to such rigs seen in Iran [Shahab-3, Shahab-3B], and Pakistan [Ghauri], with three wheels on the tractor, and two, three and four wheels on the trailer. The TEL arrangement of four wheels on the rear carriage resembles the Chinese DF-31A ICBM transporter, but the "missile" itself is of much smaller diameter, and the three wheel arrangement of the tractor in front [versus 4 wheels on the DF-31A], both support an interpretation of a missile smaller than the DF-31. The launch canister is generally consistent is size with the KN-14.

The simplest interpretation of this vehicles, assuming that it represents an operational capability rather than a fake parade missile, is that it is a transporter for the KN-14 LRICBM for emplacement of that missile into a launch silo.

Minuteman Transporter/Erector Loader (TEL)

KN-08 Hwasong-13B

Rather longer than the previously displayed Hwasong-13, the actual missile is mounted on the TEL, with a pointed conical nose cone, versus the rounded nose of the more refined successor.

Hwasong-12

The No-Dong-B 6-wheel TEL with the Hwasong-12 missile, which is much longer than the No-Dong-B missile. Strangely, the wheels of the TEL are protected by armored shield of some sort, which might protect the wheels from being shot at if the TEL was engaged in close combat in urban operations of some sort, but absent this improbably circumstance, at first glance seemed to be non-functional decoration. Upon reflection, possibly it is the Small ICBM Hard Mobile Launcher (HML), with North Korean characteristics.

The Boeing Small ICBM Hard Mobile Launcher (HML) was a mobile, radiation-hardened, vehicle designed to transport and launch the MGM-134A Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, unofficially called the "Midgetman" missile. The entire vehicle was over 110 feet long and weighed over 239,000 pounds when fully loaded, yet it could travel on paved roads at up to 55 miles per hour. The HML could also travel off-road. It could withstand moderate nuclear effects and the trailer-mounted plow allowed the tractor to bury the launcher-trailer into the ground for additional protection from nuclear blasts.

The survivability of the Hard Mobile Launcher system was a function of launcher hardness and mobility. Each launcher was "hardened" to withstand high levels of blast pressure and radiation. The mobility of the launchers allowed them to rapidly access a large area, providing launcher location uncertainty.

The two effects that were of the greatest concern to the HML were static overpressure and dynamic pressure. Static overpressure is a dramatic increase in atmospheric pressure that could crush the HML. Dynamic pressure refers to the blast winds that could blow the HML over, preventing it from launching. The vehicle must be designed so it will not be overturned by lateral blasts, but weight must also be kept to a minimum to facilitate mobility and minimize cost.

During peacetime, all launchers were to be parked "on alert" in austere shelters, except for periodic training and maintenance. These shelters provide limited crew comfort and environmental protection for the launcher. Under "attack dispersal" the launcher would be deployed off site. Because each launcher could dash within a large area, the system complicated the enemy's targeting task.

KN-11 SLBM

Missiles - Overview

The regime launched more than 20 ballistic missiles in 2015, but never an ICBM test, definitely a threatening factor for the international community. What's interesting to note is that nukes or missiles are some of key words that haven't been mentioned by Kim Jong-un in his New Year speeches since he started delivering them in 2012.

North Korea conducted at least 25 launches in the first 11 months of 2016, using ballistic missile technology, including launches of satellite, submarine-based ballistic missiles, and medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

The Taep'o dong-1 missile was test-fired in August 1998. In 1999 North Korea agreed to suspend tests of long-range missiles, and Pyongyang has extended that moratorium through 2003. In late 2000 the Clinton proposed an agreement under which North Korea would halt the production and testing of medium- and long-range missiles, as well as the export of missile technology. The US also accepted a North Korean proposal to provide two or three launches for North Korean satellites annually. By mid-2001 the new Bush Administration had returned to this general framework, though proposing new challenge inspections for number of sites in North Korea at short notice.

For many years, there has been a lack of understanding of the origins of North Korean strategic ballistic missile program. Equally absent from public the discussion about Missile Technology Control Regime is the assistance that Iran has provided to the North Koran strategic ballistic missile program and North Korea's contribution to Iran's strategic ballistic missile program.

Understanding the historical context of the relationship between Iran and North Korea will enhance the understanding of this potential strategic threat to the world. Understanding the impact of the Gorbachev era Soviet missile technology transfer to North Korea because of strategic arms reductions and its meaning to the Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR) and its impact globally can not be understated. This understanding is essential because of its implications in strategic arms control. In order to understand the true strategic threat requires a reasonable technical understanding of strategic systems and their historical and technical heritage. What follows is a discussion of what can be gleamed from the public intelligence on these various strategic issues.

In October 2003 a report released by the South Korean defense ministry estimated that North Korea had shipped over 400 SCUD-class ballistic missiles to the Middle East since the 1980s. The biggest buyers were Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, but also include Egypt and Libya.

North Korea is generally estimated to have about 500 Scuds in inventory The Korea Herald 08 May 2004]. But South Korea's defense ministry estimates that North Korea has about 600 Scuds and about 100 No dong-A missiles, Agency France-Presse reported on 07 May 2004. The [DPRK] North Korea was in 2008 credited by South Korea to have 800 deployed missiles but in March 2010 they were credited with 1,000 missiles deployed. That is 100-150 Scud-B's 300 Scud-C's, 350 Scud-ER's and 200 No-dong-A's equaling 1,000 deployed and perhaps 20 No-dong-B's in a single division identified. North Korea is also credited with having enough weapons grade plutonium to have created 6-8 nuclear device weapons that they will eventually be able to place inside a already perfected missile born re-entry vehicle to make a nuclear warhead according to South Korean government analysis.

North Korean/ Iranian Unha-2, Taep'o-dong-2B Evolutionary Development Family.

North Korean/ Iranian Launch vehicle Evolutionary Development Family through 2013




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