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Syria - 2024 Parliamentary Election

The unicameral People's Assembly or Majlis al-Shaab consists of 250 seats. Members are directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by simple majority preferential vote to serve 4-year terms. Seats are distributed nearly equally between category A (workers and peasants) or category B (other members of the populace) in the legislative body that has held authority in the country since 1971. The Syrian government treated the 15 July 2024 elections as a success simply because they took place, were able to be implemented, and thwarted all external attempts aimed at preventing them from being achieved.

There have always been discussions and debates about the intended role of the People's Assembly: is it a legislative or representative role? In fact, the People's Council performs both roles together, which explains the presence of political elites, scientific competencies, and legal expertise, in addition to a number of tribal sheikhs and representatives of all segments and spectrums of Syrian society. Most of the laws were being drafted by the executive authority (the government), while the role of the People’s Assembly was limited to discussing and approving them to become law.

Media sources and human rights groups varied in their estimates of how many persons were killed since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, with estimates ranging up to 550,000 killed. Regime and pro-regime forces reportedly conducted aerial bombardments and shelling of civilian areas, attacking civilians in hospitals, ambulances, residential areas, schools, and IDP settlements. Regime-linked paramilitary groups reportedly engaged in frequent abuses, including massacres, indiscriminate killings, kidnapping of civilians, physical abuse, sexual violence, and unjust detentions. Regime-aligned militias reportedly launched numerous attacks that killed and injured civilians. Russian and Iranian forces, as well as affiliated paramilitaries such as Lebanese Hizballah, caused civilian deaths and destroyed civilian infrastructure and property. Armed terrorist groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham committed a wide range of abuses, including killings, kidnappings, physical abuse, and recruitment or use of child soldiers. ISIS carried out killings, attacks, and kidnappings, including against civilians. There were no reports of investigation into or prosecution for such actions.

During the year 2023, the United Nations estimated there were more than 6.8 million IDPs in the country and 5.1 million Syrian refugees outside the country due to the conflict since 2011. The regime forcibly displaced populations from besieged areas and restricted movement of IDPs.

The United Nations estimated approximately 12 million Syrians were food insecure. Various human rights and various media organizations found the regime implemented a policy and legal framework to manipulate humanitarian assistance and reconstruction funding to benefit itself, reward those loyal to it, and punish perceived opponents. The regime regularly restricted humanitarian organizations’ access to communities in need of aid, selectively approved humanitarian projects, and required organizations to partner with vetted local actors to ensure the humanitarian response was siphoned centrally through and for the benefit of the regime, at the cost of preventing aid from reaching the population unimpeded. Organizations reported entities such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent faced difficulties accessing areas retaken by the regime.

There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Syria. Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the regime and other actors; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence; unlawful recruitment and use of children in armed conflict by the regime and other armed actors; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, or enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, child, early, and forced marriage, femicide, and other forms of such violence; substantial barriers to sexual and reproductive health services access; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic groups including Kurdish and Yezidi residents; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; enforcement of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.

The UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria (COI) and numerous human rights groups reported the regime killed persons in detention facilities, both by execution and torture. According to the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison, detainees were not notified regarding their execution decisions in advance, and instead were transferred to execution chambers in the evening for a sentence to be carried out on the same day or the following day.

There were numerous reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of regime authorities, and the vast majority of those disappeared since the start of the conflict remained missing. In its annual report on enforced disappearance, the SNHR reported the regime used enforced disappearance “in a systematic manner” to intimidate society, spread fear, and consolidate control. The SNHR documented at least 112,713 individuals, including 3,105 children and 6,698 women, remained forcibly disappeared. The regime forcibly disappeared critics, perceived dissidents, journalists, medical personnel, and protesters, as well as their families and associates. Most disappearances reported by domestic and international human rights documentation groups appeared to be politically motivated, and a number of prominent political prisoners detained in previous years remained missing. Many families were unaware of the status of their detained or disappeared family members and learned relatives they believed to be alive had died months or even years earlier.

The regime employed torture, including forcing objects into the victim’s rectum or vagina, administering electric shocks, suspension by one or two limbs for prolonged periods, folding persons into car tires, whipping exposed body parts, burning body parts, and extracting nails and teeth. Prisoners reportedly agreed to confess to anything after being hung by his hands with his feet off the ground. One detainee in the Military Intelligence’s “Palestine” branch who was sexually abused by guards who repeatedly inserted sticks or glass bottles into his rectum to “torture” him and cause him to “lose his honor.”

