Myanmar - Operation 1027

Fighting in Myanmar between the military junta and an alliance of ethnic armed groups intensified since late October 2023 after an unprecedented offensive in the country’s north exposed the junta’s struggles on the ground. The UN called for all sides to respect international law in a statement on 17 November 2023, saying that more than 70 civilians had already been killed and some 200,000 displaced by the upsurge in violence.

Dubbed “Operation 1027”, the offensive began on 10 / 27 / 2023 in northern Shan State on the Chinese border. Three armed groups – the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army – joined forces under the Three Brotherhood Alliance moniker. The United Wa State Army announced that they were neutral in the current conflict. While many had hoped that the Wa would join forces, their neutrality could make an army attack from the south through territory it controls difficult.

This offensive was not a total surprise. The TNLA had been fighting for most of 2023. The MNDAA had warned that they would join the TNLA should the military attack their positions in the Kokang region. The inclusion of the Arakan Army from Rakhine state was a bigger surprise, because the group had earlier concluded that they could get greater autonomy in their western state by not fighting, and had reached a ceasefire in November 2022.

Intense armed clashes, including artillery shelling and airstrikes, persisted between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), spanning multiple townships in northern Shan. This new front of the conflict had now expanded into the Northwest, Southeast and Rakhine.

Operation 1027 was important for five key reasons.

First, the Brotherhood Alliance supports the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and its goals for a federal democracy – even though to date it had not fought alongside the NUG, despite its alliance with the Kachin Independence Organization, a key member of the NUG’s multi-ethnic alliance. The TNLA had trained NUG’s people’s defense forces (PDFs), but thus far it had only fought the military in self defense. PDFs are now fighting alongside the Brotherhood Alliance.

Second, Operation 1027 is, if not actually further coordinated offensive operations against the junta, clearly opportunistic actions by other groups. The coordinated offense had clearly taken the military by surprise. Of all the various conflict zones in the country, including Sagaing, Chin, Kachin, Mon, and Tanintharyi, Shan had seen significantly less fighting. This was a new front that the military can ill afford. On Nov. 6, a coordinated operation between the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army and a PDF took control of Kawlin Township in Sagaing. It was the first of 330 township capitals in Myanmar to fall, and the first where the NUG flag was raised. It remains to be seen whether the Arakan Army would break their ceasefire in Rakhine. They may feel compelled to do so if their forces in northern Shan suffer heavy casualties. But even if they don't break the ceasefire, for the past week the military regime had been redeploying forces to Rakhine. Karreni forces launched a coordinated offensive in Kayah State on 7 November and fighting between the military and Karen National Liberation Army in the southeastern Tanintharyi region had also escalated.

Third, Beijing sent several high level delegations to Naypyidaw to pressure the junta to resume the stalled Kyaukphyu port project and the railroad and roads that would connect it to Yunnan province under China’s Belt and Road Initiative of infrastructure lending. Following the visit by a top Chinese diplomat, after Min Aung Hlaing was unceremoniously not invited to the Belt and Road’s 10th Anniversary summit in Beijing last month, Naypyidaw solicited tenders for the port project. Highway 3 and 34 are the main arteries from Mandalay and Naypyitaw to China, and part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. The free trade zone in Muse-Ruili was currently stalled, and China’s railroad terminates there. Border trade with China was critically important to the junta, as dollar-denominated trade was too expensive for the sanctioned regime. And those roads are a key conduit for armament imports from China.

Fourth, Operation 1027 clearly demonstrates their agency and willingness to resist Chinese pressure if it goes against their interests. The capture of border posts ties into the broader question about China’s involvement. All three members of the Brotherhood Alliance have traditionally been dependent on China, which stepped up their pressure on them and the KIA this year to cease their military operations against the military. China’s special representative to Myanmar had convened several meetings to pressure them to engage the junta and rejoin the peace process. While they politely refused, they also pledged to protect Chinese economic interests.

Fifth, upon capturing Chinshwehaw and two other cities – all havens for cyber scams, human, drug and wildlife trafficking, and illegal casinos – the MNDAA began to dismantle the criminal syndicates. Chinese began fleeing Laukkaing, another hub of illicit activity, to escape the fighting. Radio Free Asia had reported that Thailand was trying to repatriate 162 nationals who had been trafficked to the border crime zones. Shutting down the crime zones was a significant development in itself. But it would also impact the junta’s coffers. Most of the special economic zones are controlled by local border guards forces who are allied with the military regime. These former ethnic resistance armies accepted autonomy in return for economic concessions. The junta was believed to get a large cut of the proceeds. But if nothing else, the loss of the criminal syndicates would dry up the funds necessary to administer the border guards forces and keep their loyalty.

Finally, while the military was able to use helicopters to resupply forces in northern Shan, it doesn’t have sufficient airlift capacity to mount a full scale invasion. And with the loss of 126 camps and their supply of weapons and ammunition, it had few places from which to stage attacks. If the military tries to launch a counter-offensive and fails, that would have a huge impact on morale within its ranks, and concurrently cause a huge spike in the morale of the NUG and its allies and partners, which have been suffering high rates of casualties. It would also likely lead to more defections and desertions of soldiers and border guard units that can no longer be resupplied.

The military was likely to respond with more indiscriminate air strikes and long range artillery bombardments from a safe distance. Both would result in more civilian casualties, including in China, and refugee flows. Rather than an offensive, there might be a buildup of troops in a defensive perimeter around Pyin Oo Lwin, which was the home of the military’s once prestigious Defense Services Academy, and thus highly symbolic.

The military responded with an escalation in the number of long-range artillery and aerial bombing, both of which have resulted in increased civilian casualties. On 03 December 2023, the NUG's Ministry of Human Rights released details on SAC attacks on civilians, documenting 84 airstrikes, and 112 artillery strikes that resulted in the death of 244 civilians. Such attacks would continue as the military had neither sufficient number of troops to retake lost territory, nor sufficient means to move troops. One cannot control territory from the air.

By 15 December 2023 more than 660,000 people were estimated to have been newly displaced since the escalation of armed conflict on 27 October, with some people displaced several times and others already starting to return home. Total current displacement now stood at 2.6 million people nationwide. The volatile context was generating significant protection risks including increased civilian casualties, arbitrary arrests, exploitation, forced recruitment and forced labor. Food, safe shelter, non-food items and hygiene kits, basic health services and protection support remain priorities with shortages of essential supplies being reported in many areas due to commercial and humanitarian transport blockages.