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Franco-Hova Wars

The immediate difficulties were originated in 1881, when the queen of Madagascar announced that the French had no right to the possession of any land in the island. "This perfidy of the Hovas," exclaimed a Parisian writer," restored to us liberty of action." The last native sovereign of Madagascar, Ranavalona III. (born 1861), succeeded in 1883. The French having claimed a portion of the north-west coast as ceded to them by local chiefs, hostilities were carried on in 1882—84 against the Hovas, who refused to recognise the cession. In 1885 peace was made, Diégo Suarez being surrendered to France. A French Resident-General was received at the capital. and the foreign relations of the country were claimed to be regulated by France.

The spirit of colonial enterprise in remote parts of the globe which was manifested by the French Government after the disaster of the 1870 Franco-Prussian war was largely fictitious. It had no real root in the country and it waas been prompted partly as a compensation for their diminished influence in Europe, and partly as a mode of exciting patriolic enthusiasm for the purposes usually described as 'political capital.' Not one Frenchman in ten thousand cares a rush for the great names of Dnpleix, La Bourdonnaye, or Montcalm. In point of fact, the impulse which conducted the French within a few years to Mexico, to Tunis, to Congo, to Madagascar, and to Tonquin, can be shown to take its rise in the speculations of a few adventurous individuals, who succeeded in implicating the Government in their private affairs, and have sought to retrieve a personal disaster by a national intervention.

By 1880 the political situation was not unclouded, but tact and conciliatory measures could undoubtedly have brought about a modus vivendi between the weak native and the strong European power; while the haughty and overbearing tactics and demeanour of the Commissioner of the Republic designedly brought about a threatening atmosphere charged with explosive materials.

In a somewhat roughly worded despatch addressed to the Prime Minister, Rainilaiarivony, dated 29th April, 1882, the French Commissioner M. A. Baudais, expressed himself to the following effect. He stated that the French Government saw with regret that the Treaty of 1868 was unceasingly trampled on in practice, notwithstanding the protestations and pompous phrases of the Hova Government. He complained that none of the French grievances had met with any redress during the previous five years; or instance, the liquidation of the Laborde inheritance had been treated in a spirit of bad faith by the Malagasy officials; the affair of the Toale dhow had not been satisfactorily settled, and, in short, the treaty impugned in many important points. Again, not content with indirectly breaking their treaty engagements with the French, the Ministers of Ranavalona II. had not hesitated to make an open breach of the treaty by the promulgation of a law relating to property, known as Law 85.

Last, but not least, M. Baudais drew the attention of the Prime Minister to a fact yet more serious than the preceding ones—the assumption of authority by the Hovas over the north-west provinces, which had been secured to France by treaties many years previously. Rainilaiarivony was informed that the presence of a French squadron off those coasts indicated the importance France attached to her rights of protectorate, and finally the Malagasy Government was solemnly warned that France had decided to exact all her rights and enforce them with the utmost rigor. All the grievances of France against Madagascar were thus recapitulated at length in this despatch, which formed, in fact, a species of indictment against the Government of Ranavalona II.

The posts of Mojangt and Tamatave were bombarded. The war thus commenced (if war is a fitting name for what was little more than a series of bombardments and blockades of the ports) lasted till early in 1886, when a treaty of peace was concluded. This treaty gave the French a firmer foothold in the island than they had ever had before, and, above all, it secured the placing of a Resident-General, with a small body of French soldiers as a guard of honor, in the capital. This in due time not unnaturally led to fresh difficulties. The late Prime Minister used every possible device to minimize the operation of the treaty, while the French Residents-General, on the contrary, were ever seeking to render it more effective. The French never gained from this treaty all the influence and authority they had expected; and it was clearly foreseen that new difficulties could not long be warded off.

In October, 1894, M. Le Myre de Yilers was sent out on a special mission to present an ultimatum, which was virtually a claim to exercise a full protectorate over the island. This ultimatum is well described as having been "intended to define the uncompromising nature of the French suzerainty, affirming categorically that the Queen's government should deal with foreign powers only through the French Resident, that all concessions should he subject to the Resident's veto, that a sufficient French garrison should be permanently installed, and that the French Government should be free to execute public works and to collect taxes to defray the expense thereof." The native government replied to the French demands by making some counter suggestions, but absolutely refused to grant what M. Le Myre de Vilers required. After a few days' stay in Antananarivo the envoy hauled down his flag and returned to the coast.

As soon as the refusal of the Hova Government to accede to the French demands was known in Paris, M. Hanotaux, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a statement with regard to the intentions of the government, and said they would ask for the despatch of 15,000 men and a grant of 65,000,000 francs. After a debate lasting three days a vote to this effect was agreed to on November 25th by 377 votes to 143. General Duchesne was appointed leader of the expedition.

The first steps taken by the French to carry out their plans were the seizure of Tamatave on December 12th (the Uovas simply retiring to their intrenched camp at Manjakandrianombana), and of Mojanga on January 16th, 1895. In March the main body of the French expedition left France, many, alas ! never to see it again. Immense enthusiasm was shown by the populace, and these brave men left amid the strains of martial music, the applause of the assembled crowds, and showers of bouquets from the hands of their countrywomen. Prayers for the success of their enterprise were offered in the churches.