On 16 November 2023 in a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) brought by the Netherlands and Canada against Syria for violating its responsibilities as a state party to the Convention Against Torture, the ICJ issued provisional orders for the regime to “take all measures within its power to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” as well as to “prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of any evidence related to allegations of such acts.” The ICJ also ordered the regime to “ensure that its officials, as well as any organizations or persons which may be subject to its control direction, or influence do not commit any acts of torture or other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Prison facilities were grossly overcrowded with little space to sit or sleep, contributing to extreme exhaustion from lack of sleep. Access to and quality of food, potable water, sanitation, heating, proper ventilation, lighting, and medical care were poor and life threatening. Authorities kept prisoners confined in cells for long periods without an opportunity for movement, exercise, or use of showers and sanitary facilities.

Personal status laws applied to Muslims were derived from sharia and were discriminatory toward women. The law permitted judges to reduce penalties for murder and assault if the defendant asserted an “honor” defense, which often occurred as perpetrators “washed his shame”. The regime kept no official statistics on use of this defense in murder and assault cases and reportedly rarely pursued prosecution of so-called honor crimes. Families ostracized survivors of violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage because of their abuse. The UNFPA reported women and girls who experienced social stigma due to sexual violence risked physical harm or even death by suicide or homicide.

The law contained a number of speech offenses limiting the freedom of expression, including provisions criminalizing expression that, for example, “weakens the national sentiment” in times of war or defamed the president, courts, military, or public authorities. The law criminalized the broadcasting of false news or claims undermining confidence in the national currency. It also provided for a prison sentence of at least one year for anyone who, in writing or in speech, called for the relinquishing of Syrian territory. The regime routinely characterized expression as illegal, and individuals could not criticize the regime publicly or privately without fear of reprisal. The regime also stifled criticism by broadly invoking provisions of law prohibiting acts or speech inciting sectarianism. The regime monitored political meetings and relied on informer networks.

The regime showed little tolerance for political parties other than the Baath Party and its affiliates. Membership in the Baath Party or close familial relationships with a prominent party member or powerful regime official assisted in economic, social, and educational advancement. Party or regime connections also made it easier to achieve greater advancement and power within the government, military, and security services. Judges and prosecutors were “essentially required to belong to the Baath Party,” according to Freedom House. Freedom House reported political access was primarily a function of proximity and loyalty to the regime, noting those Alawites, Christians, Druze, and members of other religious minorities considered outside the regime’s inner circle were “politically disenfranchised along with the rest of the population.” The regime selectively enforced the 2011 decree allowing establishment of independent political parties, permitting only proregime groups to form official parties. According to local human rights groups, opposition activists declined to organize parties, fearing the regime would use party lists to target opposition members.

The most recent national elections, for the presidency in 2021, were widely reported to not be free and fair, with many allegations of abuses and irregularities, including: registration restrictions on potential voters and candidates’ ability to be listed on a ballot, lack of candidate access to media, ballot stuffing, campaigning at polling stations, lack of ballot secrecy, and intimidation.

The 2024 elections in Syria occurred against a backdrop of notable shifts in diplomatic relations. Key developments include Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, restoring ties with Damascus, Syria reclaiming its seat at the Arab League, and President Bashar al-Assad participating in summits held in Riyadh and Bahrain. These developments are also concurrent with signs of a potential reconciliation between Turkey and Syria, marking a significant shift from their strained relations since 2011.

What distinguishes these elections is that they came at a time when Syria is experiencing the beginning of a new phase, the title of which is reconstruction and overcoming the consequences of war. The repercussions of the war were not only on the military and security level, but also greatly affected the economic reality, and produced a large number of war merchants and crisis brokers.

These elections were certainly not like any other, as they were preceded by an electoral movement at the level of the ruling party in Syria (the Arab Socialist Baath Party). This movement resulted in the election of a new central leadership for the party, with a change rate of 100%, meaning that no member of the previous leadership remained, in a clear indication of its shortcomings and the dissatisfaction of the party base with it. A central committee for the party was also elected, which included in its ranks a large number of young talents and experts with a good reputation.

Decrees were issued appointing a number of governors, indicating a wave of general changes taking place in Syria that began with the party, and will certainly not end with the formation of a new government, after the current government became a “caretaker government” according to the constitution.

The changes that have taken place have a general title of fighting corruption and trying to neutralize political money as much as possible, which was clear in the People's Assembly elections. The elections were certainly not held in an “absolutely healthy” environment, and their results did not meet the citizens’ aspirations and desires, but they achieved progress in the way council members reached the parliament dome, and therefore we must expect a different upcoming role than the role of the People’s Assembly in the past.

The National Unity lists were different this time, especially with regard to the Baath lists, as these people arrived through elections that were held, and the Baath leadership did not want to change them, except for the utmost necessity, in its desire to hold the party bases responsible for their choices, without evading its responsibility in addressing some of the gaps, in terms of the representation of women, the youth element, and other segments that express the spectrums of Syrian society.

