Nodong-A Design Heritage
By (C) Charles P. Vick 2007 All Rights Reserved
The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the authors and cannot be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence, informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents, official Iranian and North Korean government documents and histories, oral histories, interviews and reverse engineering analysis. As with all data regarding the Iranian and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile programs, this analysis is subject to revision--and represents a work in progress.
No-dong - A Design Heritage
The No-dong-A represent a significant departure from the prior North Korean practice of incremental improvements on the basic single-engine Scud-B design, and this departure is reflected in the protracted development history of the system, This single-stage missile apparently incorporates a SS-N-4, Isayev S-2.713M engine No-dong-A Design Heritage. The closely related Iranian Shehab-3, 3A and the Pakistani Ghauri-II both reflect this copied design of what is variously called No-dong-A, No-dong-1, Ro-dong-1, and Scud-D.
Some aspects of the No-dong-A seems to bear a close design resemblance to the early Soviet SS-N-4/R-13 and SS-N-5/R-21 (SLBM)Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile designs. This would not be to surprising, given that these early submarine-launched ballistic missiles were an evolutionary development of the same Scud technology that is used by North Korea. However the primary plan form of the No-dong-A is the Scud-B,of the Miass, Makeyev OKB of the former Soviet Union which is where the design almost certainly originated as a follow-on design not fully developed and produced.
The Soviet R-13, known in the West as the SS-N-4, used one Isayev S2.713 engine with larger 1.3 m diameter tankage from the Scud 0.88 m diameter tankage design and warhead separation from the missile body. This missile had a launch weight of 13,745 kg, a range of 560 km and a body diameter of 1.3 meters. And the R-21, designated the SS-N-5 used the four thrust chamber Isayev S-5.38 higher thrust engine and more tankage with perhaps a airframe material tankage materials change and rearranged propellant tanks along with warhead separation. With a body diameter of 1.4 m, this missile had a launch mass of nearly 19,653 kg. with a range of 1,420 km.
The No-dong-A has a reported mass of 15,852-16,250 kilograms, with a diameter of 1.32-1.35 m and a length of 16 m giving it a range of 1,350-1,600 km. The characteristics of the No-dong-A missile with its 15,852-16,250 kg launch weight (with a 550 - 1,158 kg warhead) falls right among the upper end of the two older Soviet SLBM's design. While this may simply reflect the unavoidable consequence of using this proven Scud design approach to achieve a long range missile, other evidence suggest that a more direct connection may apparently exist.
What of Chinese & Russia’s Material, Personnel and Missile Technology Transfer to the North Korean Effort during the Gorbachev Era?
Although late Kim Il-Sung established the schools for the missile and nuclear programs of North Korea in 1965 it took quite a while for those programs to mature until external infusions through technology transfers pushed them dramatically forward.
PRC China Contribution
During the mid-1970's (1975-1978) they cooperated with the Chinese on the DF-61 storable liquid propellant missile development project which provided an initial basis for future missile development. The single stage DF-61 was to have a range of 600 kilometers with a 500 kilogram warhead and 300 kilometers with a 1,000 kilogram warhead using an inertial guidance system. The DF-61 cooperation with North Korea was cancelled by China in 1978. Development of this system was halted because of the connection of the head of the program (General Cheng Jiming, chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission) with the "Gang of Four." (1)
The U. S. S. R's Considerable Contribution
On October 15, 1992, the Russian, Security Ministry's officers stopped 64 Russian missile specialists from Miass with their family members at Moscow's Sheremetyevo-2 airport where they were preparing to leave on a flight to North Korea. Again on November 5, 1992 the Russian, Security Ministry personnel stopped 60 Russian missile specialists 40 of which were missile specialist from Miass while the remaining 10-20 were nuclear specialists at Moscow's Sheremetyevo-2 airport where they were preparing to leave on a flight to North Korea. Yet again on December 8, 1992, 36 nuclear specialists were stopped by the Russian Security Ministry personnel. Subsequently a North Korean Major General was declared persona-non grata by the Yeltsin government. Ultimately at least 17-20 missile specialist and 9 nuclear specialists made it to North Korea via China and are believed to have remained there. It turned out that these technical personnel were from the Miass, V.P. Makayev OKB, the