KN-07? & KN-11, No-dong-B / Musudan

First Acknowledged launch attempt of the No-dong-B/KN-07 land bases semi-mobile IRBM.

©By C. P. Vick, 2015/2016

Senior Technical & Space Policy Analyst

Globalsecurity.org

                                                                                                                                    April 15, 2016

On the morning of April 15, 2016 the DPRK Strategic Rocket Forces attempted to launch the No-dong-B at 5:30 am dawn from the vicinity of the east coast city of Wonsan in Hodo Peninsula. The two No-dong-B’s on their individual TEL’s had been deployed there for about 20 days (late March 2-16) for the preparation build up to this failed launch attempt. The stretch 12 meter long with a body diameter of 1.5 meters No-dong-B Soviet era SS-N-6 has a range of between 3,200 and 3,860 kilometers with a 650 kilogram warhead from official Soviet era and US documentation.

Inflight Failure

The flight is stated to have veered deviated from its normal flight trajectory soon after launch breaking up and disappearing from the radar systems of the South Korean Defense Ministry. It suggests its single stage suffered from a Vernier’s steering problem.  The flight test demonstration encompassed a high arc vertical sounding rocket like ballistic trajectory with in the DPRK’s coastal territorial waters ballistic missile range.

Some of the problems the DPRK has experienced in recent missile firings are not easily explained in the face of the same similar systems success in the post flights known. The Land based similar system  has been successfully flown but when the system of origin has failed in flight in its submarine launch test suggest that they have missed some key technologies required in recent test. I am speaking of the recent derivative Soviet era SS-N-6 SLBM called NK-11 versus the longer No-Dong-B possibly known as the KN-07 land based system.

Recent launches of the shorter KN-11/Soviet era SS-N-6 SLBM of some 8.75 meters with a body diameter of 1.5 meters has suffered launch tub/missile ejection launch issues and inflight RD-4D10 engine hard start failures. The KN-11 SLBM has a range of 2,500 kilometers with a 650 kilogram warhead with a 4,400 m/sec velocity max attained.  The KN-14 uses the same engine in a cluster of two in its first stage directly impacting it development because of this launch failure.

05-11-2010 / 4-12-13/ 5-12-15/11-28-15/ 1-6-2016 update

The North Korean and Iranian KN-11, No-dong-B/Mirim/Musudan IRBM missile system derived from the Acad. V. P. Makeyev OKB SS-N-6 missile systems technology transfer to the DPRK.

The North Korean KN-07? & KN-11, No-dong-B missile transporter erector launcher TEL system as deployed in the DPRK.

The DPRK Recent KN-11 Launch Flight Experimental Attempts

By Charles P. Vick, Senior Technical & Space Policy Analyst, Globalsecurity.org

11-2/12-8-15/1-9-2016

Successfully December 21, 2015 Experimental launch Ejection Test

The KN-11 / No-dong-B’ the Zyb/SS-N-6 SLBM pop-up experimental launch ejection test operations resumed successfully on December 21, 2015 after its failed launch ejection attempt test on November 28, 2015 according to the Bill Gertz, Washington Free Beacon 01-05-2016 information. No prior warning or further information was provided by the reports source or the official DPRK organizations. The KN-11/No-Dong-B is obvious a non-full systems up experimental ejection test vehicle not a full up flight test vehicle. It is only a demonstration ejection and flight start up test vehicle that apparently had a hard start requiring post flight test study for corrections to be demonstrated later. It was previously successfully tested on May 8, 2015. This test like the previous ones was conducted off its East Sea (Sea of Japan) coastal waters near Wonsan, Sinpo, South Hamygong Province from the same two launch tube on the same the Gulf-II class remade single Sinpo-class 2,000 ton, 67 meter long submarine names “Gorae” (Whale) by the DPRK.

DPRK engineering technical personnel along with it Russian Federation Makeyev OKB acquired personnel clearly have defined the expected launch problems with the known snubber solutions applied to the external missile skin to assist with a clean launch from it launch tube via its solid motor burn hot gas pressure release and ejection to get the rocket above the ocean surface for rocket engine startup.

Subsequent to the initial information noted above on late January 8, 2016 the DPRK state-run KCBS, Korean Central Broadcasting Station released a video of the SLMB test launch observed by the Kim Kung-un. It displayed the missile rising above the sea to about 40 meters at which point the solid propellant charge starts the rocket engine followed with the engine ignition and steering refinements from guidance commands before disappearing into the clouds at the end of the test. The DPRK video was then followed by a Scud firing above the clouds from a previous test earlier in the year. It was not the SLBM firing after start up.

November 28 th. Experimental Launch Ejection Failure

The KN-11 / No-dong-B’ the Zyb/SS-N-6 SLBM copy of about 9.65 meter length, that misfire in a mishap on November 28, between 2:20 - 2:40 PM South Korean Time was an experimental failure to launch properly. It is indicated to be obvious non full systems up ejection failure on the East Sea (Sea of Japan) then off limits shipping and air zone test range area. The failure suggest a fundamental quality control failure of the launch ejection process and missile start-up operation that has previously flown successfully from land bases semi mobile systems from Iran and the DPRK with in its territory though not reported openly. The KN-07 is the No-dong-B, some 12 meter long an evolved stretch SS-N-6 previously deployed in the DPRK land bases semi-mobile Strategic Rocket Force as an operational system.

The DPRK had cordoned off from maritime shipping a part of its East Sea coast off the Wonsan, Sinpo range area for artillery fire but this also offered a possibility of a public flight of the No-dong-B=KN-07 or KN-11 for a more complete test from the May 2015 experimental launch ejection operation. This was yet another pop-up ejection launch experimental test among several others already conducted previously. The South Koreans military and intelligence went on alert for a missile test around November 11, 2015 when the DPRK announced the no maritime sail zone and no fly zone on its East Sea (Sea of Japan) coastal waters near Wonsan, Sinpo, South Hamygong Province through December 7, 2015. On November 16, 2015 according to AFP reports and other subsequently suggested it was an artillery training drill by the DPRK with no long range international Maritime or Air Traffic warnings zones issued such as seen in previous satellite launch attempts.

