Appendix F - Project-Specific Environmental Analysis
This project-specific environmental analysis is intended to complete the National Environmental Policy Act requirements for the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. It evaluates the potential environmental, health and safety impacts of Alternative 3, "Expanded Use of the Facility," and Alternative 1, "Continue Current Operations."
F.1 Introduction
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory act for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under the aegis of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) Joint Test Organization. These laboratories are involved in bunker certification activities in support of the proposed hydrodynamic and pulse power testing at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility at the NTS. These tests are currently limited to the aboveground detonations of conventional high explosives and munitions with charges up to 3,629 kilograms (kg) (8,000 pounds [lb]) each. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory propose to expand the use of this facility to include testing of advanced technologies in support of the DOE Defense Program’s stockpile stewardship, counter-proliferation, and work for others efforts. The expanded use of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would involve large experimental systems and high-explosive charges up to 31,751 kg (70,000 lb) each. Experiments could contain potentially hazardous materials, such as beryllium, depleted uranium, deuterium, and tritium. No experiment that contains special nuclear materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 would be performed at the facility. Alternative 3 (Expanded Use) and Alternative 1 (Continue Current Operations) and their associated potential impact are addressed in this project-specific environmental analysis. Under Alternative 1, the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would continue to be used for ongoing certification tests and shaped charge research, development, and demonstration activities withhigh-explosive charges up to 3,629 kg (8,000 lb) each; no beryllium, depleted uranium, deuterium, or tritium would be used.
F.2 Purpose and Need for Action
With the end of the Cold War, the DOE’s Defense Program efforts are shifting from the development of new nuclear weapons to the difficult problem of maintaining the safety, reliability, and performance of the enduring stockpile, as well as the challenging task of developing the technologies for rendering safe potentially stolen United States stockpile nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons fielded by proliferant states, and nuclear threats from terrorist organizations. With the moratorium on underground nuclear testing, the Nation is pursuing alternative, science-based approaches to stewarding the enduring stockpile. As the numerically reduced stockpile ages, new issues emerge that are different, and in many ways more challenging than those involved in designing and testing the systems in the first place. Computational tools, appropriate for the initial design of nearly ideal systems, must be improved to address these new challenges. Further, experimental data from a variety of high energy density physics experiments are needed to validate the improved computational models. The complement to effective stewardship of the United States’ enduring stockpile is the ability to safely address the worldwide threat posed by stolen, proliferated, or improvised nuclear devices. Modern United States’ nuclear weapons have sophisticated safety features and are small in size compared to nuclear weapons of 50 years ago. Consequently, their disablement is straightforward and certain in most cases. Proliferant countries and terrorist organizations, however, are likely to produce nuclear weapons that are large, unstable and, therefore, difficult to render safe with certainty. The purpose of this DOE action is to develop technologies that provide experimental data for validation of modern computer codes and technologies that could safely neutralize the nuclear weapons that could be produced by proliferantcountries and terrorist organizations. The Big Explosives Experimental Facility would fulfill this need by providing a facility for very large explosively powered physics experiments, and the capacity to conduct hydrodynamic testing of proposed render-safe technologies against simulated nuclear devices where large amounts of conventional high explosives might be involved. The facility currently has diagnostic equipment sophisticated enough to provide this scientific data and a sufficient proof of destruct in the absence of underground nuclear testing.
F.3 Description of the Alternatives
Alternative 3, Expanded Use, and Alternative 1, Continue Current Operations, are described in the following sections.
F.3.1 Alternative 3
Alternative 3 would allow for the expanded use of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility to include hydrodynamic testing and pulse power experiments using high-explosive charges up to 31,751 kg (70,000 lb) each. These experiments would contain potentially hazardous materials such as beryllium, depleted uranium, deuterium, and tritium. Such testing would further the technologies required to support the DOE Defense Program’s stockpile stewardship, counterproliferation, and work for others efforts. No experiment that contains special nuclear materials (as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) would be performed at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility.
F.3.1.1 Location
The Big Explosives Experimental Facility is located in north-central Area 4 of Yucca Flat, a site associated with atmospheric nuclear testing and nonexplosive nuclear research at the NTS (Figure F-1 ). The site contains seven underground structures associated with atmospheric testing, one set of unidentified stanchions that might have been associated with atmospheric testing, the Bare Reactor Experiment Nevada Tower foundations and stanchions, and a "Japanese Village" mock-up. Although these structures were abandoned when aboveground nuclear testing was halted, two of the undergroundstructures, bunkers 4-300 and 4-480, are currently being used as part of the complex.
