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Favela War - Path to War

The armed forces had been willing to provide logistical and intelligence support to the Federal Police in the war against drug trafficking. They had also become increasingly involved in countering the spread of armaments among the drug traffickers. In 1994 there were an estimated 40,000 illegal weapons in Rio de Janeiro. The constitution gives the army the responsibility for supervising armaments. In addition, the army's Eastern Command had provided the Military Police (Polícia Militar--PM) of Rio de Janeiro State with many weapons, long-range vision goggles, and bulletproof vests for countering the well-armed drug traffickers.

On the night of July 23, 1993, eight homeless people were killed beside the Candelária Church in central Rio de Janeiro. Six of the victims were minors. The Candelária Church, a famous historic Roman Catholic church, had become known as a location where hundreds of Rio de Janeiro's street children formed a makeshift home at night. The church personnel provided food, shelter, education, and religious guidance to these children, many of whom were involved in the illegal drug trade and prostitution. Police maintained a constant watch on the church due to the presence of these street children.

A group of men, several of whom were members of the police force, carried out the killings. Those responsible were tried for the murders, but only two were convicted. Nelson Oliveira dos Santos was initially released but was later on parole for other crimes. Marco Aurélio Dias de Alcântara was sentenced to 204 years in prison but was also subsequently released from jail. The international community severely condemned the attack, and many Brazilians called for the prosecution of those responsible for shooting the children who slept near the church.

Studies conducted by organizations connected to Amnesty International revealed that 44 of the 70 children who slept in the streets of that region lost their lives in violent manners. The majority of the young victims were poor and Black. By 2023, 30 years after the massacre, the majority of survivors had died or gone missing. Among the most notable survivors was Sandro Barbosa do Nascimento, who in 2000 orchestrated a bus hijacking known as the Bus 174 incident and was killed by police during that event. Another survivor, Elizabeth Cristina de Oliveira Maia, known as Fat Beth and one of the leaders of the group of young people, also died before the 30th anniversary.

On August 29, 1993, just over a month after the Candelária massacre, the favela of Vigário Geral in northern Rio de Janeiro was invaded by a death squad formed by 36 hooded and armed men. The attackers broke into houses and executed 21 people, making it one of the biggest massacres in Rio de Janeiro state history. Among the deceased were seven men playing cards in a bar and eight members of a single family, including a 15-year-old girl who was killed inside her home. The killings were attributed to the local drug dealers, but the massacre occurred as an act of police retaliation, even though none of the victims had any involvement with drug trafficking.

Following federal and Rio de Janeiro state government investigations that began that year, charges were brought against 33 people, including 28 military police officers believed to belong to the infamous death squad known as the Cavalos Corredores or Galloping Horses, three civil police officers, and two civilian employees of the civil police. By 1998, the number of people charged increased to 52, but only two had been convicted. A majority of the victims' families did not receive compensation from the state.

Of the 51 accused, only one remained in prison decades later. Former military police officer Sirlei Alves Teixeira, who was serving his sentence in a semi-open regime with authorization to work outside prison and make family visits, was found dead by neighbors on March 9, 2021. He was discovered fallen on the steps that gave access to his house. While neighbors initially thought he had suffered a heart attack, emergency services determined that he had been executed. The Vigário Geral massacre highlighted the theme that has dominated Brazilian society from the early twentieth century to the present: the accepting attitude held by middle and upper class citizens and police toward the use of violence, particularly against the poor and marginalized.

In October 1993, the army provided the police forces with 7.62-millimeter FAL assault rifles--the first time such rifles were used by police forces in Brazil. The army also trained members of the Special Operations Battalion (Batalhão de Operações Especiais--Bope). In October 1993, some police officers were implicated in the smuggling of arms to the traffickers, and as a result the army was called on to take firmer measures. All weapons seized in police operations were to be put under army control in military arsenals. In addition, special army agents were to work with the Civil Police, Military Police, and Federal Police forces to identify the traffickers' arms sources.

Drug trafficking and domestic consumption were, by all accounts, on the rise. Some of the groups involved in drug trafficking control entire shantytowns (favelas) and were far better armed than the Federal Police or State Police. In October 1994, there were reports that up to 70 percent of the police force was receiving payoffs by the heavily armed drug-trafficking gangs in the favelas. Growing public demands that law and order be restored in Rio de Janeiro prompted the Itamar Franco government to order the army to launch an offensive against the gangs and to oversee a purge of the police force. The army, under the command of a general, mobilized as many as 70,000 soldiers for the operation in the favelas.

In mid-June 2008, however, 11 soldiers from an Army unit deployed to a Rio slum as security for a social project handed three youths over to drug traffickers, who subsequently killed them. The incident had brought the debate over the military's proper internal role to the front pages of newspapers throughout the country. Despite a lower court ruling ordering the Army to withdraw from the "favela", Minister Jobim continues to argue that the Army was deployed legally and should not withdraw. The debate over whether to deploy the military to take on crime in urban areas, which is already taking place in an ad-hoc fashion, will not be fully resolved until Congress addresses the matter legislatively. Until then, the executive is likely to see internal military deployments as a tool too tempting and politically useful to forgo during public security crises.