The KN-11 launch required a successful solid motor burn hot gas pressure release and ejection to get the rocket above the ocean surface for rocket engine startup. That hot gas pressure ejection will only allow it to go less than 50-75 meters ballistic ally above the sea surface unless the engines starts properly. In this case it apparently did not start causing no missile to be identified by intelligence sources and methods as having taken flight. A solid propellant charge starts the rocket engine followed with the engine ignition and steering refinements from guidance commands. If the missile was fueled partially or fully it may have exploded on impact with the sea unless it blew up prematurely at or during ejection from one of the launch tubes. Was the missile an intentional full mass model dud for submarine launch demonstration like the US did with Polaris remains unknown? Much of the debris may be the missile or more probably the plastic breakable sea water cap above the missile nose cone and base launch systems seal to eject the missile from it cylinder via solid motor hot gas release. If the missile fired in the silo canister on the Sinpo-class submarine would have created a real catastrophic explosion because it is not designed to operate that way. This leaves the question of submarine damage and or fatalities issues. There is no evidence of causalities to date from the sources available per South Korean Official on the remade Sinpo-class submarine which could have been damaged. However subsequent intelligence sources and methods analysis has identified that it was indeed an attempted launch from the submerged submarine and not the submerged platform like last May 2015 following the Soviet procedure to early field deploy of weapons systems to ring out the operational full systems issues. That assessment has defined the Gulf-II class remade Sinpo-class sail mounted two silo tube ballistic missile submarine failed as the missile did not eject properly ultimately heavily damaging the sail structure of the submarine without causalities indicated.

Also it was not a long range test involved because no long range maritime warnings, therefore indicating a near vertical probe potential launch flop that must be regarded by the State as a failure. The vehicle may have left the launch tube but it appears to have never started it rocket engines causing a catastrophic disassembly.

It is believed the dear leader Kim Jong-un attended the ejection test monitoring operation along with the State Military Commission members, pushing the State Planning System industry beyond its capability since the space booster was not ready when he desired it leaving few options on the table for his geopolitical acts. In all probability the DPRK tried to accelerate the R&D process to follow with an attempt to of the full systems up experimental demonstration shooting the works for upcoming diplomatic bluff reasons and it did not even sputter and made a mess with the obvious left over debris on the Ocean surface.

Not much more information is expected anytime soon due to the fact of intelligence gathering and analysis and newer policies controlling data released on intelligence matters. I will point out that public statements take great pains to imply things that the general populace will reach conclusions about and accept without question…those statements are not untrue, but they are misleading on purpose because of National State Policy.

The Operational Shahab-4/KN-07? & KN-11, No-dong-B Flight Tested in Iran for Iran & North Korea Confirmed

By Charles P. Vick

Senior Fellow, Globalsecurity.org

© Charles P. Vick All Rights Reserved 2006-7

04-29-06-05-02-06-02-07-07-04-10-07/4-12-13/5-2-13/5-12-15/

Introduction

It is believe circumstantially the KN-07? & KN-11, No-dong-B as the South Koreans defense and intelligence community identify it as well as the open  public pundit call it Mirim after its first sightings in 2003 as well as the Musudan is both deployed in the DPRK Strategic Rocket Forces and is an operational system that is specifically intended to be nuclear capable.

The false flag designations BM-25 is a reference to Soviet era tactical solid propellant rockets used in the WARSAW PACT while the Mirim, Musudan are unofficial public pundit designations.

NK-07? & KN-11 = No-Dong-B, Mirim, Musudan IRBM Flight Test History

Date	Flight Test	Range Km
1-17-2006	DPRK, KN-07? Near full range flight test over Indian Ocean from out of Iran for the DPRK and Iran.	3,218 km demonstrated before flight termination
? Missile became operational and was deployed in the DPRK under the Strategic Rocket Forces	DPRK, KN-07 the in country flight test unannounced near vertical launches	3,860 Km demonstrated capability (20)
October through November 2014	DPRK Navalo KN-11, SLBM application of the land based system testing	Land based R & D ejection from SLMB launch tube test firings utilizing a solid motor for cold launch
1-23-2015	DPRK Naval KN-11, SLBM flight test from above ocean surface launch platform	Range and altitude not defined
4-22-2015	DPRK Naval , KN-11, SLBM flight test from submerged ocean launch platform	Range and altitude not defined
5-8-2015	DPRK Naval SLBM, KN-11 flight test from the submerged 2,000 ton SINPO-class submarine. This is the only submarine that is in this class of the DPRK submarines. It was an in flight main engine and four steering verniers engine start up test firing of the highly toxic storable propellant single stage KN-11, SLBM. This was after the initial ejection cold launch solid motor firing from one of two launch tubes on the SINPO-class submarine a modified rebuilt Golf-II class Soviet-era submarine. It carried a dummy warhead payload. The missile is not believed to have carried a full propellant load for this test launch. The R&D variant on the No-Dong-B, KN-11 was about one quarter shorter than the standard Mirim, Musudan, No-Dong-B missile possibly designated KN-07?, length of 12 meters. That placed the KN-11 at about 9.67 meters long but there is still room for the full No-Dong-B in the two SINPO-class submarine silos. That in turn reduces the KN-11 performance down to the Soviet-era SS-N-6 to 2,400-2,500 kilometers range. Thus we now have two variants on this R&D missile.This according to South Korean sources. One can see the solid propellant smoke from the ejection motor as well as the subsequent solid propellant charge exhaust start of the engines before their main ignition followed by the pale yellow liquid propellant flame jets from the thrust chambers. The angle of attack was very close to 60 degrees from the horizontal sea surface that later lowered itself close to around 50 degrees. Equally interesting for unexplained reasons there was an observation support naval surface vessel very close to the launch as the KN-11 breached the East Sea surface. Later pictures show the boat deleted or covered with "Photo shopped" steam. Whether the DPRK was pulling a psychological warfare trick by faking and utilizing the submerged platform rather than its only submarine of that type for the public test remains an open question that US officials suggest was the reality. Thus the presence of the servicing surface vessel may be explained or that the DPRK was backing up its efforts? The polemics on the launch event methodology and the reality that only one submarine is potentially capable of launch this class missile means the SLBM threat is some years from becoming a reality. They must first test the system from the submarine to full range and then produce a larger much more sophisticated modern series of submarines capable of carrying more missile. The fact that the KN-11 requires propellant loading prior to launch from the submarines storable propellant sources definitely limits the systems effectiveness strategically. The fact that no Video of the launch has been released leaving only a hand full of doctored images with different lensing by KCNA News Agency released images of the event as it unfolded over a series of mere seconds suggest that deception was the name of this game by the DPRK. The NK-11, labeled "Pukkuksong-1" or Bukkeunkseong-1  (Polar Star). The next flight test is expected on or before October 2015. It came on November 28, 2015 a failure	Range and altitude not defined. It was not a full range flight test but only a launch vehicle engine start up demonstration. Estimated ballistic range was suggested to be 150-200 meters altitude before collapsing in the East Sea along the DPRK eastern coastal range. The No-Dong-B was flown from off the coast of the naval port city of Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province possibly achieving a range of under one kilometer according to South Korean sources.

