Drone Warfare in Ukraine and Russia
The war in Ukraine fundamentally transformed military doctrine regarding unmanned systems, culminating in an unprecedented development: the creation of dedicated military branches devoted exclusively to drone warfare. Ukraine pioneered this organizational innovation with the establishment of its Unmanned Systems Forces in June 2024, becoming the first nation in history to institutionalize drone operations as a separate branch of the armed forces. Russia followed suit in December 2024, announcing plans to create its own Voysk Bespilotnykh Sistem (Unmanned Systems Forces), which formally became operational in November 2025. These parallel developments represent a strategic recognition that unmanned systems have evolved from support assets into primary instruments of warfare, capable of decisively shaping operational outcomes across all domains. The establishment of these forces reflects battlefield realities where drones now account for approximately half of all equipment destroyed, fundamentally altering tactical approaches, logistics vulnerabilities, and force protection requirements across hundreds of miles of frontline.
Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces: From Improvisation to Institution
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the decree establishing the Unmanned Systems Forces (Syly bezpilotnykh system, or SBS) on February 6, 2024, with formal implementation occurring on June 11, 2024. This historic decision emerged from the recognition that Ukraine had fundamentally changed the security situation in the Black Sea through drone operations, successfully repelled ground assaults largely through drone employment, and inflicted massive casualties on Russian forces using unmanned systems. The creation of the SBS consolidated what had been an improvised ecosystem of volunteer units, startup manufacturers, and ad hoc battlefield innovations into a coherent military branch with unified doctrine, standardized training, systematic procurement, and centralized command structures. Ukraine's approach integrated aerial, ground, and maritime unmanned systems under a single organizational framework, acknowledging the multi-domain nature of contemporary drone warfare.
Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi was appointed as the first commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces in June 2024, serving as deputy to Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi with responsibility for implementing unmanned systems across Ukrainian forces. Sukharevskyi, who had commanded the 59th Motorized Brigade since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, brought operational experience and an understanding of how drones could be integrated into combined arms operations. Under his leadership, the USF established close contact with approximately 90 percent of domestic drone manufacturers, creating feedback loops for testing new systems and training operators for combat deployment. By November 2024, the USF had reportedly integrated more than 170 different unmanned systems into operational use, reflecting Ukraine's diverse and adaptive approach to drone warfare.
The organizational structure underwent significant evolution as the USF matured. In June 2025, President Zelenskyy replaced Sukharevskyi with Major Robert Brovdi, better known by his call sign "Magyar," who commanded the elite 414th Separate Brigade of Unmanned Systems (Magyar's Birds). This appointment represented a strategic decision to elevate battlefield innovation to force-wide leadership, as Magyar's Birds had consistently demonstrated exceptional performance and pioneered numerous tactical innovations. The unit had evolved from a small company-sized formation in 2022 to a full brigade by 2024, participating in major battles at Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Krynky, and along the Kharkiv front. Magyar himself was awarded the title Hero of Ukraine on May 8, 2025, in recognition of his contributions to developing Ukrainian drone warfare capabilities. His appointment signaled a commitment to scaling the most successful battlefield practices across the entire force structure.
In June 2025, the USF announced the creation of a unified command group that consolidated all USF military units with the "Drone Line," an initiative launched by President Zelenskyy in February 2025 to coordinate and expand five of Ukraine's strongest drone units. This grouping represented what Ukrainian officials described as a key milestone in the 100-day development plan for the USF, aimed at improving management efficiency and adapting to the requirements of modern warfare. For the first time, drone units would operate within a single vertical of control with defined structure, clear interaction protocols, and a common vision for unmanned aerial vehicle tactics. This consolidation addressed previous challenges where different units operated independently without systematic coordination, sometimes even jamming each other's drones through uncoordinated electronic warfare employment. The unified structure aimed to ensure standardized approaches, coordinated actions, and more systematic combat employment of unmanned systems across the entire force.
