Slay the Gerrymander with At-Large Elections
Partisan gerrymandering emerged as one of the most significant threats to American democracy, enabling politicians to choose their voters rather than voters choosing their representatives. This practice resulted in distorted representation, decreased electoral competition, and increased political polarization. A comprehensive solution exists: repealing the 1967 Uniform Congressional District Act and implementing at-large elections where all House members from each state are elected statewide. This reform would structurally eliminate the ability to gerrymander by eliminating district lines entirely. At the state level, geographical minorities from different regions could compete effectively for seats, reducing the dominance of safe districts and the resulting need for artificial mechanisms like term limits to create turnover.
The Gerrymandering Crisis
Gerrymandering is the practice of drawing electoral district boundaries to favor specific political interests, often resulting in districts with convoluted, winding boundaries rather than compact, logical areas. The term originated in 1812 when Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry approved a redistricting map that included a district resembling a salamander, leading to the portmanteau "gerrymander." While gerrymandering has existed since the founding era, it has reached unprecedented levels following the Supreme Court's 2019 ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause that partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable in federal courts.1
The practice employs two primary techniques: "cracking" and "packing." Cracking splits groups of disfavored voters among multiple districts, diluting their electoral strength so they cannot elect their preferred candidates in any district. Packing concentrates disfavored voters into as few districts as possible, allowing them to win overwhelmingly in those districts while weakening their influence everywhere else.1 These techniques can be deployed simultaneously to create highly skewed electoral maps that bear little relationship to actual voter preferences.
The 2024 congressional elections illustrated the severity of the problem. Analysis by the Brennan Center for Justice estimated that gerrymandered maps gave Republicans an advantage of approximately 16 House seats compared to maps that would comply with the strong anti-gerrymandering standards proposed in the stalled Freedom to Vote Act.2 North Carolina provides a striking example: after the state Supreme Court struck down the 2021 congressional map as an impermissible partisan gerrymander, court-appointed experts drew a fair map that resulted in an even 7-7 split between Democrats and Republicans in the 2022 midterms. However, after the Republican-controlled legislature redrew the map following a favorable court ruling, three Democratic districts flipped to Republicans in 2024, enough to give control of the entire U.S. House to the GOP by a slim margin.1
While both parties have engaged in gerrymandering, the overall bias in current maps strongly favors Republicans due primarily to aggressive gerrymandering in GOP strongholds in the South and Midwest.2 In Texas, although Democrats receive just under half the statewide vote, they win only around one-third of the state's 38 congressional districts thanks to politically and racially discriminatory district design.3 The shape of one Pennsylvania representative's gerrymandered district was so precisely drawn that it formed a finger that stopped at his street, encompassing his house but not the spot where he parked his car.4
Historical Use of At-Large and Multi-Member Districts
Early American Practice
At-large and multi-member districts have deep roots in American electoral history. In the First Congress (1789-1791), seven of the 11 states with multiple House seats divided representatives into geographic districts, while four states—Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—elected their representatives at-large.5 The high-water mark of at-large representation came during the 16th Congress, which seated 41 members elected at large.5
Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, at-large districts were used in two primary scenarios: either all representatives from a state were elected at-large through general ticket elections, or states combined at-large districts with geographic districts.5 At-large districts combined with geographic districts were particularly common when states gained additional House seats through reapportionment but the state legislature could not convene in time to draw new districts, or when legislators disagreed on redistricting proposals.5
Congressional Attempts to Mandate Single-Member Districts
Congress first attempted to mandate single-member districts in the Apportionment Act of 1842, which specified that representatives "shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of Representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one district electing more than one Representative."6 This Whig-controlled Congress enacted the requirement because other election practices, such as multi-member districts and general ticket elections, had often provided uniform Democratic Party control of several state congressional delegations.6 However, the use of general ticket elections continued after 1842, as four states elected their delegations through the general ticket system in the 28th Congress (1843-1845), and the new Democratic majority seated these delegations regardless.6
