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APPENDIX I

FACILITY ACCIDENTS

This appendix presents the approach used to determine and analyze impacts of accidents that might occur at the PHERMEX or DARHT facilities under all of the alternatives examined in this EIS. Section I.1 describes the Preliminary Hazards Analysis that identifies potentially hazardous conditions and potential accidents that might result. Section I.2 describes the identification of representative or bounding accidents selected for detailed evaluation. Section I.3 provides information on the consequence evaluation of these accidents, if they were to occur. Much of the technical basis for evaluating the human health impact of accidental releases is included in appendix H, Human Health. These analyses do not include the impacts from accidents involving transportation of materials, which are included in appendix J, Transportation. Unless otherwise stated, dose is the effective dose equivalent. Sums and products of numbers in this section may not appear consistent due to rounding.

I.1 PRELIMINARY HAZARDS ANALYSIS

The first step in the accident analysis process was to prepare a preliminary hazards analysis (PHA). The objective of a PHA is to identify the potentially hazardous conditions in a system and to determine the significance of the potential accidents. The PHA defines a set of abnormal operations and potential accidents that could occur at the PHERMEX or DARHT facilities. The PHA examined causes of potential accidents and qualitatively evaluated the possible consequences. A tabular summary of the PHA is shown in table I-1.Table I-1.-Preliminary Hazards Analysis for DARHT and PHERMEX

Facility Operations (All Alternatives)

Facility Area	Hazardous Element	Event Description	Frequency Categorizationa	Consequence	Mitigation/Control Measures
Firing Site	Explosives	Inadvertent detonation	U - Procedures and training; lockout on firing set (detonators)	Fatal to all persons on the firing site (up to 15); evaluate public impact	Building design and location; firing site isolation; blast shadow of buildings; access control
Firing Site	Explosives/ radiation	Worker enters firing site during detonation sequence	E - Interlocks on facility doors; cameras at firing site; access control; warning lights and sirens; procedures and training	Fatal to worker	Building design and location; firing site isolation; access control
General Facility	Explosives	Inadvertent detonation	E - HE & radioactive material prohibited from facility; no storage or staging locations; procedures and training	Fatalities among facility personnel	Building design and location; firing site isolation; procedures and training
Exclusion Zone	Explosives, hazardous materials	Noninvolved worker inside the exclusion zone during detonation	U - Access control; procedures & training; warning signs and sirens; physical lockouts	Inhalation of radioactive & other detonated material; possible injury from fragments; evaluate impact	Access control; procedures & training; warning signs and sirens
Firing Site	Radiation	Exposure to accelerator beam on firing site	E - Physical lockout of accelerator operation; limited accelerator keys; beam stop in place during testing; pro-cedures & training	Possible large, localized radiation dose to a worker	Physical lockout of accelerator operation; limited accelerator keys; beam stop in place during testing; procedures & training
Accelerator Bay	Hazardous materials	Spill of insulator liquids or transformer oil	U - Procedures and training; low frequency of change-out	Minimal impact to workers unless ingested; no offsite impacts	System design; berms around tanks and accelerators; dedicated drains and tanks for material spills
Entire Facility	Flammable	Facility is set afire internally: rags/paper ignite spontaneously; cable fire	U - Sprinklers; cable integrity and inspection; manual fire extinguishing; fire department response	Normal fire hazard for workers; no offsite impact	Alarms; emergency procedures and training

Table I-1.-Preliminary Hazards Analysis for DARHT and PHERMEX

Facility Operations (All Alternatives) - Continued

Facility Area	Hazardous Element	Event Description	Frequency Categorizationa	Consequence	Mitigation/Control Measures
Entire Facility	Natural initiator - lightning - brush fire	Facility is set afire by a lightning strike or brush fire	A - High lightning area; explosive detonation often sets brush afire	Normal fire hazard for workers; no offsite impacts	Brush control; lightning control; canyons as natural fire breaks; fire department response capability; non-flammable facility construction (concrete); control of combustible loading
Entire Facility	Natural initiator - earthquake - tornado - high wind - heavy snowfall	Major structural damage to facility	U - Infrequent occurrence of events; building structural integrity; little material at risk in facility	Significant for workers in facility; no offsite impacts	Building structural integrity; no HE or radioactive material in facility
Entire Facility	Natural initiator - flood	Major structural damage to facility	I - Facility not sited in floodplain	Incredible event not requiring additional evaluation	Building siting
Entire Facility	Aircraft	Aircraft strikes facility causing detonation of assembly on firing site	I - Distance from airport; direct overflights are limited; amount of aircraft traffic;	Incredible event not requiring additional evaluation	Amount of time assemblies at facility or on firing site
General Facility	Explosives/ radiation	Electrical power fails at facility	A - Normal electrical failures; no back-up power for facility except data back-up	No impact	Detonation system de-energized when power fails; accelerator de-energized; recovery plans; procedures and training
Containment Structure or Vessel	Explosive	Catastrophic loss of containment	E - Design specifications of vessel or building; administrative controls on HE quantities; procedures and training	Evaluate impact	Building design and location; firing site isolation; access control
Confinement Vessel for Pu Experiments	Explosives/plutonium	Catastrophic loss of double confinement	I-Based on related DOE safety studies	Evaluate impacts regardless of frequency categorization	Design and location; testing; double & triple contingency factors; access control; procedures and training
General Facility	Explosives/plutonium	Inadvertent detonation of plutonium-containing assembly	E,U-Based on related DOE safety studies	Evaluate impacts	Building design and location; firing site isolation; access control; procedures and training
a A is anticipated; U is unlikely; E is extremely unlikely, I is incredible.