submarine-launched ballistic missile design bureau. It is difficult to assess the full extent of collaboration and technology transfer between the Makayev bureau to North Korea during this Gorbachev era, although such a large, senior delegation almost certainly meant that an earlier contact had already been substantially completed with certain critical documentation exchanged on the No-dong-A and subsequent No-dong-B ballistic missiles as a part of an on going agreement. The subsequent group of ten missile engineering specialists, designers that went to North Korea in the spring of 1992 had set up the work that North Korea followed through with and continues to work to this day. When those personnel returned to the Urals they recruited the rest of the full group of senior specialists but much of the cooperative work had already started as far back as during 1988. Miass in the face of the Russian liquid propellant SLBM industry collapse it was a natural sequence of events for that OKB's highly educated and experienced personnel to seek more stable employment with a country they had been cooperating with for some period of time that had the most available best offer at that time. This effort was the end product of the cooperation so carefully nurtured by North Korea from 1988 through 1992 collecting perhaps as many as 160 missile specialists and nuclear scientists including their families with facilities to house 300 personnel developed in North Korea based on FBIS reports from 1992-1996. Within those are nine senior nuclear scientists and seventeen senior missile specialists. This new group like other senior specialist's was acquired with the offer of the equivalent of $1,200.00 - $1,500.00 - $3,000.00 - $4,000.00/month pay over their mere $6.00 - $15.00/month equivalent Ruble pay if any pay at all since they were nearly unemployed due to the cancelled liquid propulsion SLBM programs brought on by disarmament treaties. (2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24)
While there is little doubt that the No-dong-A is of North Korean design and manufacture, it certainly seems to have benefited from some aspects of the Makayev SLBM program experience and design details. The source of this missile technology transfer is the treaty cancellation of the Soviet liquid fueled SLBM programs in the early 1980's. By the mid 1980's the liquid SLBM's program personnel were reduced to caretaker status for deployed existing hardware. Effectively the cancellation of the programs resulted in the unemployment for a large group of highly trained rocket personnel. In an effort to re-employ their personnel, Glavkosmos a Soviet commercial division of the Ministry of General Machine building tried to market these SLBM's commercially as satellite and vertical probe launchers. That initial effort failed. In subsequent years some commercial flights were flown but many failed. The formal technology exchange between the Russians and the North Koreans probably started in 1988, well before the 1991 collapse of the former USSR. How much technology and materials expertise was transferred, remains somewhat uncertain except through hardware analysis? But the slow pace of this program suggest that some combination of technical and resource constraints have sorely challenged the North Korean missile program. It is however known that many of the leading leadership rocket expertise of North Korea were originally trained both in Moscow the Former Soviet Union and then in Beijing, China.
The North Korean and Iranian missile heritage family as developed from the Acad.FV. P. Makeyev OKB missile systems technology transfer.
The SS-N-4 and SS-N-5 have been on public display at the Russian Central Army Museum since at least 1992. The existence of these missile demonstrates that this is a potential fruitful line of development to extend the range of Scud-derived systems technology. It certainly represents a proven design concept, in contrast to the less sophisticated Iraqi approach of simply clustering multiple Scuds to achieve longer range. But the apparent slow and uneven progress on the No-dong-A program since 1992 may not be entirely unrelated to the cessation of active assistance from Russian former Soviet Union sources.
Soviet Design Path of Their First SLBM's
|R-11FM||Modified Scud-A, B with one Isayev engine, SS-N-0, 1959|
|Launch Weight||5,440-5,500 kg|
|Body Diameter||0.885 m|
|Fuel||TG-02, mixed Amine 50% triethylamine, 50% xylidine/T-1 Kerosene|
|Oxidizer||AK-20I=(AK-20K) = IRFNA(80% I-HNO3) +20% N2O4|
|Thrust||8,300 kg f|
|Burn time||92 sec.|
The R-13/SS-N-4 used one Isayev engines S2.713 with larger tankage from the Scud design and warhead separation from the missile body. The propellant tanks were rearranged. This was done for center of gravity control of the launch vehicle. This duel drain points were also used in the R-13/SS-N-4 tankage arrangement to assist that center of gravity control according to Makayev OKB historic documents. Deployed 1960.
