HUMAN HEALTH
This appendix presents the methods and results of calculations to estimate human health effects that could result from the airborne releases of test assembly detonations at the DARHT or PHERMEX sites under the six alternatives. The detonations would result in the aerosolization and atmospheric dispersal of a portion of the materials contained in each assembly. The hazardous components may include depleted uranium, tritium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride. Depleted uranium and tritium were evaluated for their radiological hazard, and uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride were evaluated for their chemical hazard. Unless otherwise stated, dose is the effective dose equivalent. Sums and products of numbers in this section may not appear consistent due to rounding.
This appendix addresses only the potential human health impacts from chronic exposures under routine operations. Appendix I (Facility Accidents) covers the health impacts from acute exposures that could result from accident events.
H.1 COMPUTER CODES
The potential health impacts of the atmospheric releases were evaluated with two computer codes. GENII (Napier et al. 1988a; Napier et al. 1988b; and Napier et al. 1988c) was used to calculate radiation dose from uranium and tritium. The Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS) (Droppo et al. 1989; Droppo et al. 1991; Whelan et al. 1987; Strenge et al. 1989; Buck et al. 1995) was used to calculate toxicological impacts of all constituents, except tritium, and carcinogenic risk from beryllium. The HOTSPOT code (Homann 1994) was used in a limited manner to compare explosive atmospheric dispersion to the point-source atmospheric dispersion estimates of GENII and MEPAS.
H.1.1 GENII
The GENII code was used to calculate radiation doses from depleted uranium and tritium releases. GENII models the environmental transport, accumulation, and radiation dose to an individual or population. It may be used for acute (less than 24 h) or chronic exposure scenarios. Atmospheric dispersion is modeled using a straight-line Gaussian-plume model, and the release point may be either ground level or elevated. Although it accounts for the material deposition to determine exposure to ground surface deposition, the GENII code generates conservative plume concentration estimates in part because, the code does not mathematically remove the deposition from the plume. Therefore, the material deposited is double counted and health impacts are overestimated, especially for those located at greater downwind distance.
Depleted uranium is modeled as a particulate, but GENII includes a special algorithm for modeling tritium vapor. The tritium model of GENII assumes that the tritium released is in the form of tritiated water (HTO), whereas tritium released from either the DARHT or PHERMEX facilities is in the form of tritium gas (T2). Tritium gas is about 14,000 times less a radiological hazard than tritiated water because it is
taken up by the body to a far lesser extent. GENII calculations were made assuming the tritium to be in the form of HTO for atmospheric dispersion and environmental accumulation. Radiation dose output was Table H-1.-Reference Doses (Rfd) for Beryllium, Lead, Lithium Hydroxide,
and Uranium and Their Bases
Element |
Rfd (mg/kg/d) |
Basis |
|
Beryllium |
Ingestion Rfd = 0.005 Inhalation Rfd = undefined |
Low confidence in Rfd which is based on soluble beryllium salts. The deleterious effect of the Rfd is based on weight changes. |
Lead |
Ingestion Rfd = 0.0014 Inhalation Rfd = 0.00043 |
High level of confidence in Rfd. Health effect bases are changes in the levels of certain blood enzymes and in aspects of children's neurobehavioral development. |
Lithium Hydroxidea |
Ingestion Rfd = 0.007 Inhalation Rfd = 0.007 |
Low confidence in Rfd. Symptoms of lithium toxicity resemble those of sodium deficiency and include drowsiness, anorexia, nausea, tremors, blurred vision, coma, and death. Rfd is based on sodium hydroxide threshold limit values (TLV). The TLV, however, is most likely based on the caustic nature of sodium hydroxide. |
Uranium |
Ingestion Rfd = 0.003 Inhalation Rfd = 0.0014 |
Medium confidence in Rfd. Uranium is a classic nephrotoxin. |
|
a Lithium hydroxide used as surrogate for lithium hydride in test assemblies. Source: EPA 1994b and ACGIH 1991 | ||
then corrected by replacing HTO dose factors with those for T2.
H.1.2 MEPAS
The MEPAS code was used to model the release, atmospheric transport, and receptor exposure of test assembly constituents that could cause toxicological effects (uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride) or cancer risks (beryllium). Uranium, as a heavy metal, may cause toxicological effects as well as be a source of radiation dose. MEPAS has the capability to model only chronic releases. Like GENII, MEPAS uses a straight-line Gaussian-plume model for atmospheric dispersion modeling, from either ground-level or elevated release points.
The MEPAS code output for toxicological effects from uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride is in terms of hazard index (HI). Hazard index is used to estimate the potential occurrence of noncarcinogenic effects that may result from chronic exposure to a metal or chemical. Toxicological effects are nonprobabilistic and have an occurrence threshold. They are specific to a given substance because the toxicological endpoints differ for different substances. The HI is equal to the individual's estimated exposure divided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) constituent-specific reference dose (EPA 1994b). This EPA reference dose is based on a contamination level where a deleterious effect is noted following chronic exposure. No toxicological effects would be expected where the HI was less than unity (1). The reference doses and their bases are provided in table H-1.
MEPAS output for carcinogens is presented as risk of cancer incidence. Beryllium is a potential carcinogen as well as a toxicological hazard. EPA (EPA 1994a) has published a beryllium slope factor, based on chronic exposure, that is used to estimate the probability that an individual will contract cancer in his or her lifetime. The carcinogenic effect results from the inhalation of beryllium. The inhalation slope factor is 8.4 [mgBe/(kgbody wt·d)]-1; slope factors for other exposure pathways are undefined.
H.1.3 HOTSPOT
HOTSPOT is a code developed for the initial assessment of accidents involving atmospheric releases of radioactive material. The code module used for these analyses was the "uranium explosion." HOTSPOT was used in one limited application to compare its explosive atmospheric dispersion estimates to the single-point atmospheric dispersion estimates of GENII and MEPAS. The initial plume of the postdetonation release modeled in HOTSPOT is more disperse and spacious than the point release modeled by GENII and MEPAS. The dispersion estimate comparison, while rather extensive in examining dispersion estimates at several different locations, for different quantities of high explosives, and under various meteorological conditions, was limited due to the relatively unsophisticated meteorological input used by HOTSPOT. HOTSPOT was not used for any consequence (dose, toxicological effect, or cancer risk) analysis.
H.2 METEOROLOGICAL DATA AND ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION
This section presents an overview of the meteorological data used for the human health analyses, as well as a description of the atmospheric dispersion analyses and assumptions made in modeling human health impacts.
