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V-400 Dal-2/ V-420 Dal-M [SA-5 Griffon]

Nomenclature Disambiguation

SA-5

The "SA-5" GRIFFON / GAMMON nomenclature from the 1960s is the source of considerable confusion.

  1. The V-1000 was the first Soviet anti-ballistic missile system, developed in 1956. It intercepted and destroyed an intermediate range ballistic missile warhead coming in at 3km/s on May 4 1961. The US did not demonstrate an equivalent missile until 1984. It was launched 37 times and failed only 5 time with a success rate of 85%.
  2. The V-400 Dal-2/ V-420 Dal-M [SA-5 Griffon] was a planned next generation high performance long-range SAM developed from 1959 but cancelled by 1963. The V-400 was first seen in the public in November 1963 when it was paraded on the Red Square. Because it was considered to be a SAM, it received the DIA code SA-5, along with the NATO reporting name "Griffon". Western sources associated this missile with the Leningrad system. NATO characterized the system as "A boosted missile with a configuration similar to GUIDELINE except that it is much larger... GRIFFON has been carried on a simple transporter with no facilities for launcher loading." By 1969 CIA noted "First shown in Moscow parade of November 1963. Described in Soviet literature both as surface-to-air and anti-ballistic missile. Not known to be deployed."
  3. The S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) is an enormous SAM developed after the failure of the V-400 Dal project. DIA code SA-5 was later reused for the S-200 "Volga" SAM system, NATO reporting name Gammon.

On November 7, 1963 the Griffon [NATO reporting name] interceptor was paraded in Red Square, and characterized as an ABM interceptor. The Griffon was a two-stage liquid fueled interceptor that was 16.5 meters long with a range of over 250 kilometers. Construction of the RZ-25 system, which employed the V-1000 interceptor, was first detected in the early 1960's near the Estonian capital Tallinn. However this construction soon ceased.

It must be said that this was probably the only time in history when the ZURV system did not receive any traditional alphanumeric designation, and all the years of work on it in all documents was called "Dal". This multichannel universal SAM missile defense rocket was created in OKB-301 Lavochkin for the air defense system of Leningrad. The R&D on the complex began in 1955, and in April 1957 released preliminary missile project. By August 1957 the design was completed. Flight testing was done at the end of 1958-1959. Full-scale tests of the complex at full strength began in January 1962, though intercepts of IL-28 targets failed due to the malfunction of the apparatus. Tests were conducted at the Sary-Shagan. All the work stopped in December 1962 in connection with the dissolution of OKB-301 and in connection with the successful missile tests of the V-1000.

In National Intelligence Estimate NIE 11-3-64 "Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1970", 16 December 1964, the US intelligence community assessed that "The Griffon missile is described by the Soviets as a "pilotless interceptor" which can be employed against "all modern means of aerial and space attack," implying a capability agaimt ballistic missiles. Several months ago, the Soviets aired a TV film clip in which a missile of Griffon's general appearance was portrayed in an AMM role. We believe the Griffon was designed in the late 1950s, when the Soviets may have been seeking to develop a weapon system which could be used against both aircraft and missiles. Our analysis indicates that Griffon has a capability for intercepts at altitudes of up to about 22 n.m. (i.e., within the atmosphere) against an unsophisticated ballistic missile threat, and that it has long-range, high altitude capabilities in an antiaircraft role. We believe that the Griffon missile was developed for use at the large complexes which the Soviets have been constructing at Leningrad since the winter of 1960-1961."

In March and December 1955, two government resolutions were issued on the commencement of work on multi-channel SAM systems for the protection of Leningrad - Dal and S-50. The first of these was created as a fundamentally new stationary long-range system using the latest achievements of science and technology of that time. The C-50 was mainly based on the former medium-range C-25 system, but in accordance with the new requirements it was developed mobile, with the placement of the elements of the complex in railway wagons and on platforms.

The head organization for the S-50, as well as earlier for the C-25 and C-75, was KB-1, and for Dali - OKB-301 chief designer S. Lavochkin. In the latter case, the prevailing tradition was violated, according to which all work on the SAM was led by the electronic bureau. To be fair, it should be noted that OKB-301 by that time had a lot of specialists in radio electronic engineering. And after the reorganization in 1959, one of the four KB-KB-2 that was part of it specialized in electrical and radioautomatics. His boss was Georgy Nikolayevich Babakin, who six years later, on March 21, 1965, was appointed chief designer of the Mashinostroitelny Zavod im. S. A. Lavochkina.

Parallel work on two types of surface-to-air missile systems did not last long - Dal was given preference, and in 1957 the issue of the S-50 was closed.

The interest of the country's leadership in the long-range air defense complex proved to be extremely great. And this is not surprising, because the S-25 and S-75, whose missiles had an inclined range of only 25-40 km, could provide only the defense of individual objects. N.S. Khrushchev, who loved figurative expressions, even called Berkut a "palisade".