|Launch weight||13,600 kg|
|Body diam.||1.3 m|
|Fuel||Storable Tonka-250 UDMH derivation|
|Oxidizer||AK-27I = 27% N204 + 73% HNO3 with iodium as the inhibitor =IRFNA|
|Thrust||25,720 kg f|
|Isp.||216 sec. sea level, 235 sec vacuum|
The R-21/SS-N-5 used four Scud type thrust chambers to create an advanced higher thrust Isayev engine S5.38 and more tankage was added with a possible airframe tankage material change as well as warhead separation. Deployed 1963.
|Launch weight||19,653-19,700 kg|
|Body diam.||1.3 m|
|Oxidizer||IRFNA possibly AK-27P 27% N2O4 73% HNO3 with a different inhibitor|
|Thrust||33,600 kg f|
|Isp.||248 sec sea level, 268 sec vacuum|
How did the North Koreans develop No-dong?
|Scud-A||copy the technology with steel tankage|
|Scud-B||Used one improved Isayev higher Isp engine.|
|Scud-C||like Iraq more fuel with its lengthened tankage and improved Isayev OKB engine.|
|No-dong-A||Used one engine with a single thrust chamber and four times the scud tankage and warhead separation. SS-N-4/5 like approach.|
|No-dong-A||Probable redesign for Aluminum Magnesium airframe body via the Chinese and Russian experience previously observed. SS-N-4/5 like approach. All of these programs benefited from North Korean engineers, technicians, and scientist cooperating on the PRC, Chinese canceled DF-61 program of the mid 1970's.|
|Taepo-dong-1||Used the up-rated No-dong-A with a Scud-B second stage with a SAM-2 engine fuel change placed on top. Chinese/Russian brains|
|Taepo-dong-2||Used all new first stage based on CSS-2/SS-5 design approach and an all new four thrust chambered first stage engine based on the No-dong-A single thrust chambers and a new turbo-pump machinery or four separate higher performance No-dong-B engines and a No Dong-A as its second stage. More recently it is believed that the No-dong-A second stage has been replaced by the No-dong-B/Mirim/Shahab-4 derived SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 as the Taep’o-dong-2C/3 second stage . The first stage is now also believed to be based on this No-dong-B design technology different from the No-dong-A technology. It certainly explains the seven year delay in its flight test. Certainly the Chinese design approach to the LRICBM known as CSS-3/DF-4 & DF-3/CSS-2 influenced the Taepo-Dong-2's first stage design. The exception being is that instead of one turbo pump to feed four separate thrust chambers with steering vanes for the TD-2 first stage North Koreans instead chose four fixed independent engines turbo-pumps and thrust chambers for the first stage possibly with four verniers thrust chambers on gimbals with their own pumps. This could have presented synchronization problems in both designs but especially over the original design. In order to meet the performance desired the Taep’o-dong-2 design had to change from the original design mock-up first imaged by the US in February 1994. Something related to this probably caused the first Taep’o-dong-2 launch failure. See accompanying drawings etc.|
1. Colonel Viktor Vasilyevich Stefashin, Chinese Nuclear Strategy and National Security, Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, August 1995, Niumber 8, p. 35-36.
2. FBIS reports from 1992-1996 on North Korean missile and nuclear activities, Komsomolskata Pravda Investigation, by Sergey Pluzhnikov, Sergey Sokolov & Mikhail Morozov, “Will Kim Il-song Explode Our Atom Bomb?” April 22-25, 1994 , p.5. This specific report mentions the ZYB the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 derivation developed into what we know as the No-dong-B/Mirim/Shahab-4.
3. http://www.mercurynews.conVmld/mercurynews/l5116346.htm?template=contentModule., Missiles Are Pivotal to North Korea's Military Strategy, By Daniel Sneider, July 25, 2006, PP. 1-2.
4. David C. Wright and Timur Kadyshev, "An Analysis of the North Korean Nodong Missile," Science and Global Security, November 1993.
5. Barbara Starr, "CIA expects Nodong deployment next year," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 Nov 1995 , p. 16.
6. "North Korea Shops for Nuclear Technology in Russia ," by Warren Strobel, The Washington Times July 5, 1994 p.al and a8.
7. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat 15 July 1998 .
8. Delivery Systems, and Chemical. Biological, and Nuclear Programs Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS Middle East Studies Program, 28 April 1998 .