H.2.1 Meteorological Data
A comparison was made of available LANL site-specific meteorological data to determine which was most appropriate for use in atmospheric dispersion and transport calculations for releases from the DARHT and PHERMEX sites (Area III) in TA-15. TA-15 has no meteorological tower. Data were available for two nearby areas, TA-6 and TA-49, which are north-northwest and south, respectively, of TA-15. These two sets of meteorological data were selected for comparison because they were from towers closest to TA-15, approximately equidistant from TA-15, and from towers with topography similar to TA-15.
To make a determination on which data set to use, GENII code analyses were carried out using three alternative meteorological data sets: TA-6, TA-49, and the average of TA-6 and TA-49. Doses to three different receptor locations (Los Alamos, Bandelier, and White Rock) were modeled using three different exposure scenarios (i.e., acute, chronic annual, and 30-yr cumulative exposure), as well as the 50-mi (80-km) population. Unit releases of depleted uranium and tritium were used as the source term and held constant among the different comparison cases.
The hourly meteorological data from TA-6 was selected as the input data set for modeling the atmospheric dispersion from the DARHT and PHERMEX sites in TA-15 because it consistently resulted in the highestdose estimates; therefore, potential impacts would less likely be underestimated. In the 3 of 13 cases where the TA-6 data did not result in the highest dose, the difference between the maximum and the TA-6 dose estimate was less than a factor of two.
Both GENII and MEPAS use the site-specific, hourly meteorological data in the form of joint frequency data. Joint frequency data are shown in appendix C, exhibit C1-1. Ninety-fifth-percentile, __/Q´ atmospheric dispersion values were calculated by GENII and MEPAS and used for chronic release calculations. GENII calculates 95th-percentile E/Q values for acute releases. Where hand calculations were necessary for acute release calculations (appendix I), these 95th-percentile E/Q values were used as the atmospheric dispersion input.
H.2.2 Atmospheric Dispersion
The GENII and MEPAS codes are routinely used for point (e.g., a building vent) or area (e.g., buried waste near the soil surface) source releases. However, material from the DARHT and PHERMEX sites would be released via explosive detonations. Initial post-detonation source term plumes for open-air detonations (as described below for the five uncontained alternatives) are roughly a vertical cylinder or stem-and-cap shape. Several analyses were performed to compare the impacts of using the GENII and MEPAS point sources release models to simulate the explosive detonation releases.
The initial analysis evaluated the model release geometry. The HOTSPOT code (Homann 1994) was used to compare post-detonation dispersion to point-source dispersion estimates used in GENII and MEPAS. HOTSPOT models five plumes stacked vertically for its model of nonnuclear detonations of uranium. The dispersion estimates for HOTSPOT and GENII/MEPAS were compared at several different receptor locations, for different quantities of high explosives, and under various meteorological conditions. The comparison was limited due to the relatively unsophisticated, generic meteorological input used by HOTSPOT. This analysis determined that the GENII and MEPAS point-source estimates could significantly under estimate atmospheric dispersion of explosive dispersal and therefore over estimate the human health impacts.
HOTSPOT has only limited air dispersion and dose modeling capabilities and was not used for any consequence analysis. However, HOTSPOT proved useful by providing an equation for effective release height that would allow GENII and MEPAS to more realistically simulate atmospheric dispersion from uncontained detonations. The effective release height is defined by the following empirical equation (Church 1969, as cited by Homann 1994):
effht = 0.6(76w0.25)
where effht = effective release height (m) and
w = amount of high explosives (lb).
This equation defines the mid-point of the explosively dispersed plume, with approximately 50 percent of the aerosolized source term above and 50 percent below the effective release height. The height of release is dependent on the amount of high explosives used; larger amounts of high explosives result in greater initial dispersion and a higher effective release height. The amounts of high explosives used in hydrodynamic tests may range from approximately 10 to 500 lb (5 to 225 kg), with correspondingeffective release heights of 270 to 700 ft (80 to 215 m). The release height used for all uncontained detonations of chronic exposure scenarios is 400 ft (120 m) corresponding to the use of 50 lb (22 kg) of high explosives.
Table H-2.-Atmospheric Dispersion Values Used to Compare Different
Explosive Dispersion Models
Location |
__/Q´ | ||
GENII/MEPAS |
HOTSPOTa |
Stem & Cap | |
|
10 lb (4.5 kg) of high explosives Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
4.0 x 10-8 3.5 x 10-8 4.3 x 10-8 |
4.6 x 10-10 3.6 x 10-10 2.6 x 10-10 |
4.5 x 10-8 5.5 x 10-8 7.3 x 10-8 |
500 lb (230 kg) of high explosives Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
1.6 x 10-8 2.9 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-9 |
1.1 x 10-10 7.1 x 10-11 1.1 x 10-10 |
2.3 x 10-8 1.1 x 10-8 1.4 x 10-8 |
|
a Most conservative (nighttime) __/Q´ values from HOTSPOT. | |||
A second evaluation compared the single-point release and dispersion model to the stem-and-cap (mushroom-shaped) atmospheric dispersion model. This comparison was made to ensure that the single-point release model was adequate to represent the explosive atmospheric dispersion that may be more appropriately represented by the stem-and-cap model.
Stem-and-cap releases are most accurately represented by double plume releases, with cap and stem sections modeled at different release elevations (Shinn et al. 1989). The stem-and-cap evaluation was performed for a variety of high explosive amounts with unit releases of depleted uranium. Using effective release height information gained from the initial comparison, dose consequences were calculated for a dose receptor in Los Alamos, [2.7 mi (4.4 km) NNW of TA-15]. For large amounts of explosives, the estimated dose from the stem-and-cap, double-plume release could be a maximum of 40 percent higher than that modeled for an elevated, single-point release. The dose from a representative test, using 20 lb (9 kg) of high explosives, could be up to 10 percent higher. Considering the ordinarily assumed factor of 10 uncertainty in atmospheric dispersion model results, a 10 to 40 percent difference (i.e., factor of 1.1 to 1.4) in dose estimates did not warrant the additional effort of stem-and-cap modeling. Table H-2 presents atmospheric dispersion data typical of that used in the stem-and-cap release geometry evaluations.
The Enhanced Containment Alternative release scenarios differ from those of the uncontained alternatives. The Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options assume some detonations are contained within a vessel and some are uncontained; all Building Containment Option detonations are contained. The contained releases were modeled as ground-level releases. The results of the point-release versus explosively dispersed plume and the stem-and-cap evaluations, above, are not applicable to these contained ground-level releases.