References, 1-30.

Is the No-Dong-B missile nuclear capable?

However its present deployment is not armed individually with a single operational nuclear warhead. It is anybodies guesstimate when this system by the DPRK will become an operational capable deployed nuclear weapon system. This is and has been for years a game changer staring us in the face for quite a while. I feel the U. S. Government has been less that forth coming because of the nature of the intelligence, strategic and geopolitical policy issues involved as will be explained below.

Countries do not produce missiles to travel over thousands of kilometers to deliver mere “Fire Cracker” conventional high energy explosive warhead weapons unless they are intended to carry primarily nuclear, or chemical, biological weapons. The advances in the missile launch vehicle and re-entry vehicle program do mirror the advances in the nuclear weapons program of the larger total weapons program. Generally speaking no country makes the investment up to the threshold of actually having nuclear weapons without completing the process. The parallel missile and re-entry vehicle development programs also manifest this very harsh reality.

The report issued by the Defense Intelligence Agency last month was titled “Dynamic Threat Assessment 8099: North Korea Nuclear Weapons Program.” Its executive summary reads: “D.I.A. assesses with moderate confidence the North currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles; however the reliability will be low.”

This however does not mean that the DPRK has deployed much less has operational nuclear weapon systems at the present time in April 2013.

Ref. Pentagon Says Nuclear Missile Is in Reach for North Korea, By THOM SHANKER, DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT, The New York Times, April 11, 2013, p. 1-3.

Do I think the No-dong-B, Mirim, Musudan missile could attack Guam?

I find that unlikely but the missile could be flown from the DPRK more probably over japan into the pacific over its real range of 3,200-3,860 kilometers

I have in other writing reports that North Korea and Iran conducted the flight test for the No-dong-B Mirim, Musudan. This is my understanding from the here entailed information but the reader must make their own judgment?

I am afraid that no matter what I say it will be a game in futility but in any case let me try and explain why I believe as I do that it is flight tested and operational. The original menewsline.com story from correspondents in Berlin quoting Die Welt revealed the flight test that had taken place out of Iran for the DPRK then in moratorium for both the DPRK and Iran on January 17, 2006 was later backed up by a slide presentation speech by the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency of the Pentagon Army Brig. General Patrick O’Reilly before the George C. Marshall Institute as noted below. Iran was reported to have received 18 of those missiles in December 2005 but they have never displayed them publicly.

2. The critical point is No-dong-B:

In that respect this is both confirmed by the Israeli Intelligence sources & methods but especially the U. S. Ballistic Defense Agency officials in speech.

Finally on January 29, 2007 the US government acknowledged for the first time the existence of several new Iranian and North Korean missiles under development through a speech by the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency of the Pentagon Army Brig. General Patrick O’Reilly before the George C Marshall Institute. In that speech he described the Iranian two stage Ghadr-110 solid propellant missile with a range of (1,324 miles) 1,995.16 or close to 2,000 kilometers. It has been known that the Iranians are working on the Ghadr-101 as well as the Ghadr-110 solid propellant missiles. The Ghadr-101 solid motor development was completed in 2005. He also described the two stage Taep’o-dong-2C/3 as having a range of (6,200 Miles) 9,975.8 kilometers and the three stage version with a range of (9,300 miles) 14,963.7 kilometers with a 250 kg warhead. He went further in his slides presentation to show that the No-dong-B has a demonstrated range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is thought to be capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers. (24) The No-dong-B was described as “a qualitative improvement in the performance” from earlier North Korean missile systems. The Iranian Ghadr-101, 110, 110A will in fact also provides Iran with an ASAT capability besides its operational MRBM and IRBM capability.

Also note the following:

“Oct. 6, 2009, (WikiLeaks) cable on North Korea’s missile program said the Musudan intermediate-range missile is based on Russia’s SS-N-6/(RSM-25) submarine-launched ballistic missile that has a range of up to 2,400 miles.” That is 3,861.60 kilometers. (20)

 NOTE: Where did that 3,200-3,860 kilometers range come from is indeed very interesting going to the very heart of the existing questions geopolitical strategic game changer questions. That is to assume it has not been flight test while having been under development for years through several five year plan going back before 2000 and ultimate subsequent deployment with the DPRK Strategic Rocket Forces is I suggest not realistic.

If this strategic IRBM had not been seen in flight then something is amiss here because it did not just come out of thin air…..

The nature of the intelligence, strategic and geopolitical policy issues involved probably entails intelligence sources and methods that are exceptionally sensitive to say the least. That intelligence based on open historical declassified sources information would suggest that foreign countries intelligence is a part of this that in several instances may emanate from the Middle Eastern countries, UK and Israel operations as well as US sources and methods. It could also entail Asian intelligence operation on several levels. Combined they probably have created quite a picture of concern. One of the key means of confirming this would be through multiple SIGINT signals intelligence observation combined and overlapping to create the real picture. However RADINT Radar intelligence can also play a key combined roll in confirming this kind of information. But above all the use of SIGINT space based IR early warning sensors in space as well as early warning DSP  satellite imaging to visually confirm the flights is also probable if not integral to capture these secret test flights. That in and of itself is very sensitive globally if correct but it however remains unknown.

“Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, in a public briefing held for the release of the Fiscal Year 2014 defense budget today at the Pentagon made the statement that he has to assume that North Korea has a nuclear capable ballistic missile and that the United States military is postured and prepared to handle that threat. General Dempsey stated that the United States military's job is to do three things, deter enemy actions, assure our allies, and prevent the attack. “

"The proximity of the North Koreans to achieving a miniaturization of their nuclear device on a ballistic missile is a classified matter .  But they have conducted two (3-4, cpv) nuclear tests, they have conducted several successful ballistic missile launches and with the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary we have to assume the worst case and that's why we are postured as we are. " (X)

Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Breaking News:  Assume the Worst Case Scenario April 10, 2013, p. 2 of 3.

The SS-N-6 is a single-stage SLBM/IRBM with the max range of 2,500 km. No-dong-B, Mirim, Musudan is also single stage with a similar re-entry vehicle design. If so, how could North Koreans have extended it to the extent of the suggested nearly 4, 000 km?

No it’s some 3,200-3,860 kilometers not 4,000 km. which is entirely within the design growth parameters of the systems specifications

The Iranian connection:

The Islamic republic has issued a range of diverse statements regarding its space program. The Iranian defense minister announced in February 1999 that Iran was in the process of constructing the non-military Shahab-4 missile for the purpose of launching a satellite into space

However three separate programs have replaced the original Shahab-4/Taep’o-dong-1A program launch vehicle with the successful flights of the Shahab-3B on August 11, 2004 and the No-dong-B/Mirim on January 17, 2006 and now the new Ghadr-101 program. Iran is separately trying to develop a small satellite launch vehicle perhaps similar to the Shahab-3D/IRIS or an up-rated Taep'o-dong-1A or some variation utilizing the No-dong-B as a first stage. On February 25, 2007 Iran flew a single stage Shahab-3A/B class booster rocket as a sounding rocket.

It became apparent in 1994 that North Korea had not only received the No-dong-A technology transfer from the Makeyev OKB, of the former Soviet Union but had also received the Zyb SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 the design of which evolved to the No-dong-B/Shahab-4. This technology was received from the former Soviet Union at the same time 1987-88 that the No-dong-A technology was received in North Korea . The following specific report mentions the ZYB the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 derivation developed into what we know as the No-dong-B/Mirim/Shahab-4:

["KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Investigation"article by Sergey Pluzhnikov, Sergey Sokolov, and Mikhail Morozov "prepared from materials from more than 100 open Western and Russian publications": "Will Kirn Il-song Explode Our Atom Bomb?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]…. An unprecedented scandal, connected with the improvement of missiles and of the DPRK nuclear program as a whole, erupted in October 1992. Security Ministry staffers detained 36 Russian scientists at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport. They had been intending to fly to Pyongyang along with their families. [there were a total of 64 persons stopped according to reports at the time C.P.Vick]

It later came to light that prominent representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex had wanted to get jobs in the DPRK and had already drawn up contracts: Professor Arkadiy Bakhmutov, specialist in rocket engine building and winner of the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Prize; Doctor of Sciences Valeriy Strakhov, department head at the Scientific Research Institute of Special Machine Building in Bochkovo; Yuriy Bessarabov, one of the creators of the Zyb [ SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 that evolved to the KN-11, No-dong-B/Shahab-4 C.P.Vick] rocket and a Komsomol Prize winner; and other specialists in the sphere of rocket building. The organizer of this work landing force on the Russian side was Anatoliy Rubtsov, a specialist in the sphere of solid state physics well known in the circles of scientists working for the military-industrial complex. The organizer on the DPRK side was Major General Nam Chae-uk, who was declared persona non grata by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Security.

Anatoliy Rubtsov told journalists that a plan had existed to send 200 Russian scientists to the DPRK to create the scientific base of North Korean rocket building. "I did not initiate it," Rubtsov maintained. "In August 1992 Stepanov, chief of the Russian Federation Industry Ministry Machine Building administration, visited North Korea and signed a general agreement in this regard. It was proposed that I form a group. But South Korea promised Russia aid of $1 billion, and the Russian Government abruptly changed the state policy and agreed to restrictions in relations with the DPRK." At the same time Rubtsov said that the North Koreans had "approached" him back in April 1991, when he was lecturing in Beijing : "I was made a suitable offer of permanent work, and I accepted it. I was elected a member of the North Korean Academy of Sciences and appointed director of a scientific research institute. My younger sister passed dollars to someone at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in exchange obtained from the First Consular Section clean passports for 200 people to travel abroad. The money had been passed to me by a representative of the North Korean Embassy in Moscow , and my receipt was sent to Pyongyang ."

Almost all the scientists detained at Sheremetyevo-2 told journalists the same thing: "It is all the same to us for which political purposes our knowledge might be used; we only wanted to carry on doing our favorite thing."

According to data in some respectable publications, more than 20 (26 total C. P. Vick) /Russian scientists nonetheless managed to get work in the DPRK (mainly through China ). They live there under aliases, make $3,000-4,000 a month, and want for nothing . According to press allegations, however, some of our scientists no longer need to risk and negotiate border checkpoints in order to work on the North Korean nuclear program. They sit at home and send their calculations to Pyongyang by computer mail, which it is not yet possible to monitor……. (24)

KN-07? & KN-11, No-dong-B/Shahab-4

The final answer to analysis is a political answer regardless of the analysis resulting conclusions. Take caution, that this analysis is only as good as the sources and methods utilized to develop its conclusions based on open sources and the analysis of what trends that information reveals.

The North Korean, missile recently reported flight tested in Iran, is the land mobile 12 meter long No-dong-B which is based on the Soviet era liquid propellant SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-b.htm It was said to have been launched on January 17, 2006 in Iran for the benefit of North Korea and Iran . Added to the implications of that alone is that as long expected and predicted by this analyst Iran has apparently now become the nation to do some of the flight testing of the on going North Korean ballistic missile and space booster development programs. This is while North Korea continues to honor its supposed ballistic missile space booster flight testing moratorium. Whether this flight test conducted in Iran should be consider an out right violation of the moratorium must be decided by the U.S. government. Thus the trends seem to indicate there is every reason to believe that Iran has the benefit of the design work and testing done in the DPRK ( North Korea) and Pakistan. Further the trends seem to continue to prove the underestimation of the degree of intimacy of the collaboration among these three countries strategic programs.