F.3.1.2 Bunkers 4-300 and 4-480
Bunkers 4-300 and 4-480 are part of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. The bunkers house modern hydrodiagnostic testing equipment for use during detonations of very large, conventional high-explosive charges and devices (Wobser, 1994). The bunkers have upgraded electrical, lighting, and ventilation systems; optical ports; and electronic control conduits. The facility has the capability to support many of the sophisticated diagnostics techniques needed for the evaluation of hydrodynamic and pulse power experiments containing large amounts of high explosives. The facility is designed and has been modified in full compliance with applicable building codes and DOE orders and requirements (Bevers, 1994). Bunker 4-480 is designed to contain up to five helium or nitrogen-gas-driven rotating-mirror framing cameras, one (or more) laser-illuminated image-converter camera, one (or more) continuous-rotating-mirror framing camera, one (or more) streaking camera, and one (or more) infrared imaging camera in various combinations. This bunker is equipped with five camera stands and five corresponding optical ports with access to the 20-meter (m) x 20-m (66-foot [ft] x 66-ft) area gravel firing pad. Bunker 4-300 contains three rooms: the control room, the laser room, and the utility room. The control and utility rooms were modified to house the diagnostic and firing control electronics, digitizers, electronic recording equipment, and other electronic equipment necessary for hydrodynamic and pulse power experiments. The laser room was modified to accommodate a pulsed Ruby laser for image-converter camera illumination and a laser for multibeam Fabry-Perot velocimetry. Both bunkers are shown in Figure F-2 . In the future, experiments of larger scale and more complexity may be proposed in support of both the stockpile stewardship and render-safe missions. These experiments would require sophisticated, advanced diagnostic techniques and may involve advanced pulse power techniques as well. Specific diagnostic and pulse power equipment may require additional bunker/shelter space near the firing location. Future experiments may also require recording to a large number (several hundred) of electronic and optical data channels; an expanded, suitably sheltered recording station may also be required. Additional shelters and blast-shields may be temporary or permanent and constructed of native soil as earth berms or steel and sandbag structures. Additional bunker space, if needed, would be reinforced concrete construction, buried or earth covered, in a manner virtually identical to bunkers 4-480 and 4-300. Figure F-1. Location of Area 4 at the NTS showing the Big Explosives Experimental Facility location Figure F-2. Layout and orientation of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility, including bunkers 4-480, 4-300, and firing pad
F.3.1.3 Firing Table and Surroundings
The Big Explosives Experimental Facility contains an approximately 20-m x 20-m (66-ft x 66-ft) firing table within the graded area west of the bunkers. The firing table consists of pea gravel 1.8 m (6 ft) to 2.4 m (8 ft) deep. Three large (3 m [10 ft] in diameter and 6-m [20-ft] long) steel cylinders are placed outside the bunkers near the firing pad to house 2.3-million-electron volt Febetron X–ray sources for high-energy X-ray radiography. Hycam recorders and video monitors are placed around the firing area to monitor aboveground activity and the experimental performance of the test devices. The area surrounding the bunkers is graded with new earthen berms that provide blast protection and shield from radiation, and with a downrange projectile stop. The Big Explosives Experimental Facility has a perimeter security fence, approximately 222 m x 480 m (728 ft x 1,575 ft), with a guardhouse to provide security and access control.
F.3.1.4 Operation
Approximately 100 research and diagnostic experiments would be conducted annually at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. Quantities of high explosives expended in tests would range from 0.5 kg (1 lb) each to 31,751 kg (70,000 lb) each. The firing table configuration may be modified (i.e., extended or deepened) for certain experiments that involve very large high-explosive masses or unusual circumstances. The experiments would continue ongoing hydrodynamic testing and include applications of shaped-charge technology. Advanced technologies would also be pursued. Some of these tests would typically involve somecomponents of beryllium and depleted uranium. Some tests would involve deuterium and or tritium. However, the quantities of these potentially hazardous and radioactive materials would be limited. The maximum quantities of these materials would be 120 kg/yr (265 lb/yr) of beryllium; 1,202 kg/yr (2,650 lb/yr) of depleted uranium; 200 milligram (mg) per year (mg/yr) (4.4 x 10-4 lb/yr) of deuterium; and 200 mg/yr (2,000 curies per year [Ci]/yr) of tritium. Tritium would be used in approximately 10 of the 100 tests per year; but no more than 100 mg (1000 Ci) per test would be used. Table F-1 shows the estimates of annual material usage during Big Explosives Experimental Facility operations. Most of this material would be dispersed in the form of solid debris that either would be recovered after the test or would be deposited in the firing table gravel (which is periodically removed and replaced) (Section F.5.2.5 ). Because the experiments would be conducted outdoors, the remainder of the material would be, for the most part, dispersed to the environment (primarily as metal or oxides). The materials listed on Table F-1 are, therefore, an indication of what would constitute the maximum annual source terms for waste streams and/or emissions that would likely result from conducting approximately 100 tests per year.
F.3.1.4.1 Pretest and Test Activities
Storage and assembly of high-explosives charges for the Big Explosives Experimental Facility Operations would be provided in Sandia National Laboratories’ Warehouse No. 8, located in Zone 2, Area 6 of the NTS (or its equivalent). Warehouse No. 8 is an approved facility for the storage of high-explosive charges used in support of the DOE-laboratory testing activities. The high-explosive device would be assembled at the Baker Site in Area 27, an NTS high-explosive and nuclear assembly area. High-explosive devices would be transported from Warehouse No. 8 to the Baker Site, and then to the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. Under security guard, high-explosive charges would likely remain on the firing table at the facility until preparations for the experimentwere completed and the high explosive was detonated.