Potential hazards were identified using a modified energy barrier approach, in which abnormal events or potential accidents were selected by considering energy sources potentially capable of being released from control or containment barriers. Barriers between the source and the receptor may be present to prevent or restrict the release of energy. For example, major portions of the DARHT facilities are located below grade, using the earth as a barrier between the firing point and occupied areas. In this example, the high explosives on the firing point represent the energy source potentially capable of being released. Other examples of energy sources include radioactive materials and radiation, kinetic energy (e.g., moving vehicles, hoisting equipment), potential energy (hoisted loads), hazardous chemical materials, electrical energy, and flammable materials.

In the process described above, components associated with the PHERMEX and DARHT facilities under each alternative were analyzed using engineering judgment based on previous operating experience with PHERMEX and similar types of firing-site operations in Technical Area (TA) 15. Each of the major work locations or processes in the facilities was evaluated for potential hazards to the general public, onsite personnel, and the operating staff.

Safety features provided to prevent or mitigate hazards were also identified. Review of the hazards led to generating a list of potentially hazardous events and associated safety features.

The PHA is intended to identify hazards from which accidents are selected that may be bounding, and considers only accident pathways that for a given frequency category may have significant effects. Theinitial estimate of safety significance is based on historical experience with similar hazards and engineering judgment. Not all of the events described in the PHA were analyzed in detail to assign frequency categories or to determine expected consequences. Instead, conservative estimates were made to select a limited number of accident scenarios for detailed review (evaluation or analysis) as potentially bounding accidents.

Frequency categories are based on the entire set of events included in the accident scenario, not just the initiating event frequency. The entire event includes the initiating event and any subsequent equipment failures or human errors. As a result, it is possible for accidents with similar (or identical) initiating events to have greatly different frequency assignments. This is due to the assumptions regarding subsequent events and system failures.

The form of the PHA does not allow a detailed listing of all of the specific event assumptions. The PHA summary table succinctly describes the overall event or scenario and initiating event. Where lack of historical data or prior experience forces frequencies to be estimated based on engineering judgment, conservative assumptions were made.

The frequency categorization column of the table lists those items considered in assigning a frequency category and consequence to the event. The last column, mitigation/control measures, lists measures present principally for limiting the consequences of the event. An event in the anticipated frequency category may be constrained by physical systems (e.g., shielding walls) and administrative controls (e.g., procedures and training). Another event may be in the unlikely or extremely unlikely frequency category based on the same considerations, but may also consider the failure of one or more of the mitigation/control measures. The event frequency determination may consider the existing or planned administrative control to limit frequency or to limit consequences.

Frequency categories used in the PHA are the following.

· Anticipated (A) (1 to 10^-2 per year) - accidents and natural phenomena that may occur a few times during the lifetime of the operation or facility.

· Unlikely (U) (10^-2 to 10^-4 per year) - accidents and natural phenomena that will probably not occur during the lifetime of the operation or facility.

· Extremely Unlikely (EU) (10^-4 to 10^-6 per year) - accidents and natural phenomena that are credible but very unlikely to occur during the lifetime of the operation or facility.

· Incredible (I) (<10^-6 per year) - scenarios of exceedingly small probability. By definition, scenarios determined to occur less than once every 1,000,000 years are not credible.

The PHERMEX and DARHT facilities are rather unique from a hazard analysis and accident selection perspective in that the source of potential consequences to the general public from the normal operation - that is, detonation of high explosives and dispersal of depleted uranium and other materials from the site - is also the source of bounding consequences for accidents. Consequences of most accidents impact only the involved workers. For this reason, hazards and potential accidents that impact only involved workers are included in table I-2.Table I-2.-Preliminary Hazards Analysis of Hazards and Potential Accidents

that Would Affect Facility Workers (Involved Workers) Only

Facility Area	Hazardous Element	Event Description	Frequency Categorizationa	Consequence	Mitigation/Control Measures
Accelerator Rooms	Electrical energy	Workers contacts accelerator injector power supply	U - Procedures and training	Potentially fatal to involved workers
Accelerator Bay & Laser Room	Electrical energy	Worker contacts with laser power supply	U - Procedures and training	Potentially fatal to involved workers
General Facility Areas	Potential/kinetic energy	Failure of mechanical lift	U - Periodic inspections; preventive maintenance; procedures & training	Potentially fatal to involved workers	First aid available; hospital nearby
General Facility Areas	Toxic materials	Worker spills solvents used in facility	A - Frequent but small usage	Minor inhalation or uptake	Room ventilation
Camera Room	Potential/ kinetic energy	High-speed camera flies apart, producing fragments	U - Camera construction and reliability	Worker could be injured by fragment	Camera room is an exclusion area when cameras operating
Accelerator Hall	Inert gas	Confined space entry into accelerator during maintenance	U - Procedures and training; confined space entry program	Possible asphyxiation due to SF6 inhalation	SF6 required to be vented from area prior to accelerator entry
Laser Room	Radiation (non-ionizing)	Exposure to laser beam during maintenance or operations	U - Procedures and training	Possible eye injury or skin burn
Accelerator Rooms	Radiation (ionizing)	Exposure to accelerator beam scattered radiation or bremsstrahlung	U - Exclusion area; shielding	Radiation exposure within LANL administrative guidelines	Procedures and training
a A is anticipated; U is unlikely; E is extremely unlikely, I is incredible.

I.2 BOUNDING ACCIDENT SELECTION

As noted in section I.1, the source of potential impacts to the public from PHERMEX or DARHT accidents is identical to normal operations, namely the detonation of high explosives and dispersal ofmaterials from the firing site. Most of the differences between accidents are noted in potential impacts to involved workers, and less difference in impacts to noninvolved workers and members of the public.