The operational impact of the USF has been substantial, though exact figures require appropriate qualification given the fog of war. Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi claimed in July 2025 that the Unmanned Systems Forces had struck 19,600 targets in June 2025 alone, representing one-third of all targets hit by Ukrainian forces that month, with 5,024 targets reportedly destroyed. Ukrainian sources attributed 4,500 Russian casualties to USF operations in June, including 2,548 killed. For July 2025, Syrskyi claimed that USF drones hit 23,400 Russian targets and killed 5,134 enemy personnel. These figures, while not independently verifiable, illustrate the scale at which drone operations have become integrated into Ukrainian military operations and suggest that unmanned systems have become a primary rather than supporting element of Ukrainian combat power.
The USF has demonstrated particular success in long-range strike operations deep inside Russian territory. Notable examples include the January 2025 strike by the 14th Separate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Regiment on a pumping station along the Druzhba pipeline on the Russian-Belarusian border in Bryansk Oblast, which reportedly employed drones carrying 250-kilogram aerial bombs with ranges potentially exceeding 2,000 kilometers. The USF has also integrated advanced capabilities including laser weapon systems, with the first footage of the "Tryzub" directed-energy weapon destroying a fiber-optic FPV drone released in April 2025. Additionally, the 59th Separate Assault Brigade was transferred to the USF in January 2025, demonstrating the expansion of the force structure beyond specialized drone units to include conventional combined arms formations enhanced by unmanned systems capabilities.
Fiber-Optic Drones and Electronic Warfare
The most significant technological development in drone warfare during 2025 was the widespread adoption of fiber-optic controlled first-person view (FPV) drones by both Ukrainian and Russian forces. Unlike traditional radio-controlled drones susceptible to electronic warfare jamming, fiber-optic drones use physical cables to transmit control signals and video feeds, making them essentially immune to electromagnetic interference. This seemingly simple modification addresses the fundamental vulnerability that has plagued drone operations throughout the conflict, where sophisticated electronic warfare systems deployed by both sides have rendered entire categories of unmanned systems ineffective at critical moments. The shift to fiber-optic control represents one of the clearest examples of how tactical necessity drives rapid technological adaptation on the Ukrainian battlefield.
Russia appears to have been first to deploy fiber-optic FPV drones at scale, with these systems becoming increasingly prominent throughout 2024 and particularly in 2025. The advantage of these drones extends beyond simple immunity to jamming; they also provide perfect video quality and eliminate concerns about radio horizon limitations that plague traditional systems. However, fiber-optic drones carry significant disadvantages stemming from the physical cable connection. The large spools required to operate over extended distances add substantial weight, reducing speed and maneuverability compared to radio-controlled counterparts. The cables themselves can become entangled in obstacles, limiting the drone's ability to navigate complex terrain or confined spaces. Despite these limitations, the tactical advantages have proven decisive in specific operational contexts, particularly for strikes against high-value targets in areas with heavy electronic warfare presence.
The range capabilities of fiber-optic drones expanded dramatically throughout 2025, reflecting intense competition between Ukrainian and Russian developers. Ukrainian manufacturers, particularly those associated with Magyar's Birds unit, announced in January 2025 that they had developed fiber-optic drones with cables extending to 41 kilometers, reportedly with production of 1,000 units per month planned. This range represented a significant advance over earlier systems that typically operated at 10 to 20 kilometers, extending the reach of unjammable precision strike capabilities to targets previously considered safely in the rear areas. Russian sources subsequently claimed development of fiber-optic drones with 50-kilometer cable ranges, though these reports remain unconfirmed and raise questions about the feasibility of deploying such long, fragile tethers in combat environments. Ukrainian expert Andriy Hyrtseniuk, head of the Brave1 defense tech incubator, has noted that the effective range of fiber-optic drones depends not just on cable length but on environmental factors, particularly wind, which can reduce practical range by causing cable deflection.
