Uranium Program
Korean Motivations
The sudden admission by DPRK officials of an active nuclear program came as a great surprise to the rest of the world, and the rationale for the disclosure was open for speculation. The North Korean argument that delays in the building of the light-water reactors and the US grouping of it as part the "axis of evil" released it from any obligation to the 1994 accord was inconsistent with the fact that the uranium program had apparently been in progress for some considerable time prior to disclosure.
An active and operational North Korean nuclear weapons capability in the hands of the often-unpredictable Kim Jong-Il threatened regional security. The admission seemed to be a continuation of North Korean "brinkmanship" diplomacy last seen during the 1994 crisis. The exact reason for the admission remained unclear, and there were several possible explanations.
According to one school of thought there was a decision among the North Korean leadership that admitting the existence of the uranium program would give them more leverage in negotiations with the United States in terms of demonstrating the agreed framework had not been successful. In order to get the DPRK to actually comply, the US would have had to provide more incentives.
The other view was that, in addition to other contemporary revelations about Korean abduction of Japanese citizens, the admission was part of a significant rethink in foreign policy on the part of the DPRK and a move towards towards a more open foreign policy that allowed for some compromises. An overt denial by officials in the face of real and compelling evidence would have seriously damaged North Korean attempts to normalize relations with South Korea and Japan. Overtures and admissions of wrongdoing faced becoming meaningless gestures if it refused to openly acknowledge the pursuit of nuclear weapons and the active attempt to acquire components necessary to sustain nuclear development.
The DPRK might also have been exercising a strategy of 'divide' and 'rule' toward the US-Japan-South Korean alliance formed in dealing with the North. While demonstrating moves to improve relations with Japan and South Korea, the North was creating a critical situation with the US.
According to a third school of thought, this was a defiant reaction. The admissions were a way of saying "you can't push us around with your rhetoric. You may be intending to come after us, but don't think you can do that. We have powerful weapons."
Kim Jong-il might have concluded that, following Saddam Hussein's demise, Washington would soon turn to regime change in North Korea. Pyongyang says that it was willing to negotiate with the United States over its covert nuclear weapons program, but first Washington had to agree to a non-aggression pact. Pyongyang said it had the right to hold nuclear and other weapons if it felt its existence was threatened.
The North Korean admission came at a time when the US was in a difficult bargaining position. The situation in Iraq seriously diminished the potential for immediate US military intervention. Any threatened military action would be counter to existing regional desires to normalize relations with Pyongyang. North Korea likely recognized the unique position it was in vis-à-vis the United States and other regional powers.
North Korea could also have been exploiting the existing geopolitical situation. By admitting the program's existence, North Korea forced the US to confront the issue then and there, not likely preferred by Washington, rather than following any action in Iraq. Direct support of military action would threaten to split US support in the region and damage US foreign policy actions on a number of issues, including Iraq and the war on terrorism.
Pyongyang made it clear that it was seeking negotiations with Washington. Kim Young-Nam, President of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Presidium since 1998, had stated that North Korea would be willing to abandon its nuclear program in return for greater foreign assistance and a change in US policy toward DPRK. The North Koreans openly objected to being portrayed as part of the "axis of evil" and any negotiation were expected to need to include a reversal by Washington.
Specifically the North Koreas reportedly offered to United States officials to: End their efforts to develop a uranium-based weapons system; continue to abide by the guidelines established within the 1994 agreed framework in regard to plutonium systems; and accept US inspection and verification measures. In return, the United States would have to make a public pledge not to stage a pre-emptive attack against the DPRK, sign a peace treaty and restore the 1953 armistice, and normalize diplomatic relations. Some analysts saw North Korea's confession as sending out a signal that it did not want a military confrontation with the United States and preferred to reopen dialog.
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