The PHA provided the basis for selecting bounding accidents. Bounding accidents are those which, if they occurred, would result in the highest potential consequences (impacts) to members of the public and noninvolved or involved workers. Bounding accidents were selected from the PHA based on potential consequences, with little or no consideration of the frequency of occurrence; that is, they were considered as "what if" accidents, although the likelihood of occurrence would be small. Accidents with expected smaller consequences than the bounding accidents were eliminated from further consideration. The accident selected for more detailed analysis under all alternatives was the inadvertent uncontained detonation of a test assembly. Under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, the catastrophic failure of a containment vessel was selected for the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options. Under the Building Containment Option, the bounding accident was the cracking and loss of integrity of the containment walls or major failure of the HEPA-filtered overpressure release system.

For involved workers at and around the firing site, inadvertent detonation is clearly the bounding case for all alternatives. The number of workers and observers on the firing site when explosives are present is limited to 15; under an inadvertent detonation scenario all of these individuals could be killed. Other accidents, mainly industrial-type accidents, could also result in worker fatalities. However, only an explosives-type accident has the capability of injuring or killing a large number of workers. In addition, for all alternatives, the direct exposure of a worker to the accelerator beam pulse was selected because it falls well outside the scope of hazards typically encountered in an industrial or laboratory setting.

Two postulated accidents involving plutonium, an inadvertent detonation and the breach of a double-walled containment vessel, identified in table I-1, were selected and evaluated on a "what if" basis. Impacts to the public maximally exposed individual (MEI), the population, noninvolved workers, and involved workers were all evaluated.

I.3 ACCIDENT ANALYSES

This section presents the methods used to analyze the human health impacts from facility accidents, and also presents the detailed results of the analyses. Some of the technical basis for evaluating the impacts of accidents is the same as for evaluating impacts from normal operations. Therefore, some of the technical basis for these analyses is contained in appendix H, Human Health.

The detonation of a test assembly results in the aerosolization and atmospheric dispersal of a portion of the materials contained in the assembly. Depleted uranium and tritium were evaluated for their radiological hazard; and uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride were evaluated for their chemical hazard. The potential for carcinogenesis from exposures to uranium, tritium, and beryllium was evaluated, as well as the potential occurrence of toxicological effects from exposure to uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride.

An inadvertent uncontained detonation was evaluated as the bounding accident for all uncontained alternatives, that is the No Action, DARHT Baseline, PHERMEX Upgrade, Plutonium Exclusion, and Single Axis alternatives, as well as the uncontained detonations under the Vessel Containment and PhasedContainment options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative. This accident considered the impact from uncontained inadvertent detonation of a test assembly with release of all assembly materials to the environment.

Two accident scenarios, applicable for the three options, were evaluated under the Enhanced Containment Alternative. The vessel accident scenario considered a catastrophic failure of a containment vessel, releasing all test assembly materials to the environment. The building accident scenario considered a building wall cracking or a HEPA filter failure during a detonation, allowing the release of a portion of the detonated inventory.

Evaluation of impacts from accidents involving plutonium are applicable for each of the alternatives in the EIS.

I.3.1 EXPOSURE MODELING

The GENII code, spreadsheet, and hand calculations were used for the health impact evaluation of accident scenarios. A description of the GENII code and model approach can be found in appendix H, Human Health. Whereas the MEPAS code was used in the evaluation of the chronic exposures in appendix H, it was not appropriate to use this code for the acute exposure scenarios of accidental releases. Therefore, hand calculations were used to estimate the intake of the nonradioactive hazardous releases.

Hazard indexes (HI) are to be used to describe the potential for toxicological effects only in situations of chronic exposures; they are inappropriate to use for acute exposure evaluations. Therefore, only the acute intake of nonradioactive constituents via the inhalation pathway over the plume passage period was evaluated. GENII acute-scenario atmospheric dispersion estimates (using 95th percentile E/Q values) were used in the spreadsheets to determine the amount of nonradioactive constituent inhaled. Inhalation intakes were then calculated and compared to equivalent intakes for the NIOSH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) values (NIOSH 1995).

A test assembly inventory was established for each of the accident release cases that would be within the operating limits of the facility, represent normal assembly configuration, but would maximize possible consequences. Each inventory has the same quantity of potentially hazardous constituents as presented in table I-3.Table I-3.-Assumed Inventory of an Individual Test Assembly for Accident Analysis

Accident Release Scenario	Inventory
	DU	Tritium	Be	Pb	LiH
Uncontained Detonation	50	0.75	0.5	4	25
Enhanced Containment Vessel Containment Breach Building Containment Breach	50	0.75	0.5	4	25
Note: All inventories in kg, except for tritium, which is in Ci.

The radionuclide composition of the depleted uranium is presented in appendix H, table H-4. The high-explosive content for the uncontained detonation case was assumed to be relatively low to decrease dispersion and therefore increase potential impacts; thereby conservatively estimating impacts. The high-explosive content of assemblies under the containment breach cases would be higher, to effect the loss of containment.

For the uncontained detonation accident case, the effective point of material release is based on the amount of explosives used in the detonation (see appendix H). The amount of explosives detonated in the test assembly was assumed to be 22 lb (10 kg), with an effective midpoint release height of 330 ft (100 m). As discussed in appendix H for chronic releases, the single-point release assumption used in the modeling may cause potential impacts to be overestimated by up to a factor of 100.

