TRANSPORTATION
This appendix discusses the methods, data, and results used to analyze the impacts of transporting test assemblies from the assembly facility to the firing site. With respect to transportation impacts, there are only two different transportation scenarios and analyses. The No Action and Upgrade PHERMEX alternatives, in which activities at the DARHT site would be terminated, are slightly different from the other alternatives, which would take place at the DARHT site. The No Action and Upgrade alternatives are discussed as the No Action Alternative while the other alternatives are discussed collectively as the DARHT Baseline Alternative.
J.1 SHIPPING SCENARIOS
The options for shipping test assemblies from the assembly facility to firing sites are discussed in this section. All scenarios assume that the test assembly is assembled by the WX division, and that the fully assembled test assembly would be transported via truck to the magazine for interim storage, and following interim storage would be transported via truck to the firing site. It was further assumed that only one test assembly would be transported at a time and all testing apparatus would be installed at the firing site. There may be up to six supporting equipment shipments associated with each test assembly detonation. These would not involve hazardous materials and would occur within the facility boundary; therefore, these supporting shipments have not been included in this analysis.
The test assembly would consist of a steel frame work, high explosive, and depleted uranium. Although the quantity of high explosives may vary per test assembly, it is assumed that the quantity of depleted uranium will remain constant. The test assemblies were assumed to be transported on a flat bed truck. Once the device is assembled, all testing equipment, consisting of x-ray triggering devices and the high explosives detonators, would be installed at the firing site. In accordance with U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, the detonators would not be transported on the same vehicle as the high explosives.
The following subsections discuss the shipping scenarios, transportation and packaging systems, and the affected facilities.
J.1.1 Facilities
For both transportation scenarios, the test assembly would be assembled at the WX facility (TA-16-410) and transported to a magazine (Building R-242), which is used for interim storage. From the magazine, the test assemblies would be transported to the PHERMEX (No Action Alternative) or to the DARHT Facility (DARHT Baseline Alternative). These facilities were identified to estimate the consequences to LANL facility workers during normal or incident-free shipping and during shipping accidents.
J.1.2 Transport Scenario
The test assembly would be fully assembled, without detonators, by the WX division in TA-16-410 and transported to the PHERMEX or the DARHT Facility via truck on roads internal to TA-16 and TA-15. The fully assembled device would be loaded and secured at TA-16-410 on a flat bed truck and transported to a magazine (Building R-242). If required, the device could be staged at the magazine on the transport vehicle for a few hours with attending personnel before being shipped from the magazine to the receiving facility where it would be unloaded.
J.2 SHIPPING SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
This section describes the shipping container and the truck used to transport the test assembly. The information presented in this discussion focuses primarily on the parameters that would affect the analysis results, that is, the shipping container, the radionuclide inventory, the hazardous chemical inventory, and the quantity and characteristics of the high explosives.
The test assembly would be secured to a flat bed truck and would not be transported in a shipping container. The estimated radionuclide and hazardous chemical inventories for depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, tritium, and lithium hydride are presented in section 3.11, table 3-4. It is anticipated that there would be 20 shipments per year, with a maximum of 110 lb (50 kg) depleted uranium per test assembly and a maximum annual usage of 1,540 lb (700 kg). The high explosives used in test assemblies may be sensitive to heat and impact. Three bounding test assemblies have been identified: Test Assembly 1 containing 22 lb (10 kg) high explosive, Test Assembly 2 containing 500 lb (230 kg) explosive, and Test Assembly 3 containing 1,010 lb (460 kg) high explosives. These larger high explosives tests were assumed not to contain any additional depleted uranium.