Materials from 6 percent of the contained detonations of the Enhanced Containment Alternative were assumed to be released to the environment, based on previous operational experience at LANL. The bounding assumption of 6 percent containment release is used to account for potential leakage or failure of the vessel or building containment in a nonaccident scenario. Accidents are examined separately in appendix I.
H.2.3 Summary
Site-specific hourly meteorological data was evaluated and data from TA-6 was selected for use in atmospheric dispersion estimates. Several different atmospheric dispersion models were evaluated and it was determined that estimates made using the single-point release model in GENII and MEPAS were acceptable to conservatively represent the explosive dispersal of material from detonations. The single-point release model may overestimate potential impacts by up to a factor of 100. This potential over estimation would not apply to ground-level releases from contained detonations.
H.3 SOURCE TERM
The constituents of test assemblies that may be released to the atmosphere and have the potential to adversely impact humans include uranium, tritium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride. At detonation, test assembly material is dispersed in various size fractions ranging from large pieces or chunks to very small, micron or sub-micron size particles. Of particular interest is the aerosolized fraction of the material with particles sizes that are considered respirable, 10 µm or less aerodynamic diameter (see appendix C).
H.3.1 Usages and Environmental Releases
The estimated releases of materials to the environment from detonation activities are indicated in table H-3.Table H-3.-Maximum Anticipated Annual Environmental Releases
of Materials from Test Assemblies
Constituent |
Uncontained Alternativesa |
Vessel Containment Option |
Building Containment Option |
|
Deleted uranium (lb) |
1540 |
385 uncontained 70 contained |
92 contained |
Tritium (Ci) |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Beryllium (lb) |
22 |
5.5 uncontained 1.1 contained |
1.3 contained |
Lead (lb) |
33 |
9 uncontained 2 contained |
2 contained |
Lithium Hydride (lb) |
220 |
55 uncontained 11 contained |
13 contained |
|
a No Action, DARHT Baseline, Upgrade PHERMEX, Single Axis, and Plutonium Exclusion alternatives. | |||
The annual usages of materials in uncontained detonations under the No Action, DARHT Baseline, Upgrade PHERMEX, Plutonium Exclusion, and Single Axis alternatives are identical. The impacts of each of these alternatives are identical as well. The impacts of the Enhanced Containment Alternative were evaluated separately. The values listed are the largest foreseeable annual releases. The releases listed for the Vessel Containment Option represent 25 percent of the annual inventory used during uncontained detonations and the use of a containment vessel for the remaining 75 percent of the inventory. It was conservatively assumed, based on operating experience, that 6 percent of the inventory detonated in a vessel annually would be released to the atmosphere. The Building Containment Option similarly assumed 6 percent of the total annual inventory is released from the building. The Phased Containment Option assumed 5 percent vessel containment during the first 5 years of the project 30-year operational period, 40 percent vessel containment during the second 5 years, and 75 percent vessel containment for the final 20 years.
The radionuclide source term used in the health effects evaluation is based on the radionuclides present in 10-year-old Rocky Flats depleted uranium, containing, by mass, 99.8 percent uranium-238, 0.22 percent uranium-235, and 0.00057 percent uranium-234. Depleted uranium is a usable residual product left after extracting some portion of uranium-235 from uranium ore. Naturally occurring uranium has typical uranium isotope mass fractions of 99.3 percent uranium-238, 0.7 percent uranium-235, and minutequantities of uranium-234 and uranium-236. The mass percentage and activity of the constituents 10-year-old Rocky Flats depleted uranium constituents are presented in table H-4Table H-4.-Radionuclide Constituents of Depleted Uranium by Mass Activity
Radionuclide |
Mass Percent |
Activity of Depleted Uranium Constituents (Ci/g)a |
|
Uranium-234 |
0.00057 |
3.7 x 10-8 |
Uranium-235 |
0.22 |
4.9 x 10-9 |
Uranium-238 |
99.8 |
3.4 x 10-7 |
Protactinium-234 |
(negligible) |
3.4 x 10-7 |
Thorium-231 |
(negligible) |
4.9 x 10-9 |
Thorium-234 |
(negligible) |
3.4 x 10-7 |
|
a Activity of constituents is based on 10-year-old Rocky Flats Plant depleted uranium. | ||
. Radionuclides other than uranium in this table are the radioactive progeny produced by decay of the parent uranium radionuclides.
Lithium hydroxide (LiOH) was used in MEPAS as a surrogate for lithium hydride (LiH), which was not part of the MEPAS database. Lithium hydride readily converts to LiOH upon contact with water. A stoichiometric correction was made in the modeled release of the LiH because the LiOH surrogate has three times the mass of LiH because of the addition of the oxygen atom. Therefore, the release source terms of the surrogate LiOH used in the risk calculations are three times those listed in table H-3.
H.3.2 Aerosolization
Upon detonation of the test assembly, the depleted uranium is ejected in the form of large fragments, small fragments (from 0.08 to 1.1 in2 [0.5 to 7 cm2]), and aerosols, as discussed in appendix B (McClure 1995). The amount of depleted uranium aerosolized and available for atmospheric dispersion beyond the firing site could range from 0.2 to 10 percent of the test assembly inventory (Mishima et al. 1985; Dahl and Johnson 1977; McClure 1995). All analyses performed for the EIS assume 10 percent aerosolization of depleted uranium.
There is uncertainty about the magnitude of the aerosolization fraction of the detonated hazardous constituents. Much of the uncertainty results from the difficulty in sampling close to high explosive detonations (Baskett and Cederwall 1991). Dahl and Johnson estimated that 2 percent of the beryllium is aerosolized, whereas Shinn et al. estimate 8 percent based on their re-analysis of the Dahl and Johnson results (Dahl and Johnson 1977; Shinn et al. 1989). Little information was available on the aerosolization of the lead and lithium hydride. Due to the lack of a strong basis for constituent-specific aerosolization fractions, an aerosolization fraction of 10 percent was used for all constituents, the same as for depleted uranium.
Respirable-size particles (less than 10 µm AMAD) may comprise 20 to 90 percent of the aerosolized fraction (2 to 9 percent of the total source term); however, for the purposes of these analyses, the aerosolized fraction of the depleted uranium and other constituents was assumed to be 100 percent respirable (10 percent of the total source term).