For both of the containment-breach accident scenarios under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, a ground-level release was modeled because the containment was assumed to diminish the upward pressure of the blast. This assumption minimizes atmospheric dispersion and, as a consequence, increases calculated potential impacts.

For the uncontained detonation and vessel breach cases, 100 percent of the test assembly inventory was assumed to be released to the environment. For the building containment breach case, only 10 percent of the test assembly inventory was assumed to be released. For all accident cases, only a portion of the released hazardous constituents would be of respirable size. An aerosolization fraction of 0.1 (10 percent) was assumed for this EIS (see appendix H), with the entire aerosolized portion assumed to be respirable. Therefore, the percentage of the test assembly inventory available for intake by human receptors would be 10 percent for uncontained detonations and the vessel containment breach, and 1 percent for the building containment breach.

Potential impacts to the MEI were evaluated at three points of public access near the PHERMEX and DARHT facilities: the nearest point of State Road 4, Pajarito Road, and Bandelier National Monument. A nearby noninvolved worker was evaluated in each case for onsite impacts. For the uncontained alternatives, impacts to noninvolved workers were evaluated at hazard radius boundary 2,500 ft (750 m), a typical hazard radius for hydrodynamic tests. For the Enhanced Containment Alternative, the noninvolved worker location, 1,300 ft (400 m), was applicable to the scenario where the noninvolved worker was located at the assumed vessel containment hazard radius boundary that was assumed to be reduced from the uncontained detonation hazard radius boundary. This scenario is also bounding for impacts to a noninvolved worker inside the hazard radius during an uncontained release. Involved workers were assumed to be near the blast and killed or seriously injured by overpressure or fragments. Table I-4Table I-4.-Locations of Individuals Evaluated

for Accidental Release Cases

Category	Location Description	Location
MEIa Public Individual Public Individual	State Road 4 (SR4) Pajarito Road Bandelier	0.9 mi (1.5 km) SW 1.7 mi (2.7 km) NE 3 mi (5 km) SSE
Noninvolved Worker Uncontained Detonation		2,500 ft (750 m) NW
Noninvolved Worker Containment Breach		1,300 ft (400 m) NW
a MEI is the maximally exposed individual.

presents the locations of these individuals.

The basis for selecting the public access locations was the frequented points of closest approach by offsite individuals. These individuals are assumed to remain at that point for a brief period of time; for example, an individual changing a tire located on State Road 4 or Pajarito Road or a hiker in the Bandelier National Monument at the time of the acute release.

The noninvolved worker was located on the roadway just outside the hazard radius, approximately 2,500 ft (750 m) away for uncontained detonations. The hazard radius was assumed to be smaller for the contained detonations under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, with the noninvolved worker 1,300 ft

(400 m) away. These distances are based on administrative hazard radii that LANL has established for protection of personnel from fragment injury and would be a typical exclusion for test assembly detonations. The hazard radius determinations are included in LANL operating procedures, based on principles presented in the DOE Explosives Safety Manual (DOE 1994).

The exposure pathways and parameters values for those of greatest importance and interest are presented in table I-5.Table I-5.-Code Input Parameters Used to Evaluate Accident Release Consequences

Pathway	Dose Receptor/Applicable Accident Scenarioa
	Public Individual All Accident Scenarios	Noninvolved Worker Uncontained Detonation	Noninvolved Worker Containment Breach
External exposure external plume ground surface (hours)	Plume passage 1	Plume passage 0.25	Plume passage 0.25
Inhalation	Plume passage	Plume passage	Plume passage
a Individuals are located in the plume centerline during the entire time of its passage. Miscellaneous parameters: soil density, 100 lb/ft3 (1.6 x 103 kg/m3) surface soil density, 15 lb/ft3 (240 kg/m2) mass loading, 4.5 x 10-9 lb/ft3 (7.2 x 10-5 g/m3)

For radioactive material, the exposure pathways considered under the acute accidental release scenarios included inhalation and external exposure from the material in the plume and deposited on the ground surface. This was principally depleted uranium because for all six alternatives, the radiation dose from tritium, in the form of T₂, was determined to be about 1 x 10^-8 (about 1 in 100 million) that of depleted uranium. An analysis was performed, using GENII, to compare dose consequences of the acute releases of depleted uranium and tritium. Because it was determined to be an insignificant contributor to the radiation dose, tritium impacts were not explicitly calculated. To evaluate the potential toxicological effects of uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride, and the carcinogenic risk from beryllium, only the inhalation exposure pathway was considered.

In the past, DOE has conducted dynamic experiments with plutonium at LANL. Future experiments with plutonium would always be conducted in double-walled containment vessels; these experiments could not reasonably be expected to result in any release of plutonium to the environment. DOE has evaluated the potential impacts of two types of accidents that could involve plutonium: inadvertent detonation and containment breach. It is important to note that any accidents involving plutonium would not be nuclear detonations, but rather detonations of the high explosive that could disperse particles of plutonium. This analysis is documented in a classified supplement to the EIS. Results and unclassified calculation assumptions and modeling methods are included in this appendix and in applicable sections of Chapter 5.

Radionuclide-independent exposure modeling assumptions and methods for accidents involving plutonium were the same as those presented for depleted uranium with the following exceptions for population dose calculations:

· Plume depletion due to natural settling and deposition processes was taken into account.

· Diffusion of released material across an entire exposed sector was taken into account, rather than assuming that all exposure took place on the plume centerline.

· Estimates of population dose were made using both the 50th and 95th percentile atmospheric dispersion factors, rather than just the 95th percentile value.