J.3 TRANSPORTATION ROUTE INFORMATION
The assembled test assemblies would be transported from TA-16-410 to the PHERMEX or the DARHT Facility using roads internal to TA-16 and TA-15. The truck would be loaded at TA-16-410 and transported nonstop approximately 5 mi (8 km) to the magazine (Building R-242). From the magazine, the test assembly would be transported nonstop approximately 1.2 mi (2 km) to the PHERMEX gate or 1 mi (1.5 km) to the DARHT gates. At each of the facilities, the test assembly would be transported approximately 1,600 ft (490 m) from the facility gate to the firing site. It was assumed that 10 people would be exposed to the shipment at each of the stops (i.e., magazine, and facility gates), and that approximately 60 percent of the route is through LANL open space (~5 workers/km2) and 40 percent of the route is past occupied buildings (~360 workers/km2). These assumptions were based on an examination of a LANL site map.
J.4 DESCRIPTION OF METHODS USED TO ESTIMATE CONSEQUENCES
This section describes the methods used to estimate the impacts to individuals at the LANL site due to transporting test assemblies for both incident-free and accident conditions. Any impacts would be due to exposures to radiological and hazardous materials and physical traumas from explosion of the highexplosives. The RADTRAN 4 (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) and GENII (Napier et al. 1988) computer codes were used to estimate radiological consequences. The hazardous material consequences were calculated by hand using the same site meteorological characteristics data used in the GENII analyses. The consequences associated with explosions of the high explosives were calculated using explosion modeling data presented in Rhoads et al. (1986).
J.4.1 RADTRAN 4 Computer Code
The RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) was used to perform the analyses of the radiological impacts of routine transport, and the integrated population risks of accidents during transport of the test assembly. RADTRAN was developed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to calculate the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive materials. The original code was written by SNL in 1977 in association with the preparation of NUREG-0170, Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes (NRC 1977). The code has since been refined and expanded and is currently maintained by SNL under contract with DOE. RADTRAN 4 is an update of the RADTRAN 3 (Madsen et al. 1986) and RADTRAN 2 (Taylor and Daniel 1982; Madsen et al. 1983) computer codes.
The RADTRAN 4 computer code is organized into the following seven models (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992):
· Material model
· Transportation model
· Population distribution model
· Health effects model
· Accident severity and package release model
· Meteorological dispersion model
· Economic model
The code uses the first three models to calculate the potential population dose from normal, incident-free transportation and the first six models to calculate the risk to the population from user-defined accident scenarios. The economic model is not used in this study.
J.4.1.1 Material Model
The material model defines the source as either a point source or as a line source. For exposure distances less than twice the package dimension, the source is conservatively assumed to be a line source. For all other cases, the source is modeled as a point source that emits radiation equally in all directions. The material model also contains a library of 59 isotopes, each of which has 11 defining parameters that are used in the calculation of dose. The user can add isotopes not in the RADTRAN library by creating a data table in the input file consisting of 11 parameters.
J.4.1.2 Transportation Model
The transportation model allows the user to input descriptions of the transportation route. A transportation route may be divided into links or segments of the journey with information for each link on population density, mode of travel (e.g., trailer truck or ship), accident rate, vehicle speed, road type, vehicle density, and link length. Alternatively, the transportation route also can be described by aggregate route data for rural, urban, and suburban areas. For this analysis, the aggregate route method was used for each potential origin-destination combination.
J.4.1.3 Health Effects Model
The health effects model in RADTRAN 4 is outdated and is replaced by hand calculations. The health effects are determined by multiplying the population dose (person-rem) supplied by RADTRAN 4 by a conversion factor (ICRP 1991).
J.4.1.4 Accident Severity and Package Release Model
Accident analysis in RADTRAN 4 is performed using the accident severity and package release model. The user can define up to 20 severity categories for three population densities (such as urban, suburban, and rural), each increasing in magnitude. Eight severity categories for Spent Nuclear Fuel containers that are related to fire, puncture, crush, and immersion environments are defined in NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977). Various other studies also have been performed for small packages (Clarke et al. 1976) and large packages (Dennis et al. 1978) that also can be used to generate severity categories. The accident scenarios are further defined by allowing the user to input release fractions and aerosol and respirable fractions for each severity category. These fractions are also a function of the physical-chemical properties of the materials being transported. The source term for RADTRAN 4 is adjusted to account for the presumed explosion in an accident scenario.