The Apportionment Act of 1911 contained similar language requiring single-member districts that were compact, contiguous, and with equal populations.6 However, the Supreme Court's 1932 decision in Wood v. Broom ruled that districting regulations in apportionment laws did not carry over into subsequent apportionments.7 Since the Reapportionment Act of 1929 contained no districting requirements, various states returned to using at-large districts. In the 1932 House elections, Missouri, Kentucky, Virginia, Minnesota, and North Dakota each elected all their representatives at-large, while Texas elected 3 of their 21 seats at-large, and several other states elected some seats at-large.7
The 1967 Uniform Congressional District Act
Motivations for Banning Multi-Member Districts
Congress enacted the Uniform Congressional District Act in 1967, permanently requiring that all states with more than one House seat use single-member districts (with temporary exemptions for Hawaii and New Mexico, which had never drawn congressional districts).7 Two primary motivations drove this legislation. First, following the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) and related cases establishing the "one person, one vote" principle, Congress feared that courts would impose at-large plurality districts on states that failed to redistrict to comply with the new equal population mandates.8 Such court-ordered at-large elections would have threatened many incumbent Representatives.8
Second, in the wake of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress sought to prevent Southern states from using at-large or multi-member district elections to dilute the newly-enfranchised Black vote.8 As Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee stated when proposing the amendment that became the Uniform Congressional District Act, "an ethnic group concentrated in one area may have no voice at all if the election is on an at-large basis," making single-member districts a "vital, essential, and integral part of the concept of equality of representation."8 Representative Claude Pepper of Florida warned that without the law, many states might be forced by courts or legislatures to conduct House elections at-large.8
The bill passed both chambers by voice vote, reflecting widespread agreement on the need to ban at-large House elections.8 By 1967, only New Mexico and Hawaii still used at-large elections anyway, so the practical impact was limited.7 However, the unintended long-term consequence was to entrench the single-member district system that has proven highly vulnerable to partisan manipulation through gerrymandering.
Modern Critiques of the 1967 Mandate
Legal scholars have begun questioning whether the 1967 single-member district mandate remains appropriate given modern technology and political trends. A 2020 William & Mary Law Review article argues that the mandate may violate voters' First Amendment political association rights under the Anderson-Burdick standard, which requires courts to weigh the burden an election law imposes on political association rights against the government's legitimate interests.9 The article contends that while the mandate originally served the legitimate interest of ensuring representation for Black voters, it has had unintended and far-reaching negative consequences for America's national political health, including peak levels of congressional dysfunction, partisan gridlock, and a composition of Congress that lags behind the growing diversity of the American electorate.9
How At-Large Elections Eliminate Gerrymandering
Structural Prevention by Eliminating District Lines
The fundamental solution to gerrymandering is straightforward: eliminate the district lines that enable the practice. If all House members from a state are elected at-large on a statewide basis, there are no district boundaries to manipulate. Gerrymandering becomes structurally impossible because the essential tool—the ability to draw advantageous district lines—no longer exists.
Under the current single-member district system, a plurality or slight majority in carefully drawn districts can capture 100% of local representation, leaving substantial minorities completely unrepresented. Map-makers exploit this by distributing voters to maximize their party's seats while minimizing opposition representation through cracking and packing. At-large statewide elections eliminate this vulnerability entirely. Every voter in the state participates in electing every representative from that state, making geographic manipulation irrelevant.
This represents a permanent, structural solution rather than an ongoing arms race between map-drawers and reformers. Unlike reforms that rely on independent redistricting commissions or mathematical fairness criteria—which must be continuously monitored and enforced—at-large elections make gerrymandering impossible by design. There are no maps to challenge, no partisan advantage to calculate, and no sophisticated computer algorithms needed to detect manipulation.
Competition Among Geographical Minorities
A critical advantage of at-large statewide elections is that geographical minorities—candidates and constituencies from different regions of the state—can compete effectively for representation. Under current gerrymandered systems, rural conservatives in urban states and urban progressives in rural states are often cracked across multiple districts or packed into a few districts, minimizing their influence. Their votes effectively don't matter in determining who represents them.
With at-large elections, these geographical minorities become important constituencies that candidates must court. A candidate from rural areas can appeal to rural voters statewide, building a coalition that crosses the urban-rural divide. Similarly, urban candidates can build coalitions that include suburban and even some rural support. Rather than safe districts where the outcome is predetermined, candidates must compete for votes across the entire state, encouraging coalition-building and broader appeal.
