Mediterranean - Soft Underbelly
Winston Churchill proposed to enter the continent of Europe via the Balkans, "the soft-underbelly" of German occupied Europe. Forrest Pogue in "Command Decisions" points out that "The political leaders in the United States had framed no policy for dealing with an aggressive Soviet Union in Central Europe.. .(and that)... no political directive was ever issued to General Eisenhower by his American superiors or by the US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff".
In the British view, the victory over Germany should be won with the minimum expenditure of men and materials. Moreover, it was vitally important for the British Commonwealth of Nations to consolidate the British position in the Mediterranean and in the Near and Middle East. At the end of 1943, the Allied successes in the Mediterranean led the British Staff to attach greater importance to the development of offensive operations in the Eastern Mediterranean than to a cross channel operation. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Churchill, the British Staffs, therefore, at the end of 1943, were advocating the strategy of attacking Germany through the Balkans and the Black Sea rather than across the Channel.
The opening blows against Hitler's Fortress Europe came not in Western Europe but in the Mediterranean. Once the United States had entered the war, American leaders pressed for a direct cross-channel assault against the Continent. Through 1942 and much of 1943, however, they yielded to British concerns over Allied readiness for such a large step and accepted less ambitious endeavors against the "soft underbelly" of Axis-dominated Europe. The soft underbelly proved to be a hard shell as Allied armies, after driving the Germans and Italians from North Africa and Sicily, made slow progress against a tenacious German defense in the wet climate and rugged highlands of the Italian peninsula.
At the ARCADIA conference (Washington, 24 December 1941 to 14 January 1942), the American and British Chiefs of Staff developed and the President and Prime Minister approved a broad strategic plan for the conduct of the war. The attack on Germany would be initiated by offensive operations in the Mediterranean, coupled with the maximum possible air bombardment of Germany and Fortress Europe, with reinforcement of the blockade against Germany and by subversive operations in German-held Europe.
The ARCADIA conference expressly left the question open of what strategy to follow after the Mediterranean had been seized. "In 1943, the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out". It will be noted that one of the reasons for the Mediterranean offensive was to eliminate the danger of a coordinated German, Italian, Vichy naval sortie by restricting the French and Italian fleets to their bases and obtaining a position from which they could be eliminated.
It did not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany, except on the Russian front, will be possible. But in 1943, the way may be clear for a return to the Continent across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. In Europe, the Germans had several courses of action open to them. These included : (1) an all out offensive to destroy the Russian Army and gain the oil of the Caucasus; (2) a drive through the Middle East to control its resources, cut off the southern route to Russia and destroy the Allied forces of the Middle East; (3) invasion of the British Isles; (4) operations in the Iberian Peninsula, the Central and Western Mediterranean and North Africa, to control the resources of this area, control the Mediterranean sea lanes and support the drive through the Middle East. Invasion of the British Isles and operation in the Western Mediterranean, North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, would require the Germans to divert forces of such magnitude from the Russian front, that a decisive victory could not be obtained against Russia. These alternatives were therefore considered improbable.
The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the Allies should not remain idle while Russia was being defeated, but should utilize available forces at once for such offensive action as was possible. In particular, they favored an air offensive, designed to draw German air forces away from the Russian front, and a Mediterranean offensive, designed: (1) to divert Axis air and ground forces from Russia to the Mediterranean; (2) to strengthen the allied position generally; and (3) to neutralize or eliminate the Vichy and Italian Navies.
The members of the American Planning Staff had radically different views. Britain and the United States ought to concentrate the balance of their forces on one offensive effort. They should not further disperse their strength among several minor offensive fronts. An offensive launched from England through France and the Low Countries and aimed at entering Germany and destroying her forces in Western Europe, would afford Russia maximum assistance and, indeed, would be the only method of achieving ultimate victory over the Germans. U.S. Staff were convinced that American manpower and industry would provide the force necessary for offensive operations by 01 April 1943.
The Allied position in the Middle East and the Mediterranean would be gravely endangered if Russia were eliminated. While the collapse of Russia would free enormous German forces for a drive through the Middle East, only a small British Army in an isolated position would be available for resistance. General Marshall's opinion that this British strategic policy was unsound as a Mediterranean campaign in 1942 would so strain Allied resources as to make impossible a cross channel operation in 1943, since logistic studies had made it abundantly clear that even if all available shipping were devoted to the necessary build-up for such operations, resources could hardly be accumulated in England in time for a full scale invasion in 1943.
The final decision to begin operations in the Mediterranean by landings in North Africa, rather than to stage a "sacrifice" cross channel operation in 1942, or to organize a full scale offensive against German forces in France in 1943 was due primarily to the fact that the President and the Prime Minister attached great importance to the launching of a successful offensive in 1942. By the end of July 1942, it had become obvious that even a minor cross channel assault [SLEDGEHAMMER] would be impossible in 1942. The Dieppe Raid, executed in August 1942 with approximately the strength planned for the leading phase of SLEDGEHAMMER, was characterized by Hitler as military idiocy. Thus, the strategy for the opening phase of the European war was to initiate the attack on Germany by a combined air-Mediterranean offensive.
‘Torch’ [the invasion of North Africa], began on 02 November 1942. The Mediterranean strategy, approved at the time of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, was successfully followed throughout the year 1943. The decision then taken to invade Sicily in June was followed, after the successful landings in Sicily, by the decision to undertake landings in Italy, approved at the TRIDENT Conference in Washington in May 1943.