The operational impact of fiber-optic drones has been substantial, particularly in their ability to strike targets deep behind front lines where electronic warfare protection was previously assumed sufficient. In October 2025, a Russian fiber-optic FPV drone struck within the city of Kramatorsk for the first time, located approximately 12 miles from the front lines, raising alarms about the vulnerability of rear areas and civilian population centers. Ukrainian analyst Serhii Sternenko warned that there is no such thing as a safe rear area within 30 kilometers of the front, urging local officials to implement anti-drone nets and other protective measures. Russian fiber-optic drones have been particularly effective in disrupting Ukrainian logistics, targeting supply routes, ammunition depots, and artillery systems that were previously protected by standoff distance and electronic warfare coverage. The ability to achieve precision strikes on high-value targets such as self-propelled artillery, with systems like the Russian Msta-S requiring seven crew members and extensive logistics yet vulnerable to a drone costing perhaps $400, represents a dramatic asymmetry in cost-effectiveness that challenges traditional military economics.
Ukrainian forces responded to the fiber-optic drone threat through multiple approaches, reflecting the rapid innovation cycle characteristic of this conflict. Magyar's Birds unit reported in January 2025 that they had developed a counter-system using mobile radars to detect incoming fiber-optic FPV drones at ranges of several kilometers, then launching their own drones to intercept Russian ones before they reach targets. The success of this approach depends critically on early detection, as the radar warning provides time for defensive drones to reach interception positions. Magyar's Birds demonstrated this capability in video footage showing a Ukrainian FPV drone destroying a Russian fiber-optic drone mid-flight, taking advantage of the slower speed and reduced maneuverability imposed by the heavy cable spool. However, scaling this approach across a 600-mile front presents enormous challenges, as it requires extensive deployment of mobile radar systems and maintenance of ready-to-launch interceptor drones at countless positions along the entire line of contact.
The technological trajectory suggests that fiber-optic drones represent an intermediate stage in an ongoing competition rather than a final solution. Both sides are exploring hybrid systems that combine fiber-optic cables with radio backup to ensure connection reliability, allowing operators to switch modes if the cable breaks or becomes entangled. Advanced countermeasures under development include acoustic sensors that can detect the characteristic sound of approaching drones, artificial intelligence-powered automated turrets equipped with radar and camera sensors capable of shooting without human intervention, and potentially directed-energy weapons like Ukraine's Tryzub laser system demonstrated in April 2025. The fundamental challenge remains that traditional electronic warfare systems, which represent massive investments and form the backbone of force protection for both armies, have been rendered largely irrelevant against fiber-optic threats. This reality is driving development of entirely new categories of defensive systems while simultaneously accelerating refinement of offensive drone capabilities in a classic action-reaction cycle.
Production, Logistics, and Industrial Base
The sustainability of drone warfare at current intensity levels depends fundamentally on industrial capacity, supply chain resilience, and the ability to rapidly iterate designs based on battlefield feedback. Ukraine has developed a remarkably agile ecosystem connecting military units directly with manufacturers, often through personal relationships and volunteer networks that enable extremely rapid development cycles. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reported that the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces maintains close contact with 90 percent of domestic drone manufacturers, creating systematic feedback loops where operators test new systems and provide input to developers while simultaneously training for combat employment. This Silicon Valley-style approach of rapid iteration and direct user feedback has enabled Ukraine to field innovative solutions at speeds that would be impossible within traditional defense acquisition bureaucracies.
Ukrainian drone production scaled dramatically since the establishment of the USF, with more than 50 manufacturers of ammunition for drones operating by early 2024, including both state and private enterprises capable of producing munitions ranging from 300 grams to 10 kilograms. The Ukrainian government has opened the market for drone ammunition by establishing legislative frameworks for manufacturers and standardizing technical requirements, reducing bureaucratic obstacles that previously hindered rapid scaling of production. However, Ukraine faces a critical vulnerability in its dependence on imported components, particularly from China, which supplies the vast majority of commercial drone parts used in military applications. President Zelenskyy has warned that China has begun restricting exports of quadcopter-style Mavic drones to Western countries, raising concerns about long-term sustainability of Ukrainian drone operations if Chinese supply chains are disrupted or restricted.