The No-dong-B reportedly flew its test dummy warhead some 3,000 kilometers but its performance data revealed that it had a range capability of less than 4,000 kilometers. This tends to say to this analyst that the intelligence is rapidly being out paced by the actual progress in these integrated space and ballistic missile nuclear warhead programs. In an attempted to deliberately masquerade the flight test as a failure Iran blow it up once the test objective was achieved. This was after the intentional early engine shutdown and warhead separation. Interestingly apparently the flight test also exhibited Shahab-3Binstrumentation guidance telemetry causing it to initially be analyzed as a failed Shahab-3B flight test. This also indicates that the instrumentation and guidance for the No-dong-B is similar to the Shahab-3B equipment adaptation. When the all source information from the flight test was reviewed it proved that it was far from being that. It also presumable provided Iran as of late 2005 with the baseline system that is the basis of the first stage and especially the second stage of the yet to be flight tested redesigned Taep’o-ding-2C/3 space booster ICBM. This technology had long been sought after for purchase and financed development by Iran .

It has been known since 1994 from FBIS/JPRS reports from Russia that the North Korean’s received the Soviet Era SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 missile technology between 1988 and 1991 with its higher performance closed cycle liquid propulsion engine. This in 2003 manifested itself as a deployed land based and or a future potential surface ship or submarine deployed threat, due to its greater propellant load and increased range longer length SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 the No dong-B.

A critical point noted by John Pike is that “this new missile has the advantage that it fits inside a standard 40 foot to 50 foot shipping container, which would be really hard to detect on container ship on the open ocean.” This author notes that is especially the case if the warhead is interchangeable unattached and the fact that the missile is designed and installed on a land mobile transporter canister erector launcher for selected pre-surveyed launch sites. The whole mobile unit perhaps can be placed in the container and erect trough a top rear hatch that automatically opens up for launch with the other containers carrying the control room and pre fueled at the factory. This game could conceivably be played by both Iran and North Korea . Pike further points out “that small cargo ships can call in the DPRK or Iran get a container loaded with a missile loaded on board, and roam the oceans waiting to fire it when the orders are received.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-b.htm

It took North Korea between fifteen and eighteen years to master the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 for the No-dong-B technology including its closed cycle propulsion system, UDMH production/storage technology, the critical welding technology and highly improved inertial guidance technology. The production of the advanced guidance technology, with the addition of GPS ground input capability and the use of proper materials technology to handle the propellants represents a very significant leap forward for this space booster/ballistic missile program. More recently it was learned that in August 2004 that China has helped Iran integrate a new GPS aided laser inertial guidance system coupled with GPS back up input into the Shahab-3B MRBM.

Prior to this around 2003, the North Koreans added a new UDMH propellant storage facility as a harbinger of things to come beside the Taep’o-dong-2C/3 launch pad with enough capacity for and entirely new booster, with its new second and third stages and probable redesigned first stage for the satellite launcher prototype. The SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 derivation uses UDMH as one of its liquid propellant components in addition to the already available Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid.

Both the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B appear to perhaps have the same or similar nuclear warhead prototype RV design. The current indicated mass of 650 kilograms is based on the Soviet era heritage SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 capability for both the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B. Believing the Re-entry Vehicle (RV) is a nuclear warhead prototype and proving it are two very different worlds. The design of the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B, RV certainly indicates the expected standardized nuclear warhead RV design. It also indicates that they have mastered the technology for reducing the size of the nuclear device with in the RV’s airframe but does not prove that it is a complete nuclear warhead. Proving the RV’s potential nuclear lethality is no easy task requiring radiation sensing as well as atmospheric sampling of the emitted gaseous vapors. The question is why develop such a RV but for a nuclear warhead as all previous nations have done that possess nuclear technology for weapons production?

The late 2003 earlier 2004 observation in North Korea of the No-dong-B and its Re-entry Vehicle (RV) with its “top of a baby bottle-neck” nose cone design description which is what allowed the U. S intelligence community to recognize the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 origin of the new missile system. This along with the subsequent appearance of the Iranian Shahab-3B in Iran with its “baby bottle-neck” nose cone design reflected a commonality not immediately anticipated except with the knowledge of the intimacy of collaboration between these countries programs should have been predicted. The fact that both countries had their RV designs described separately in the same way profoundly suggests that their tested, operational nuclear weapon system is one and the same or very similar. When applying the known Shahab-3B, RV design to the No-dong-B it was found that it fitted with the known propulsion performance design constraints of the rocket stage. Circumstantially this result can not be ignored much less dismissed. Although for this analyst there remain issues of dry weight and propellant mass and burn time they will be resolved in due course

The No-ding-B’s were first sighted outside Pyongyang , North Korea on the Mirim, Air force base by US intelligence imaging system during September 2003. At the time it was predicted that some of the ten missiles imaged were expected to be put on display in an official holiday military parade in Pyongyang but this did not occur. Subsequently the missiles were found to be deployed in imagery early in 2004. The 3,000-4,000 kilometer range No-dong-B’s were deployed in the Sangnam-ri and Heocheon counties in the north Hamgyeong province. No further information on the missile systems appeared until it was flight test in January 17, 2006 out of Iran . Iran had received the No-dong-B’s from North Korea back in December 2005 through it Bandar Abbas port. ^{(18, 19, 20)} Immediately after the delivery in December 2005 it was followed with a flight test of the No-dong-B on January 17, 2006 out of Iran . ⁽²³⁾

Yet at the same time in 2003 and early 2004, the question could and should be asked, as did John Pike, did the North Korean displayed the No-dong-B’s for the US benefit? They were not paraded, which would have allowed for a much close examination of their realness. Nor have there been any identified flight test of the No-dong-B although they could be convinced that no flight test are required because of its design heritage and ground testing success. Also were the six of twenty six expected Iranian deployed Shahab-3B’s real or are they both a deception for our benefit? Are the No-dong-B’s real and are the Shahab-3B’s fakes and what is one to make of the Shahab-4 question?