H.4 EXPOSURE SCENARIOS
Human health impacts resulting from routine, chronic exposure of the public and workers were evaluated by making exposure assumptions about the individuals and population. Annual chronic exposure scenarios consider impacts from routine releases over a one-year period. Cumulative exposure scenarios, an extension of the annual chronic exposure scenario, sum the annual exposures during the 30-yr operational life of the facility and exposure to any soil accumulation that had occurred as a consequence of the 30-yr operational period. The annual and cumulative radiological dose and risk, and the carcinogenic risk from beryllium exposure to the population residing within 50 mi (80 km) of TA-15 were also estimated. The potential impact to the 50-mi (80-km) population from toxicological effects due to chemical exposure (indicated by Hazard Index) were not calculated. These effects are nonprobabilistic and have an occurrence threshold, so low results for the maximally exposed individual were an adequate indication that population calculations were not needed.
Three residential locations around LANL (Los Alamos, White Rock, and Bandelier) were chosen at which to evaluate the maximally exposed individual (MEI) for radiation dose and chemical exposure. Residents were assumed to be at their homes continuously and to consume home-grown crops. Assessing impacts at multiple locations provided a better indication of possible impacts, and also provided allowance for slight differences in the atmospheric dispersion and deposition algorithms used in the two consequence assessment codes (GENII and MEPAS) to ensure that individuals with the highest potential impacts were identified.
H.4.1 Receptor Type and Location
The general categories of individual receptors evaluated included the annual-chronic MEI, cumulative (over 30 years of operations) MEI, and noninvolved worker (see table H-5). Both public MEI categories considered offsite residents nearest to TA-15 (i.e., Los Alamos, White Rock, and Bandelier). The noninvolved worker was assumed to be located on the road leading to DARHT or PHERMEX about 2,500 ft (750 m) away. This distance is based on a series of administrative hazard radii that LANL has established for protection of personnel from fragment injury and would be a typical exclusion for test assembly detonations. The hazard radius determinations are included in LANL operating procedures, based on principles presented in the DOE Explosives Safety Manual (DOE 1994). The above individual receptor locations are presented in the table H-5. Table H-6Table H-5.-Locations of Individuals Evaluated for Impacts
from Chronic and Cumulative Exposures
Category |
Location Name |
Location |
|
Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI) Chronic (Annual) and Cumulative (30 Years of Operation) |
Bandelier White Rock Los Alamos |
3 mi (5 km) SSE 3.8 mi (6 km) ESE 2.7 mi (4.4 km) NNW |
Noninvolved worker |
2,500 ft (750 m) NW |
Table H-6.-The 1993 Population Distribution within the 50-mi (80-km)
Polar Grid Centered on TA-15
presents the 1993 population distribution data for the 50-mi (80-km) area surrounding TA-15, used in population impact calculations.
Due to the close proximity of DARHT and PHERMEX sites [0.4 mi (0.6 km) apart], the MEI distances used for each site were assumed to be equivalent. The PHERMEX facility was modeled in the No Action Alternative as operational for an additional 30 years.
H.4.2 Exposure Pathways
Table H-7Table H-7.-Exposure Pathways Evaluated for Impacts from Routine Releases
Pathway |
Chronic MEIa |
Cumulative MEIa |
Noninvolved Worker |
Population |
|
External exposure from: plume ground surface Dermal absorptionb |
x x x |
x x x |
x x x |
x x x |
Inhalation of plume and resuspended soil/dust |
x |
x |
x |
x |
Ingestion of: incidental soil crops c animal productsd |
x x NA |
x x x |
x NA NA |
x x x |
|
a MEI = maximum exposed individual. b Nonradioactive constituents only. c Leafy vegetables, "other" vegetables, fruit, grains. d Meat and milk. | ||||
lists the exposure pathways included in evaluating impacts of routine exposures. The annual chronic MEI's pathways included external exposure and dermal absorption, inhalation of airborne constituents and resuspended soil, ingestion of food crops, and the inadvertent ingestion of soil. The cumulative MEI and population included these same pathways as well as additional pathways of meat and milk ingestion. The noninvolved worker pathways were more limited. The noninvolved worker would be present onsite, and only for a fraction of the year, during working hours. Exposure pathways included were external exposure, dermal absorption and inhalation of the airborne plume, and inhalation of resuspended soil. Table H-8Table H-8.-Code Input Parameters and Values Used in Evaluating
Human Health Effects of Routine Releases
Pathway/Parameter |
Chronic MEI |
Cumulative MEIa |
Noninvolved Worker (Chronic) |
Population |
|
External exposure from: plume (h) ground surface (h) dermal absorption (h) |
8,766 8,766 8,766 |
8,766 8,766 8,766 |
2,000 2,000 2,000 |
8,766 8,766 8,766 |
Inhalation (h) |
8,766 |
8,766 |
2,000 |
8,766 |
Ingestion of: incidental soil (mg/d) crops (kg)b leafy vegetables other vegetables fruit grain meat (kg)c milk (kg)c |
100 16.5 34.9 55.7 73.9 0 0 |
100 16.5 34.9 55.7 73.9 95 110 |
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
100 16.5 34.9 55.7 73.9 95 110 |
|
a For Hazard Index (HI) and post-operation calculations, 30 years of previous facility operation have been assumed. MEI = maximum exposed individual. b All crops 1 day holdup. c Beef 20 day holdup, 75 percent fresh forage consumption. Milk 2 day holdup, 75 percent fresh forage consumption. Note: Annual exposure times are shown unless otherwise indicated. Miscellaneous parameters: absolute humidity - 3 x 10-4 lb/ft3 (0.0048 kg/m3) soil density - 100 lb/ft3 (1.6 x 103 kg/m3) roots - 60 percent upper soil, 40 percent deep soil manual redistribution factor - 0.15 surface soil density - 15 lb/ft2 (240 kg/m2) mass loading - 4.5 x 10-9 lb/ft3 (7.2 x 10-5 g/m3) | ||||
presents the code input parameters of most interest that were used to evaluate the human health impacts.
H.5 RESULTS
Results are presented for potential radiological, toxicological, and carcinogenic impacts of releases of uranium, tritium, lead, beryllium, and lithium hydride. Radiation dose estimates are presented in terms of effective dose equivalent (EDE). The radiation dose estimates were translated into a measure of latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) using recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection in its Publication 60 (ICRP 1991). The ICRP estimated the risk of cancer from data based on populations exposed to relatively high doses and dose rates. A dose reduction factor of 2 was used when doses were below 20 rad, as is the case with all doses estimated in these analyses. The dose-to-risk conversion factors used for estimating cancer deaths from exposure to low dose rates of ionizing radiation were 500 cancer deaths (latent cancer fatalities) per million person-rem effective dose equivalent (5 x 10-4 deaths per person-rem) for the general population and 400 cancer deaths per million person-rem (4 x 10-4 deaths per person-rem) for workers. The difference is attributable to more diverse age groups in the general population. These values include the dose reduction factor. For purposes of explaining potentialimpacts to individual members of the public or individual workers, these dose-to-risk conversion factors have also been used to estimate the "probability" of contracting a latent cancer for the representative member of the public or worker.
