Brazil Royalist Revolts - 1893-1894
Field Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, commander in Rio Grande do Sul led a group of military officers into a conspiracy to replace the cabinet in November 1889. What started as an armed demonstration demanding replacement of a cabinet turned within hours into a coup d'état deposing Emperor Pedro II. With the Law of Constitution and the Presidential election of 1891 the dictatorial authority which General da Fonseca had exercised unchecked for fifteen months nominally ended, but subsequent events show how little he allowed his actions to be controlled by the new law. His election was the result of pressure upon the first Brazilian Congress by the military party, and in no sense represented popular feeling.
President Deodoro Da Fonseca had learned little from his experience while holding dictatorial power. The Federal authority continued to intervene in local matters in opposition to the spirit and letter of the recently framed Law of Constitution, and the State of Sao Paulo openly protested against this policy. On March 9,1891, a manifesto was issued, calling attention to the irregularities practiced by the President. This document asserted that the attitude of the Federal Government towards Sao Paulo was caused by that State voting against Fonseca for the Presidency. Another manifesto followed on March 18, signed by thirty Senators and Deputies representing fourteen States and the Federal District, and amongst its signatories were Aristides Lobo, formerly adjutant-general of the army, Jose Simeao, ex-chief of police of Rio de Janiero, Admiral Custodio de Mello, Colonel Marciano de Magalhaes, and Major Serzedello.
The immediate effect of these protestations was to increase the severity of the praetorian system. Arrests were made on the grounds of implication in plots for restoring the imperial regime, but no monarchist conspiracy was really attempted. Harsh measures and the short-sighted policy of not conciliating the Opposition resulted in exasperating public feeling during the first half of 1891, and when Congress met for the annual session in June, 1891, it was evident a political explosion could not be long deferred.
The plan adopted to force the hand of Fonseca was simple. Every measure sent into Congress by the Administration was blocked, judicial and other appointments made by the Provisional Government between 1889 and 1891 were declared illegal on the grounds they were not sanctioned by the Legislature, amendments to the Constitution were proposed to curtail the presidential powers, and the Chambers refused to vote supplies that the President considered necessary.
On 03 November 1892 General Deodoro da Fonseca arrogated to himself dictatorial rights. He was again in the position he seized when, as leader of the military revolt on November 15, 1889, he deposed Dom Pedro II. He endeavored to justify his action by declaring that the Government had clear proof of monarchist plots, and that the conspirators had determined to take advantage of the restless feeling produced by economic and financial causes to raise the standard of armed revolution. In reality, the President had very little to say in defense of his coup d'etat. His assertions of monarchist conspiracies deceived nobody, and the population extended neither sympathy or support to the course he had taken.
On November 9, the garrisons at Rio Grande, Bage, Pelotas, and other points in the State of Rio Grande do Sul declared against the action of the Federal Government. On the 10th, the regiment stationed at Santa Anna de Livramento revolted, and the troops at Jaguarao, Cacapava, Alegrete, and Uruguayana followed. Generals Osorio, Tavares, and Astrogildo assumed command of these opposition forces and occupied all important points, and two days later, Governor Julho de Castilhos was forced to resign office. A committee consisting of Dr Assis Brazil, Dr Barros Casal, and General Rocha Osorio was then appointed to administer the State, the National Guard was called out, and by November 23 the number of men under arms prepared to dispute the authority of Fonseca was 50,000.
In Rio de Janeiro the navy took up the defense of the Chambers. Admiral Wandenkolk and Admiral Custodio de Mello were both National Deputies. They decided to resort to armed force to counteract the Government decrees of November 3, and the naval officers of the squadron joined the movement. A raid was made on the 21st upon one of the stations of the Central Railway, and a quantity of material and stores seized by the insurgents. The Government, becoming seriously alarmed, ordered the arrest of several prominent naval officers, amongst these Admirals Wandelkolk and Guimaraes; but that did not stop the rising, and next day Admiral Custodio de Mello boarded the cruiser Riachuelo and assumed command of the war vessels. On the morning of the 23rd the squadron steamed into position before the city. A rumor of bombardment caused a panic, but only a few shots were fired, one of which struck the Candelaria Church.
The fact that the navy was in opposition was regarded by the President as proof that the game was lost, so he held a hasty consultation with his ministers, and determined to resign. This resolution come to, he sent for Vice-President Floriano Peixoto and gave orders for the release of Admiral Wandenkolk, at the same time issuing a manifesto announcing his resignation.
Some riotous scenes followed, and two newspaper offices, the Diario de Commercio and Nomdades, were wrecked. The municipal building was raided in search of the Prefect, Senhor Jose Felix, who had made himself specially obnoxious by strict enforcement of recent arbitrary orders, and outbursts of minor importance occurred in the city. These conditions, however, were of short duration, and normal quiet was restored in a few hours. General Floriano Peixoto, in virtue of his office as Vice-President of the Republic, assumed the Presidency, and Fonseca retired into private life for good and all, forgotten until his death in August 1892.
Peixoto's accession gave promise of better things. Brazilians were aware of the part he had taken in the overthrow of his predecessor, and quite understood that his action was dictated by personal motives, and did not forget that the Vice-President was connected with the military element, which had caused much misery in the past two years. The experiences, however, the country had passed through since the deposition of Dom Pedro II. inclined people to anticipate that the new Administration would be conducted on constitutional lines, and militarism restrained. President Peixoto's first steps in forming his ministry, and the abrogation of the decree of November 3, dissolving the Chambers, helped to strengthen this hopeful feeling, and the reassembling of Congress on December 18, 1891, further assisted to restore confidence. On December 5 had come news of the death of Dom Pedro II. It evoked such expressions of regret in Rio de Janeiro and other prominent cities, as served to reveal the small part that the general public had taken in his deposition in 1889.
Political interest was now concentrated upon Congress, and the relations between the Legislature and President Peixoto. Matters went smoothly at first, the President bringing no undue pressure to bear upon the Chambers. A new electoral law was passed to provide for an election in case of the death or resignation of the President within two years of assuming office. This point (Article 42 of the Constitution) is important, for the reason that round it centered a bitter dispute at a later period. Congress rose on the 21st of January 1892, after passing a vote of confidence in the Administration, and recommending that stringent measures be taken to avoid a recurrence of internal political disturbances.
Peixoto, now free from the control of Congress, soon showed signs of perpetuating many of the worst abuses of his predecessor. Militarism became more marked than at any previous period, and unmitigated hostility was shown towards the Governors of States who had not openly pronounced against General da Fonseca when he made his coup d'etat on November 3 preceding. Towards the close of January a mutiny occurred at the fortress of Santa Cruz, situated near the entrance to the harbor of Rio de Janeiro; but the outbreak was suppressed by two battalions of infantry, this force assaulting the fort and sustaining heavy loss in the attack. The President believed that the rebellious act was promoted by his enemies, and cherished bitter feeling towards all opposed to him, which led him into a course of action carrying in its train many tragic results.
He surrounded himself with a clique, and to ensure the adherence of these supporters, corrupt practices were condoned and public monies inadvisedly expended. Absolute obedience to his will was demanded, both from his immediate following and from the Governors of the States, and he intervened persistently in State Government affairs, going so far in February, 1892, as to depose the Governors of Ceara, Amazonas and Matto Grosso.
The year 1893 opened with ominous murmurings of discontent and frequent rumors of revolutionary conspiracies. The President was aware of the popular sentiment, but only became the more severe in his treatment of persons suspected of political intrigue and consolidated his military resources for a determined resistance if armed revolt broke out.
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