Favela War - Operation Containment 2025
On 28 October 2025, Rio de Janeiro experienced its most lethal police operation in history when approximately twenty-five hundred officers from the Civil and Military Police launched Operation Containment in the Penha and Alemão complexes in the North Zone. The massive operation aimed to execute more than one hundred arrest warrants targeting leaders of Comando Vermelho and to combat what Governor Cláudio Castro described as the faction's territorial expansion. By the end of the day, at least one hundred and thirty-two people had been killed according to the regional public defender's office, though official government figures initially placed the death toll at fifty-eight and later acknowledged sixty casualties. Four police officers died in the operation. Dozens of bodies were found by favela residents and displayed in the streets for families to identify, while others were discovered in wooded areas near Penha the day after the operation concluded. The death toll surpassed even the notorious Jacarezinho massacre of 2021.
The operation deployed overwhelming military-style force including two helicopters, twelve demolition vehicles from the Military Police's Special Operations Support Unit, thirty-two armored vehicles from the National Public Security Force, and mobilization of all specialized Civil Police units. Suspected criminals responded by erecting barriers and burning buses to block roads, including major arteries like Avenida Brasil and the Yellow and Red Lines, paralyzing traffic throughout the city. In a dramatic escalation of tactics, gang members used drones to drop explosives on police forces, prompting authorities to characterize the response as "narcoterrorism." The intense confrontations lasted throughout the day with automatic weapons fire echoing across the densely populated neighborhoods, helicopters shooting from above, and explosives creating columns of smoke visible from distant parts of the city. Schools, health clinics, and essential services shut down. Residents trapped in their homes posted desperate messages to social media describing the terror as the battle raged around them.
The death toll from the operation reached at least 119 people, including 115 suspected gang members and four police officers, though some organizations reported figures as high as 132 fatalities. The raid lasted approximately seventeen hours and involved intense gun battles between police and heavily armed gang members. Authorities reported that gang members used weaponized drones to drop explosives on police forces, erected barricades using buses, and engaged in sustained firefights. Police seized 93 rifles, over half a ton of drugs, and arrested 113 suspects during the operation.
Residents of the affected favelas spent the night of October 28 collecting bodies from wooded ravines and hillsides, bringing them to central squares where family members identified their loved ones. By early morning on October 29, at least 50 bodies of mostly young men lay in the streets of Penha, surrounded by hundreds of mourning family members and residents. Many in the crowd screamed the words massacre and justice as forensic teams arrived to collect the remains. Local activists and residents reported finding people who had been shot in the back, shot in the head, stabbed, and in some cases tied up, leading them to describe the operation as a state-sponsored massacre rather than a legitimate police action.
The scale of the massacre sparked immediate domestic and international condemnation. The United Nations Human Rights Office expressed horror at the violence, stating that it "furthers the trend of extreme lethal consequences of police operations in Brazil's marginalized communities" and reminded authorities of their obligations under international human rights law. The U.S. State Department issued a security alert warning American citizens to avoid northern Rio. Human rights organizations pointed out that the operation occurred just days before Rio was scheduled to host the C40 World Mayors Summit and Prince William's Earthshot Prize ceremony, raising questions about whether the timing was intended to project an image of government control ahead of these international events. Critics noted that the operation violated the spirit if not the letter of ADPF 635 restrictions, with many arguing that such massive raids exemplify exactly the kind of disproportionate use of force the Supreme Court had sought to curtail.
Governor Castro used the aftermath of Operation Containment to launch bitter attacks on both the federal government and the Supreme Court. He claimed that President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's administration had denied three previous requests for support from the Armed Forces, including requests for armored vehicles, leaving Rio "completely alone" in conducting what he called the largest operation in the state's history. Castro sharply criticized ADPF 635, arguing that the Supreme Court's restrictions had made it easier for drug traffickers from other states to relocate to Rio, taking advantage of limits on police action. He characterized the operation as necessary to combat territorial expansion by Comando Vermelho and vowed that the state would not retreat because "the more public safety works, the freer you and your family will be." The governor's rhetoric echoed that of Wilson Witzel years earlier, framing favela residents as enemy populations and police operations as wars against terrorism rather than law enforcement actions that must respect human rights and constitutional constraints.
Rio de Janeiro Governor Claudio Castro defended the operation, stating that Rio was engaged in a war against narco-terrorism and that those killed had resisted police action. He insisted that all those killed were criminals and that the clashes primarily occurred in wooded areas where civilians would be unlikely to venture. The governor claimed that the only real victims were the four police officers who died. Castro, from the conservative opposition Liberal Party, criticized the federal government for insufficient support in combating organized crime, directing his comments at the leftist administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
Brazilian President Lula expressed horror at the scale of fatalities and surprise that such an operation had proceeded without the federal government's prior knowledge. Justice Minister Ricardo Lewandowski convened emergency meetings with local authorities in Rio to examine the situation. The federal Justice Ministry noted that it had repeatedly responded to requests from Rio's state government to deploy national forces, renewing their presence eleven times. Non-governmental organizations, the United Nations human rights body, and international human rights groups quickly condemned the operation and called for investigations into the high number of deaths.