Accounting for plume depletion and diffusion of released material resulted in lowering values for the atmospheric dispersion factors, with consequently lower estimated atmospheric concentrations for a given unit of release. This resulted in estimates of plutonium air concentrations approximately 38 and 10 times lower for ground-level (containment breach) and elevated (inadvertent detonation) releases, respectively, than would have been estimated had these factors not been taken into account. Use of the 50th and 95th percentile atmospheric dispersion factors provide a range of estimates using realistic (50th) and a reasonable upper bound (95th) of atmospheric dispersion conditions.

In addition to calculating the potential dose to the population in the hypothetical maximally exposed sector, at the request of the State of New Mexico Environment Department and various American Indian pueblos, the potential dose to the populations of a number of individual communities in the vicinity of LANL were calculated. The communities included in this evaluation and community-specific input parameters are presented in table I-6Table I-6.-Additional Communities Evaluated for Impacts from

Postulated Accidents Involving Plutonium

Communities	Population	Distance [mi (km)]	Direction from TA-15	E/Q (s/m3)
				50th	95th
Cochiti Puebloa	936	13 (21)	SSW	3.6 x 10-7	8.6 x 10-7
Santa Clara Puebloa	1742	10 (16)	NNE	3.7 x 10-7	1.1 x 10-6
San Ildefonso Puebloa	634	8 (12)	NE	6.8 x 10-7	1.4 x 10-6
Jemez Puebloa	2642	13 (21)	SW	1.2 x 10-7	8.3 x 10-7
Españolab	9026	12 (20)	NNE	3.3 x 10-7	8.8 x 10-7
Pojoaque Puebloa	162	15 (24)	E	3.0 x 10-7	6.4 x 10-7
Los Alamosb	3965	3.5 (6)	NNW	4.2 x 10-7	3.2 x 10-6
White Rockb	498	4 (6)	ESE	5.3 x 10-7	2.4 x 10-6
Santa Feb	41300	25 (40)	ESE	1.8 x 10-7	4.4 x 10-7
a Population data from the Pueblo Cultural Center. b Population data from the 1990 U.S. Census.

. As was done for other accidental release calculations, it was assumed that the plume released from the accident passed directly over the community. This explains why results are presented for communities in opposite directions; for example, Cochiti Pueblo that is south-southwest, and Santa Clara Pueblo that is north-northeast. These calculations included plume depletion but did not account for the diffusion of material in the plume; that is, the communities were assumed to be on the centerline of the plume of released material. Calculations were done using both the 50th and 95th percentile atmospheric dispersion factors.

I.3.2 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS RESULTS

The estimated radiation dose and carcinogenic risk impacts to members of the public and noninvolved workers from exposure to radioactive material and beryllium released during an accident are presented in table I-7Table I-7.-Estimated Doses and Carcinogenic Risk from Bounding Case Accidents

Accidental Release Case	Total dose (rem EDE)	Probability of Radiation-Induced LCFc	Probability of Beryllium-Induced Cancer
Uncontained Detonation Public MEIb, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker Population (ESE)a (number of LCFs)	6 x 10-4 3 x 10-4 3 x 10-4 7 x 10-4 1.9 person-rem	3 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 1 x 10-7 3 x 10-7 none (9 x 10-4 LCFs)	4 x 10-10 2 x 10-10 2 x 10-10 5 x 10-10 none (1 x 10-6 total cancers)
Vessel Containment Breach Public MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker Population (ESE) (number of LCFs) Building Containment Breach Public, MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker Population (ESE)a (number of LCFs)	1 x 10-2 8 x 10-3 3 x 10-3 5 x 10-2 17 person-rem 1 x 10-3 8 x 10-4 4 x 10-4 5 x 10-3 1.7 person-rem	6 x 10-6 4 x 10-6 2 x 10-6 2 x 10-5 none (9 x 10-3 LCFs) 6 x 10-7 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 2 x 10-6 none (9 x 10-4 LCFs)	8 x 10-9 5 x 10-9 3 x 10-9 3 x 10-8 none (1 x 10-5 total cancers) 8 x 10-10 5 x 10-10 3 x 10-9 3 x 10-9 none (1 x 10-6 total cancers)
a The east-southeast (ESE) sector. b MEI is the maximally exposed individual. c LCF is latent cancer fatality. Note: Population impacts are shown as expected number of LCFs and cancers rather than an individual probability of occurrence.

. The maximum radiation dose to a member of the public was estimated to be 0.011 rem to the MEI, located at State Road 4, in the event of a catastrophic failure of a containment vessel during a detonation. The maximum probability of a latent cancer fatality (LCF) from this accident scenario would be 6 x 10^-6. Dose to members of the public at Pajarito Road, Bandelier, and other locations would be lower than those at the State Road 4 location. The estimated maximum dose to the surrounding population within 50 mi (80 km), also from a containment vessel failure, would be about 17 person-rem. No LCFs would be expected among the population from this dose (9 x 10^-3 LCFs).