J.4.1.5 Meteorological Dispersion Model
RADTRAN 4 allows the user to choose two different methods for modeling the atmospheric transport of radionuclides after a potential accident. The user can either input Pasquill atmospheric-stability category data or averaged time-integrated concentrations. In this analysis, the dispersion of radionuclides after a potential accident is modeled by the use of time-integrated concentration values in downwind areas compiled from meteorological data acquired in TA-6.
J.4.1.6 Routine Transport
The models described above are used by RADTRAN 4 to determine dose from routine transportation or risk from potential accidents. The public and worker doses calculated by RADTRAN 4 for routine transportation are dependent on the type of material being transported and the transportation index (TI) of the package or packages. The TI is defined in 49 CFR 173.403(bb) as the highest package dose rate in millirem per hour at a distance of 3.3 ft (1 m) from the external surface of the package. Doseconsequences are also dependent on the size of the package, which, as indicated in the material model description, will determine whether the package is modeled as a point source or line source for close-proximity exposures.
J.4.1.7 Analysis of Potential Accidents
The accident analysis performed in RADTRAN 4 calculates population doses for each accident severity category using six exposure pathway models. They include inhalation, resuspension, groundshine, cloudshine, ingestion, and direct exposure. This RADTRAN 4 analysis assumes that any contaminated area is either mitigated or public access controlled so the dose via the ingestion pathway equals zero. The consequences calculated for each severity category are multiplied by the appropriate frequencies for accidents in each category and summed to give a total point estimate of risk for a radiological accident.
J.4.2 GENII
GENII (Napier et al. 1988), which is also referred to as the Hanford Environmental Dosimetry Software System, was developed and written by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory to analyze radiological releases to the environment. GENII is composed of seven linked computer programs and their associated data libraries. This includes user interface programs, internal and external dose factor generators, and the environmental dosimetry programs. GENII is capable of calculating:
· Doses resulting from acute or chronic releases, including options for annual dose, committed dose, and accumulated dose
· Doses from various exposure pathways evaluated including those through direct exposure via water, soil, and air as well as inhalation and ingestion pathways
· Acute and chronic elevated and ground level releases to air
· Acute and chronic releases to water
· Initial contamination of soil or surfaces
· Radionuclide decay
The pathways considered in this analysis include inhalation, submersion (in explosive cloud), and external exposures due to ground contamination.
J.4.3 Explosives Model
The explosive effects model was taken from Rhoads et al. (1986), which evaluated the effects produced by TNT explosions. The physical effects of explosions are related to the blast pressure, which will decrease with distance from the point of explosion. The assessment contained in Rhoads et al. assumed that a 27 lb/in2 (186 kPa) peak overpressure was 100 percent fatal. Assuming that the blast wave expands equally from the center point, the distance to the peak overpressure for an unconfined explosion can be calculated using the following formula:
D = ZW1/3
where D is the distance from the blast, Z (ft/lb1/3) (m/kg1/3) is the scaled range and W is the TNT equivalent of the explosion. For this assessment, Z was assumed to be equal to 5.5 ft/lb1/3 (3.7 m/kg1/3), which corresponds to a peak overpressure of 27 lb/in2 (186 kPa).