If true that has now changed with this reported successful flight test of the No-dong-B perhaps identified internally in Iran as the new Shahab-4. It is now expected or assumed because of this successful flight test that it clears the way for both Iran and North Korea to begin production of this missile for further testing land deployment with Iran following behind North Korea. It is now reported that Iran has received a considerable shipment of these missiles recently. This also opens the door to North Korea to finally flight testing the long delayed redesigned Taep’o-dong-2C/3 space booster ICBM with its new more efficient propulsion system.

The Missile and RV programs of Iran have outpaced the warhead fuel program but not the warhead nuclear device design program which is in hand and has been for some time now. There is circumstantial evidence that Iran has not merely developed the already tested atomic nuclear device design but has also test the neutron producer trigger that has also cleared the way for the future thermo-nuclear device to be deployed. We also now know that Iran has plutonium in hand as circumstantially suspected. I would expect them to have the bomb fuel much soon than later from last years estimate of 10 years which has been revised to reflect this reality of less than five years in recent months.

Countries do not produce missiles to travel over thousands of kilometers to deliver mere “Fire Cracker” conventional high energy explosive warhead weapons unless they are intended to carry primarily nuclear, or chemical, biological weapons. The advances in the missile launch vehicle and re-entry vehicle program do mirror the advances in the nuclear weapons program of the larger total weapons program. Generally speaking no country makes the investment up to the threshold of actually having nuclear weapons without completing the process. The parallel missile and re-entry vehicle development programs also manifest this very harsh reality.

Finally on January 29, 2007 the US government acknowledged for the first time the existence of several new Iranian and North Korean missiles under development through a speech by the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency of the Pentagon Army Brig. General Patrick O’Reilly before the George C Marshall Institute. In that speech he described the Iranian two stage Ghadr-110 solid propellant missile with a range of (1,324 miles) 1,995.16 or close to 2,000 kilometers. It has been known that the Iranians are working on the Ghadr-101 as well as the Ghadr-110 solid propellant missiles. The Ghadr-101 solid motor development was completed in 2005. He also described the two stage Taep’o-dong-2C/3 as having a range of (6,200 Miles) 9,975.8 kilometers and the three stage version with a range of (9,300 miles) 14,963.7 kilometers with a 250 kg warhead. He went further in his slides presentation to show that the No-dong-B has a demonstrated range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers. ⁽²⁴⁾ The No-dong-B was described as “a qualitative improvement in the performance” from earlier North Korean missile systems. The Iranian Ghadr-101, 110, 110A will in fact also provides Iran with an ASAT capability besides its operational MRBM and IRBM capability.

We now have a consistent Acad. V. P. Makeyev, OKB launch vehicle and Acad. A. M. Isayev; OKB-2 propulsion design heritage for the following systems that have flown in flight test except for the latest last two in research and development: They are as follows:

Acad. V. P. Makeyev OKB DPRK Heritage Missile Systems:

 Name Type Designations, Missions, S/F

Scud-B KN-03?	TBM	Success
Scud-C KN-04?	TBM	Hwasong-5 Success
Scud-ER KN-05?	TBM >	Hwasong-6 Success
No dong-A KN-06?	MRBM	Success
No dong-B, KN-07?	IRBM	Success
Taep’o dong-1 Cancelled	Space booster	Unha-1 Failure
Taep’o dong-2 R & D	Space booster	Unha-2, 3, 4 Failures
Taep’o dong-3 R & D	Dedicated Space Booster	Geostationary/Manned L.V.
No-dong-C R & D, KN-08	LRICBM to replace TD-2	[No-dong-C (cpv)]

TBM-Tactical Ballistic missile, MRBM-Medium Range Ballistic Missile, IRBM- Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, LRICBM – Limited Range Inter-continental Ballistic Missile.

No-dong-B

05-11-2010 update

No-dong-B/Mirim IRBM

Totally Orchestrated Deception Was North Korea ’s Flight Testing Game

At Variance Intelligence Assessment Question

By © Charles P. Vick, 2007 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

04-12-07

Introduction

Was the deception by North Korea and Iran so well orchestrated that at least one of the last two of seven flight tests by North Korea on July 4-5, 2006 may possible have been a No-dong-B flown inside a No-dong-A flight profile. The missile in question was possibly transmitting on the No-dong-A, A1 telemetry format while possibly doing a simulated ICBM warhead re-entry test by powering the warhead thrusting downward while remaining inside the No-dong-A performance envelop? If there was no telemetry monitored it came back in the recoverable re-entry vehicle package similar to the Chinese way to recover data from their strategic ballistic missile systems flight tests. If North Korean “bi-static intercept” radar deception operations were still being conducted they could have masqueraded the operation even more to the allies. This question continues to linger on whether North Korea carried out such a test in addition to many other unanswered questions on these flight tests.

Trends Suggested At Variance Intelligence Assessment

Preliminary indications are assuming that if one of the last two flight test were the No-dong-B from North Korea suggested by South Korea and the previous No-dong-B flight test out of Iran may have proven the common Iranian, North Korean ICBM “re-entry vehicle” and “warhead fusing mechanisms” viability with two or three apparently successful flight tests in a row. Newly re-reviewed evidence appears to suggest that the last two missiles flight tested July 5, 2006 thought to initially be Scud-ER variants now appear to be potentially the second and third flight test of the Shahab-4/No-dong-B/Mirim 3,000-4,000 kilometers range IRBM or No-dong-A flights. (23) The last two of seven test flights were in the final report tentatively assessed as being No-dong-A flight test pending further review of the information still on going through 2006 and early 2007. All the data released so far indicates real problems on the part of all three communities even when combining all the all source data available in analyzing the flights flown and identifying the vehicles flown.