The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer, again to the MEI at the State Road 4 location from a containment vessel failure, would be 8 x 10^-9. Inhalation intakes of material released during the accidents are presented in table I-8Table I-8.-Inhalation Intakes of Materials Released

in the Accident Release Cases

Accidental Release Case	E/Qa (s/m3)	Plume Exposure Time(s)	U (µg)	Be (µg)	Pb (µg)	LiH (µg)
Uncontained Detonation Public MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker	7.5 x 10-6 4.4 x 10-6 3.5 x 10-6 8.9 x 10-6	180 182 309 140	9 5 4 10	0.09 0.05 0.04 0.4	0.7 0.4 0.3 0.8	4 4 2 5
Vessel Containment Breach Public MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker	1.4 x 10-4 9.6 x 10-5 4.7 x 10-5 6.2 x 10-4	160 218 500 51	200 100 50 700	2 1 0.5 7	10 9 4 60	80 60 30 400
Building Containment Breach Public MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker	1.4 x 10-4 9.6 x 10-5 4.7 x 10-5 6.2 x 10-4	160 218 500 51	20 10 5 70	0.2 0.1 0.05 0.7	1 0.9 0.4 6	8 6 3 40
IDLHb Value (mg/m3) Equivalent intake (µg)			10,000 100,000	4,000 40,000	100,000 1,000,000	500 5,000
a The E/Q (E over Q) is a measure of atmospheric dispersion for short-term (acute) atmospheric releases using gaussian dispersion plume modeling, with units of s/m3. For a given point or location at some distance from the source, it represents the time-integrated air concentration (e.g., Ci-s/m3 ) divided by the total release from the source (e.g., Ci). Integrated air concentrations used are usually plume centerline values. E/Qs are typically used for releases lasting no longer than 8 to 24 hours. b IDLH (Immediately dangerous to life or health) values from NIOSH 1995.

, and calculated air concentrations and their comparison to the IDLH values are presented in table I-9. The transitory air concentrations that would be experienced by the MEI at the State Road 4 location would be, at the greatest, less than 1 percent of the IDLH values.

A noninvolved worker would receive the highest dose from the vessel containment failure, receiving a dose of about 0.05 rem (table I-7). The maximum probability of a LCF from this accident scenario would be 2 x 10^-5. The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer would be about 3 x 10^-8. Inhalation intakes of material released during the accidents are presented in table I-8. The amount of material inhaled was estimated from the E/Q information. However, the IDLH health impact guidelines for acute exposures to hazardous materials are based on air concentrations (NIOSH 1995). The IDLH values are the best available for determining health impact, but are not ideal, given the original intendeduse of the IDLHs for emergency response purposes. IDLH values are based on 30-minute exposure times. The exposure times of the modeled individuals are much shorter than 30 minutes (see table I-8).

The IDLHs are based on breathing 353 ft³ (10 m³) of air over the 30-minute exposure time. Since it would be difficult to draw health impact conclusions from air concentrations that are based on 30-minute exposure levels for the MEI 1 to 8 min exposure levels, the IDLH-equivalent intake was calculated for comparison to the MEI intakes. The IDLH-equivalent intake values are the product of the constituent-specific IDLH (µg/m³) (NIOSH 1995) and the volume of air intake [353 ft³ (10 m³)] and are listed in table I-8 for the constituents of interest. All MEI intakes of the hazardous constituents are less than their respective IDLH-equivalent intake values. Table I-9Table I-9.-Percent of the IDLH Intake Basis Inhaled by the Individual

Accidental Release Case	U	Be	Pb	LiH
Uncontained Detonation Public MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker 2,500 ft (760 m)	9 x 10-3 5 x 10-3 4 x 10-3 1 x 10-2	2 x 10-4 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-3	7 x 10-5 4 x 10-5 3 x 10-5 8 x 10-5	8 x 10-2 8 x 10-2 4 x 10-2 1 x 10-1
Vessel Containment Breach Public MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker 1,300 ft (400 m)	2 x 10-1 1 x 10-1 5 x 10-2 7 x 10-1	5 x 10-3 3 x 10-3 1 x 10-3 2 x 10-2	1 x 10-3 9 x 10-4 4 x 10-4 6 x 10-3	2 1 6 x 10-1 8
Building Containment Breach Public MEI, State Road 4 Public, Pajarito Road Public, Bandelier Noninvolved worker 1,300 ft (400 m)	2 x 10-2 1 x 10-2 5 x 10-3 7 x 10-2	5 x 10-4 3 x 10-4 1 x 10-4 2 x 10-3	1 x 10-4 9 x 10-5 4 x 10-5 6 x 10-4	2 x 10-1 1 x 10-1 6 x 10-2 8 x 10-1
IDLHa equivalent intake (mg)	100	40	1,000	5
a IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health).

indicates each individual's exposure as a percent ofthe IDLH. Most intakes are less than 1 percent of the IDLH; the highest is for the noninvolved worker exposed to a level of 8 percent of the LiH IDLH during a vessel containment failure.

Containment breach releases have greater potential impacts than uncontained releases (tables I-7 to I-9) mainly because there is less atmospheric dispersion of ground-level containment releases than for the explosive elevated uncontained releases. This can result in a greater atmospheric concentration at the nearby point of exposure. Other important considerations are the quantity of material released and the population distribution (for population dose calculations). Appendix C (section C.1.3.3) provides some additional discussion on comparative impacts of releases from containment and uncontained detonations.

Potential impacts from postulated accidents involving plutonium are shown in tables I-10 Table I-10.-Hypothetical Impacts to Workers and the Public from

Postulated Accidents Involving Plutonium

Affected Category	Inadvertent Detonation		Containment Breach
	Dose (rem)	Maximum Probability of LCFs	Dose (rem)	Maximum Probability of LCFs
Workers	-a	NA	no impact	no impact
Noninvolved Workers 750 m 400 m	90 160	0.04 0.06	20 60	0.009 0.02
Public MEI	76	0.04	14	0.007
a No radiological impact estimated; up to 15 fatalities could result from explosion blast effects. b NA = not applicable

Table I-11.-Hypothetical Impacts to the Maximally Exposed Sector

of the Population from Postulated Accidents Involving Plutonium

Atmospheric Dispersion Assumption	Inadvertent Detonation		Containment Breach
	Population Dose (person-rem)	Number of LCFs	Population Dose (person-rem)	Number of LCFs
50tha 95thb	9,000 24,000	5 12	210 560	0 (0.1) 0 (0.3)
a 50th percentile of atmospheric dispersion conditions. b 95th percentile of atmospheric dispersion conditions. Note: The communities of Santa Fe and White Rock are included within the population of this sector.

