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"In wartime, truth is so precious that
she should always be attended by
a bodyguard of lies."
Winston Churchill

DPRK Missile Programs - Kim Jong-un

Recent developments in North Korea's missile programs are rather difficult to follow. There has been an outburt of activity, both parade missiles and flight tests, In the years since the accession of Kim Jong-un on 22 December 2011.

• By one count, there have been as many significant missile and nuclear tests [about 75] in the first five years of the Kim Jong-un era as there were in the preceding quarter century of rule of Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-Sung.
• The Kim Jong-un program involves different missiles from the precceding programs. The Kim Il-Sung program consisted of SRBM [short range ballistic missile] Scud derivatives, in large part developed with and for Iran. The Kim Jong-il program consisted of the No-dong / Hwasong-7 MRBM [medium range ballistic missile] and related derivatives of the Soviet SS-N-5 submarine launched ballistc missile. The Kim Jon-il program appeared to include larger missiles, based on gantry construction, but this Taep'o-dong-3 / Unha-9 vehicle has not materialised.
• The Kim Jong-un program includes three entirely new missile designs:
  1. A new intermediate range ballistic missile [IRBM] in one stage [Hwasong-10] and two stage [Hwasong-12] variants, along with a sea launched ballistic missile [SLBM] variant [Pukguksong-1], all of which are derivatives of the Soviet SS-N-6 submarine launched ballistc missile.
  2. A new intercontinental range ballistic missile [ICBM] seen in at least three variants [ KN-08, KN-14 and KN-20, also known as Hwasong-13 and Hwasong-14], all of which appear to be derivatives of the Soviet R-29RM / SS-N-23 SKIF submarine launched ballistic missile design.
  3. A new solid propellant SLBM, in two stage [Pukguksong-2] and three stage [Pukguksong-3] variants, using a family of 1.4 meter diameter solid rocket motors developed in concert with the Iranian Ashura / Ghadr-110A program.

• These three missile programs are submerged in a blizzard of at least three conflicting designation systems [DPRK, ROK and USA] that remain incompletely reconciled in the open literatur. Adding to the confusion, a number of variants of each of the three designs have been seen on parade and in fight tests. These variants may reflect the experimentation of a development program, and/or efforts to baffle outsider with non-functional cosmetic ornamentation.
• Although it would be difficult to quantify, the DPRK missile program seems large relative to the comparable missile programs of the UK, France and Israel.
  1. The UK spent a few years in the late 1950s on the Blue Streak IRBM, which was cancelled in 1960 prior to deployment. The smaller Blue Steel air launched ballistic missile saw limited service after 1963.
  2. France developed two generations of SSBS Sol-Sol-Balistique-Stratégique [land to land ballistic missiles] and five generations of MSBS Mer-Sol-Balistique-Stratégique (Sea-Ground - Ballistic -Strategic) missiles. The SSBS was a land-based variant of the MSBS, so France never had more than one missile program under development at any one time.
  3. Israel developed the Jericho 1 missile in the 1960s, the Jericho 2 missile in the 1980s, and the the Popeye cruise missile in the 1990s. A very modest and leisurely program compared to the frenetic North Koreans.

• The upsurge in North Korean activity took place in the same timeframe as the international negotiations to limit Iran's nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief, which began 24 November 2013. On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. The deal culminated 20 months of negotiations. October 18, 2015 marked Adoption Day of the JCPOA, the date on which the JCPOA came into effect.
• It seems probable that the notable upsurge in missile activity in North Korea reflects a broader effort to relocate Iran's WMD program to the DPRK. The two countries have been working together on special weapons for at least three decades, since North Korea began building specialy designed Scuds for Iran's use in the Imposed War with Iraq.

North Korea unveiled posters depicting its ballistic missile striking the White House. The North’s official Korean Central News Agency on 17 August 2017 revealed six propaganda posters upholding the regime’s earlier threat to attack the US. The posters depict the North’s Hwasong-14 missiles attacking the White House and smashing the phrases “sanctions resolution,” “a preventive war,” and “a military option.” They were seen as an expression of Pyongyang’s determination not to succumb to UN Security Council sanctions or U.S. presidential security adviser Herbert McMaster’s recent remarks on the U.S.’ preparations for a preventive war against the North.

Kim Jong Un inspected a factory producing ballistic missile launch vehicles in early January 2024, where he demanded officials fix “flaws” in production to prepare for war with South Korea, according to state media on 10 January 2023. The brief Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report heavily focused on the roles of factories in facing off against the “main enemy” South Korea, but it did not name them or the weapons Kim inspected on Jan. 8, widely believed to be his birthday, and the following day. Photos published with the report appeared to mostly show transporter erector launchers (TELs) for the Hwasong-11D close-range ballistic missile (CRBM) under production at one or more factories, while the text said Kim visited multiple sites.

There were at least 27 Hwasong-11D TELs mostly or completely assembled in one assembly hall that Kim appeared to visit at night while wearing a long leather coat, according to NK News analysis. There were at least another 18 in one or more assembly halls that Kim appeared to visit in the daytime while wearing a shorter leather coat.

One photo shows what appears to be a larger TEL in the early stage of production, with features resembling the TEL used for the Hwasong-12B, a medium-range missile North Korea says is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). While KCNA said Kim was satisfied with the factories’ contributions, he also pointed out “some flaws recently revealed in the organization of munitions production” and gave instructions over “readjusting the main production indices of munitions factories in a long-term view” and in “consideration of factory capacity.”

He said the weapons industry in general must “permanently expand production capacity and implement innovative reconstruction and modernization goals.” Kim reportedly “judged the Republic of Korea clan to be our main enemy” and said North Korea must keep “continuously stockpiling unparalleled overwhelming power” due to growing hostilities with South Korea.

This echoed a major shift in Pyongyang’s policy toward South Korea which the DPRK leader previewed at last month’s party plenum. He previously said “our main enemy is war itself, not a particular country or group like South Korea or the United States” in a speech about weapons development in Oct. 2021. “The Republic of Korea, which has pursued only vicious confrontations to overthrow our regime and system for nearly 80 years, [is] the most hostile state of the DPRK,” Kim said during the inspections, according to KCNA.

But while Kim emphasized the danger that the ROK poses to North Korea, he signaled that the DPRK would not strike first unprovoked. “We will never unilaterally carry out a great disaster by overwhelming force on the Korean peninsula, but we have no intention of avoiding war if the Republic of Korea dares to attempt to use force against our country or threaten our sovereignty and security.”