Table F-1. Estimated materials usage for the Big Explosives Experimental Facility operations
| Estimated usage per year | ||||
| Material | Alternative 1 (Continue Current Operations)a,b | Alternative 3 (Expanded Use)a,b | ||
| kg | lb | kg | lb | |
| Bariumc | 0.022 | 0.044 | 0.022 | 0.044 |
| Berylliumd | 0 | 0 | 120 | 265 |
| Chromiumc,e | 6.9 | 15.2 | 6.9 | 15.2 |
| Cobalt | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Copperf | 1,200 | 2,650 | 7,200 | 15,900 |
| Fluoride salts | 3.6 | 7.9 | 3.6 | 7.9 |
| Leadc | 4.1 | 9.0 | 4.1 | 9.0 |
| Molybdenum | 1,200 | 2,650 | 1,200 | 2,650 |
| Nickele | 8.6 | 19.0 | 8.6 | 19.0 |
| Silverc | 120 | 265 | 120 | 265 |
| Vanadium | 3.6 | 7.9 | 3.6 | 7.9 |
| Zinc | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Lithium salts | 22.6 | 49.8 | 22.6 | 49.8 |
| Depleted uraniumd,g | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 2,650 |
| Explosives | 226,800 | 500,000 | 453,600 | 1,000,000 |
| Deuteriumd,h | 0 | 0 | 0.0002 | 0.0004 |
| Tritiumd,h | 0 | 0 | 0.0002 | 0.0004 |
| Tantalum | 120 | 265 | 120 | 265 |
Transport, handling, and testing of high-explosive devices would be conducted by trained and experienced NTS, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory personnel in accordance with all federal and state regulations, DOE orders, The DOE Explosives Safety Manual (DOE, 1991), and the DOE-approved test plans and procedures to ensure safe handling and testing of high-explosive materials. Nonexplosive support fixtures and apparatus needed for the test assemblies would be assembled at the facility and set up on the firing table. This apparatus often includes heavy foundations or shot stands to support the explosive experiment, armored radiographic film cassettes, heavy-steel momentum-transfer plates, mild-steel and wooden shrapnel shields, glass optical turning mirrors and mounting hardware, expendable capacitor discharge units, high-pressure gas-filled devices, and other special diagnostic equipment. Much of this apparatus is expended in the test. Motor-driven cranes and forklifts may be used to move both the inert apparatus and the explosives, if needed. Strict administrative controls would be applied to restrict personnel movement and location while certain of these set-up operations are conducted. When other equipment has been readied, the explosives-containing assembly would be brought by truck to the firing table from its assembly point at the Baker Site or from an explosives storage magazine and carefully set in position; only essential personnel would be in attendance. System checks, in the form of "dry runs," would be performed to show that all electrical and mechanical systems had been properly installed and connected and to verify that proper time delays between individual events had been programmed. When all dry-run testing is complete, the site would be secured. Personnel would be assembled and accounted for ("mustered") within the protected control room (bunker 4-300), and the experiment would be conducted. During testing, the muster control distance for any noninvolved worker could be up to 8,534 m (28,000 ft) from the firing table, depending on the size of the high-explosive charge.
F.3.1.4.2 Post-Test Activities
Experiments would be electronically and optically monitored by the Big Explosives Experimental Facility bunker supervisor and test personnel from the protected control room in bunker 4-300. After an experiment that does not involve radioactive materials, television cameras would survey the firing table for burning debris. Fires would be quenched by a short-duration water washdown or allowed to self-extinguish. When entry to the firing table is permissible, qualified explosives handlers (using breathing protection, if necessary) would reenter. Any smoldering materials or unreacted explosives would be rendered safe so that others could enter. Diagnostics data would be collected, and the firing table would be cleaned in preparation for the next experiment. Tests involving components containing tritium would be administratively limited to 100 mg (1,000 Ci) tritium each; it is estimated that a maximum of 10 such tests per year would be performed (a maximum of 200 mg [2,000 Ci] of tritium per year). After an experiment, re-entry to the firing table would be delayed until tritium levels were deemed acceptable for re-entry. Re-entry scheduling would also depend on the levels of any other residual radiation, the intensity of which would be monitored during and after an experiment.
F.3.2 Alternative 1
Under Alternative 1, the DOE Defense Program would continue ongoing certification tests and shape charge research, development, and demonstration activities with aboveground detonations of high explosive charges up to 3,629 kg (8,000 lb) each. The facility configuration (Sections F.3.1.1 through 3.1.3), pretest and test activities (Section F.3.1.4.1 ) and post-test activities (Section F.3.1.4.2 ) would also apply to Alternative 1, except no beryllium, depleted uranium, deuterium, or tritium would be used. Estimates of annual material usage at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility under Alternative 1 are presented in Table F-1 . The DOE would continue to develop render-safe technologies. However, without the use of beryllium, depleted uranium, and tritium to provide realistic threat-nuclear-device and without the ability to developand test technologies requiring greater than 3,629 kg (8,000 lb) of conventional high explosives, the confidence in the proof of destruct and, therefore, the efficacy of new render-safe technologies might be seriously degraded.