and I-11. Potential health consequences of exposure to plutonium are well understood and have been greatly exaggerated by the popular press (Sutcliffe et al. 1995). These results include hypothetical impacts to thepublic MEI, population in the maximally exposed sector, noninvolved workers, and involved workers. The MEI, located at State Road 4, could receive up to 76 rem in the event of an accident. The maximum probability of a LCF occurring in this hypothetical individual would be 0.04. The dose to the potentially maximally exposed sector of the population, east-southeast of the DARHT and PHERMEX sites that includes the communities of White Rock and Santa Fe, could be between 9,000 and 24,000 person-rem, taking into consideration the 50th and 95th percentile meteorology, respectively. Between 5 and 12 LCFs would be projected from radiation doses such as these to the population.

Impacts to noninvolved workers could be as high as 160 rem, for a worker 1,300 ft (400 m) away from an uncontained detonation. The maximum probability of an LCF occurring in a worker from this radiation dose would be 0.06. More likely, a noninvolved worker would be no closer than 2,500 ft (750 m). The dose to a worker at this distance would be about 90 rem, with a corresponding maximum probability of about 0.04 of an LCF occurring.

Table I-12 Table I-12.-Hypothetical Impacts to Nearby Communities from

a Postulated Inadvertent Detonation Accident Involving Plutonium

Community	50th Percentile Meteorologya		95th Percentile Meteorologyb
	Population Dose (person-rem)	Number of LCFs	Population Dose (person-rem)	Number of LCFs
Cochiti Pueblo Santa Clara Pueblo San Ildefonso Pueblo Jemez Pueblo Española Pojoaque Pueblo Los Alamos White Rock Santa Fe	300 1000 400 600 4400 50 5900 500 7500	0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 3	800 2900 900 4400 12100 100 45100 2400 18700	0 1 0 2 6 0 22 1 9
a 50th percentile of atmospheric dispersion conditions. b 95th percentile of atmospheric dispersion conditions. Note: Values for communities in different compass directions are not additive (see table I-6).

Table I-13.-Plutonium Isotope Unit Dose Factors for Evaluation of Potential

Human Health Impacts from Acute, Ground-Level Releases^a

Accident Release Case Dose Receptor	Pu-236	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242	Pu-244
Public (rem/µCi released)b MEI, State Road 4 Pajarito Road Bandelier	6.2 x 10-6 4.3 x 10-6 2.0 x 10-6	1.3 x 10-5 9.2 x 10-6 4.3 x 10-6	1.4 x 10-5 9.7 x 10-6 4.6 x 10-6	1.4 x 10-5 9.7 x 10-6 4.6 x 10-6	2.3 x 10-7 1.6 x 10-7 7.4 x 10-8	1.3 x 10-5 9.3 x 10-6 4.4 x 10-6	1.3 x 10-5 9.2 x 10-6 4.3 x 10-6
Population (person-rem per µCi released) East-southeast	9.6 x 10-3	2.0 x 10-2	2.2 x 10-2	2.2 x 10-2	3.6 x 10-4	2.1 x 10-2	2.1 x 10-2
Noninvolved Worker (rem/µCi released) 1,300 ft (400 m) 2,500 ft (760 m)	2.7 x 10-5 9.8 x 10-6	5.7 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-5	6.1 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-5	6.1 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-5	9.8 x 10-7 3.6 x 10-7	5.8 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-5	5.8 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-5
Specific Activity (µCi/g)	5.3 x 108	1.7 x 107	6.2 x 104	2.3 x 105	1.0 x 108	3.9 x 103	1.8 x 101
a Includes all applicable exposure pathways described in table I-5. b Release can be estimated as follows: inventory x fraction released x respirable fraction.

shows hypothetical impacts to nearby communities in the event of an inadvertent uncontained detonation involving plutonium. These values are likely to be overestimated because of the assumption that all of the community population is located on or near the plume centerline. In particular, the value for Los Alamos is likely to be overestimated because the airborne plume would be relatively narrow at this distance and would expose only a small fraction of the population shown in table I-6, leaving most of the population unexposed. Because of its closeness to LANL, however, Los Alamos could be one of the most affected communities if the plume passed that way. Some of the other small communities could receivehigh enough population doses in the event of an accident under the specific exposure conditions assumed in the analysis that some LCFs could occur. Up to one LCF could occur at White Rock and Santa Clara Pueblo, up to two at Jemez Pueblo, between two and six at Española, and between three and nine in Santa Fe. No LCFs would be projected for the other communities evaluated. Values for communities in different compass directions are not additive (see table I-6). Only values for Santa Clara and Española, and White Rock and Santa Fe, may be added since these two sets of communities lie in the same direction from TA-15.