This competition benefits democracy in multiple ways. It forces candidates to consider statewide rather than merely local interests. It gives voice to constituencies that might be gerrymandered into irrelevance under district-based systems. It creates genuine electoral competition in states that currently feature mostly non-competitive districts. And it ensures that voters from all regions of a state have meaningful input in choosing all their state's representatives, rather than having their influence confined to a single district that may have been designed specifically to dilute their voting power.
Reducing the Need for Term Limits
The Term Limits Movement as Response to Safe Seats
The term limits movement gained momentum largely as a response to the problem of safe seats and entrenched incumbency. When districts are gerrymandered to be safely Republican or safely Democratic, the only real competition occurs in primary elections among candidates from the favored party. Once a candidate wins that primary and the general election, they often face little to no meaningful challenge for decades. Voters frustrated by this lack of accountability and turnover advocated for term limits as a mechanism to force change.
However, term limits represent an artificial solution that creates its own problems. They force out effective, experienced legislators along with ineffective ones. They shift power to unelected staff, lobbyists, and executive branch officials who maintain institutional knowledge while elected members cycle through. They reduce accountability by ensuring legislators cannot be rewarded or punished by voters for their performance. And they don't address the underlying problem: lack of genuine electoral competition.
At-Large Elections Create Natural Competition
At-large elections solve the problem that term limits attempt to address by creating genuine, ongoing electoral competition. Without gerrymandered safe seats, every representative must continually earn their position by appealing to a broad statewide electorate. Incumbency still confers advantages—name recognition, fundraising ability, and a record of constituent service—but these must be continuously demonstrated and renewed through competitive elections.
In competitive at-large systems, natural turnover occurs when representatives fail to serve their constituents effectively or when changing political currents favor different candidates. This turnover is organic and merit-based rather than arbitrary and time-based. Effective representatives can continue serving as long as they maintain voter support, building valuable expertise and institutional knowledge. Ineffective representatives face genuine challenges and can be voted out when they fail to perform.
This creates a healthier democratic process than term limits. Voters, rather than constitutional provisions, determine when change is needed. The threat of competitive elections provides continuous accountability rather than merely limiting the duration of unaccountable service. And the incentive structure encourages representatives to maintain broad appeal and effectiveness throughout their careers rather than becoming complacent in safe seats or acting recklessly as term-limited lame ducks.
State-Level Implementation
State-Level Implementation
Complete At-Large Approach
Under this reform, each state would function as a single at-large district electing all its Representatives statewide. For example, Texas with 39 Representatives would hold a single statewide election, with all 39 winners determined by voter preferences across the entire state. This approach would completely eliminate gerrymandering since there would be no district lines to manipulate. It would ensure that all voters in the state participate in choosing all their state's representatives, rather than being confined to influencing the outcome in a single, potentially gerrymandered district.
The voting mechanics could employ various methods. The simplest would be plurality voting where voters select up to the number of seats available (for Texas, voters could select up to 39 candidates), and the top vote-getters win. Alternative methods that encourage broader representation could also be employed, such as cumulative voting where voters receive votes equal to the number of seats and can distribute them among candidates as they choose, or limited voting where voters receive fewer votes than seats available, ensuring majority blocs cannot capture all seats.
This system would fundamentally change campaign dynamics. Rather than candidates focusing on narrow geographic districts that may have been gerrymandered to favor one party, they would need to build statewide coalitions and appeal to diverse constituencies across the state. A candidate from rural areas would need to explain how their perspective serves the entire state, while urban candidates would similarly need to demonstrate statewide relevance. This encourages representatives to think beyond parochial local interests and consider how their positions affect all regions of their state.
Advantages for Geographical Diversity
Critics might argue that at-large elections reduce geographic representation, but in practice they could enhance meaningful geographic diversity. Under current gerrymandered systems, many regions are split across multiple districts specifically to dilute their influence. Urban areas are cracked apart to combine urban voters with suburban or rural voters, while rural areas may be split to prevent formation of cohesive rural constituencies.
At-large elections allow geographical communities to organize and support candidates who genuinely represent their regional interests. Rural voters across a state could coordinate to elect representatives who understand agricultural, natural resource, and rural infrastructure issues. Urban constituencies could similarly support candidates who prioritize urban challenges. Suburban areas, often gerrymandered to serve as swing territories in carefully calculated districts, could elect representatives focused on suburban concerns.