The successful operations, first in Sicily and later in Italy, led to the negotiation of the Italian surrender, which Marshall Badoglio announced in September 1943. The Anglo-American commitment in Southern Italy made it necessary, in accordance with the TRIDENT decision, to proceed with offensive operations in Italy. Moreover, the surrender of the Italian fleet and the agreement negotiated by Admiral Cunningham for Italian naval forces to operate under his command in the Mediterranean, completely altered the Mediterranean situation. Hence at the QUEBEC Conference, only conditional approval was given to the OVERLORD Plan. The final decision as to whether the final assault on Germany should be launched from Northwest Europe or by operations across the Mediterranean and from Turkey into the Balkans, was postponed for later decision. At the Quebec conference Churchill stated that "an Anglo-American entry into the Balkans and Southern Europe would prevent aSoviet rush into the area ..." To the United States, the Balkans were nothing but anotherBritish imperialistic adventure.
It seemed to the American Planning Staffs strategically and logically unsound to attempt the defeat of the European Axis by an invasion from the Mediterranean. On the other hand, they believed that the United Kingdom was an unparalleled base for the invasion of Europe, and that France was the only area where armies of sufficient size to defeat Germany could be deployed. The Balkan Eastern Mediterranean approach to the European Fortress is unsuitable, due to terrain and communication difficulties for large scale military operations.
In July of 1942, General Marshall had been opposed to executing the North African invasion. At the Casablanca Conference, he was opposed to the invasion of Sicily;1 at the Washington Conference (TRIDENT) in May, he was opposed to the invasion of Italy, and agreed to it only on the condition that seven of the thirty-four divisions then available in the Mediterranean should not be used in Italy, but, instead, held in idleness for subsequent transfer to the United Kingdom.2 At the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in August, he urged scheduling OVERLORD unconditionally and employing Mediterranean resources solely in support of OVERLORD.3 At the Cairo Conference (SEXTANT) in November 1943, he endeavored to obtain a categorical British commitment that OVERLORD, and operations in support of OVERLORD, would be the sole allied offensive, and to institute a system of Mediterranean command which would prevent the British from embarking on unilateral Mediterranean operations. At Teheran, he told the Russians he was entirely in favor of OVERLORD and that his only misgivings were on the question of whether OVERLORD would succeed.
In the British view, it was important that sufficient forces should be accumulated in the United Kingdom for full scale amphibious operations on the Continent before May 1944. In the British view, it seemed desirable in 1943 to follow up successes in the Mediterranean, rather than to postpone further offensive action until sufficient forces could be accumulated in England to permit a cross channel operation to be undertaken. In August of 1943, General Smuts, who Churchill describes as "following Greek fortunes attentively," pointed out to the Prime Minister that: "with politics let loose amongst those peoples, we may have a wave of disorder and wholesale Communism set going all over those parts of Europe. This may even be the danger in Italy, but certainly in Greece and the Balkans... The Bolshevisation of a broken and ruined Europe remains a definite possibility, to be guarded against by a supply of food and work and interim allied control."
The final decision to launch OVERLORD and to curtail the Mediterranean offensive, was taken at the Teheran (EUREKA) Conference on 30 November 1943. As the year 1943 progressed, it had become more and more evident that Russia was safe, and that German and Italy were doomed. During 1943, approximately two-thirds of Germany's ground strength was deployed on the Russian front, but her strength in Russia was significantly less than in 1942 and had been steadily reduced to meet the increasing requirements of the Western and Mediterranean fronts, thus facilitating the Soviet advance.
On the Mediterranean front, the Germans had lost a major army. The Allies had gained possession of all of Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and Southern Italy. The Mediterranean was open to Allied shipping and virtually freed of all German naval interference. The Allied air attack from the Mediterranean was progressively increasing in weight.
The Russian view was unambiguous at the first Teheran meeting. Marshall Stalin wanted Britain and America to establish their forces in the west. He did not want them to introduce forces into the Balkans, the Black Sea or the Aegean. He had studied the ideas of both the British and the Americans and he favored the American view. He wanted the Allies to make their main effort and concentrate their principle forces on the Cross Channel assault for an offensive against Germany from the west. He did not favor pushing either the Italian campaign or the Adriatic campaign, both of which would put the Allies in the upper Balkans. He did not favor putting Allied forces in Greece or the Adriatic. Stalin said that he thought that there was a chance for an operation against Southern France. This operation could be mounted from Corsica, and the forces involved could make contact with OVERLORD forces in due course. This, he felt, was better than to scatter forces in several widely scattered areas. At the end of 1943, when the EUREKA Conference was held, no continental European nation, except Germany, possessed, at that time, sufficient military power to restrain Russia from establishing a European hegemony, if she so desired.
One possibility was to bring Turkey into the war, open the Aegean Sea, open the Dardanelles, and launch an offensive into Bulgaria in the rear of the German armies of the Ukraine. Churchill often brought this proposal forward. A defeated Germany would be intact. Anglo-American armies, rather than Russian ones would be on her southeastern flank. A Russian post-hostilities occupation of the area would have been improbable. It would seem that the only logical ground supporting this strategy was that it would benefit Britain and America, as against Russia, in the post war world. It aimed at assuring that Britain and America would be in military possession of southeastern and a part of Middle Europe, and at excluding Russia from control of this area. Roosevelt expressed "doubts that the Russians would wish to dominate the Balkans unduly in any event."
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