9. Report: NK Rodong-1 Missile Battalions In Place Jim Lea Pacific Stars and Stripes October 26, 1999 -- North Korea has deployed four Rodong-1 missile battalions — one in North Pyongan Province bordering China and three stationed in North Hwanghae Province near the Demilitarized Zone. Each of the battalions has launch pads for nine Rodong-1 missiles.
10. Greg Gerardi and Jpseph Bermudez Jr. An Analysis of the North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7 , number 4, 1995, pp. 184-190.
11. Kugbanggwa Kisul, No. 127, Sept 89, FBIS-EAS 29 Nov 89 .
12. UW02183593 KBS-1 Radio Network ( Seoul ), 21 December 1992 ; in JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 January 1993 , p.6.
Arrival of Russian Nuclear Specialists Thwarted
SK2012025892, Seoul KBS-l Radio Network in Korean, 0200 GMT 20 Dec 92
[Report by ASSOCIATED PRESS and YONHAP from London ]
[Text] According to the British SUNDAY TIMES, Russian security authorities on 8 December prevented the departure of an airplane heading from Moscow to North Korea with 36 Russian nuclear weapon specialists aboard. This paper quoted a Russian security authorities' source who said that all 36 nuclear weapon specialists were arrested. This paper reported that the Russian authorities’ action was a dramatic measure to frustrate North Korea 's ambition to development nuclear weapons.
The SUNDAY TIMES also reported that North Korean authorities hired these Russian scientists, who had worked for a Russian nuclear weapons research institute, at monthly salaries ranging from $1,500 to $3,000, to assist North Korean nuclear development.
13. Missile Technicians Held In Moscow
SK2212001392, Seoul KBS-I Radio Network in Korean, 2200 GMT, 21 Dec 92
[ASSOCIATED PRESS and YONHAP from Moscow ]
[Text] Russia ’s Security Ministry said yesterday that it has recently banned 64 missile technicians from departing the country.
(Kandahrov) -spokesman of the Security Ministry said in an interview with the ASSOCIATED PRESS that security personnel hauled in scientists who were trying to depart the country from the Moscow Airport on 15 October and 5 November and released them after holding them temporarily.
Prior to this, THE SUNDAY TIMES of the United Kingdom reported on 20 December that Russian security personnel took 36 nuclear experts employed by North Korea after banning an airplane carrying them from taking off on 8 December and that some of the nuclear experts are being questioned now.
14. Yonhap, Seoul , 21 December 1992 , FBIS-SOV-92-246, 22 December 1992 , p. 16. Indicates that alt least 10 of the 64 from October were nuclear scientists.
15. PM2112173192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22, Dec 92 Morning Edition p 2.
[Sergey Mostovshchikov report: "Russian Ministry of Security Instructs Bearers of Secrets to Stay in Their Jobs"]
“….The report also says that the Russian nuclear power industry specialists were picked by the Koreans from workers at secret military bases and promised a monthly salary of $3,000 in the DPRK. Moreover, "Radio France Internationale" cites certain Western intelligence data stating that North Korea is a year away from possessing its own nuclear bomb.”
16. LD0402183593 Moscow ITAR-TASS, 4 February 1993 ; in JPRS-TND-93-005, 12 February 1993 , pp.14-15.
Defense Worker Reportedly Tried To Go to DPRK
Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, l800 GMT 4 Feb. 93 (By ITAR-TASS correspondent Evgeniy Tkachenko)
(Text] Chelyabinsk February 4 TASS—A group of over 60 Russian defence researchers tried to leave for North Korea last October where they were offered a monthly salary of 1.5-4,000 US dollars, according to the CHELYABINSKl RABOCHIJ newspaper which quoted local security officers.
All the researchers worked at defence enterprises and more than 40 of them were from the machine-designing bureau in Miass.
The composition of the group allowed it to create a warhead for a nuclear missile, according to experts of the Russian security ministry.
The group was detained in the Moscow International Shercmctycvo-2 Airport and was kept for two months in a rest house near Moscow.
The newspaper said that although the organizers of the trip were not found, each of the scientists received 40,000 rubles from them and left for home.
Some of them resumed work at their enterprises; others are still hoping to leave abroad, the newspaper said.