In 1955, Lavochkin OKB began to design an anti-aircraft missile for the Dahl system. She was given a factory index of "400". This ZUR was supposed to ensure the defense of large industrial centers from aircraft and cruise missiles of the enemy, hitting air targets with a reflective surface the one that had the IL-28. They could fly at altitudes up to 30 km at speeds up to 3000 km / h. For simultaneous tracking and guidance of 10 missiles for any number of targets out of 10, a powerful digital computer was included in the ground part of the system.

The anti-aircraft guided missile system "Dahl" was developed in accordance with the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 17, 1956. The Dahl system is the first domestic anti-aircraft missile system designed to defeat air targets flying to the defender from any direction at altitudes up to 27-30 km at a speed of up to 3000 km / h at ranges up to 70-165 km, depending on the altitude and speed objectives (for the project). The system had 10 channels of guidance, but in accordance with the structural scheme of the system's facilities, the number of channels can in principle be significantly increased.

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 17, 1956. The term of presentation of the outline design of the "Dal" system was established in the fourth quarter of 1956. In June 1957 OKB-301 MAP presented a preliminary design of the "Dal" system, which envisages the use of a single-stage guided missile with vertical launch in the system. At the same time, the OKP-301 MAP indicated that this missile will be replaced by a two-stage missile with an inclined launch, which has better tactical and technical characteristics. OKB-301 MAP undertook to provide the necessary additions to the draft project not later than September 1957.

In September 1957, OKB-301 MAP presented additions to the draft design, which provide for the development of issues related to the use of a two-stage rocket in the system.

In order to provide instructions in the combat zone for the destruction of MIG-17 type aircraft at an altitude of 10 km (from 50 to 75 km at a flight speed of 2000 km / h), the project required an external detection from ranges of 350 km, which was not provided by the Lena radar. For the MIG-17, the "Lena" radar [P-14/P-70 5N84 Tall King] has at this altitude a detection range of 265 - 280 km. Thus, the zones of destruction of air targets of the SIG-17 type when using the Lena radar are significantly reduced. To provide the ability to combat targets like MIG-17, the range of detection of air targets is necessary.

Determination of coordinates in the "Dal" system was carried out with the aid of locators of circular survey. Their design was carried out first in OKB-37 of the Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry, and then in the Research Institute-244 MRT. The complex consisted of two such radars, with which the system of active "request-response" (SAZO) was constructively combined, using common antenna-rotary devices. An important element was the guidance control machine (UMN), developed by SKB-245 and intended for automatic tracking of targets and missiles. She formed all the necessary commands and transferred them to missiles through the command transmission station (SEC).

Preliminary research on the topic "DAL" OKB was completed in mid-1956, and in April the following was released sketch design of the rocket "400". However, he almost immediately underwent a major alteration, which was completed by August of the same year. In accordance with the April version, the missile was planned to be made single-stage, and in the second - two-stage: with the launch accelerator and the march stage. The accelerator was to be equipped with the RDTT TD-70 of OKB-81 design. To stabilize the missile at the initial section of the trajectory, four wings were installed on the accelerator, located in two mutually perpendicular planes.

The sustainer ["march"] stage had a normal pattern. Four wing consoles with ailerons were placed in the middle part of its hull in two mutually perpendicular planes, and air rudders were installed on the tail. It was equipped with a two-chamber LPRE P01-154 with a turbo-pump fuel supply system, design OKB-154 chief designer S. Coxberg. The starting mass of the rocket was 8,757 kg.

The ZUR "400" took off at an angle of 45 degrees to the horizon with a special lifting-launcher. At the site of the accelerator flight control was not performed, the rocket was only stabilized by ailerons located on the wings of the accelerator. In the next section, it was controlled by radio commands from the ground, which from the on-board command transmission station entered the autopilot AP-69B, OKB-923 design. The current coordinates of the SAM were determined by SAZO, the on-board equipment of which was combined with the on-board equipment of the SEC - SAZO-SEC, developed by NII-33 GKRE. After the "capture" of the goal, the control was transferred to the radar head of Zenit homing, created at NII-17 GKRE. The defeat of the aircraft was carried out by the fragmentation warhead, the detonation of which was carried out at the command of the radio fuser "Grif" (NII-504) after hit the target in the zone of effective defeat. He also served to self-destruct the missile in the event of a miss.

The technical base of the Dahl system was divided in the draft design into a "long-term storage base" and "technological flow", and the "long-term storage base" is not included in the "Dal" system. This artificial separation of the finished technological cycle for the preparation and storage of missiles coming from industry was irrational, since it deprived the Dal system of the possibility to provide itself with ready-made missiles by its own means and leads to an unreasonable duplication of the means for ensuring the technological preparation of missiles is a second KIS, a smaller size, means of filling with air, etc.) and additional costs for equipment and facilities.

The "Dal" system did not ensure the defeat of air targets in the entire range of ranges specified. The farthest boundary of the zone of destruction of aircraft type IL-28 and TU-16 at an altitude of 5 km was 70 km, instead of 100 km, given by the TTT. Accordingly, at an altitude of 20 km - 165 km, instead of 180 - 200 km. The damage zones given in the draft design were calculated without taking into account a number of conditions (exchange rate parameters other than zero, priority of target acquisition, possible reduction in the detection range of the Lena station), so the far boundaries of the zone of damage may in fact be even smaller.