Russia developed a rapidly growing and effective drone industry despite facing international sanctions and political pressure from Europe and the United States. By focusing on proven, low-cost, and serially produced designs rather than attempting to match Western high-end systems, the Kremlin has been able to quickly increase output across a wide range of platforms including loitering munitions, fiber-optic-controlled FPV drones, interceptor drones, maritime drones, and ground-based robotic platforms. Particular success has been achieved in producing tactical strike systems with ranges of 20 to 50 kilometers, such as the Lancet, Molniya, and Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky, as well as strategic-level systems with ranges exceeding 500 kilometers, such as the Geran and Harpiya designs based on Iranian Shahed patterns. Defense Minister Belousov reported in December 2024 that since April 2024, more than 65 types of unmanned systems had been delivered to Russian troops, including 31 types of UAVs, eight ground robotic systems, two types of signals intelligence systems, 20 electronic warfare systems, and four types of unmanned boats.
President Putin's statement that Russian troops received over 1.5 million unmanned systems of various types in 2024 represents an extraordinary scale of deployment that apparently exceeded Ukrainian production by significant margins. Western analyst Samuel Bendett noted that Russian forces were receiving monthly deliveries of at least 120,000 drones by late 2024, with that figure likely to grow significantly in 2025 as Russian forces adopted Ukrainian tactics and integrated them into their own operations. This industrial advantage has translated into battlefield effects, with Russian forces increasingly able to flood Ukrainian defenses with large numbers of drones, overwhelming defensive capabilities through sheer volume even when Ukrainian systems demonstrate superior individual effectiveness. The asymmetry in production capacity represents a strategic challenge for Ukraine that cannot be addressed purely through tactical innovation or operational excellence.
The industrial competition created unusual dynamics where both sides study and replicate each other's most successful designs. Ukrainian manufacturers have begun producing copies or derivatives of Russian systems including the Molniya, Lancet, fiber-optic drones, and Shahed-style long-range systems, viewing them as optimized combat designs that can be produced without massive industrial investment or advanced manufacturing technologies. This pragmatic approach to technology acquisition through battlefield capture and reverse engineering reflects the reality that in high-intensity drone warfare, proven effectiveness matters more than innovation for its own sake. Both nations are engaged in what amounts to an open-source warfare model where successful designs proliferate rapidly across the battlefield, with improvements and adaptations developed by multiple actors simultaneously rather than through centralized research and development programs.
Doctrinal Implications and Future Trajectory
The establishment of dedicated unmanned systems forces by both Ukraine and Russia represents a doctrinal watershed with implications extending far beyond the current conflict. These organizational decisions formalize recognition that drones have become primary combat systems rather than supporting assets, requiring dedicated career paths, specialized education, independent command structures, and representation at the highest levels of military planning. The shift is analogous to the establishment of air forces as independent services in the early 20th century, reflecting technological maturation that demands specialized expertise and organizational focus. The fact that both nations independently arrived at similar conclusions about organizational requirements suggests these changes reflect fundamental operational realities rather than temporary adaptations to specific circumstances.
The doctrinal evolution encompasses several critical elements that distinguish contemporary drone warfare from earlier applications of unmanned systems. First, the integration of drones across all operational levels from tactical engagements at squad level through operational maneuver at brigade and division scale to strategic strikes against infrastructure and logistics deep in enemy territory has created requirements for unified doctrine that spans these domains. Ukrainian military literature, including the doctrine "Application of Unmanned Systems in the Defense Forces of Ukraine" signed by then Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi in January 2024, represents early attempts to codify lessons learned and establish systematic approaches to unmanned systems employment. Second, the necessity of coordinating drone operations with electronic warfare, air defense, artillery, and maneuver forces requires command structures capable of synchronizing effects across multiple domains, justifying the creation of independent branches rather than simply adding drone capabilities to existing formations.
The future trajectory of unmanned systems forces will likely be shaped by several technological and operational trends visible in the current conflict. Autonomy and artificial intelligence will play increasingly important roles as human operators prove unable to manage the scale and tempo of drone operations at current intensity levels. Russian military analysts have already critiqued the "one operator-one UAV" model as unsustainable, calling for automated command and control systems analogous to the evolution of air defense systems in response to increasing complexity and speed of aerial threats. Swarming tactics, where multiple drones coordinate to attack targets or defend against threats, represent another likely evolution that will require sophisticated software and communications infrastructure. The integration of artificial intelligence for target recognition, navigation, and autonomous decision-making is already visible in systems deployed by both sides, with this trend likely to accelerate as technological maturity increases.