F.4 Description of the Affected Environment
A brief description of the affected environment surrounding the Big Explosives Experimental Facility as it relates to the scope of Alternative 3 is presented in this section. Detailed descriptions can be found inChapter 4 of this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
F.4.1 Topography, Geology, and Soils
Area 4 is located within the northern half of Yucca Flat, an (350-square kilometers [km2] [135 square mile (mi2)]) oval-shaped bolson (a basin with no outlet) located in the northeastern corner of the NTS. The area is mostly flat and gently slopes upward from east to west. Average elevation is approximately 1,280 m (4,200 ft). Sediments in this area are mostly alluvial because tributary streams erode the surrounding mountains and deposit sediments in Yucca Flat. The majority of these sediments in this area have been disturbed by human use.
F.4.2 Seismicity
The Big Explosives Experimental Facility is located in a region that has experienced seismic activity within historical times. Yucca Fault in Yucca Flat has been active within the last few thousand to tens of thousands of years.
F.4.3 Climate and Air Quality
Area 4 has a desert climate. Annual mean precipitation is approximately 152 millimeters (mm) (6 inches [in.]), most of which falls between October and April during major winter storms. Strong, persistent winds are characteristic of the site. In Yucca Flat, the average annual wind speed is 11 kilometers per hour (kph) (7 miles per hour [mph]). The prevailing wind direction during the winter months is north-northeasterly, and during the summer months is south-southeasterly. The NTS region is designated as attainment for criteria pollutants under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Criteria pollutants include carbon monoxide, lead, oxides of nitrogen, ozone, particulate matter 10 microns or smaller (PM10), and oxides of sulfur. Fugitive dust (PM10) generated from the various programmatic construction activities at NTS includes 1,422 tons/yr from Defense Program activities, 4 tons/yr from waste management activities, 219 tons/yr from environmental restoration activities, and 180 tons/yr from site support activities. The total Nye County fugitive dust emissions are 866,400 tons/yr. The NTS criteria pollutant emissions from mobile sources include 240 tons/yr carbon monoxide, 33 tons/yr volatile organic compounds, and 43 tons/yr nitrogen oxides. The Nye County criteria pollutant emissions from mobile sources include 571 tons/yr carbon monoxide, 82 tons/yr volatile organic compounds, and 135 tons/yr nitrogen oxides.
F.4.4 Hazardous Air Pollutants
Toxic air contaminants are subject to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants standards pertaining to operations at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility are those for beryllium and radionuclides. Using the 1993 data for release of radionuclides from NTS operations, the maximum boundary dose to a hypothetical individual who remains continuously during the year at the NTS boundary located 60 km (37 mi) south-southeast of Area 12 tunnel ponds would have an effective dose equivalent of 4.8 x 10–3 millirem (mrem). This is below the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants standard of 10 mrem per year, and well below the natural background radiation to individuals of 382 mrem per year.
F.4.5 Surface and Groundwater Hydrology
No surface sources of water exist at the site. The depth to the water table under Yucca Flat is approximately 366 m (1,200 ft) (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.5 of the NTS EIS). The Big ExplosivesExperimental Facility firing table gravel is periodically removed and replaced (Section F.5.2.5 ); the percolation of metal residue to groundwater is not expected.
F.4.6 Vegetation
Vegetation of the area is dominated by rabbitbrush, cheatgrass, and other grasses. Desert thorn is an important associate. No plants that have been listed as threatened or endangered are known to occur at the NTS.
F.4.7 Wildlife
Fauna observed in the field is limited to jackrabbits, lizards, and various birds. The area is approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of the desert tortoise habitat (see Section 4.1.6 of this EIS).
F.4.8 Cultural Resources
Bunkers 4-300 and 4-480 are identified as historic structures and are potentially eligible for the National Register of Historic Places because of their association with the atmospheric nuclear testing period at the NTS. Coordination with the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and an evaluation of potential effects that would result from the modification and operation of the bunkers have been conducted. This evaluation showed that the modifications done on the bunkers and their ongoing operations would not adversely impact the bunkers. One additional property exists that has been identified as a potential historic structure because of its association with the Bare Reactor Experiment Nevada Tower. This property consists of a grouping of three wood-frame structures and is referred to as the "Japanese Village." The village is located approximately 676 m (2,218 ft) east of the bunkers along Road 4-04. These structures have experienced severe weather-related deterioration; however, they have been hardened with steel structural plates to withstand a peak over-pressure of 70 g/cm2 (1 lb/in.2). The tower has since been relocated to Area 25 of the NTS. Further details concerning the cultural, archaeological, andbiological resources of the site are provided by Johnson et al. (1994).
F.4.9 Floodplains and Wetlands
No floodplains or wetlands exist within or near the Big Explosives Experimental Facility.
F.4.10 Noise
Existing chronic noise sources at or near the Big Explosives Experimental Facility include vehicular traffic, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning equipment. Acute sources are limited to explosives testing (up to 140 decibels [dB] at the bunkers). Background noise levels are generally low, ranging from 50 dB to 70 dB.
F.5 Potential Effects of Alternative 1 and Alternative 3
In the sections that follow, the environmental impacts of Alternative 1 and Alternative 3 are described and compared.