J.4.4 Microshield
Microshield (Grove Engineering 1988) was used to analyze the shielding of gamma radiation in such areas as shielding design, container design, temporary shielding selection, source strength inference from radiation measurements, ALARA planning, and teaching. This program is a microcomputer adaptation of the main frame code ISOSHLD, a public domain "point kernel" code first written in the early 1960s. Microshield was used in this analysis to calculate the TI or estimated dose rate (mrem/h) at 3 ft (1 m) from the test assembly. This estimated dose rate is required in RADTRAN to calculate doses to truck crews and onsite and offsite individuals during routine transportation. The depleted uranium was modeled as a solid spherical source, approximately 8 in (20 cm) in diameter, shielded by plastic (high explosives). Table J-1Table J-1.-Microshield Input Data
Input Parameter |
Value |
|
Sphere radius (cm) |
25 (10) |
Shielding materiala - Plastic (cm) |
2.5 (1) |
Distance to receptor (cm) |
250 (100) |
Radionuclides (Ci)b: |
|
Th-231 Th-234 Pa-234 Pa-234m U-234 U-235 U-238 |
2.5 X 10-4 1.7 X 10-2 1.7 X 10-2 1.7 X 10-2 1.9 X 10-3 2.5 X 10-4 1.7 X 10-2 |
|
a Modeled as water. b Appendix H. | |
Table J-2.-Input Parameters for RADTRAN and Explosives Model
Parameter |
Value |
|
Fraction of travel time, rural population zonea |
60 |
Fraction of travel time, suburban population zoneb |
40 |
Fraction of travel time, urban population zone |
0 |
Dose rate at 3.3 ft from package (mrem/h)c |
5.9 x 10-1 |
Length of package (ft) |
13 |
Velocity (mi/h) |
35 |
Number of crewmen |
2 |
Distance from source to crew |
10 |
Stop time per mi, h/mL (1hr/stop 2 stops/trip) |
0.27 |
Persons exposed while stopped |
10 |
Average exposure distance while stopped (ft) |
66 |
Shipments per year |
20 |
|
a Data taken from Romero and Jolly (1989). b Estimated percentages based on a review of site layout drawings. For the purposes of this analysis the suburban population zone is used to characterize onsite activities. c The dose rate from the package at 1 m calculated using microshield (Grove Engineering 1988). | |
presents the input data used to determine the dose rate at one meter.
J.4.5 Analysis Input Parameters
Table J-2 presents the input parameters used to perform the incident-free and accident analysis using the RADTRAN computer code.
J.5 ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT-FREE (ROUTINE TRANSPORTATION) IMPACTS
The following section discusses the radiological and nonradiological impacts to the truck crew and the public during incident-free or routine transportation of the test assembly. The impacts due to interim storage of the test assembly at the magazine, if necessary, are not addressed in this analysis. The results of the analyses are presented in section 5.7.
J.5.1 Radiological Impacts due to Routine Transportation Activities
The radiological doses to the truck crew, onsite worker, and the public due to transportation activities were calculated using RADTRAN 4 (see section J.4.1). As discussed in section J.4.1, RADTRAN 4 uses a combination of meteorological, demographic, health physics, transportation, packaging, and material factors to analyze the risk due to incident-free transport activities. Input data used to perform the analysis are shown in section 5.7 and tables J-1 and J-2.
The calculated annual dose is based on 20 shipments per year. The dose to the truck crew for the No Action Alternative would be 6 x 10-6 person-rem for each shipment or 1 x 10-4 person-rem annually. The calculated dose to the public would be less than 1 x 10-10 person-rem and for this analysis is considered zero. The total dose to the onsite worker population for the No Action Alternative would be 2 x 10-4 person-rem for each shipment or 3 x 10-3 person-rem annually.
The potential health effects or latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) were calculated using the methodology described in ICRP 60 (1991), i.e., 4.0 x 10-4 LCFs/person-rem to the onsite worker and truck crew respectively. The annual health effects for truck crews, were estimated to be 4 x 10-8 (No Action Alternative) and 4 x 10-8 (DARHT Baseline Alternative). The annual health effects for the onsite worker, were estimated to be 1 x 10-6 and 1 x 10-6 for the No Action and DARHT Baseline alternatives, respectively.