Some individuals may wish to explore potential human health consequences of hypothetical accidental releases of plutonium from proposed PHERMEX or DARHT activities. Estimates of the potential dose impact from unit releases of plutonium isotopes are provided in tables I-13, I-14Table I-14.-Plutonium Isotope Unit Dose Factors for Evaluation of Potential

Human Health Impacts from Acute, 330-ft (100-m) Releases^a

Accident Release Case Dose Receptor	Pu-236	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242	Pu-244
Public (rem/µCi released)b MEI, State Road 4 Pajarito Road Bandelier	3.4 x 10-7 2.0 x 10-7 1.6 x 10-7	7.2 x 10-7 4.3 x 10-7 3.4 x 10-7	7.6 x 10-7 4.6 x 10-7 3.6 x 10-7	7.6 x 10-7 4.6 x 10-7 3.6 x 10-7	1.2 x 10-8 7.4 x 10-9 5.9 x 10-9	7.3 x 10-7 4.4 x 10-7 3.5 x 10-7	7.2 x 10-7 4.3 x 10-7 3.5 x 10-7
Population (person-rem per µCi released) East-southeast	1.1 x 10-3	2.3 x 10-3	2.4 x 10-3	2.4 x 10-3	4.1 x 10-5	2.3 x 10-3	2.3 x 10-3
Noninvolved Worker (rem/µCi released) 1,300 ft (400 m) 2,500 ft (760 m)	7.0 x 10-7 3.9 x 10-7	1.5 x 10-6 8.3 x 10-7	1.6 x 10-6 8.8 x 10-7	1.6 x 10-6 8.8 x 10-7	2.6 x 10-8 1.4 x 10-8	1.5 x 10-6 8.5 x 10-7	1.5 x 10-6 8.4 x 10-7
Specific Activity (µCi/g)	5.3 x 108	1.7 x 107	6.2 x 104	2.3 x 105	1.0 x 108	3.9 x 103	1.8 x 101
a Includes all applicable exposure pathways described in table I-5. b Release can be estimated as follows: inventory x fraction released x respirable fraction.

Table I-15.-Plutonium Isotope Unit Dose Factors for Evaluation of Potential

Human Health Impacts from Acute, 400-ft (120-m) Releases^a

Accident Release Case Dose Receptor	Pu-236	Pu-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Pu-241	Pu-242	Pu-244
Public (rem/µCi released)b MEI, State Road 4 Pajarito Road Bandelier	2.4 x 10-7 1.1 x 10-7 1.1 x 10-7	5.2 x 10-7 2.4 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-7	5.5 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-7 2.4 x 10-7	5.5 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-7 2.4 x 10-7	8.9 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-9 3.9 x 10-9	5.2 x 10-7 2.5 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-7	5.2 x 10-7 2.5 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-7
Population (person-rem per µCi released) East-southeast	7.3 x 10-4	1.6 x 10-3	1.6 x 10-3	1.6 x 10-3	2.7 x 10-5	1.6 x 10-3	1.6 x 10-3
Noninvolved Worker (rem/µCi released) 1,300 ft (400 m) 2,500 ft (760 m)	4.7 x 10-7 3.1 x 10-7	1.0 x 10-6 6.6 x 10-7	1.1 x 10-6 7.0 x 10-7	1.1 x 10-6 7.0 x 10-7	1.7 x 10-8 1.1 x 10-8	1.0 x 10-6 6.7 x 10-7	1.0 x 10-6 6.6 x 10-7
Specific Activity (µCi/g)	5.3 x 108	1.7 x 107	6.2 x 104	2.3 x 105	1.0 x 108	3.9 x 103	1.8 x 101
a Includes all applicable exposure pathways described in table I-5. b Release can be estimated as follows: inventory x fraction released x respirable fraction.

, and I-15 for ground-level, 330-ft (100-m), and 400-ft (120-m) releases, respectively.

I.4 REFERENCES CITED IN APPENDIX I

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994, DOE Explosives Safety Manual, DOE/EV/06194, August, Washington, D.C.

NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health), 1995, NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, in Tomes-Toxicological, Occupational Medicine, and Environmental Series (CD-ROM), Database used: NIOSH Pocket Guide.

Sutcliffe, W.G., et al., 1995, A Perspective on the Dangers of Plutonium, April 14, UCRL-ID-118825, Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.

accelerator I-2, I-5, I-6

accelerators I-2

accident I-1, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, I-8, I-7, I-8, I-10, I-11, I-12, I-11, I-14, I-15, I-16

accidents I-1, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, I-9, I-11, I-12, I-11, I-13, I-14

beryllium I-6, I-9, I-11, I-12, I-11

containment I-2, I-1, I-6, I-7, I-8, I-7, I-8, I-9, I-8, I-10, I-9, I-10, I-12, I-11, I-12, I-11, I-13, I-14

depleted uranium I-4, I-6, I-7, I-9

detonation I-2, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, I-8, I-7, I-8, I-9, I-10, I-9, I-10, I-12, I-11, I-12, I-13, I-14, I-15, I-14

detonations I-6, I-8, I-9, I-13

dose I-1, I-2, I-10, I-9, I-10, I-11, I-12, I-11, I-13, I-14, I-15, I-16

dynamic experiments I-9

earthquake I-2

exposure pathway I-9

exposure pathways I-9, I-15, I-16

firing point I-1

high explosive I-9

high explosives I-1, I-4, I-5

human health I-1, I-6, I-7, I-15, I-16

hydrodynamic tests I-8

latent cancer fatality I-12, I-11

LCF I-12, I-11, I-14, I-15

maximally exposed individual I-6, I-9, I-12

MEI I-6, I-8, I-9, I-12, I-11, I-12, I-11, I-12, I-13, I-14, I-15, I-16

mitigation I-2, I-4, I-5

phased containment I-6, I-7

plutonium I-2, I-6, I-7, I-9, I-10, I-11, I-13, I-14, I-13, I-15, I-14, I-15, I-16, I-18

radiation I-2, I-1, I-5, I-9, I-11, I-12, I-11, I-14

radiation exposure I-2, I-5

radiological impact I-14

soil I-10

transportation I-1

tritium I-6, I-8, I-9

vessel containment I-6, I-8, I-12, I-11, I-13