The operation severely disrupted daily life in the affected areas. Schools closed, a local university canceled classes, train services on multiple lines were suspended, metro operations were interrupted, family health clinics shuttered, and COVID-19 vaccination centers closed. Over 2,000 students missed classes. The gun battles were so intense that at least one person was shot inside a subway car passing through a station that serves the North Zone neighborhood. The event occurred just one week before Rio de Janeiro was scheduled to host thousands of international visitors for a United Nations climate summit.
The October 2025 massacre represents the most extreme example of a pattern of lethal police operations that has characterized Rio de Janeiro for decades. Between 2016 and 2023, research organizations documented 283 police operations in Rio de Janeiro that could be characterized as massacres, resulting in 1,137 civilian deaths. This averages to approximately three massacres per month throughout that seven-year period. Police in Brazil killed 2,212 people nationwide in 2013, a figure that increased to 3,022 the following year, contributing to Brazil's national murder rate of 30 deaths per 100,000 people.
Studies have identified a particularly deadly subset of operations referred to as revenge operations, which occur after a police officer has been killed or injured. These operations are on average 71 percent more lethal than other police massacres. Since 2016, revenge operations have resulted in 117 deaths in Greater Rio. The October 2025 operation followed this pattern, as the massive escalation in violence occurred after a civil police officer was shot and killed in a confrontation shortly after the operation began. The initial phase of the operation was relatively calm, but the massacre intensified dramatically following the death of the officer.
The distribution of police massacres across Rio de Janeiro is not uniform. While the South Zone recorded nine massacres between 2016 and 2023, with four occurring in the Rocinha favela, the North Zone experienced 73 massacres that killed 373 people during the same period. This stark geographical disparity reflects the concentration of police violence in predominantly poor and Black communities. Critics have pointed to the Brazilian middle and upper classes' accepting attitude toward the use of violence against marginalized communities as a fundamental factor that enables continued police brutality.
The Broader Pattern
The massacres in Rio de Janeiro reflect a broader crisis of public security and human rights in Brazil. Criminal gangs have expanded their presence across Brazil in recent years, including into the Amazon rainforest. The Red Command, also known as Comando Vermelho, has particularly increased its control over favelas in Rio de Janeiro, prompting increasingly militarized police responses. The gang's sophisticated weaponry, including the use of armed drones, represents an escalation in the technological capabilities of organized crime in Brazil.
Critics of aggressive police operations argue that such actions fail to address the root causes of organized crime and do not produce lasting security improvements. Community leaders and favela rights organizations have noted that those killed in police operations are easily replaceable within criminal organizations. Within approximately 30 days after a major operation, organized crime typically reorganizes in the territory and resumes its activities, including drug sales, cargo theft, and fee collection. In terms of concrete results for the population and society, these operations achieve practically nothing according to those who study their long-term impact.
The massacres have disproportionately affected poor and Black communities. The majority of victims across all major massacres in Rio de Janeiro have been young, poor, and Black, reflecting the intersection of poverty, racism, and state violence. Between 1988 and 1991, federal police reported that almost 6,000 children were killed in Brazil, most coming from rural areas and urban shantytowns. These children found in the streets of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo a sense of belonging that they lacked elsewhere, joining with others in similar circumstances, but often falling victim to violence from both criminal organizations and state security forces.
The legal and political responses to these massacres have often proven inadequate. Conviction rates for police officers involved in killings remain extremely low. Political leaders have adopted diverging approaches to the crisis, with some governors and security officials describing operations in military terms as wars against narco-terrorism, while federal authorities and human rights organizations emphasize the need for investigations, accountability, and alternative approaches to public security. The tension between state and federal authorities, particularly when they represent different political parties, has complicated efforts to develop coherent policies for addressing both organized crime and police violence.
The international community has consistently condemned the massacres in Rio de Janeiro. United Nations human rights bodies, Amnesty International, the International Federation for Human Rights, and numerous other organizations have called for thorough investigations, accountability for perpetrators, and systemic reforms to Brazilian policing. These international appeals have had limited impact on changing the fundamental patterns of violence that continue to characterize Rio de Janeiro's approach to public security. The October 2025 massacre, occurring just days before Brazil was to host a major international climate summit, brought renewed international attention to the ongoing crisis of police violence in Rio de Janeiro.