J.5.2 Nonradiological Impacts due to Routine Transportation Activities
Impacts to the public from nonradiological causes were also evaluated. This included fatalities resulting from pollutants emitted from the vehicles during normal transportation. Based on the information contained in Rao et al. (1982), the types of pollutants that are present and can impact the public are sulfur oxides (SOx), particulates, nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC), and photochemical oxidants (Ox). Of these pollutants, Rao et al. (1982) determined that the majority of the health effects are due to SOx and the particulates. Unit risk factors (fatalities per kilometer) for truck shipments were developed by Rao et al. (1982) for travel in urban population densities (1.0 x 10-7/km for truck). Although, this unit risk factor is for urban population densities, it was combined with the total shipping distance past occupied buildings [40 percent of the total distance of 2.5 and 2.4 mi (4 and 3.8 km) for the No Action and DARHT Baseline alternatives, respectively] to calculate the nonradiological routine impacts to the public. Based on travel distances per shipment or per year, the estimated number of fatalities due to routine nonradiological impacts, as presented in section 5.7, table 5-17, are very low (roughly 4.0 x 10-7 per shipment or 8 x 10-6 annually).
J.6 ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS
The following section discusses the potential radiological and nonradiological impacts due to transportation accidents. Radiological accident impacts to the collective population (public) were calculated using the RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). The radiological impacts to a nearby individual and the maximally exposed individual (MEI), both onsite and offsite, were performed using GENII (Napier 1988). For analysis purposes, the nearby individual was assumed to be located 330 ft (100 m) from the point of release, the onsite MEI was assumed to be located at the nearest occupied facility, and the offsite MEI was assumed to be located at the site boundary. This scenario assumes that the high explosives detonate and the depleted uranium is released to the environment.
J.6.1 Radiological Impacts to the Public from Transportation Accidents
This section describes the analyses performed to assess radiological impacts to the public from transportation accidents.
J.6.1.1 Radiological Impacts to the Public
For these analyses the impacts were expressed as MEI doses or as integrated population risks. The integrated population risk was determined by multiplying the expected consequences by the accidentfrequency integrated over the entire shipping campaign or estimated number of shipments annually. The potential consequences to the population from transportation accidents were expressed in terms of radiological dose and LCFs. Typically these impacts can result from breaches in the shipping cask or damage to the cask shielding; however, in this analysis these impacts would be due to detonation and release of the radiological materials.
Once the material is released to the environment it would be dispersed and diluted by weather action and a small amount would be deposited on the ground due to plume depletion. Access to the area adjacent to the transportation accident would be controlled by emergency response personnel until the area could be remediated and the radiation monitoring personnel have declared the area safe.
The input data used to calculate the radiological dose to the public (i.e., population densities, travel times and distances) were the same as the inputs used to calculate the incident-free dose to the population and are discussed in section J.4.1. The accident frequency used in the analysis was based on a review of local or state specific accident data. It was assumed, because of the characteristics of the high explosives, that all transportation accidents were severe enough to detonate the high explosives and result in a release to the environment. This was a conservative assumption that would tend to overstate the expected consequences. The initial accident data [or rates expressed as accidents/mi (accidents/km)] used in this analysis were taken from Saricks and Kvitek (1994) for the state of New Mexico. The accident rate used, 3.78 x 10-7 accidents/mi (2.35 x 10-7 accidents/km), was a combination of accident rates for rural and urban federally aided highway systems.
It was assumed that 10 percent of the material in a test assembly was aerosolized and respirable (appendix H).
Radiological doses were calculated using RADTRAN for the two population densities of interest (i.e., LANL open space and occupied buildings). The calculated dose, on a per shipment basis, to the two populations was estimated to be 2.4 x 10-1 person-rem and 1.7 x 101 person-rem, respectively. The integrated risk to the public (i.e., consequences times accident frequency integrated over the entire shipping distance) was estimated to be 9.8 x 10-5 person-rem and 9.3 x 10-5 person-rem for the No Action Alternative and DARHT Baseline Alternative, respectively.