The expedition was to start from Mojanga and to march by this route to Antananarivo, a distance of little less than 300 miles. The general landed at Mojanga early in May, but before his arrival General Metzinger had already taken Marovoay, an important Hova garrison town about 40 miles distant from Mojanga, on a small tributary of the Betsiboka. On June 9th Mevatanana, another important town near the junction of the Ikopa and the Betsiboka, was also captured. Near this place is Suberbieville, a town that has sprung up within the last few years in connection with a gold concession granted to a Frenchman named Suberbie. Up to this point the river had been utilized to some extent, tho not so fully as the French had hoped, and much confusion appears to have existed. But now began the most trying part of the campaign—viz., a difficult land journey through a roadless country, and ten weeks were taken up with the construction of a military road from Mevatanana to Andriba, a Hova garrison town about midway between Mevatanana and Antananarivo. It has been estimated that the construction of a hundred miles of road cost 1500 lives, 15 for every mile; and a correspondent, writing from Andriba, pathetically named it "that long Calvary."

Comparatively few men were killed by the Hovas, as very little serious fighting took place. It should be remembered that the English officers had been dismissed some months before, and those who know Madagascar are not much surprised that the native officers showed little resource or courage, and that troops did not care to face French soldiers. Although positions of great natural strength — as, for instance, at Andriba — were selected and great labor was expended in the construction of earthworks, as soon as the French attack was commenced these positions were at once abandoned. General Rainianjalaky, in command of the troops at Andriba, sent the following message to the Prime Minister: "I can do nothing. My men will not stand. They run away as soon as they perceive that two or three of their friends have been killed."

During this last part of the campaign the novas seem to have shown more energy and courage than iu the earlier stages, and for the three days immediately preceding the capture of Antananarivo they made a steady attempt to check the French, and disputed the ground with them mile by mile; but even at this stage the fighting cannot have been very severe, as the French losses were only about 50 wounded and 7 killed. Antananarivo was taken after a brief bombardment on the afternoon of Monday, September 30th.

The losses of the French were chiefly in the lower parts of the country. The numbers in the hospitals were very large, and medical attendance was altogether inadequate. At one time, when quinine was sorely needed, cases of it were lying unrecognized on the beach at Mojanga, having by some error been labeled "nails." Many of the soldiers sent out were quite young, and it was among theso that the death-rate was so terribly high. The official estimate gave 3,500 as the total number of deaths in the island. Many more (probably another 500) died on their way home; and hundreds of the survivors long had reason to remember Madagascar, the malarial fever having such a strange unwillingness to leave those whom it has once attacked.

The mortality among the troops, more especially among the boy volunteers of the 200th regiment, was very high, and the military burial parties which passed through the towns were alarmingly frequent. Many of the men were extraordinarily emaciated and ansemic. The surgeons say that the Madagascar fever induces malarial cachexia in a far shorter time than any other tropical fever of which they have had experience; and it is certain that many young soldiers, within three weeks of landing on the island, robust and ruddy, looked like wornout, bloodless old men. This cachexia produces a great mental depression, and a remarkable number of the sick soldiers committed suicide.

In spite of some facts which might seem to point to a different conclusion, the Hovas are not to be considered a warlike people. Military service is hated and dreaded by them. Nothing pleases them more than to be allowed quietly to attend to their agriculture and their trading. Then it has been evident for months past that serious divisions existed among the native rulers. There have been among them not a few who have been in sympathy with the aims of the French. It must not be forgotten that French officials have been living in Antananarivo for ten years, and that they have made many friends among the people. They have diligently sought to prepare for events they saw would not be long delayed, and it may without any serious breach of charity be assumed that French gold had already to some extent paved the way for General Duchesne's army.

Some disappointment was expressed at the utter collapse of the Hovas. Their patriotism proved to be of a very shallow and ineffective description. Cowardice, however, was not the only explanation of the course of events. Had the Hova troops been well fed and well led, and, above all, bad there been a general feeling of contentment with the existing government, General Duchesne and his little band of toil-worn troops might have met with a very different reception when they reached the neighborhood of Antananarivo in the closing days of last September.

The utter collapse of the Hovas was not, however, without its compensations. When it is remembered how they were mown down by the French guns, and especially what havoc was caused by the melinite shells, we may acknowledge that their so-called cowardice had at least this advantage, that it saved thousands of lives. The greatest friends of the Hovas never believed they could successfully contend with the well-trained and well-armed soldiers France could send against them; and a stouter resistance would only have prolonged a useless struggle, and would not have altered the final result.

What kind of influence the French obtain by the recent treaty is not very clear. That it is not a Protectorate is admitted, but something is implied in a Resident-general in the island, with a Vice-resident at the mountain capital. The ex-governor of Cochin-China becomes the first Resident, who will have authority, in some way, to interfere with any foreign policy of the native sovereign. This treaty of Tamatave is dated December 12, 1885. For the satisfaction of certain assumed monetary claims, £400,000 will be paid by the queen to the Republic, her port Tamatave being held in trust till payment be made. On the other hand, the French now acknowledge Ranavalona as undisputed queen of Madagascar, and declare that they will defend her throne. It is odd that the Malagache supposed that they had gained the diplomatic victory.