17. UPI, 10 February 1993 ; in Executive News Service, 10 February 1993 .
18. Itar-Tass, 24 February 1993 ; in FBIS-SOV-93-035, 24 February 1993 , pp.11-12.
Missile Designers Explain Attempt to Work in DPRK,
LD2402123293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1207 GMT 24 Feb 93
[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Evgeniy Tkachenko]
(Text) Miass February 24 TASS—Miserable wages forced best missile constructors from die machine-designing bureau in Miass, Chelyabinsk region in the Urals, to agree to work in North Korea, the administration of the Unique Defence Enterprise told TASS commenting on the foiled trip of a 60-men strong group of Russian scientists who were hired to develop modern strategic armaments in North Korea.
The group, which included one doctor and six masters of sciences, was detained at the Moscow international Sheremetyevo-2 airport at the end of last year white heading for Pyongyang .
Yuriy Benarabov. a leading expert of the enterprise told TASS that Pyongyang did not offer to pay much for his job—1,200 U.S. dollars a month, which is nothing compared to Western standards.
But in Russia he monthly earned only 3,000 roubles in 1992, which is less than six U.S. dollars according to the current official exchange rate.
Bessarabov, who has three children, said a cleaner at a nearby car works earns twice as much. Besides, there was nothing to do at the defence enterprise which lost most of the state orders.
"We did not plan to leave the Motherland for good, we wanted to make money and come back", he said.
The scientists, who have now returned to their bureau, told TASS they had not intended to create modem strategic armaments in North Korea and were to train local personnel for designing such armaments.
19. Armed Forces Journal International , April 1993, p.9.
20. PM2912170793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30, Dec 93 First Edition p 4
[Sergey Leskov article: "The Defense Industry Has Seized the Monopoly in the Refrigerator Market but
Dreams Most About Arms Export"]
[Text] The Russian Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry unites …. It was only by chance that a group of missile specialists bound for North Korea was recently stopped. According to certain information a settlement is currently being upgraded in North Korea to house 300 Russian Defense specialists. …..
21. PM 1801203194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 4
[Report by Aleksandr Sychev: "Pacific Fleet Sells Written-Off Submarines and Is Happy"]
[Text] The Asia-Pacific Region is panicking slightly. Following the four written-off "Foxtrot" class Russian
submarines (IZVESTIYA No. 9), the Pacific Fleet has apparently sold another 10 "Golf-2" submarines, capable of carrying three SS-N-5 sea-base ballistic missiles, to North Korea.
22. Moscow IZVESTIYA 27 Jan 94 we have; (Sergey Agafonov report: "A Total of 160 Russian, Nuclear Scientists and Missile-men Helped North Korea To Create a Nuclear Bomb. The Japanese Have Learned This from a Secret Report by the Russian General Staff"]
[Text] Tokyo —The Japanese weekly SHUKAN BUNSHUN carries a detailed account of a secret report off
"North Korean nuclear affairs prepared by the Russian General Staff and an interview with an unnamed official involved in compiling that report, referred to in a note as "a leader.
…. Almost 160 Russian nuclear scientists and missile men have passed through North Korean laboratories and specialized centers since then. At present nine (9) Russian nuclear scientists and 17 highly qualified missile specialists are working in North Korea.This is outside the framework of bilateral cooperation and is unofficial, as it were—according to the "leader's" comments, many of our scientists have changed their names, and some have taken DPRK citizenship. Only it is not this that is important but the fact that the project, to create the Korean Nodong-1 intermediate-range missile was successfully completed with the assistance of Russian, brains, and North Korea has accumulated a sufficient stock of enriched nuclear raw materials with the help of Russian scientists and technologies and now possesses approximately 10-12 kg of uranium-235 and 20 kg of plutonium-239. Citing the Testimonies of four Russian specialists who recently returned from the DPRK after working in Korean nuclear complexes, the report maintains that Pyongyang already possesses one or two nuclear warheads and by the end the year will roll several more off the conveyor belt.
23. and from Moscow IZVEST1YA 24 Jun 94 (Article by Yevgeniy Albats: "Back in 1990 the USSR , KGB Reported That the DPRK Had Completed the Development of a Nuclear Device"]
[Text]….. The Atomic Energy Ministry's view was fully confirmed by DPRK ambassador in Moscow Mr. Son Song-pil, who honored the State Duma International Affairs Committee with his presence: "We do not have the technical potential to produce nuclear weapons," he said.