The HI is used to estimate potential occurrence of toxicological effects resulting from chronic exposure to a chemical. The basis is the EPA's constituent-specific reference dose (EPA 1994a) which is based onchronic exposure at a contamination level where a deleterious effect is noted. The HI for a specific contaminant is equal to the individual's estimated exposure divided by the EPA reference dose, and thus is a unitless measure. The critical value - 1.0 - indicates that the individual is exposed at a level equivalent to the reference dose and, therefore, would be expected to experience the health effect
upon which the reference dose is based. No deleterious effects would be expected when the hazard index is less than 1.0.
The risk of cancer incidence (as compared to the risk of cancer fatalities, as is estimated from radiation dose) from exposure to beryllium was also calculated, using the EPA slope factor for beryllium (EPA 1994a).
Estimated impacts of expected normal releases under the uncontained detonation alternatives (No Action, DARHT Baseline, Upgrade PHERMEX, Plutonium Exclusion, and Single Axis) are described in section H.5.1. Analysis and results of these impacts apply to all uncontained alternatives. The estimated impacts of the Enhanced Containment Alternative are shown in section H.5.2. Results are presented for individuals and population, for annual and cumulative exposures. Results of accident analyses are presented in appendix I.
For all alternatives, the radiation dose from tritium, in the form of T2, was determined to be approximately 1 x 10-7 (1/10,000,000) that of depleted uranium. An analysis was performed, using GENII along with hand calculations to correct for the tritium chemical form difference, to compare dose consequences of the projected chronic annual releases of depleted uranium and tritium. Because it was determined to be an insignificant contributor to the radiation dose, tritium impacts were not explicitly calculated.
H.5.1 Uncontained Alternatives
Analysis of the uncontained alternatives - No Action, DARHT Baseline, Upgrade PHERMEX, Plutonium Exclusion, and Single Axis - involved only uncontained detonation and atmospheric releases of test assembly material, including depleted uranium, tritium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride.
H.5.1.1 Public
Health impacts would not be expected in the maximally exposed members of the public, located at Los Alamos, Bandelier, and White Rock, from routine annual releases under the uncontained alternatives (seetables H-9 and H-10Table H-9.-Estimated Annual Doses and Carcinogenic Risks for Members of the Public
and the Noninvolved Worker for Routine Release from All Uncontained Alternatives
Maximally Exposed Individual Location |
Annual Dose (rem) |
Annual Probability of Radiation-Induced LCFa |
Annual Probability of Beryllium-Induced Cancer |
|
Los Alamos |
2 x 10-5 |
1 x 10-8 |
3 x 10-11 |
Bandelier |
1 x 10-5 |
7 x 10-9 |
6 x 10-12 |
White Rock |
2 x 10-5 |
8 x 10-9 |
4 x 10-11 |
Noninvolved Worker |
2 x 10-5 |
9 x 10-9 |
3 x 10-11 |
|
a LCF = latent cancer fatality. | |||
Table H-10.-Estimated Toxicological Effects to Members of the Public and the
Noninvolved Worker for Annual Routine Releases from All Uncontained Alternatives
Individual Location |
Hazard Index (HI)a | |||
Uranium |
Beryllium |
Lead |
Lithium Hydride | |
|
Los Alamos |
1 x 10-7 |
5 x 10-10 |
8 x 10-9 |
1 x 10-8 |
Bandelier |
3 x 10-8 |
1 x 10-10 |
2 x 10-9 |
2 x 10-9 |
White Rock |
1 x 10-7 |
1 x 10-9 |
5 x 10-9 |
8 x 10-9 |
Noninvolved Worker |
2 x 10-7 |
0 |
1 x 10-8 |
1 x 10-8 |
|
a Toxicological effects would not be expected for a hazard index value less than 1. | ||||
Table H-11.-Estimated Cumulative Dose and Probability of Cancer from Radiation
and Beryllium Exposure from 30 Years of Operation for all Uncontained Alternatives
Individual Location |
Cumulative Dose (rem) |
Cumulative Probability of Radiation-Induced LCFa |
Soil Buildup Doseb (rem) |
Cumulative Probability of Beryllium-Induced Cancer |
Soil Buildup Probability of Beryllium-Induced Cancerb |
|
Los Alamos |
7 x 10-4 |
4 x 10-7 |
2 x 10-8 |
9 x 10-10 |
1 x 10-11 |
Bandelier |
4 x 10-4 |
2 x 10-7 |
1 x 10-8 |
2 x 10-10 |
2 x 10-12 |
White Rock |
5 x 10-4 |
3 x 10-7 |
1 x 10-8 |
1 x 10-9 |
9 x 10-12 |
Noninvolved Worker |
7 x 10-4 |
3 x 10-7 |
- |
9 x 10-10 |
- |
|
a LCF = latent cancer fatality. b Reflects the potential impact from buildup of released material in soil; evaluated during the first year following 30 years of operations. | |||||
). Neither would health impacts be expected in maximally exposed members of the public at these locations from exposure over the projected 30 years of facility operations (tables H-11 and H-12). This table includes values calculated from releases of uranium, tritium, and beryllium, as well as the dose and risk projected in the first year immediately following 30 years of operations from the deposition and accumulation of depleted uranium and beryllium in the soil. Table H-12Table H-12.-Estimated Toxicological Effects to Members of the Public after 30 Years
of Facility Operation for All Uncontained Alternativesa
Maximally Exposed Individual Location |
Hazard Indexb (HI) | |||
Uranium |
Beryllium |
Lead |
Lithium Hydride | |
|
Los Alamos |
1 x 10-7 |
4 x 10-10 |
8 x 10-9 |
1 x 10-8 |
Bandelier |
3 x 10-8 |
9 x 10-11 |
2 x 10-9 |
2 x 10-9 |
White Rock |
9 x 10-8 |
7 x 10-10 |
4 x 10-9 |
6 x 10-9 |
|
a Reflects the potential impact from buildup of released material in soil; evaluated during the first year immediately following 30 years of operations. b Toxicological effects would not be expected for a hazard index value less than 1. | ||||
presents an estimate of the potential toxicological effects that would occur as a result of deposition and accumulation of uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride in the soil. The results are presented for the first year immediately following 30 years of operations, when buildup of the materials in the soil would be at a maximum. All values are well below 1.0; therefore, toxicological effects would not be expected. These results indicate that any environmental accumulation of released materials in the soil would create a negligible residual health risk to members of the public living around LANL after termination of DARHT or PHERMEX operations.