J.6.1.2 Radiological Impacts to Individuals
In addition to the radiological dose to the collective population, the LANL site was reviewed to identify an onsite MEI, i.e., an individual located at the nearest occupied facility, and offsite MEI, i.e., an individual located at the site boundary. For this analysis, based on the location of the site boundary and the nearest public roadway and the meteorological data, the offsite MEI was assumed to be located approximately 1 mi (1.5 km) to the northwest and north-northwest. The location is dependent on the median effective release height (see appendix H.1). Meteorological data for TA-6 at LANL is used in the dose consequence analyses.
The location of the maximally exposed onsite worker, was determined by reviewing the LANL site drawings with respect to the location of the PHERMEX and DARHT facilities. It was assumed that the onsite MEI is located 0.50 mi (0.75 km) to the northwest and north-northwest.
Radiological accident impacts to the offsite and onsite MEIs and the MEI were calculated using GENII (Napier 1988). The source term for GENII is adjusted to account for the presumed explosion in an accident scenario; the adjustment takes the form of specifying a median effective release height. To calculate the impacts to the receptor, a median effective release height of 327 ft (99 m), 713 ft (216 m), and 848 ft (257 m) was used for Test Assembly 1, Test Assembly 2, and Test Assembly 3, respectively. This was calculated using the methodology described in appendix H. The results of the radiological analyses to the MEIs are presented in section 5.7, table 5-19.
In the past, DOE has conducted dynamic experiments at LANL with plutonium. Any future experiments with plutonium would always be conducted in double-walled containment vessels; these experiments would not reasonably be expected to result in any release of plutonium to the environment. DOE has evaluated the potential impacts of two types of accidents that could involve plutonium - inadvertent detonation and containment breach. This analysis is documented in a classified supplement to this EIS; and results, unclassified calculations, and assumption and modeling methods are included in appendix I, section I.3.2, and in applicable sections of chapter 5.
The bounding accident for accidents during transportation of materials was assumed to be a hypothetical detonation of a plutonium experiment while outside of its double containment vessel. The impacts were calculated as if the event took place at the PHERMEX or DARHT site (rather than at some other location within LANL where the experimental device might be handled) because these sites are closest to the LANL boundary. The impacts would be the same regardless of whether this accident took place at the PHERMEX site or the DARHT site. Such an accident has never happened nor has any mechanism been identified that would initiate such an event, hence it was examined only as a "what if?" accident. Related DOE safety studies indicate that the probability of an accidental uncontained detonation of the type analyzed would be less than 10-6 per year, which is considered to be an incredible event.
Because, under this scenario, detonation of the explosive would be uncontained, the release was modeled as a 330-ft (100-m) elevated release (see Appendix I). The MEI, located at State Road 4, could receive up to 76 rem in the event of an accident. The maximum probability of a LCF occurring in this hypothetical individual would be 0.04. The dose to the potentially maximally exposed sector of the population, east-southeast of the DARHT and PHERMEX sites that includes the communities of White Rock and Santa Fe, could be between 9,000 and 24,000 person-rem, taking into consideration the 50th and 95th percentile meteorology, respectively. Between 5 and 12 LCFs would be projected from radiation doses such as these to the population.
J.6.2 Nonradiological Impacts to the Public from Transportation Accidents
This section describes the analyses performed to assess nonradiological impacts to the public and the MEIs.
J.6.2.1 Nonradiological Impacts
The vehicle travel speed is limited to 35 mi/h (56 km/h); therefore, vehicle impacts are not considered severe enough to cause fatalities to the truck occupants or occupants of other vehicles involved in theaccident. For the purposes of this analysis it was assumed that the transport vehicle impacted a stationary object with sufficient force to detonate the high explosive.