F.5.1 Alternative 1
Under Alternative 1, the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would continue to be used for certification tests and shaped-charge research, development, and demonstration activities with high-explosive charges up to 3,629 kg (8,000 lb) each. A total of 100 shots per year would consume approximately 226,796 kg (500,000 lb) of high explosives. No beryllium, depleted uranium, deuterium, or tritium would be used. There would be no increased levels of generation of low-level or mixed wastes. Because Alternative 1 represents the levels of current ongoing operations, the facility would not contribute any incremental emissions or waste generation. The DOE would continue its present level of ongoing missions to support development of render-safe technologies.
F.5.2 Alternative 3
The following section describes the potential environmental impacts that would occur under Alternative 3. These impacts have been included indetermining the cumulative impacts associated with Alternative 3.
F.5.2.1 Construction-Related Effects
Potential construction-related impacts associated with modification of the firing table and construction of bunkers would include increased fugitive dust, noise, and temporary on-site traffic disruptions from the use of earth-moving equipment. Fugitive dust emissions would be mitigated by spraying water on the roads and on the exposed piles of excavated soils. Workers would wear appropriate ear protection to reduce noise impacts. Traffic disruptions would be kept to a minimum by limiting other nonconstruction-related activities. The area within the perimeter of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility has previously been disturbed, and there are no foreseeable cultural or natural resources that would be impacted by the construction activities.
F.5.2.2 Noise and High-Explosive Weight Limits
Meteorological conditions at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility are monitored before each test so that noise levels can be projected and a minimum "stay-out" zone surrounding the firing table for safe operation can be determined. On previous tests performed at the facility, noise levels were monitored for each detonation at stations placed at various distances from the high-explosive charges and at stations within the bunkers (Bevers, 1994). The results of these noise-monitoring activities demonstrated that noise levels from explosives testing for up to 3,538 kg (7,800 lb) of trinitrotoluene (TNT) placed 8 m (27 ft) from bunker 4-480 did not exceed 140-dB within bunker 4-300, which would be manned during normal operations. The 140-dB limit has been adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (Air Force Design Manual) and is also an Occupational Safety and Health Administration limit. Traffic and NTS personnel would be prevented from entering within a radius between 500 m and 8,534 m (1,640 ft and 28,000 ft) from the high-explosive charges; the size and predicted noise levels of the test would determine the radius of exclusion. All explosive experimental testing at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would be carriedout on the 20-m x 20-m x 1.8-m to 2.4-m (66-ft x 66-ft x 6-ft to 8-ft) deep gravel firing table in order to minimize dust uplift, dispersal of soil contaminants, and coupling of ground shocks to the surrounding structures. A 31,751 kg (70,000 lb) high-explosive detonation could form a crater 15 m (50 ft) in diameter and 3 m (10 ft) in depth. Therefore, the firing table would be modified (extended beyond 20 m [66 ft] from bunker 4-480) so that detonation of this size would not penetrate ground soils. Additionally, high-explosive charge-weight versus distance limits would be established for safe, manned operation of the facility. Testing of a given high-explosive charge size and configuration would be performed while keeping the blast over-pressure, ground shock, and noise levels well within the envelope of the facility design criteria. Within a large margin of safety, the facility is designed to withstand the effects of 454 kg (1,000 lb) of high-explosives detonated 4.6 m (15 ft) from the outer wall of bunker 4-480, or 2,268 kg (5,000 lb) of high explosive detonated 8.2 m (27 ft) from the outer wall of bunker 4-480. Based on standard engineering principles, these design criteria, and the size of the firing table, an effective upper limit can be determined for the size of the high-explosive charge that could be detonated at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. If the maximum distance from the outer wall of bunker 4-480 to the end of the gravel firing table is 20 m (65 ft), then the largest high-explosive charge that could be detonated at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility in its present configuration would be 31,751 kg (70,000 lb).
