Brazil - Drugs
Brazil stands as the world's second-largest consumer of cocaine after the United States, a distinction that reflects both the country's geographic position in South America's drug trafficking corridors and its massive domestic market. The country documented more than 180,000 incidents involving cocaine trafficking in 2023, with authorities seizing nearly 130,000 kilograms of the drug. Unlike North America and Europe, Brazil has relatively low levels of opioid consumption, with prescription opioid use representing only a small fraction of that seen in high-income countries. The recent emergence of synthetic opioids like nitazenes has prompted increased surveillance, though seizures remain limited compared to other drug types. The primary substances of concern remain cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana, with alcohol representing a significant unregulated market that contributes to public health challenges across the country.
Expanded activity by the Colombian drug mafia and smaller, independent cocaine trafficking groups during the 1990s strained Brazil's already hard-pressed federal, state, and local police. Confronted with federal budget shortfalls and the resulting lack of resources, Brazilian drug law enforcement authorities face an uphill battle in their effort to combat drug trafficking and large quantities of cocaine continue to filter through Brazil. Cocaine hydrochloride, cocaine base, cocaine essential chemicals, and heroin essential chemicals are either produced in Brazil or transported through the country.
There was also evidence of a serious drug abuse problem in Brazil, as coca derivative products become more readily available. In addition to inhalants and marijuana, crack cocaine and bazuco, a highly impure solid by-product created during the cocaine conversion process, increasingly are being consumed primarily by low-income Brazilians. An equally disturbing drug problem in Brazil is the emergence and use of combination and hybrid drugs like merla, a mixture of cocaine base and marijuana, and skank, a crossbreed of Afghan, Moroccan, and Thai cannabis.
Drug trafficking was not a critical social problem in Brazil until the late 1970's. Then, following the new routes chosen by the Colombian cartels and the Italian-American Mafia, cocaine began to be negotiated on a large scale in Brazil. Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, as well as other cities and towns, became new consumer markets for drugs. Data on violent crimes during the past few years suggest a link between the spread of drug use, mainly among young people, the increase in violent crime rates and the repressive policies in which police corruption thrives. The social and economic context of inflation, repression, and increased poverty only worsens the situation.
In the Sao Paulo region, the percentage of violent crimes among total crimes registered increased 50 percent in 4 years. As soon as the government adopted repressive measures to combat drug use, criminalizing certain drugs but not others, the police held enormous powers. Arrests, convictions, and incarcerations have increased. Despite the enormous repressive effort and the increased expenses of keeping predominantly young and poor males in prison, there was no indication that violence and crime diminished.
On the contrary, in Campinas there was an increase in most crimes typically connected with drugs. The wealthy built high walls around their homes in reaction to the crime threat, and the poor tended to isolate themselves in their homes and among their families. Some sought security in new Protestant religious sects that emphasize the need to destroy the devil through rites of exorcism practiced on individuals who seek their services. The concept of an absolute evil that explains this explosion of violent criminality contributed to the growth of these sects.
The Primeiro Comando da Capital, commonly known as PCC, emerged as Latin America's largest criminal organization with an estimated 40,000 members and 60,000 contractors operating across five continents. Founded in São Paulo's prison system, the organization transformed into a sophisticated transnational enterprise generating at least one billion dollars in annual revenue since 2020, with recent investigations revealing the group controls approximately five billion dollars in property investments.
The PCC's business model distinguishes itself from other Brazilian criminal groups through its emphasis on quiet market expansion rather than violent territorial confrontations. The organization pivoted decisively toward international cocaine exports in 2014, cementing its control over the Port of Santos, South America's largest port, which became the gateway for massive cocaine shipments to Europe, Africa, and Asia. The PCC has forged crucial alliances with Italy's 'Ndrangheta mafia, which provides logistics and distribution networks across Europe, while also maintaining partnerships with Mexican cartels, Colombian suppliers, and criminal networks in Russia, Lebanon, and various African nations.
The Comando Vermelho represents Brazil's oldest major criminal organization, having originated in the 1970s within Rio de Janeiro's prison system during the military dictatorship. Political prisoners and common criminals were housed together, creating an unlikely alliance that eventually evolved into one of the country's most powerful drug trafficking networks. At its peak in 1985, the Comando Vermelho controlled approximately 70 percent of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro's favelas, and current estimates suggest the organization maintains around 30,000 members throughout Brazil.
Unlike the PCC's more discrete approach, the Comando Vermelho has consistently engaged in direct armed confrontations with state forces since the mid-1980s, contributing to Rio de Janeiro's persistent violence problem. The organization maintains crucial supply relationships with Colombian guerrilla groups including ELN and FARC dissidents, as well as cocaine producers in Peru and Bolivia. These drugs move through Amazon river routes and border regions before reaching Brazilian ports and domestic distribution networks.
Both major organizations have expanded their international reach significantly in recent years, with the Comando Vermelho establishing connections with European mafias including Italy's 'Ndrangheta and Balkans criminal networks to facilitate cocaine shipments to European markets where prices can reach tens of thousands of euros per kilogram. The competition between PCC and Comando Vermelho for control of strategic trafficking routes has intensified, particularly in the Amazon region where both organizations seek to dominate the corridors connecting cocaine-producing countries to Brazilian ports. This rivalry has spawned alliances with numerous smaller regional factions across Brazil's 27 states, creating a complex criminal ecosystem that includes approximately 80 different criminal gangs and armed militia groups. The militias themselves represent a distinct threat, often composed of former police officers who control territory in Rio de Janeiro and charge residents for protection services.
The extent of cartel control over Brazilian territory is staggering, with approximately 60 percent of Rio de Janeiro state under the influence of either drug gangs or militias. Recent law enforcement operations demonstrate both the scale of violence and the challenges authorities face in combating these organizations. A major police operation in Rio de Janeiro in late October 2025 resulted in over 100 deaths, including four police officers and 60 alleged criminals, with authorities executing more than 250 arrest and search warrants. Such operations frequently disrupt daily life in affected areas, forcing school and medical facility closures and requiring bus routes to be altered to avoid conflict zones. The timing of these operations often coincides with major international events, raising questions about their strategic deployment.
As Brazil approaches the 2026 national elections, drug trafficking and criminal violence are expected to dominate political discourse, with ongoing debate about whether to classify major criminal organizations as terrorist groups, a designation the current government has resisted despite pressure from conservative political factions.
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