The government's preoccupation with the security situation as a priority, the need to secure the needs of the citizen, and to overcome the sanctions imposed on Syria, among other reasons, have led to the emergence of some abnormal "bubbles" that have apparently begun to be ended. These "abnormal" cases were represented by the emergence of a number of new businessmen who were able to assume important political positions, some of whom reached the People's Assembly, seeking the immunity enjoyed by members of the People's Assembly, in their capacity as representatives of the Syrian people, a right guaranteed by the constitution.

Many of these individuals were able to weave a network of relationships that enabled them to obstruct the measures to be taken against them, especially the lifting of their immunity, so that the judicial authorities could begin investigating them, and the judicial ruling would be the decisive factor in convicting or acquitting them of the charges against them. Some of these were not Baathists, but they had the support of a number of their fellow Baathist members of the People's Assembly, who abstained from voting on the measures to lift immunity, which was seen as defending the corrupt or obstructing judicial proceedings.

This incident did not pass without accountability from the new Baath leadership, whose main focus after its election was to “fight corruption,” hold the corrupt accountable, and take regulatory measures against members of the People’s Assembly who were Baathist comrades and did not vote on the decision. These measures were met with great satisfaction among the party bases, and restored confidence in the expected role of the Baath Party in overcoming and correcting mistakes, as it is the ruling party in Syria and responsible for this stage with its positives and negatives, noting here that many of the Baathist comrades, members of the People’s Assembly, who were punished organizationally by the party leadership, and thus were deprived of running for a second electoral term, were not necessarily involved in corruption or defending it, but they did not adhere to the general line of the party and the directions of its leadership in facilitating judicial procedures to reach everyone suspected of involvement in corruption.

The competition between businessmen was limited to Damascus, and success was for the strongest and most extravagant, especially since these people organized themselves into two competing lists, which is a natural result and a general phenomenon and is not limited to the Syrian situation only, while emphasizing the importance of the presence of national businessmen who remained in Syria and did not leave it in search of more profit, especially since the simplest economic rules say that capital is cowardly and does not like to take risks.

The National Unity lists did not include businessmen or even wealthy people, and this is a natural thing that comes in harmony with the fact that the Baath Party is the party of workers and peasants, first and foremost. The National Unity lists were not at the same level, as the rest of the parties allied with the Arab Socialist Baath Party were left free to choose their candidates, according to what the leaders of those parties saw fit, as they did not follow electoral behavior in choosing their candidates.

The absence of electoral programs is a phenomenon that can be generalised to all parties and electoral lists, and it was striking that there was no ability to distinguish between the electoral program and the slogans. Tribal loyalties and family and tribal affiliations were strongly present in some governorates. This is certainly an unhealthy phenomenon, and reflects a closed-mindedness and thinking that belongs to the “pre-state” era. However, it remained a limited phenomenon, and was restricted to some independent candidates.

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), of the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria announced its boycott of the upcoming legislative elections, urging people "not to participate in them." In a statement, the SDC called on "all national and democratic Syrian forces to unite efforts to build a broad national front capable of representing the aspirations of the Syrian people and defending their legitimate rights." The Autonomous Administration's decision follows its announcement to postpone municipal elections in the areas under its control in northern Syria, initially scheduled for June 11, reportedly due to threats from Turkey and pressure from the United States.

Syria's Ba'ath Party issued a statement calling for widespread participation in the upcoming election scheduled for July 15, emphasizing that "voting is a national responsibility and a duty of both the party and the people, as well as a constitutional right."

Syria's Higher Judicial Committee for Elections announced the results of the People’s Assembly elections held on Monday, July 15. More than 7 million Syrian citizens participated in the parliamentary elections, with a turnout of 38.16%, higher than the approximately 33% turnout in the 2020 elections. They elected 250 members to the People's Council from among 1516 candidates, as per the Committee. Judge Jihad Murad, the chairman of the Higher Judicial Committee for Elections, affirmed that the elections were conducted under full judicial supervision, from the nominations to the announcement of results, ensuring "the broadest representation of the Syrian people across its various segments and sectors."

Voting in Syria’s parliamentary elections took place as scheduled on July 15, except in much of northeastern Syria where SDF-linked authorities enforced a boycott; and in Suwayda and parts of Daraa where local anti-regime protesters raided voting stations, spoiled or destroyed ballots and ballot boxes, and set up roadblocks to prevent voting. According to official sources, the turnout for the elections was 38.16%. This represented only a small increase from the 33% recorded in 2020, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2016, at the height of Syria’s armed conflict, turnout was reported at 57%.

According to the publicly revealed results, the Baath Party won 170 seats and affiliated leftists secured a further 15 of the 250 seats – making a total of 185, or eighteen more than the minimum needed to ensure Assad will be given the necessary constitutional amendment allowing him to run again for President in 2028. In 2020, the Baath Party and allies won 177 seats.