F.5.2.3 Air Emissions
Air emissions from the Big Explosives Experimental Facility were estimated based on material usage data (Table F-1 ), the total quantities of high explosives detonated, and applicable emission factors. Most of these materials would be dispersed as solid debris that could be recovered after the test or would be deposited in firing table gravel. Because the experiments would be conducted outdoors, some fraction of these materials would be dispersed to the environment as metal or oxides. Detonation products of the high explosives and high-explosive binders, however, would be dispersed to the air. These projected emissions of high-explosive detonation products are presented in Table F-2 . These emissions from the Big Explosives Experimental Facility are small when compared to the overall NTS and Nye County emission levels. In order to estimate a percentage increase from ongoing NTS and Nye County emissions due to the expanded Big Explosives Experimental Facility operations, it was assumed that Alternative 1 represents no increase above current levels of emissions (those from ongoing NTS operations). Therefore, increase in air emissions under the expanded use would be the difference between columns 2 and 4 of Table F-2 . For example, incremental carbon monoxide emissions would be the difference between 3,311 kg/yr (7,300 lb/yr) and 1,678 kg/yr (3,700 lb/yr), or 1,633 kg/yr (3,600 lb/yr). This incremental increase in carbon monoxide emissions (due to proposed facility operations) of 1,633 kg/yr (3,600 lb/yr) is small compared to the NTS carbon monoxide emissions of 217,724 kg/yr (480,000 lb/yr) and Nye County carbon monoxide emissions of 517,095 kg/yr (1,140,000 lb/yr). Therefore, Alternative 3 represents less than an approximate 1-percent increase in NTS carbon monoxide emissions and an approximate 0.3-percent increase in Nye County carbon monoxide emission levels. Similarly, the incremental 1,633 kg/yr (3,600 lb/yr) volatile organic compound emissions represents a 7-percent increase in NTS volatile organic compound emissions and a 3-percent increase in Nye County emission levels. The carbon dust and soot increment of 1,451 kg/yr (3,200 lb/yr) would be small compared to the NTS and Nye County emissions of fugitive dust of approximately 1,825 tons/yr and 866,400 tons/yr, respectively. Hence, the expected emissions from proposed activities in the facility would represent a minor increase in air emission levels from the NTS site. Beryllium and radionuclide emissions are subject to National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants standards. Most of the beryllium would be contained within the firing table as metal or oxide. Most of the depleted uranium, however, would be volatilized as metal oxide. It is conservatively estimated that the depleted uranium peak concentrations after a detonation would be 2.5 x 10-4 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) (1 x 10-5 micrograms per cubic foot[µg/ft3]). In contrast, the Derived Concentration Guide (a calculated concentration of radionuclides that could be continuously consumed or inhaled and not exceed the DOE primary radiation protection standard to the public of 100-mrem-per-year effective dose equiva lent) for depleted uranium is 0.3 µg/m3 (0.01 µg/ft3). The radioactive air emission of potentially greatest impact is tritiated water. On approximately 10 tests per year, tritium may be used. On some of these 10 tests, the tritium content may be as high as 100 mg (1,000 Ci). The total tritium usage would be administratively limited to 200 mg (2,000 Ci) per year. It is assumed that, as a worst case, all tritium would be converted to tritiated water. Of the maximum of 1,000 Ci of tritium that could be present on the firing table, 99 mg (990 Ci) (99 percent) is expected to result in tritiated water vapor, and 1 mg (10 Ci) (1 percent) would condense on the steel supports, gravel, equipment, and debris at the firing table. (SeeSection F.5.2.4 for discussion of exposures to ionizing radiation.) Airborne emissions of radionuclides and hazardous air pollutants would comply with the National Emission Standards and Hazardous Air Pollutants compliance and reporting requirements.
F.5.2.4 Exposure to Radionuclides
Detonations at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility could involve radioactive materials such as tritium, depleted uranium, and, on some tests, thorium. Furthermore, certain test configurations could occasionally generate small quantities of neutrons, which could result in radioactive neutron-activation products. To estimate the radionuclide exposure to the workers and the public, a worst-case scenario was assumed for considering dispersal of the airborne tritium (tritiated water), depleted uranium, and neutron activation products. This scenario is defined by the use of only 2,268 kg (5,000 lb) of high explosives. This amount of high explosives will give the smallest plume height and, therefore, the largest dose closest to the firing point. The high explosive is assumed to be TNT, which is less energetic than many other forms of high explosives and, therefore, produces the least plume rise. It is further assumed that the firing of the high explosives would be done under relatively calm wind-speed conditions, which result in less dispersion and higher plume centerline radiological concentration as the detonation cloud moves downwind.
| Estimated emissionsa | ||||
| Material | Alternative 1 Continue Current Operations | Alternative 3 Expanded Use | ||
| kg/yr | lb/yr | kg/yr | lb/yr | |
| Carbon monoxide | 1,678 | 3,700 | 3,311 | 7,300 |
| Volatile organic compounds | 1,633 | 3,600 | 3,266 | 7,200 |
| Nitrogen oxides | 998 | 2,200 | 1,950 | 4,300 |
| Fugitive emissionsb | 1,451 | 3,200 | 2,903 | 6,400 |
| aProjected air emission dispersals per year is based on the estimated composition of 100 tests/yr bCarbon dust and soot. | ||||
The dose versus downwind distance results from the application of the HOTSPOT code are given in Table F-3. This worst-case scenario gives the maximum potential effects from the airborne radionuclides. All other scenario conditions would yield doses that are less than those given in Table F-3 . Based on the collective effective dose equivalent for 10 shots per year for 30 years, the excess cancer fatality rate to the on-site maximally exposed individual would be 1.7 x 10-4 (approximately 2 in 10,000 chance of fatal cancer per year over a 30-year exposure). An off-site maximally exposed individual at a distance of 50 km (31 mi) from the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would have an excess cancer fatality rate of 4.6 x 10-7 (approximately 5 in 10 million chance of fatal cancer per year over a 30-year exposure). It is assumed that after each such test, as many as 3 involved facility-area workers would spend 2 to 6 hours per day and up to 2 days at the firing table. To obtain the worst-case potential exposure estimate, it was assumed that 10 Ci of tritium and all activated products would be evenly distributed inan area of 0.5 km (0.31 mi) in radius. The workers would wait until residual radiation levels are safe for reentry (1 to 7 days). Maximum potential exposure to facility-area workers is presented in Table F-4 . Based on this analysis, the collective dose to workers at 0 km (0 mi) and workers at a 3.5-km (2.2-mi) distance would result in a probability of excess cancer fatality of 4.3 x 10-4 (4 in 10,000 chance of fatal cancer per year over a 30-year exposure). Any airborne dispersal of activated products would be minimal and well below the DOE guideline of 5 rem per year and natural background radiation of 382 mrem per year.