This creates representation based on actual communities of interest rather than artificially drawn lines. A mining region in one part of a state and an oil-producing region in another part could recognize common interests and support candidates who understand resource extraction issues, even though they might be hundreds of miles apart. Hispanic voters in South Texas and Hispanic voters in El Paso could coordinate support for candidates attuned to their concerns, rather than being cracked across districts designed to minimize their influence.
Advantages of the Reform
Structural Elimination of Gerrymandering
The primary advantage is that at-large elections structurally eliminate gerrymandering. Unlike reforms that rely on independent redistricting commissions or mathematical fairness criteria—which must be continuously monitored and enforced—at-large elections make gerrymandering unprofitable by design. No matter how one might theoretically draw lines, there are no lines to draw. This provides a permanent solution rather than an ongoing arms race between map-drawers and reformers.
Increased Electoral Competition
At-large elections would dramatically increase electoral competition. Currently, the vast majority of House seats are "safe" for one party, with competitive races occurring in perhaps 30-40 districts nationwide. Under an at-large system, every seat potentially becomes competitive because candidates must appeal to a broad statewide electorate rather than a gerrymandered district designed to favor one party. Even candidates from minority parties or viewpoints could compete effectively by building statewide coalitions around specific issues or constituencies.
Better Representation of Diverse Viewpoints
At-large elections ensure that diverse viewpoints across a state gain voice in representation. Currently, voters whose views don't align with their district's gerrymandered partisan lean have essentially no influence. A progressive in a heavily gerrymandered conservative district, or a conservative in a heavily gerrymandered progressive district, might as well not vote—the outcome is predetermined. At-large elections give all voters an opportunity to influence outcomes by participating in choosing all their state's representatives.
Enhanced Accountability
Representatives elected at-large are accountable to the entire state rather than merely a gerrymandered base. This creates incentives for coalition-building, compromise, and attention to statewide rather than purely local interests. A representative must consider how their positions affect all regions and constituencies in their state, not just the narrow slice of voters in a safely drawn district. This broader accountability encourages more moderate, pragmatic governance and reduces the incentive for extreme partisanship that thrives in safe, gerrymandered districts.
Challenges and Criticisms
Voting Rights Concerns
The most serious criticism is that at-large elections have historically been used to dilute the voting power of racial minorities. The Supreme Court has held that at-large elections can impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice, particularly when three conditions exist: the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; the minority group is politically cohesive; and the majority votes as a bloc to usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate.10 For this reason, the Voting Rights Act protects against at-large systems that result in discriminatory effects.10
This concern must be taken seriously in any implementation of at-large elections. However, the historical problem arose primarily from at-large elections combined with plurality or block voting in contexts where white majorities could use their numbers to exclude minority candidates entirely. Modern at-large systems could employ various mechanisms to ensure minority representation, such as cumulative voting (where voters can concentrate multiple votes on preferred candidates) or limited voting (where voters receive fewer votes than seats available, preventing any bloc from capturing all seats). The key is ensuring that the at-large system includes protections against majority domination rather than enabling it.
Loss of Local Representation
Critics argue that at-large elections reduce local representation and accountability. Voters accustomed to having a single Representative from their immediate area might feel less connected to representatives serving the entire state. A Representative from one region might not understand or prioritize the concerns of voters in distant parts of the state.
However, this criticism may overstate the value of current "local" representation. Many current districts are so gerrymandered that they bear no relationship to actual communities. A district might snake through multiple counties, combining disparate urban and rural areas in a configuration designed purely for partisan advantage. Such artificial constructs provide little genuine local representation. Additionally, under at-large systems, voters could choose to support candidates from their own region, potentially resulting in geographic diversity among a state's delegation that reflects actual population distribution rather than gerrymandered lines.
Campaign Costs and Complexity
Statewide campaigns are more expensive than district-based campaigns, potentially creating barriers for candidates without substantial fundraising capacity or name recognition. This could favor wealthy candidates or those with established political networks, potentially reducing the diversity of candidates who can mount competitive campaigns.