The strategic implications extend to military planning globally, as armed forces worldwide observe the Ukrainian battlefield and draw conclusions about future requirements. The United States has established experimental lethal unmanned systems platoons within the 101st Airborne Division and other formations, testing structures and tactics influenced by Ukrainian experience. These units represent American attempts to integrate lessons learned without necessarily adopting the comprehensive separate-branch approach pioneered by Ukraine and Russia. The question of whether Western militaries will follow the Ukrainian-Russian model or develop alternative organizational structures remains open, potentially influenced by different threat environments, existing force structures, and resources available for transformation. However, the fundamental lesson that drones have become central rather than peripheral to military operations appears inescapable based on observed battlefield results.
The establishment of unmanned systems forces also raises challenging questions about the human dimensions of warfare. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces website prominently states that its most important value is human life, reflecting how unmanned systems enable strike capabilities while reducing exposure of personnel to direct fire. This aligns with Ukrainian concerns about recruitment and manpower sustainability, as the country has struggled to maintain force levels necessary for defending against numerically superior Russian forces. The ability to achieve military effects through unmanned systems rather than manned operations offers potential solutions to manpower constraints, though at the cost of creating dependencies on industrial production and technical supply chains that may prove equally vulnerable to disruption. The broader ethical and strategic questions about increasingly automated warfare, including potential future progression toward fully autonomous systems, remain largely unaddressed in current military literature focused on immediate operational requirements.
Comparative Assessment and Strategic Outlook
Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Russia's VBS represent different approaches to institutionalizing drone warfare, shaped by their respective strategic circumstances, industrial capabilities, and military cultures. Ukraine established its force first, benefiting from bottom-up innovation driven by necessity and enabled by flexible volunteer networks operating outside traditional bureaucratic structures. The Ukrainian approach emphasized rapid adaptation, direct connections between operators and manufacturers, and willingness to experiment with radical organizational concepts including creation of the world's first dedicated drone branch. The appointment of Magyar, a businessman-turned-soldier who built his unit through crowdfunding and personal networks, as USF commander exemplifies Ukraine's preference for elevating battlefield innovation over traditional military hierarchy. This approach has generated remarkable tactical success and established Ukraine as the global leader in small-unit drone employment.
Russia's VBS reflects a more systematized approach attempting to impose institutional order on what had been largely improvised capabilities developed during the war. The emphasis on establishing higher military educational institutions, standardized doctrines, and integration into existing command structures suggests Russian determination to professionalize drone operations and eliminate what Moscow perceives as inefficiencies in ad hoc organization. However, this approach risks stifling the same bottom-up innovation that has driven Russian drone development, potentially creating bureaucratic obstacles that slow adaptation in a rapidly evolving technological environment. The relatively late establishment of the VBS compared to Ukraine's USF may reflect institutional resistance or simply longer decision-making processes in the more hierarchical Russian military system. Whether Russia's systematic approach will prove more sustainable over extended timeframes or will sacrifice agility remains an open question.
The comparative effectiveness of the two forces remains difficult to assess given limited reliable data and the propaganda considerations that shape public reporting by both sides. Ukrainian sources claim that the USF accounts for approximately one-third of all targets struck by Ukrainian forces, suggesting it has become a major contributor to overall combat power. Russian sources emphasize the scale of their drone production and deployment, with President Putin's claim of 1.5 million unmanned systems delivered in 2024 suggesting quantitative advantages that may offset Ukrainian qualitative superiority in specific systems or tactics. Western analysts generally assess that Ukraine maintains technological leads in certain areas, particularly in innovative applications and rapid adaptation of commercial technologies, while Russia has achieved superior industrial scale and can flood the battlefield with numbers that overwhelm defensive capabilities through sheer volume.