The projected annual dose to the population of 290,000 individuals living in the 50-mi (80-km) radius of TA-15 would be 0.91 person-rem. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected among the population from this population dose (5 x 10-4 LCFs). Beryllium-induced cancer would not be expected in this population (4 x 10-7 cancers). Cumulative dose to the population over 30 years would be 27 person-rem; latent fatal cancers would not be expected (1 x 10-2 LCFs). Cancer from cumulative exposure to beryllium would not be expected (1 x 10-5 total cancers).
H.5.1.2 Noninvolved Worker
Health impacts would not be expected in noninvolved workers as a result of releases to the atmosphere under the uncontained alternatives (see tables H-9 and H-10). Neither would any health impacts be expected from cumulative exposures over the 30-yr anticipated life of the project (table H-11).
H.5.1.3 Workers
The average annual dose to workers at the facility was estimated to be no more than 0.01 rem. The maximum probability of such a worker contracting a latent fatal cancer would be 4 x 10-6. Over the 30-yr operating life of the facility, an involved worker's maximum probability of contracting a latent fatal cancer would be 1 x 10-4. An annual collective worker dose similar to that observed for PHERMEX in the past was assumed to be representative for future operation, or about 0.3 person-rem/year. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected among the worker population (1 x 10-4 LCFs). Collective worker dose over the anticipated 30 years of operations would be about 9 person-rem. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected among the worker population (4 x 10-3 LCFs). The collective dose estimate was based on a maximum of 100 workers at the facility, each receiving an average of 0.003 rem per year. No operating information was available on exposure to chemicals or metals. The risks of exposure to these materials would be expected to be similarly low to those for radiation exposure.
H.5.2 Enhanced Containment Alternative
Under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, three operations were evaluated: the Vessel Containment Option, the Building Containment Option, and the Phased Containment Option. The Vessel ContainmentOption assumed 25 percent of annual usages were uncontained detonations, and 6 percent of the contained inventory of the detonations was released routinely via ground-level leakage. The Building Containment Option assumed that all detonations were contained and that 6 percent of the inventory was released routinely via ground-level leakage. The Phased Containment Option assumed 5 percent vessel containment during the first 5 years of the project 30-year operational period, 40 percent vessel containment during the second 5 years, and 75 percent vessel containment for the final 20 years. The Vessel Containment Option would have slightly higher potential impacts than the Building Containment Option in all cases. The Phased Containment Option impacts would be essentially the same for impacts to individuals, but somewhat higher than the other two options for population impacts; about 30 percent higher than the Vessel Containment Option and twice the Building Containment Option over the 30-year operating lifetime of DARHT. Over the last 20 years of the operating period potential impacts would be identical to those of the Vessel Containment Option.
H.5.2.1 Public
Health impacts would not be expected in maximally exposed members of the public, located at Los Alamos, Bandelier, and White Rock, from routine annual releases under the Enhanced Containment Alternative (see tables H-13Table H-13.-Estimated Annual Doses and Carcinogenic Risk for Members of the Public
for the Enhanced Containment Alternative
Enhanced Containment Option |
Maximally Exposed Individual Location |
Annual Total Dose (rem) |
Annual Probability of Radiation-Induced LCFa |
Annual Probability of Beryllium-Induced Cancer |
|
Vessel and Phased |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
1 x 10-5 1 x 10-5 2 x 10-5 |
5 x 10-9 6 x 10-9 8 x 10-9 |
1 x 10-11 2 x 10-12 1 x 10-11 |
Building |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
5 x 10-6 1 x 10-5 2 x 10-5 |
2 x 10-9 5 x 10-9 8 x 10-9 |
4 x 10-12 8 x 10-13 4 x 10-12 |
|
a LCF = latent cancer fatality. | ||||
Table H-14.-Estimated Toxicological Effects to Members of the Public for Annual Routine Releases for the Enhanced Containment Alternative
Enhanced Containment Option |
Maximally Exposed Individual Location |
Hazard Index (HI)a | |||
Uranium |
Beryllium |
Lead |
Lithium Hydride | ||
|
Vessel and Phased |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
5 x 10-8 1 x 10-8 5 x 10-8 |
2 x 10-10 4 x 10-11 4 x 10-10 |
4 x 10-9 7 x 10-10 2 x 10-9 |
6 x 10-9 1 x 10-9 4 x 10-9 |
Building |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
2 x 10-8 4 x 10-9 2 x 10-8 |
7 x 10-11 2 x 10-11 1 x 10-10 |
1 x 10-9 2 x 10-10 9 x 10-10 |
2 x 10-9 4 x 10-10 2 x 10-9 |
|
a Toxicological effects would not be expected for a hazard index value less than 1. | |||||
and H-14). Neither would health impacts be expected in maximally exposed members of the public at these locations over the projected 30 years of facility operations (see table H-15).Table H-15.-Estimated Cumulative Dose and Probability of Cancer from Radiation and Beryllium Exposure from 30 Years of Operation for the Enhanced Containment Alternative
Enhanced Containment Option |
Maximally Exposed Individual Location |
Cumulative Dose (rem) |
Probability of Radiation-Induced LCFa |
Soil Buildup Doseb (rem) |
Probability of Beryllium-Induced Cancer |
Soil Buildup Probability of Beryllium-Induced Cancerb |
|
Vessel and Phased |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
3 x 10-4 3 x 10-4 (5 x 10-4)c (6 x 10-4)d |
1 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 (2 x 10-7)c (3 x 10-7)d |
8 x 10-8 8 x 10-8 1 x 10-7 |
3 x 10-10 7 x 10-11 3 x 10-10 |
3 x 10-12 6 x 10-13 2 x 10-12 |
Building |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
1 x 10-4 3 x 10-4 5 x 10-4 |
5 x 10-8 7 x 10-8 2 x 10-7 |
4 x 10-8 8 x 10-8 1 x 10-7 |
1 x 10-10 2 x 10-11 1 x 10-10 |
3 x 10-13 7 x 10-14 3 x 10-13 |
|
a LCF = latent cancer fatality. b Reflects the potential impact from buildup of released material in soil; evaluated during the first year immediately following 30 years of operations. c Vessel Containment Option. d Phased Containment Option. | ||||||
Table H-16.-Estimated Toxicological Effects to Members of the Public after 30 Years of
Facility Operation for the Enhanced Containment Alternativea
Enhanced Containment Option |
Maximally Exposed Individual Location |
Hazard Indexb (HI) | |||
Uranium |
Beryllium |
Lead |
Lithium Hydride | ||
|
Vessel and Phased |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
4 x 10-8 7 x 10-9 3 x 10-8 |
1 x 10-10 2 x 10-11 2 x 10-10 |
3 x 10-9 5 x 10-10 1 x 10-9 |
4 x 10-9 8 x 10-10 2 x 10-9 |
Building |
Los Alamos Bandelier White Rock |
6 x 10-9 1 x 10-9 4 x 10-9 |
1 x 10-11 3 x 10-12 1 x 10-11 |
4 x 10-10 7 x 10-11 2 x 10-10 |
6 x 10-10 1 x 10-10 4 x 10-10 |
|
a Reflects the potential impact from buildup of released material in soil; evaluated during the first year immediately following 30 years of operations. b Toxicological effect would not be expected for a hazard index value less than 1. | |||||
This table includes the projected cumulative impact from releases of uranium, tritium, and beryllium, as well as the dose projected in the first year immediately following 30 years of operations from the deposition and accumulation of depleted uranium and beryllium in the soil. Table H-16 presents an estimate of the potential toxicological effects that would occur as a result of deposition and accumulation of uranium, beryllium, lead, and lithium hydride in the soil. The results are presented for the first year immediately following 30 years of operations, when buildup of the materials in the soil would be at a maximum. All values are well below 1.0; therefore, toxicological effects would not be expected. These results indicate that any environmental accumulation of released materials in the soil would create a negligible residual health risk to members of the public living around LANL after termination of the enhanced containment operations.