However, this concern applies equally to current statewide races for governor and senator, yet those offices regularly see competitive races from candidates with diverse backgrounds. Moreover, modern campaign technology—including social media, email outreach, and targeted digital advertising—has reduced the cost of reaching large numbers of voters. The concern about cost must also be weighed against the current reality where gerrymandering makes most districts non-competitive, effectively eliminating meaningful electoral competition in the majority of House races regardless of campaign costs.
Political Feasibility
The most significant obstacle is political feasibility. Congress would first need to repeal or amend the 1967 Uniform Congressional District Act—a law that has been in place for nearly six decades.11 Current members of Congress, elected under the existing system, might resist changes that could disrupt their electoral prospects. The reform would require at least 218 House members (a majority) to vote for a system that could make their re-election more challenging by introducing greater competition.
Additionally, individual states would need to implement the new system and adopt at-large election methods. States with significant minority populations would face potential Voting Rights Act challenges if their implementation prevented election of a reasonable number of racial minority representatives or diminished minority voting power.11 Careful design of the at-large system, potentially including mechanisms like cumulative voting or limited voting to protect minority representation, would be essential to overcome these legal hurdles.
Constitutional Considerations
Congressional Authority
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution grants Congress broad authority over congressional elections: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations." Congress has repeatedly exercised this authority throughout history, mandating single-member districts in 1842, 1911, and 1967.6 The same constitutional provision that authorized Congress to mandate single-member districts equally authorizes Congress to permit or require at-large districts.
Equal Protection and One Person, One Vote
The Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" jurisprudence requires that congressional districts have approximately equal populations, ensuring that each citizen's vote carries equal weight.8 At-large elections satisfy this requirement. When all representatives from a state are elected at-large, every voter in the state has an equal opportunity to participate in electing every representative. There are no district population inequalities because there are no districts. Each voter's influence is equal to every other voter's influence in determining the composition of their state's congressional delegation.
Right to Vote and Political Association
Some scholars argue that single-member districts may violate voters' First Amendment right to political association by severely burdening voters who support minority viewpoints or disfavored candidates.9 Under the Anderson-Burdick standard, courts weigh election law burdens on political association against legitimate state interests. While the original 1967 mandate served the legitimate interest of protecting newly-enfranchised Black voters, that interest must be reassessed in light of modern understanding and implementation options. At-large systems that include protections for minority representation—such as cumulative voting or limited voting—could potentially better serve both competitive elections and minority representation than gerrymandered single-member districts.9
Conclusion
Partisan gerrymandering represents a fundamental threat to democratic representation, enabling politicians to entrench themselves in power regardless of voter preferences. While various reforms have been proposed—including independent redistricting commissions, mathematical fairness criteria, and judicial oversight—these approaches require constant vigilance and enforcement. They treat symptoms rather than addressing the underlying cause: the existence of manipulable district lines.
Repealing the 1967 Uniform Congressional District Act and implementing at-large elections where all House members from each state are elected statewide offers a structural solution. By eliminating district lines entirely, this reform would make gerrymandering impossible. It would increase electoral competition by eliminating safe seats created through gerrymandering. It would ensure that geographical minorities from different regions of each state could compete effectively for representation, rather than being cracked or packed into irrelevance. And by creating genuine electoral competition, it would reduce the need for artificial mechanisms like term limits—representatives would face ongoing accountability through competitive elections rather than serving in safe seats until arbitrary time limits force them out.
While implementation challenges exist—particularly ensuring compliance with the Voting Rights Act through careful design of voting methods, and overcoming political resistance from incumbents who benefit from the current system—the benefits of ending gerrymandering through at-large elections justify serious consideration of this reform. As more Americans recognize that current electoral systems fail to deliver fair representation, and as the dysfunction resulting from gerrymandering becomes increasingly apparent, the political will for fundamental reform may develop.
The question is not whether at-large elections would improve American democracy by eliminating gerrymandering and increasing competition—the logic is clear that they would—but whether the political system can reform itself to adopt them. History shows that major electoral reforms, from direct election of Senators to universal suffrage, have occurred when public frustration with existing systems reached critical levels. The current crisis of gerrymandering and non-competitive elections may be creating conditions for similarly fundamental reform.