F.5.2.5 Waste Effluents
The proposed action would result in the generation of low-level waste and/or mixed waste. Conservative estimates are that one 36 m3 ( 1,280 ft 3 ) transportainer of shot or test debris and four 2.5 m3 (90 ft3) gravel boxes would be generated as low-level waste from each test. This estimate assumes that low-level waste would be generated from all tests, including tests without any radiological components, because of some activation products remaining from previous tests with radionuclides. Mixed waste generation is expected from the proposed action because of the use of hazardous materials and radionuclides listed in Table F-1 . Conservative estimates are that 4.5 m3 (160 ft3) of mixed waste would be generated from each test. Mixed waste generation would be minimized by the use of nonhazardous substitutes for hazardous materials to the extent possible.
Table F-3. Potential impacts from maximum potential exposure to tritium emissions
| Distance | CEDEa (rem/test)b | Excess cancer fatalities to an MEI per yearc | |
| km | mi | ||
| 3.5 | 2.2 | 7.06 x 10-3 | 1.7 x 10-4 |
| 50 | 31.1 | 1.53 x 10-5 | 4.6 x 10-7 |
| a Collective effective dose equivalent b Rem (roentgen equivalent man) c Based on the DOE dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10-4 (4 in 10,000) latent cancer fatalities per person-rem for workers and 5 x 10-4 (5 in 10,000) for the general public. Maximally exposed individuals would be on-site workers at 3.5 km (2.2 mi), and members of the public at 50 km (31.1 mi). Calculations assume 10 shots per year and 30-year exposure, and tritium usage of 200 mg/yr (2,000 Ci/yr). | |||
Table F-4. Maximum potential exposure to Big Explosives Experimental Facility-area workers
| Distance | CEDEa (rem/yr)b | Excess cancer fatalities to an MEIc per yeard | |
| km | mi | ||
| 0 | 0 | 1.08 x 10-2 | 2.6 x 10-4 |
| 3.5 | 2.2 | 7 x 10-3 | 1.7 x 10-4 |
| Total workerse | 1.78 x 10-2 | 4.3 x 10-4 | |
| a Collective effective dose equivalent b Rem (roentgen equivalent man) c Maximally exposed individual d Based on the DOE dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10-4 (4 in 10,000) latent cancer fatalities per person-rem for workers and 5 x 10-4 (5 in 10,000) for the general public. Assumes maximally exposed individual exposure from 10 shots per year for 30 years e Collective dose to three workers at the firing table (0 km [0 mi]) and workers at 3.5 km (2.2 mi). | |||
Table F-5 shows the amounts of mixed, hazardous, and radioactive waste generated annually from the Big Explosives Experimental Facility operations. The facility data in this table are based on the assumption that 10 tritium tests and 90 nontritium tests would be conducted annually at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. These amounts of waste generation represent a small increase in the amounts of waste handled by the NTS. Although the amounts of low-level waste andmixed waste generated annually at the NTS are small, the amounts of waste handled by the NTS are large because the NTS receives, stores, and disposes of waste from throughout the DOE complex, as well as from its own operations.
F.5.2.6 Accident Scenarios
. The reasonably foreseeable accident scenarios that could produce the greatest potential impacts would be (1) accidental detonation from a test with a 31,751-kg (70,000-lb) charge of high explosives at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility firing table and (2) accidental detonation of a high-explosive charge containing up to 100 mg(1,000 Ci) of tritium. In either case, the involved workers would probably be fatally injured from peak over pressure and debris due to blast effects, but there would be no injury to off-site members or the general public. No damage to current buildings off site or in other areas of the NTS would be expected.
| Waste Type | Solids from Big Explosives Experimental Facilitya | NTS waste-handling totals (1994) (cubic feet per year) | ||
| m3 | ft3 | m3 | ft3 | |
| Hazardous wasteb | 0 | 0 | 303 | 10,695 |
| Low-level waste | 4,644 | 164,000 | 21,312c | 752,644c |
| Mixed waste | 46 | 1,640d | 76e | 2,698e |
| Transuranic wastef | 0 | 0 | NAg | NAg |
| a This is an estimate based on 100 shots per year b No hazardous waste generation is anticipated from the Big Explosives Experimental Facility. If any is generated, quantities would be so small as to be an insignificant impact to hazardous waste operations at the NTS c The amount of low-level waste generated at the NTS in 1994 was 91 m3 (3,208 ft3). However, the total volume of low-level waste disposal at the NTS in 1994 was 21,313 m3 (752,644 ft3). Existing disposal capacity available at the NTS is approximately 283,170 m3 (1.0x107 ft3) d Mixed waste generation would be minimized by the use of nonhazardous substitutes to hazardous materials, when possible. e Generation of mixed waste at the NTS is minimal. Most of the mixed waste at the NTS is from historical activities that are no longer conducted. Currently, there are 76 m3 (2,698 ft3) of stored mixed waste. The remaining capacity of the NTS for mixed waste is 90,614 m3 (3.2 x10 6 ft3) f No transuranic waste would be generated by Big Explosives Experimental Facility operations g Not applicable. | ||||
Assuming the noninvolved worker is located approximately 3.5 km (2.2 mi) from the facility, that individual would have a committed effective dose equivalent of 7.0 x 10-3 rem. Hence, either accident scenario would result in a fatality to an involved worker, but there would be minor impacts to the structures and noninvolved workers. This projected radiation dose to the noninvolved worker is still lower than the DOE guideline limits for workers and for the general public; thus, the greatest effect would be fatalities or injuries to workers due to primary blast effects, as noted above.