The projected annual dose to the population of 290,000 individuals living in the 50-mi (80-km) radius of TA-15 from the Vessel Containment, Phased Containment, and Building Containment options would be about 0.44, 0.57, and 0.27 person-rem, respectively. No LCFs would be expected among the population from these population doses (2 x 10-4, 2 x 10-4, and 1 x 10-4 LCFs, respectively). Beryllium-induced cancer would not be expected in this population (1 x 10-7, 1 x 10-7, and 5 x 10-8 cancers, respectively).
Cumulative impacts over the anticipated 30-year life of the project for the Vessel Containment, Phased Containment, and Building Containment options would be about 13, 17, and 8 person-rem, respectively. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected (6 x 10-3, 8 x 10-3, and 4 x 10-3 LCFs, respectively). Cancers from cumulative exposure to beryllium would not be expected (1 x 10-4, 1 x 10-4, and 6 x 10-5, respectively).
H.5.2.2 Noninvolved Worker
The annual radiation dose from chronic exposure of a noninvolved worker under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment Options would be about 2 x 10-5 rem. The maximum probability of this worker contracting a latent fatal cancer from this dose would be about 6 x 10-9. The cumulative dose over the 30-year operating life of the facility to the same worker would be about 5 x 10-4 rem. The worker'scumulative maximum probability of contracting a latent fatal cancer from this dose would be about 2 x 10-7. The maximum annual probability of a beryllium-induced cancer in a noninvolved worker would be about 2 x 10-11. This worker's cumulative probability of contracting a beryllium-induced cancer over the 30-year operating life of the facility would be about 5 x 10-10.
The annual radiation dose from chronic exposure of a noninvolved worker under the Building Containment Option would be about 1 x 10-5 rem. The maximum probability of this worker contracting a latent fatal cancer would be about 5 x 10-9. The cumulative dose over the 30-yr operating life of the facility to the same worker would be about 4 x 10-4 rem. The worker's maximum probability of contracting a latent fatal cancer from this dose would be about 2 x 10-7. The maximum annual probability of a beryllium-associated cancer in a noninvolved worker would be about 1 x 10-11. This worker's cumulative probability of contracting a beryllium-associated cancer over the 30-year operating life of the facility would be about 3 x 10-10.
Potential toxicological impacts to noninvolved workers under the Vessel Containment, Phased Containment, and Building Containment options are presented in table H-17Table H-17.-Estimated Toxicological Effect to Noninvolved Workers for Annual
Routine Releases for the Enhanced Containment Alternative
Enhanced Containment Alternative |
Hazard Index (HI)a | |||
Uranium |
Beryllium |
Lead |
Lithium Hydride | |
|
Vessel and Phased |
9 x 10-8 |
0 |
8 x 10-9 |
8 x 10-9 |
Building |
6 x 10-8 |
0 |
4 x 10-9 |
4 x 10-9 |
|
a Toxicological effects would not be expected for a hazard index value less than 1. | ||||
. Toxicological effects would not be expected, as Hazard Index values are all well below 1.0.
H.5.2.3 Workers
Impacts to workers under the Enhanced Containment Alternative could be somewhat higher than those previously observed under PHERMEX operating conditions or projected for the uncontained alternatives because cleanup of contained space (vessels or buildings) could involve exposure to greater quantities and concentrations of materials. Worker exposures were projected to be higher than that previously observed at PHERMEX or those for other alternatives. The average annual worker dose would probably not exceed 0.020 rem. The maximum probability of a latent cancer fatality from this dose would be 8 x 10-6. The annual collective worker dose, assuming a maximum of 100 workers, would probably not exceed 2 person-rem. No latent cancer fatalities would be expected from this dose (8 x 10-4 LCFs). The collective worker dose over the assumed 30-yr lifetime of the facility would probably not exceed 60 person-rem. No latent cancer fatalities would be expected from this dose (2 x 10-2 LCFs).
Involved worker exposures to radiation and radioactive materials under normal operations would be controlled under established procedures that require doses to be kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Any potential hazards would be evaluated as part of the radiation worker and occupational safety programs at LANL, and no impacts outside the scope of normal work activities would be anticipated.
H.5.3 Routine Operations Involving Plutonium
This section summarizes evaluations of the potential impacts to the public and workers from routine operations that could involve plutonium. Details about these impact evaluations are included in a classified supplement that is not available to the general public. Any use of plutonium would be the same under each alternative, so distinctions between alternatives are not made. Potential health consequences of exposure to plutonium are well understood and have been greatly exaggerated by the popular press (Sutcliffe et al. 1995).
Routine operations for plutonium experiments were assumed to be conducted in a double-walled containment vessel with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters having particulate retention efficiencies of 99 percent to 99.9 percent (gases would not be impeded) and an effluent monitor with a detection limit of 6 x 10-10 Ci. Under routine operating conditions, a doubly contained plutonium experiment would not be expected to release any gases or particulates to the atmosphere. However, to conservatively estimate the consequences from potential releases associated with routine operations during plutonium experiments, the release for each experiment was assumed to equal the detection limit of the monitoring instrument. Thus, a maximum of 6 x 10-10 Ci of plutonium was assumed to be released to the atmosphere during each experiment. Other methods and assumptions used were as described earlier in this appendix.