Trend Suggested At Variance Analysis

Several US government officials along with the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld have stated that the North Koreans have not successfully tested an ICBM to full range with a warhead. This is true but the North Koreans do not have a traditional fully instrumented ICBM range as does Russia and the U. S. in order to evaluate the “re-entry vehicle” performance and it’s “warhead fusing mechanisms”. But the DPRK does have shorter ranges that have already been used. If it is assumed that the last two missile flight tests of North Korea seven flights were the No-dong-B of three suspected flights. If this is correct then they have now run the reentry test three times utilizing the No-dong-B with the last two flown off the DPRK coast on steep ballistic trajectories rising perhaps as much as between 1,000-2,000 kilometers high and powered return over a 420 kilometers range ground track. The Iranian, North Korean first No-dong-B suspected flight test on January 17, 2006 went some 3,000-3,218 kilometers down range into the Indian Ocean and could have gone 4,000 kilometers. “The USAF used a similar approach for Re-entry Vehicle (RV) and fusing mechanisms development flight from Green River, Utah to White Sands Missile Range, NM and from Wallops FF, VA out in the Atlantic. Like the Air Force launches they could achieve ICBM-like re-entry conditions by pointing the vehicle back down while still under thrust.” (30) There should be little wonder why the North Koreans and Iranians are reportedly satisfied with the flight test results in spite of the launch failure of the Taep’o-dong-2 class booster satellite launch.

Presumably the ICBM re-entry vehicle and fusing mechanisms flight testing was the precise purpose of those last two or three flight test of the No-dong-B by North Korea with the Common Iranian, North Korean re-entry warhead design configuration indicating how far they have perhaps advanced.

Common North Korean, Iranian Re-entry Vehicle Design Heritage Trends

The North Korean’s certainly got the plan form for the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 missile from MIASS and greatly improved it but also got the plan form for the re-entry vehicle but not necessarily the warhead device type. There are definite differences in the present RV from older design SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 reflecting the more advanced RV designs of the Soviets/Russians that the sanctioned NIIGRAFIT, Grafit Research Institute – The State Scientific Research Institute of Graphite, company of Moscow were involved. They were involved in providing the ablative asbestos graphite composite board coatings materials and forming manufacturing technology for the new Icononic re-entry vehicle seen deployed and flight test on the Iranian Shahab-3B/ER MRBM.. Developing the conventional none nuclear proximity fused firecracker warhead with the provided RV is easy verse the nuclear gun type much less the plutonium implosion type nuclear warhead which is a whole different ball of wax to sculpt. The Makayev OKB, MIASS was not privy to the nuclear device design except for the interface, mass & cabling design requirements of the RV. That was ultimately handled by a separate Soviet/Russian nuclear industry organization in the area with only the RV/missile interface requirements being provided by MIASS. The policy at the time was not to provide nuclear weapons design but the North Koreans got at least nine nuclear scientists which could have seriously impacted that area of the technology transfer besides the in excess of seventeen rocket scientists.

However based on open sources analysis which is fully documented it is apparent that the telemetry seen received or captured from the Shahab-3B launches and the Shahab-4/No-dong-B launches appear to be of the same format indicating they are using the same equipment guidance, accelerometers, command control data processors and that it is extremely difficult to separate which missile is which. The only way to separate them is through the radar tracking performance, if they really perform to full capability, but that is not two data points that is only one in both cases which leaves a large area of uncertainty. Further that is subject to deception IE make Shahab-4 perform like the Shahab-3B/ER or No-dong-A fore shorting or redirecting its true performance capability. The Shahab-4/No-dong-B flight test out of Iran of January 17, 2006 is the only flight test yet to be identified as having taken place based on the 3,000 kilometer performance which far exceeded the Shahab-3B/ER 2,000 kilometer capability. Some of those flights in July 2006 out of North Korea may literally have gone off the scope so you are left with the realization that they could have done a propulsion driven ICBM like re-entry test like the US conducted with in the No-dong-A performance parameters. The exception being that if we know the potential nominal performance of the suggested missile how would one do a reentry test using that propulsion IE the time between the radar loss of the target to its reacquisition of the vehicle could indicate the ballistic profile for a No-dong-A test but may have been a No-dong-B propulsion driven re-entry test that we totally missed. This could also apply to a Scud–C or Scud-ER test disguise for this case but less likely. Whether the intelligence people of the US-(USN & NSA and USAF, Army) much less the South Koreans or the Japanese intelligence organizations have the information to check this if they even recognize this potential deception is uncertain to say the least and this is why I remain unsatisfied and very suspicious with the present end product analysis of all sides involved.

Although No-dong-A of Iran and Pakistan carried the conical Chinese heritage nuclear warhead re-entry vehicle (RV) design received from China by technology transfer to Pakistan it was not the RV design of choice for accuracy. This is why we see the second generation Shahab-3B/ER RV is so significant besides the long range nuclear suggestion. The late 2003 earlier 2004 observation of the No-dong-B, Re-entry Vehicle (RV) with its “top of a baby bottle-neck” nose cone design description which allowed the U. S intelligence community to recognize the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 origin of the new IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system. This along with the subsequent appearance of the Iranian Shahab-3B/ER with its “baby bottle-neck” nose cone design reflected a commonality not immediately anticipated. The facts that both countries had their RV’s designs described separately in the same way profoundly suggest that their tested, operational nuclear weapon system is one and the same. When applying the known Shahab-3B/ER, RV design to the No-dong-B it was found that it fitted with the known propulsion performance design constraints of the rocket stage. Circumstantially this result can not be ignored much less dismissed.

The current indicated mass of 650 kilograms is based on the Soviet era heritage SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 capability for both the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B/ER which appear to have the same nuclear warhead prototype RV design. Believing the RV is a nuclear warhead prototype and proving it are two very different worlds. The design of the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B/ER, RV certainly indicates the expected standardized nuclear RV warhead design. It also indicates that they have mastered the technology for reducing the size of the nuclear device with in the RV’s airframe but does not prove that it is a nuclear warhead. Proving the RV’s potential nuclear lethality is no easy task requiring radiation sensing as well as atmospheric sampling of the emitted gaseous vapors. The question is why develop such a RV but for a nuclear warhead as all previous nations have done that possess nuclear weapons technology for weapons production? The Missile and RV programs have outpaced the warhead fuel program but not the warhead nuclear device design program which is in hand and has been for some time now. Countries do not produce missiles to travel over thousands of kilometers to deliver mere “Fire Cracker” conventional high energy explosive warhead weapons unless they are intended to carry primarily nuclear, or chemical, biological weapons. The advances in the missile launch vehicle and re-entry vehicle program do mirror the advances in the parallel nuclear weapons program of the larger total weapons program. Generally speaking no country makes the investment up to the threshold of actually having nuclear weapons with out completing the process.