F.5.2.7 Cultural Resources
Testing at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would be done so that the blast over-pressure, shock, and noise would be less than or equal to design criteria for bunkers 4-300 and 4-480 (Section F.5.2.2 ). Thus, the proposed testing would not adversely impact these bunkers. Additional calculations were done to estimate the potential over-pressure at the Japanese Village remains approximately 683 m (2,240 ft) from the facility. These calculations show that these structures might experience an over-pressure from a blast of 0.024 kg/square centimeter (cm2) (0.34 lb/square inches [in.2]) for 90 milliseconds. It is unlikely that such a short-duration pulse would have an adverse effect on the remnants of the Japanese Village. Forces from naturally occurring phenomena (e.g., winds) at the NTS could reach speeds that apply equivalent forces. Coordination with the SHPO was conducted to determine the historical value of the properties at the two sites. The remaining structures of the Japanese Village were strengthened with wood screws and shoring planks. No adverse impacts on these structures are expected from operations of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility.
F.5.2.8 Natural Resources
Operations at the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would not impact the groundwater. The firing table gravel is periodically removed and replaced, and any percolation of metal residue to groundwater is not expected. Facility operations would not impact the desert tortoise habitat, located at least 26 km (16 mi) to the south. Also, no impacts are expected to sensitive natural resources because there are no known threatened, endangered, or candidate plant species near the facility.
F.5.2.9 Cumulative Impacts
The Big Explosives Experimental Facility operations would result in an approximate 4-percent increase in Nye County carbon monoxide emissions, a 3-percent increase in volatile organic compound emissions, and an approximate 0.002-percent increase in fugitive dust emissions. The cumulative exposure to radionuclides for a hypothetical individual at the site boundary would be 3.1 x 10-2 mrem per year. This would be well below the National Emission Standards and Hazardous Air Pollutants standard of 10 mrem per year, and well below the natural background radiation to individuals of 382 mrem per year. Based on a 30-year exposure at the fenceline, the maximally exposed individual would have a probability of an excess cancer fatality of 4.6 x 10-7 (i.e., the off-site maximally exposed individual would have a 5 in 10 million chance of fatal cancer per year over a 30-year exposure). Wastes generated from facility operations would be small compared to the existing disposal capacities at the NTS.
F.5.2.10 Conformity
The proposed expanded use of the Big Explosives Experimental Facility would not result in levels of emissions of precursor organic compounds (carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds) that would place the facility above Environmental Protection Agency conformity thresholds. The operations would not cause or contribute to any violation of the national Ambient Air Quality Standards. The facility would be operated in conformance with all rules and regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency, which are included as part of the State Implementation Plan.
F.5.2.11 Environmental Justice
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations (Executive Order [EO] 12898), requires that federal agencies identify and address, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of their programs and activities on minority and low-income populations. The DOE is developing official guidance on the implementation of this executive order. However, the analysis in this project-specific environmental analysis indicates that there would be insignificant or no potential for differential or disproportionate impacts from Alternative 3 (or from Alternative 1) to off-site populations that could be characterized as predominantly minority or low income.
F.6 Persons and Agencies Contacted
Consultation and notification of Alternative 3 and its environmental analysis were conducted as part of the NTS EIS National Environmental Policy Act process. Details of consultations can be found in Chapter 8 of this EIS.
F.7 References
REGULATION, ORDER, LAW
| EO 12898 | Executive Order, Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Population, Office of the President, Washington, DC, 1994. |
| GENERAL | |
| Bevers, 1994 | Bevers, T.L., Safety Assessment Report for the Certification Testing of LLNL's Big Explosives Experimental Facility, Livermore, CA, 1994. |
| DOE, 1991 | U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), DOE Explosives Safety Manual, Washington, DC, 1991.Johnson et al., 1994 |
| Johnson et al., 1994 | Johnson, W. G., S.R. Edwards, and N.G. Goldenberg, Desert Research Institute Cultural Resources Reconnaissance Short Report, A Class III Cultural Resources Reconnaissance of the Proposed Shaped-Charge Scaling Project and Utility Corridor, Yucca Flat, Area 4, NTS, SR062994-1, NTS Project #945604, Desert Research Institute, Las Vegas, NV, 1994. |
| Wobser, 1994 | Wobser, J., Big Explosives Experimental Facility/POPOVER Diagnostic and Instrumentation Plan for Bunker Certification Tests., MISC-94-10A, Livermore, CA, 1994. |
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