The lethal limits due to the blast wave were estimated using the formula and assumptions discussed in section J.4.3 and the high explosive inventories discussed in section 5.7. The impacts due to explosions were modelled for each of the test assemblies. Assuming that a peak overpressure of 27 lb/in2 (186 kPa) is fatal, all individuals within an approximate radius of 15 ft (5 m), 43 ft (13 m), and 53 ft (16 m) for test assemblies 1, 2, and 3, respectively, would be subjected to potentially fatal overpressures. This would include the truck crews which are assumed to be located within 33 ft (10 m) of the test assembly. In addition to impacting the truck crew, depending on the quantity of high explosive involved, 50 percent of the individuals at distances up to 80 ft (24 m) could be killed due to the blast wave. Individuals located further away may not be impacted by overpressure but could be seriously injured or killed by fragments ejected by the detonation.
In addition to evaluating the impacts from a detonation of the high explosives, an assessment of the consequences of a release of the hazardous materials identified in section 5.7, was performed. The release fraction and percentage respirable was the same release fraction used for the depleted uranium; 10 percent of the total material in the device was assumed respirable. The results, based on the meteorological data for the LANL site, are shown in section 5.7, table 5-18. For comparison, although plume passage times are very short in duration, the immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) exposure limits are also provided in table 5-18.
J.7 REFERENCES CITED IN APPENDIX J
Clarke, R.K., et al., 1976, Severities of Transportation Accidents, Volume 1 - Summary, SLA-74-001, September, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Dennis, A.W., et al., 1978, Severities of Transportation Accidents Involving Large Packages, SAND77-0001, May, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Grove Engineering, Inc., 1988, Microshield Version 3. Grove Engineering, Incorporated, Rockville, Maryland.
ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection), 1991, 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication 60, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
Madsen, M.M., et al., 1983, RADTRAN II User Guide, SAND82-2681, 1983, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Madsen, M.M., et al., 1986, RADTRAN III, SAND84-0036, February, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Napier, B.A., et al., 1988, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software System, PNL-6584, Vol. 1, Vol. 2, Vol. 3, December, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
Neuhauser, K.S., and F.L. Kanipe, 1992, RADTRAN 4: Volume 3 - User Guide, SAND89-2370, January, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1977, Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NUREG-0170, December, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Rao, R.K., et al., 1982, Non-Radiological Impacts of Transporting Radioactive Material, SAND81-1703, February, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Rhoads, R.E., et al., 1986, Evaluation of Methods to Compare Consequences from Hazardous Materials Transportation Accidents, SAND86-7117, October, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Romero, R.J., and E.L. Jolly, 1989, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report: Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility, Phase II Hydrotest Firing Site, December, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Saricks, C., and T. Kvitek, 1994, Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers of Interstate Freight, ANL/ESD/TM-68, March, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois.
Taylor, J.M., and S.L. Daniel, 1982, RADTRAN II: Revised Computer Code To Analyze Transportation of Radioactive Material, SAND80-1943, October, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
accident J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, J-8, J-9, J-10, J-11, J-12
accidents J-1, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-8, J-9, J-10, J-11, J-12
beryllium J-2
containment J-10
depleted uranium J-1, J-2, J-6, J-8, J-11
detonation J-1, J-9, J-10, J-11
dose J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, J-7, J-6, J-9, J-10
dynamic experiments J-10
exposure pathway J-5
exposure pathways J-5
high explosive J-1, J-2, J-11
high explosives J-1, J-2, J-3, J-6, J-8, J-9, J-11
latent cancer fatalities J-8
LCF J-10
maximally exposed individual J-8
MEI J-8, J-9, J-10
monitoring J-9
nonradiological impacts J-6, J-8, J-10
plutonium J-10
radiation J-3, J-6, J-9, J-10, J-11
radiological impacts J-3, J-6, J-8, J-9, J-12
soil J-5
transportation J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-6, J-8, J-9, J-10, J-11, J-12
tritium J-2
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