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Operation Sea Lion

Given Hitler’s hopes to avoid further direct conflict with Britain, several high-ranking German leaders, including Germany’s Secretary of State in the Commissariat forAir, Field Marshal Erhard Milch; Commander of Luftflotte 2, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring; and Luftflotte 2 fighter pilot Adolf Galland doubted Hitler’s full commitment to the invasion of Britain. According to German accounts, the plans exhibited none of the detail previous campaigns contained, even though an amphibious invasion increased the coordination requirements between service arms.

While Hitler may have entertained unfounded political hopes, he was persuaded by more pragmatic concerns to prepare for the worst case — that which would pit Germany against Britain in open hostilities. Hitler made contingency plans to prepare and execute Operation Sea Lion, an amphibious invasion of Great Britain. As early as 29 November 1939, Hitler anticipated the possibility of open hostilities between Germany and Britain. Hitler issued a directive which outlined occupying the Belgian and French coastlines inorder to pursue a blockade of Britain by sea and air at the conclusion ofthe Battle of France, the German Army and Navy were not well prepared to commencean immediate assault upon Britain.

On 24 May 1940, Hitler issued a further directive, which stated that following the defeat of France and until Operation Sea Lion could beexecuted the Luftwaffe should commence independent operations against the British Isles. This was followed by a June 1940 order from Göring, that Luftflotten 2, 3, and 5 should prepare to execute attacks “against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces.”

Hitler’s mid-July Directive 16 ordered that, “As England, in spite of the hopelessness of her situation, has shown herself unwilling tocome to a compromise, I have therefore decided to begin to prepare for and if necessary carry out, an invasion of England. The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English motherland as a base from which war against Germany can be continued and ifnecessary, to occupy the country completely.” The directive went on to assign to the Luftwaffe its role as linchpin in the operation by tasking it to destroy the RAF, attackRoyal Navy forces at their home bases, overcome coastal defenses, break resistance of ground troops, annihilate reserve forces, and destroy lines of transport. As a result, Göring’s Luftwaffe staff met on 21 July 1940 to outline detailed requirements for the air offensive.

Germany’s quick victories over Poland, Norway, Belgium, and France led Hitler to believe the Wehrmacht would prevail in a struggle with Britain. In the case of theLuftwaffe, the head of intelligence made several misleading and inaccurate assessments of British air forces including underestimating British fighter performance, pilot skill, leadership flexibility, aircraft production and maintenance infrastructure, and the robustnature of the air defense network. It was upon this faulty intelligence estimate Hitler and Göring based their strategy for the Battle of Britain. Hitler foresaw Germany conducting independent air operations that would concurrently isolate Britain economically and break the morale of the British people and government by total air warfare.

The first argument that recommended this option was that by avoiding a full-scale invasion, Germany could save its Army troops for Continental operations, especially the contemplated invasion of Russia. Second, an independent Luftwaffe operation was much simpler to plan than an amphibious landing and invasion. Also, Germany had an advantage (almost 1.5:1) in the air in terms of numbers of fighter aircraft. Another positive aspect of this option was that if the independent air campaign alone failed to intimidate Britain, it might at least create the preconditions necessary to conduct an invasion.

Unlike Continental operations in Poland, Norway, Belgium, and France, the execution of an amphibious invasion would require complicated operations and logistics coordination between Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Army and Navy were as yet unprepared to invade Britain. Detailed plans had not yet been drawn up; moreover, Army and Navy forces had to be reconstituted after the Battle of France. According to Navy Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, the Navy would not be prepared to bring Army troops to England until at least 15 September 1940, just a few weeks before fall and winter weather closed in making anamphibious landing impossible.

Although Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion, he consoled himself with the belief that the invasion might be possible in the spring of 1941. With that thought, he did not want to end the air campaign and preparations for “Sealion” were continued solely for the purpose of maintaining political and military pressure on England.