The strategic outlook for unmanned systems forces depends heavily on factors external to military organizations themselves, particularly industrial sustainability, supply chain resilience, and international support. Ukraine's dependency on Chinese components for drone production represents a critical vulnerability that could be exploited through diplomatic or economic pressure, potentially crippling Ukrainian drone operations if supplies are restricted. Russia's ability to sustain high-volume production under international sanctions depends on domestic manufacturing capacity, access to critical components through third countries, and allocation of resources in competition with other military priorities. Both nations face the challenge of maintaining innovation velocity while simultaneously scaling production, a tension between customization and standardization that has challenged defense industries historically.
The broader strategic context includes international efforts to support or constrain drone warfare capabilities. Western nations providing military assistance to Ukraine have increasingly included drone systems and counter-drone technologies in aid packages, recognizing the centrality of unmanned systems to Ukrainian defensive capabilities. NATO has planned to expand intelligence-sharing with Ukraine to counter Russian electronic warfare attacks, while the United States has upgraded F-16 fighter jets destined for Ukraine to enhance their ability to operate in electronic warfare environments. These efforts reflect Western recognition that supporting Ukraine's unmanned systems capabilities represents a critical element of maintaining Ukrainian defensive viability. Conversely, Chinese restrictions on drone component exports and potential sanctions on companies supporting Russian military production represent attempts to constrain capabilities through industrial means rather than direct military intervention.
Conclusion
The establishment of dedicated unmanned systems forces by Ukraine and Russia represents a fundamental transformation in military organization and doctrine driven by battlefield realities in the largest conventional conflict since World War II. These institutions formalize recognition that drones have evolved from supporting assets into primary instruments of warfare, requiring specialized expertise, independent command structures, and systematic development of capabilities across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Ukraine's pioneering creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces in June 2024, followed by Russia's establishment of the VBS that became fully operational in November 2025, establishes organizational precedents that will likely influence military structures globally as armed forces worldwide observe the Ukrainian conflict and draw conclusions about future requirements.
The technological competition between Ukrainian and Russian unmanned systems, particularly the widespread adoption of fiber-optic controlled drones immune to electronic warfare, demonstrates how tactical necessity drives rapid innovation under the pressure of high-intensity combat. The dramatic expansion in range capabilities, from 10-20 kilometers to potentially 50 kilometers for fiber-optic systems, the integration of artificial intelligence for target recognition and autonomous operation, and the development of sophisticated countermeasures including drone-versus-drone combat all illustrate the accelerating pace of change in this domain. These developments have rendered vast investments in traditional electronic warfare systems partially obsolete while creating entirely new categories of threats that existing force protection measures struggle to address effectively.
The industrial dimension of this competition, with Russia apparently achieving quantitative superiority through mass production while Ukraine maintains advantages in innovation and tactical application, highlights how drone warfare depends fundamentally on sustainable manufacturing capacity and supply chain resilience. The vulnerability of both sides to disruption of component supplies, particularly from Chinese manufacturers, represents a strategic dependency that could be exploited through economic or diplomatic means. The open-source nature of innovation in this conflict, where successful designs rapidly proliferate across the battlefield through capture and reverse engineering, challenges traditional concepts of military technological advantage and suggests that adaptability and production speed may matter more than exclusive possession of advanced capabilities.
Looking forward, the unmanned systems forces established by Ukraine and Russia will likely serve as models studied by military organizations worldwide, though whether other nations adopt similar dedicated branch structures or develop alternative organizational approaches remains to be seen. The fundamental lesson that drones have become central rather than peripheral to military operations appears inescapable, suggesting that some form of organizational adaptation will be necessary for armed forces expecting to operate in high-intensity conflicts. The ethical and strategic questions raised by increasingly automated warfare, including potential progression toward fully autonomous systems capable of selecting and engaging targets without human intervention, remain largely unaddressed in current military literature focused on immediate operational requirements. These questions will become increasingly pressing as technological capabilities mature and the precedents established in Ukraine inform development of next-generation unmanned systems globally.
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