Police corruption had been a long-standing problem in Rio de Janeiro. From the relatively low-wages that Rio police officers earn (the second lowest in all Brazilian states) to the high level of danger they face on a daily basis (arguably, the most violent work conditions), Rio police were relatively easy targets for drug traffickers' influence. Many police officers supplement their meager incomes by working with Rio's drug traffickers -- supplying contraband weapons, running drugs themselves, or providing protection. Several previous government administrations had attempted to tackle Rio's police corruption, but the underlying problem of officers being paid too little to tackle too big and dangerous an enemy remains.

Brazil understood that it faced extraordinary challenges as it prepares the country’s security for the upcoming Games. As a result, the federal government had created a specific agency under the Ministry of Justice charged with overall security planning and coordination for the Confederations Cup, the World Cup, and the Olympics. Brazil’s Secretariat for the Security of Large Event’s (SESGE) is in charge of the tactical and operational security planning at the 12 Brazilian host cities for the World Cup in coordination with state and local security forces. The institution brings together officials from all relevant federal and state security organizations, to ensure an integrated effort for security nationwide.

In early 2009 Rio de Janeiro’s State Secretary for Public Security launched a program called the Favela Pacification Plan, with the aim of entering and occupying, and thereby “pacifying” various favelas (slums) in Rio in order to provide public services and security to law abiding citizens. Rio’s police successfully entered at least five favelas, including several – Cantagalo, Pavao-Pavaozinho, and Morro da Babilonia – located near popular beaches and tourist sites commonly visited by U.S. citizens. The incursions of the police into favelas frequently led to gunfire and violence in and around the favelas, and led to retaliation attacks by criminals against public transportation.

Under the Favela Pacification Program (FPP) whereby specially recruited and police officers trained in community policing enter Rio’s favelas (slums), expel drug gang members and other armed criminal elements, and establish a permanent presence, called a Unidade de Policia Pacificadora (UPP). Municipal authorities can then enter the favela and safely deliver much needed social services and economic assistance to residents. The long-term goal of the FPP is to integrate the favela residents into mainstream society, a process that is ongoing and currently exceeding expectations.

Human rights and favela community representatives generally supported Rio de Janeiro's Favela Pacification Program and reported no killings related to the 450 Pacification Police Unit (UPP) officers that patrolled the four favela shantytowns under "pacification" by 2009. By then authorities had "pacified" four favelas, i.e. eliminated drug-trafficking elements, established a sustained UPP presence, and started provisions of basic services. Anti-narco trafficking operations were still underway in a fifth favela, which would receive UPP officers to conduct community policing as soon as the security situation fully stabilizes. Crime indicators - especially homicides - were much lower in pacified communities and the provision of basic services, such as electricity and trash collecting, was steadily improving.

By 2011, significant progress had been made in reducing Rio de Janeiro’s legendary, critical crime rates. Since November 2008, there had been 20 major pacification efforts. The result is that police had reasserted permanent control in dozens of previously unpacified favelas, home to nearly a million people. The two major Rio de Janeiro drug gangs, the Commando Vermelho and the Amigos dos Amigos, had permanently lost their base of operations in the Complexo do Alemao and Rocinha favelas. The senior leadership of both gangs were now in custody or on the run as fugitives. Police effectively control every major favela in Rio from the downtown financial district, extending south to the affluent Zona Sul (South Zone) and west to the Barra da Tijuca. This includes the area near the Maracana Stadium that will host the 2014 World Cup finals and the Barra Da Tijuca where the 2016 Olympic Games will be based. The goal until 2016 is for more than 20 additional pacification efforts to stand up, requiring the hiring of thousands of additional police officers. This is will bring nearly all of Rio’s favelas under the effective control of the police by 2016 when Rio hosts the Olympic Games.

According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Amnesty International, specialized Police Pacification Units (UPPs) significantly reduced violence in dozens of communities, but the NGO stated that police in Rio de Janeiro continued to depend on repressive methods and were responsible for at least 30 percent of all civilian casualties in police operations. Under the pacification program, the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat for Public Security inaugurated eight new UPPs during the year, bringing the total to 27. In July 2012, after 19 months of control of the community, the armed forces handed over control of the favela Complexo do Alemao to UPP officers. At the end of 2012, UPPs were responsible for patrolling approximately 150 favela areas in Rio de Janeiro State.

After decades battling organized crime in the favelas, the poor communities that dot the hills surrounding the city, authorities in 2008 launched a huge slum "pacification" program. By 2014, some 38 Police Pacification Units (UPPs) comprising 9,500 officers had been installed in 174 favelas home to some 600,000 people. Rio intensified its efforts to keep a lid on crime as it attempts to turn the city into an international showcase for the World Cup and the Rio Olympics in 2016, the first Olympiad in South America.

Authorities stepped up efforts to quell the violence as the 2014 World Cup, which kicked off on June 12, loomed ever closer. Rio would stage seven matches, including the July 13 final. Rio authorities asked the government to approve military support for police in favelas in thrall to violent gangs and drug traffickers after a series of attacks on police units. President Dilma Rousseff on 24 March 2014 confirmed the government would send troop support following an appeal for assistance by Rio governor Sergio Cabral. Brazilian reconnaissance troops entered a sprawling slum district near Rio's international airport 26 March 2014 ahead of a larger operation to secure the crime-ridden area ahead of the World Cup. The federal troops joined police in the deployment in Mare to set the stage for a major joint drive to "pacify" a cluster of 16 neighborhoods seen as havens for organized crime.