References:

1. Iran Could Achieve Nuke Capability in 2006, Washington date line [MENL], http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/january/01_22_1.html ( Army War College analysis)

2. Iran launched ”secret” rocket test, from correspondents in Berlin quoting Die Welt, The Weekend Australian, Feb. 4, 2006, News.com.au source AAP, http://www.theaustrailian.nes.com.au/common/story/_page/0,5744,18035986%255E1702,0...2/4/2006

3. U.S. Revises Assessment on Iran’s Nukes, Washington, [MENL], (quoting Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph)

http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/february/02_13_1.html 2/13/2006

4. Iran Develops Missile With 4,000-km Range London [MENL] http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/march/03_02_1.html

(Defines the Shahab-4, 3000km performance with 4000km capability)

This was the final all source analysis results that can only be the No-dong-B.

5. Iran Secretly Tests New Surface-To-Surface Missile, Staff Writer, Berlin, Germany (AFP) Feb 03, 2006, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_Secretly_Tests_New_Surface_To_Surface_Missile.... 2/6/2006

6. Iran Shihab3 Fails Test Launch, Staff Writers, Washington, DC (UPI) Feb 15, 2006, (Quoting FlightInternational.com defines the launch data and the initial analysis of the event) http://www.spacewars.com/reports/Iran_Shihab3_Fails_Test_Launch.html 2/17/2006

7. Iran has missile capable of hitting Europe: Israel, Jerusalem, April 27 (AFP) April 27, 2006 (defines that it is the No-dong-2 missile that is involved)

http://www.spacewars.com/2006/060427071156.kdge83yj.html

8. Iran Deploys Nuke-Capable IRBMs, Jersuslem [MENL]

. http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/april/04_30_2.html

(confirms additional missile of No-dong-B type delivered etc.)

9. The Closely related Collaborative Iranian & North Korean Strategic Space, Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Weapon Programs, OPEN SOURCE ESTIMATE, By © Charles P. Vick, 1999-05, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Senior Fellow Space Policy Globalsecurity.org 03-20-05 update 07-24-05

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/missile-development.htm

10. WMD missiles of Iran & North Korea

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/missile.htm

11. North Said To Deploy Longer Range Missile, by Lee Chul-hee/Ser Myo-ja, JoongAng Ilbo/Staff Writer, September 9, 2003 #885, http://www.ht.com/pdfs/jai/H200309091001000JA1.PDF

12. North Korea Deploys New Missile, By Joseph S. Bermudez, Janes Defense Weekly Aug. 4, 2004, http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw040802_1_N.shtm

13. North Korea Hybrid Missile Could Threaten US, New Scoentist.com news service, Aug 4, 2004, http://www.newscientist.com/print.jsp?id=ns99996242

14. New N. Korean Missile Said to Threaten U. S., By Mark Travelyan, Berlin (Reuters) August 2004.

15. N. Korea Deploying New Missile with Longer Range, South Says, Seoul, Washington Post, July 9, 2004, P. A15

16. North Deploys New 4,000 km Range Missile, Digital Chosun, The Chosun, IIbo, May 12, 2004, http://www.english.chosun.com/cgi-bin/printNews?.d=200405040031

17. FBIS –Sov-94-079, 25, April 1994, p. 15,Article Views DPRK Nuclear Program ‘Scandal’, Pravda, in Russian, 22-25 April 1994, p.5.

18. North Korea Fortifying Since War In Iraq Souths Government Says, By Jeremy Kirk, Stars and Stripes, Pacific Edition, Yangson Garrison South Korea, July 9, 2004, July 10, 2004.

19. Los Angeles Times, N. Korea Working on Missile Accuracy, By Sonni Efron, Sept 12, 2003.

20. New Suspicions Arise On NK’s Missiles, by Ryu Jin, Staff Reporter, The Korea Times.

21. Hawaii Possibly Within Range of North Korea Missile, By Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times, Seoul South Korea.

22. North Korea To Display New Missile, by Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, Sept. 9, 2003, P. 1,20.

23. http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200607/200607180002.html, N. Korea May Have Tested New Longer-Range Missiles, Digital Chosun, July.18, 2006 08:33 KST.

24.http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070130-122437-6559r.htm Gertz, Bill, How the “axis” seeks the killer missile, The Washington Times, January 30, 2007 , p. ?

25. North Korea test-fires ballistic missile from submarine: KCNA, nknews.org, Images of test and Kim Jong Un published by state media, Hamish Macdonal May 9th, 2015,

http://www.nknews.org/2015/05/north-korea-test-fires-ballistic-missile-from-submarine-kcna/

26. "North Korea Conducts Ejection Test of New Submarine Missile" By: Bill Gertz Washington Free Beacon . 5 May 2015, pp. 1-3.

27. North Korea Flight Tests New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile, Pentagon: KN-11 missile test fired from floating platform, By: Bill Gertz, Washington Free Beacon, February 18, 2015, pp. 1-3

28. North Korea says successfully test-fired underwater ballistic missile, The Times of India‎, Seoul, South Korea, AFP, May 9, 2015, p. 1.

29. U.S. Confirms North Korean Sub Missiles, By: Bill Gertz, Washington Free Beacon, North Korea tests a submarine-launched ballistic missile / Arirang, March 19, 2015, pp. 1-3.

30. "N.K. continues saber-rattling over holiday". The Korea Herald. 22 February 2015 . Retrieved, 23 February 2015 .

References:

1-23. http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200607/200607180002.html, N. Korea May Have Tested New Longer-Range Missiles, Digital Chosun Ilbo , July.18, 2006 08:33 KST

2-30. Private correspondence between C. P. Vick & Wayne Eleazer, Cape Canaveral , FL Friday, July 28, 2006, 3:57 PM, and Friday, July 28, 2006 8:42 PM , Subject: Re: Taepodong Launch.