Uranium Program
International Response
Iran, Iraq and North Korea made up what President Bush called an "axis of evil." How the United States handled Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il differed, even though both were thought to be developing weapons of mass destruction. With their economic ties, North Korea's neighbors had the potential for greater influence with Pyongyang than countries in the Middle East have with Baghdad. President Bush had backed away from Washington's previous policy of tentative engagement with North Korea, saying it was part of an "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage defended the differing approaches the United States has taken with regards to Iraq and North Korea over their respective weapons of mass destruction programs. Armitage said the differences in the 2 situations are "fundamental."
The deputy secretary pointed out that Iraq had attacked and invaded both Kuwait and Iran, and used weapons of mass destruction during its 8-year conflict with Iran. Such weapons were also used against its own citizens, said Armitage, in reference to Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological attack on Halabja, northern Iraq in 1988. Lastly, Iraq had "a well-known affection for terrorism and identification with terrorist groups," he said.
By contrast, said Armitage, North Korea had maintained "a rough equilibrium or stability on the [Korean] peninsula for about 50 years," and had been normalizing its relations with the neighboring Republic of Korea. Also, he said, "we have not had a North Korea which has been associated with terrorism," since the 1987 bombing of a Korean Airlines flight.
Most observers agreed that the Bush administration was not likely to wage war on the Korean peninsula, because any such conflict could result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans.
Secretary of State Colin Powell said the United States was not going to buy an end to North Korea's nuclear program a second time. He said the only way for North Korea to get the wider diplomatic recognition it wanted, and the outside aid it desperately needed, was to first give up its nuclear weapons ambitions. Powell said, "The United States will not enter into dialogue in response to threats or broken commitments and we will not bargain or offer inducements for North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements it has signed."
Given both Pyongyang and Washington's stated preference for a diplomatic solution to the present crisis, this was likely the first course of action to be pursued. This by no means guaranteed a successful resolution through diplomacy especially given North Korea's failure to follow the guidelines of the 1994 accord. Negotiations revolved around US demands of a cessation of all North Korean nuclear programs, full and unfettered inspection and monitoring of such sites. North Korean's were expected to likely seek normalized relations with the US and its Asian neighbors, increased economic assistance, and timely assistance in developing atomic energy.
The United States felt it could promote a policy of containment in regard to North Korea. By isolating and containing North Korea the US could, in theory, prevent any real continuation of North Korean WMD programs through the use of sanctions and embargos. However, this policy had the potential to be problematic given that all regional powers had to be on board and the US would need to first secure the approval of the United Nations.
The US also retained the option to pursue military action to disarm North Korea. This course of action was not seen as likely not be considered until after any action in Iraq would be resolved. In the early 2000s, there were approximately 37,000 US troops stationed in South Korea. Potential military action would first necessitate a build up of troops beyond those already stationed in Korea. This build-up would include substantial increases in air and naval forces in the region.
Brent Scowcroft and Daniel Poneman argued that "...loose talk denigrating our military options is a serious mistake, undermining a half-century investment - sealed in American blood - in standing up to North Korean aggression. As President Bush has made clear, the U.S. must reserve the right to take military action to confront a nuclear-armed threat rather than run the risk of enduring a nuclear attack." (From "Charting A New Course In North Korea," Wall Street Journal, 14 November 2002)
Some US hawks suggested going to war with the North, arguing that the communist country was more dangerous than Iraq, and South Korean conservatives continued to utter hard-line remarks inciting crisis and confrontation. Although some suggested that a military response was obviously out of the question, given the difficulty of threatening regime-change in Iraq and fighting North Korea, this was precisely the 2 nearly simultaneous major theater war scenario that had formed the basis for American military planning since the Gulf War.
The initial consensus worldwide, however, following the North Korean admission of an active nuclear program was that regardless of where negotiations with Pyongyang went, North Korea had to accept international inspections of its nuclear and missile facilities. From the left to the right, some criticized the US for the perceived inconsistencies in threatening the "sword" against Iraq while applying "wise diplomacy" to North Korea.
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for engaging the communist North, said there were 3 possible responses. He said war would be horrible. Economic sanctions might only leave North Korea more isolated and therefore free to continue building nuclear weapons. So the only choice he saw was to pursue dialogue. However, in South Korea, the news that North Korea had been violating its commitment to give up its nuclear ambitions, sparked a backlash against further engagement known as the Sunshine policy. Most of the confidence-building projects appeared at the time to have gotten nowhere.
The 24 October 2002 inter-Korean joint statement included Pyongyang's nuclear development program. In particular, the issue of the North's highly-enriched uranium program was included among other issues in the statement. The 2 Koreas pledged to actively cooperate to solve the nuclear and other issues, through discussion. With this, the South virtually accepted the North's demand that all issues be comprehensively resolved, in contrast to the US position that the North's nuclear program must be dismantled before any dialogue was held to resolve any issues.
US President George W. Bush, Republic of Korea President Kim Dae-Jung, and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agreed that North Korea's program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons was a violation of several agreements and called on North Korea in a statement 26 October 2002 to dismantle the program in a prompt and verifiable manner. The 3 leaders agreed that North Korea's program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons was a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea's IAEA safeguards agreement, and the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The 3 leaders called upon North Korea to dismantle this program in a prompt and verifiable manner and to come into full compliance with all its international commitments in conformity with North Korea's recent commitment in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration.
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi said her government, unlike the United States, would continue to keep open a diplomatic channel with North Korea for talks on normalizing relations. However, she said there was no difference in US and Japanese policy on North Korea's nuclear programs. A joint US-Japanese statement said North Korea's relations with the outside world would "hinge" on its willingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. It also said the 2 governments urged North Korea to cease all ballistic missile activities, including the export of missiles and related technology.
President George W. Bush said, "This program undermines regional and international security and the international nonproliferation regime." The United States said the issue of North Korea dismantling the nuclear program was not negotiable. Since the surprise DPRK admission, the United States clearly and repeatedly stated a desire to resolve the crisis through negotiation rather than force. North Korea posed a severe challenge to the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive use of military force. The fact that the Adminstration did not focus on Korea demonstrated that there were some flaws and logical inconsistencies in their policy. Instead, Washington immediately sought regional support to place pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Washington officials frequently stated their confidence that this approach will be successful.
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