Finally, Russian intelligence, as IZVEST1YA wrote recently, also denies that Pyongyang has the technology and capacity to produce nuclear weapons. This is amusing. Amusing because four years ago it said precisely the opposite, the words coming from' Vladimir Kryuchkov, USSR KGB chairman at the time.
The document that is cited below is a memorandum from Kryuchkov (No. 363-K) to the USSR leadership dated 22 February 1990 and headed "On the question of the development of nuclear weapons in the DPRK." Here is the full text:
"The KGB has been informed by a reliable source that research and development work is actively continuing in the DPRK on nuclear weapons. The North Korean leaders, in particular. Kirn Chong-il, who is personally supervising the aforementioned research, are seeking military superiority over South Korea and are also pursuing the goal of joining the states that possess these weapons.
"According to available data, the development of the first nuclear device has been completed at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon, in Pyongan-pukto Province. There are no plans for testing it at the moment in order to conceal from the world public and international monitoring organizations the fact that nuclear weapons are being produced in the DPRK.
"The KGB is taking extra steps to check the data.
"This is for your information.
"KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov."
24. FBIS-SOV-94-079, p. 15, PM2504085794 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRA VDA in Russian 22-25 Apr 94 p 5
["KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Investigation"article by Sergey Pluzhnikov, Sergey Sokolov, and Mikhail Morozov "prepared from materials from more than 100 open Western and Russian publications": "Will Kirn Il-song Explode Our Atom Bomb?"]
[Excerpts] [passage omitted]…. An unprecedented scandal, connected with the improvement of missiles and of the DPRK nuclear program as a whole, erupted in October 1992. Security Ministry staffers detained 36 Russian scientists at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport. They had been intending to fly to Pyongyang along with their families. [there were a total of 64 persons stopped according to reports at the time CPVick]
It later came to light that prominent representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex had wanted to get jobs in the DPRK and had already drawn up contracts: Professor Arkadiy Bakhmutov, specialist in rocket engine building and winner of the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Prize; Doctor of Sciences Valeriy Strakhov, department head at the Scientific Research Institute of Special Machine Building in Bochkovo; Yuriy Bessarabov, one of the creators of the Zyb [ SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 that evolved to the No-dong-B/Shahab-4 CPVick] rocket and a Komsomol Prize winner; and other specialists in the sphere of rocket building. The organizer of this work landing force on the Russian side was Anatoliy Rubtsov, a specialist in the sphere of solid state physics well known in the circles of scientists working for the military-industrial complex. The organizer on the DPRK side was Major General Nam Chae-uk, who was declared persona non grata by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Security.
Anatoliy Rubtsov told journalists that a plan had existed to send 200 Russian scientists to the DPRK to create the scientific base of North Korean rocket building. "I did not initiate it," Rubtsov maintained. "In August 1992 Stepanov, chief of the Russian Federation Industry Ministry Machine Building administration, visited North Korea and signed a general agreement in this regard. It was proposed that I form a group. But South Korea promised Russia aid of $1 billion, and the Russian Government abruptly changed the state policy and agreed to restrictions in relations with the DPRK." At the same time Rubtsov said that the North Koreans had "approached" him back in April 1991, when he was lecturing in Beijing : "I was made a suitable offer of permanent work, and I accepted it. I was elected a member of the North Korean Academy of Sciences and appointed director of a scientific research institute. My younger sister passed dollars to someone at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in exchange obtained from the First Consular Section clean passports for 200 people to travel abroad. The money had been passed to me by a representative of the North Korean Embassy in Moscow , and my receipt was sent to Pyongyang ."
Almost all the scientists detained at Sheremetyevo-2 told journalists the same thing: "It is all the same to us for which political purposes our knowledge might be used; we only wanted to carry on doing our favorite thing."
According to data in some respectable publications, more than 20 (26 total cpvick) Russian scientists nonetheless managed to get work in the DPRK (mainly through China ). They live there under aliases, make $3,000-4,000 a month, and want for nothing. According to press allegations, however, some of our scientists no longer need to risk and negotiate border checkpoints in order to work on the North Korean nuclear program. They sit at home and send their calculations to Pyongyang by computer mail, which it is not yet possible to monitor…….
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