Uranium Program
History
Most interest regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program was largely centered around the program based upon technology apparently received from Pakistan. However there was a time in North Korea's nuclear weapons program during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when it was possible that North Korea had previously engaged in uranium enrichment. If that were the case, then American estimates of their program and their potential weapons capability could be significantly off.
Shortly after the signing of the 1994 accord known as the "Agreed Framework," it was believed that North Korea began another clandestine program to enrich uranium and develop a uranium-based nuclear program. The evidence at first was faint and circumstantial. Western intelligence had "shards of evidence" of the North Korea-Pakistan nuclear relationship going back to 1997. These developed into clear suspicions by 1998, and by 1999 the North Koreans committed to this program.
It was clear in 1998 that construction of the first Light Water Reactor under the Agreed Framework would be at least 3 years behind schedule, because of US reservations and hesitancy.
North Korea secretly brought equipment needed for its nuclear weapons program into the country in June 1998 from Pakistan. The nuclear equipment, which included a sample gas centrifuge used to enrich uranium and its blueprints, were transported on a special flight from Islamabad to Pyongyang.
The United States identified at least 3 sites where the North Korean's were suspected of possibly conducting enrichment tests. These locations were the Academy of Sciences near Pyongyang, and sites in the Hagap region and Yehong-dong. North Korea likely shifted to uranium based systems because uranium programs were generally easier to hide and more reliable than their plutonium counterparts.
In the December 2002 issue of the Japanese magazine Tokyo Gendai, an article titled "North Korea Has Completed Arming Itself With Nuclear Weapons" was written by Kenki Aoyama. The author was born in Japan to Korean parents in 1939, returned to North Korea in 1961, and defected in 1998 to Japan. He claims to know first-hand that Nodong missiles were deployed in deep tunnels near the Chinese border. Aoyama called Yongbyon "a gigantic nuclear complex" with about 20,000 researchers ( along with thier family dependents) working on nuclear plants. Only a few buildings were above ground, while "all other facilities lie underground." Aoyama claimed that a successful underground nuclear test was conducted at Yongbyon in 1993. He claimed that North Korea's nuclear weapons program wes subsequently moved to Pakchon, not far from Yongbyon. Another defector, who was a nuclear scientist claimed it had been moved farther south to North Hwanghae Province.
The complex at Hagap was first identified in the press in 1998 citing a classified Defense Intelligence Agency report titled "Outyear Threat Report." The DIA was unable to identify the purpose of the Hagap facility, but speculated that it could be used for nuclear production and/or storage. The facility, located 3 miles north of Hyangsan, P'yongan-Pukto Province, consisted of 3 main areas. The operations area was said to have had 30 buildings and 5 additional buildings that were under construction. The location was at the foot of the Myohyangsan mountains that had at least 4 tunnel entrances and 11 support buildings. Reports indicated that 4 tunnels connected to dozens of buildings. This facility was said to be unique as it was the only one of several potential nuclear facilities that has been built underground.
For a number of years, possibly back as far as 1999, there were reports that the US and the South Korean intelligence community had gotten indications that the DPRK was attempting to acquire equipment related to centrifuges, which could be used for uranium enrichment.
According to senior US officials, equipment Pakistan exported to North Korea may have included gas centrifuges used in creating weapons-grade uranium. The the shipment took place as part of a barter deal between the 2 countries in the late 1990s. In return, North Korea provided Pakistan with medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Russia and China were also said to have supplied equipment for the North Korean secret nuclear weapons program.
North Korea secretly supplied Libya with almost 2 tons of uranium in early 2001. Libya turned over a large quantity of uranium hexafluoride to the United States in early 2004, as part of an agreement to give up its nuclear program. US officials initially identified Pakistan as the likely source of the material. The uranium amounted to 1.7 metric tons (or 1.87 American tons) of uranium hexafluoride, the standard feed stock for centrifuges. The uranium was slightly enriched to about 1 percent U-235, above the 0.7 percent concentration in natural uranium. Libya could have enriched the urainium to make one small atomic bomb.
Pakistan's assistance to North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program may have continued through the summer of 2002. What was termed "highly suspicious shipping trade" indicated that Pakistan continued to trade nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly material in exchange for missile parts.
Evidence continued to accumulate, to the point that by August 2002 administration officials felt the case was compelling enough to be grounds for cutting off talks aimed at improving relations with the isolated state. Prompted by North Korean attempts to acquire quantities of high-strength aluminum from a source in Russia, US officials decided to confront the North Koreans about the state of their program. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly took the evidence to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. After initially denying the program, the North Koreans admitted to developing the program in direct violation of the 1994 accord.
The 13 February 2007 provided that North Korea was subject to consultations with other parties of the six-party talks to provide a list of all nuclear programs that were to be abandoned according to the September 19 Joint Statement. However, North Korea consistently denied the existence of uranium enrichment programs, and thus uranium facilities were not dealt with. North Korea must be paying huge sums of foreign currencies to purchase leaked technologies from abroad. The uranium enrichment facilities with 2,000 centrifuges alone would have cost North Korea approximately US$400 million, each centrifuge worth $150,000 to $200,000.
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