H.5.3.1 Public
The dose to the MEI among the general public over the 30-year life of the project would be about 2 x 10-10 rem. This would be the same whether the tests were conducted at the PHERMEX site or the DARHT site. The maximum probability of contracting a latent fatal cancer from this dose would be about 8 x 10-14. The population dose over the life of the project would be about 3 x 10-7 person-rem. No LCFs would be expected (1 x 10-10 LCFs).
H.5.3.2 Noninvolved Workers
The dose to a noninvolved worker 2,500 ft (750 m) away over the 30-year life of the project would be about 6 x 10-10 rem. This would be the same whether the tests were conducted at the PHERMEX site or the DARHT site. The maximum probability of contracting a latent fatal cancer from this dose would be about 2 x 10-13. Assuming a noninvolved work force of 15 workers at this point, the collective dose over 30 years would be 9 x 10-9 person-rem. No latent cancer fatalities (3 x 10-12 LCFs) would be expected.
H.5.3.3 Workers
No exposure to plutonium would be expected for DARHT or PHERMEX workers during any normal operations. This is based on past operating experience with dynamic experiments involving plutonium. Any radiological impacts on workers would come from the handling of depleted uranium and would be the same as reported under each of the alternatives. There would be no incremental increase in impacts due to routine operations involving plutonium.
H.6 REFERENCES CITED IN APPENDIX H
ACGIH (American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists), 1991, Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents and Biological Exposure Indices, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Baskett, R.L., and R.T. Cederwall, 1991, Sensitivity of Numerical Dispersion Modeling to Explosive Source Parameters, 91-86.5, June, 84th Annual Meeting, Air and Waste Management Association.
Buck, J.W., et al., 1995, Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS) Application Guidance: Guidance for Evaluating MEPAS Input Parameters for Version 3.1, PNL-10395, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Church, H.W., 1969, Cloud Rise from High-Explosives Detonations, TID-4500, p. 14, 53rd ed., Health and Safety, SC-RR-68-903, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Dahl, D.A., and L.J., Johnson, 1977, Aerosolized U and Be from LASL Dynamic Experiments, LA-UR-77-681, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994, DOE Explosives Safety Manual, DOE/EV/06194, August, Washington, D.C.
Droppo Jr., J.G., et al., 1989, Supplemental Mathematical Formulations: The Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS), PNL-7201, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Droppo Jr., J.G., et al., 1991, Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS) Application Guidance Volume 1 - User's Guide, PNL-7216, December, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1994a, Health Effects Assessment Summary Tables, FY-1994 Annual, 9200.6-303 (94-1), EPA54O/R-94/020, March, Washington, D.C.
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1994b, IRIS - Integrated Risk Information System, in TOMES-Toxicology, Occupational Medicine, and Environmental Series (CD-ROM). Database used: Chembank.
Homann, S.G., 1994, HOTSPOT, Health Physics Codes for the PC, UCRL-MA-106315, March, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection), 1991, 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 60, Pergamon Press, New York.
McClure, D.A., 1995, DARHT EIS Section 3.1.3.2 Effluents (Mass Balance), LANL Memorandum No. Massdist.doc., Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos New Mexico.
Mishima, J., et al., 1985, Potential Behavior of Depleted Uranium Penetrators under Shipping and Bulk Storage Accident Conditions, PNL-5415, March, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland Washington.
Napier, B.A., et al., 1988a, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software System, Vol. 1, December, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Napier, B.A., et al., 1988b, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software System, Vol. 2, November, Pacific Northwest Laboratory Richland, Washington.
Napier, B.A., et al., 1988c, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software System, Vol. 3, September, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Shinn, J. H., et al., 1989, Beryllium Dispersion Near Explosive Firing Tables: A Comparison of Computed and Observed Results, UCID-21682, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
Strenge, D.L., and S.R. Peterson, 1989, Chemical Data Bases for the Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS): Version 1, PNL-7145, December, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Sutcliffe, W.G., et al., 1995, A Perspective on the Dangers of Plutonium, April 14, UCRL-ID-118825, Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
Whelan, G., et al., 1987, The Remedial Action Priority System (RAPS): Mathematical Formulations, PNL-6200, August, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
accident H-1, H-10, H-11, H-21
accidents H-1, H-3, H-6
beryllium H-1, H-2, H-3, H-6, H-7, H-8, H-9, H-11, H-12, H-13, H-14, H-13, H-16, H-15, H-16, H-18, H-21
containment H-5, H-6, H-7, H-6, H-11, H-13, H-15, H-16, H-15, H-16, H-17, H-18, H-19
contaminant H-11
cumulative impact H-15
cumulative impacts H-16
depleted uranium H-1, H-3, H-5, H-6, H-7, H-8, H-7, H-8, H-11, H-12, H-13, H-15, H-20, H-21
detonation H-4, H-6, H-7, H-11, H-12
detonations H-1, H-4, H-5, H-6, H-7, H-9, H-15, H-20
dose H-1, H-2, H-3, H-4, H-5, H-8, H-9, H-10, H-11, H-13, H-16, H-15, H-16, H-17, H-18, H-19
dynamic experiments H-20
exposure pathways H-3, H-9, H-10, H-9
heavy metal H-2
high explosive H-5, H-7
high explosives H-3, H-4, H-5
human health H-1, H-3, H-4, H-8, H-10, H-9
hydrodynamic tests H-4
latent cancer fatalities H-9, H-13, H-16, H-18, H-19
latent cancer fatality H-13, H-16, H-18
LCF H-13, H-16
maximally exposed individual H-8, H-10, H-13, H-14, H-16
MEI H-8, H-9, H-10, H-9, H-10, H-9, H-10, H-19
monitoring H-19
phased containment H-5, H-6, H-13, H-15, H-16, H-17, H-18
plutonium H-7, H-6, H-11, H-12, H-19, H-20, H-21
potential releases H-19
radiation H-1, H-2, H-8, H-9, H-11, H-13, H-16, H-17, H-18, H-19, H-21
radiation exposure H-13
radiological impacts H-20
soil H-4, H-8, H-10, H-9, H-10, H-13, H-14, H-13, H-16, H-15
tritium H-1, H-2, H-3, H-6, H-7, H-9, H-11, H-12, H-13, H-15
vessel containment H-5, H-7, H-6, H-13, H-15, H-16, H-17, H-18
waste management H-20
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