The "Dal" system had limited capabilities to combat air targets having a reflecting surface equivalent to a MiG-17 type aircraft. The defeat of these targets is possible in the altitude range from 5 to 20 km, at flight speeds up to 2000 km / h. If the Lena radar is used to detect targets, the affected areas will be reduced.

It was necessary to work out the question of the possibility of simultaneous operation of 3 to 4 Dal fire complexes without mutual radio interference and to determine the minimum possible distances between them. The estimation of the operational reliability of the system's facilities was made approximately, and therefore the probability of failure of ground and airborne equipment of the systems, as well as the probability of failures in the guidance process, should be clarified during further design and testing.

The probability of target demolition (IL-28) at an altitude of 30 km (0.54 one and 0.79 with two missiles) was indicative, since it did not take into account the operational reliability of the system's means, the angle of flight of targets and the effect on the accuracy of guidance of the material and the radome shape.

OKB-301 MAP in the 1st quarter of 1958 submitted to 4 GUMO materials on the specification of the characteristics of the control system, as well as work on the probability of damage to maneuvering targets at altitudes of 20 to 30 km.

In the last days of 1958, the first V-400 missiles entered the factory flight tests. Since the range of their flight greatly exceeded the capabilities of the Kapustin Yar test site, the tests were conducted in Sary-Shagan, not far from where the anti-missile patrols of P. Grushin had already flown. Unfortunately, not everything developed as it was desired, and the "Dal" system was never able to be brought to a state acceptable for its adoption.

Apparently, it was impossible in principle to predict the progress of work on entirely new topics that are unparalleled, and therefore all the dates were set exclusively arbitrarily. As a rule, they were much less than required by the circumstances of the case. Using such a simple technique, the head of any enterprise could always be accused of dragging out works and demanding their acceleration, regardless of the available opportunities. Sometimes this method led to disastrous consequences.

As is well known, Semen Alekseevich Lavochkin had a sick heart, and the heavy climate of the polygons was completely inappropriate for him. Therefore, in the spring of 1960, when the V-400 ["four hundred"] trials were going on in Sary-Shagan, he stayed in Moscow. At one of the banquets about some significant event N. Khrushchev in the most categorical form told Lavochkin that the work on the "Dali" is not very successful, because during the tests the general designer is in Moscow. Semyon Alekseevich had to go to the landfill, where he died suddenly on 9 June from a heart attack, not surviving three months before his sixtieth birthday. The death of the general, undoubtedly, left a mark on the further course of events.

Work on the missile defense at the 301-m plant, which by that time was called the SA Lavochkin Machine-Building Plant, continued for another two and a half years under the leadership of Chief Designer M. M. Pashinin. Another chief designer N. Chernyakova, together with a group of leading specialists, was transferred to OKB-52 at the request of his general designer V. Chelomey. This also weakened the Lavochkin OKB.

Despite all efforts, the development of "Dal" had a significant lag from the deadlines. The most "thin place" was UMN. In addition, at the 82nd plant did not manage to launch the serial production of the 400 missiles. These and other reasons led to the fact that tests of the "Dal" complex in a closed circuit with radar-1, SAZO-1 and UMN began only in January 1962. However, even then the system remained very "raw". Although the correct design of the control loop of the ZUR "400" was confirmed, during the tests in a closed loop, not one Il-28 target aircraft was shot down. The reason was the failure of electro-vacuum devices, which repeatedly led to malfunctions in the operation of ground and airborne equipment.

In the second half of 1960 in OKB im. S. A. Lavochkin was designed systems "Dal-M" and "Dal-2", which resulted in the release, respectively, of the draft and advance design. These complexes were the further development of "Dal" with even greater range of action.

Probably, "Dal" still could be brought to the necessary level of reliability, if not for the intervention of "external" forces. In 1962, the interests of the two leading missile design bureaus of the country - S.Korolev and V.Chelomey - collided. The latter by this time was engaged not only in cruise missiles for the Navy, but also ballistic. Both leaders claimed the territory of the former artillery factory of V.Grabin, and behind each of them stood influential forces. In this struggle the Machine-Building Plant named after. SA Lavochkina became a "change card." At the suggestion of the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, D.Ustinov was transferred to Chelomey, and Korolev received the Grabinsk plant. From the end of December 1962 until November 1964, the OKB and the pilot plant named after SA Lavochkin were temporarily separated and completely reoriented to the OKB-52 themes.

As a result of this reorganization in December 1962, all work on the SAM in an enterprise bearing the name of Lavochkin was discontinued. One anti-aircraft missile system in the country became smaller, and near Leningrad for many years there were dozens of abandoned structures, starting positions and shelters for missiles.

After almost half a century, authors still tried to get to the true technical reasons for the failures of the last launches of Dal in a closed loop. They were not successful: the surviving reports and protocols seemed to have been written specifically to hide the truth. It seemed that the mystery would remain unsolved, but the lucky case helped. It turned out that at NPO Lavochkin worked very modest man - Major General of Aviation in retirement Sergei Ivanovich Gushchin. At the time, he was in the rank of major engineer was the head of the analysis department of the Sary-Shagan test site and was engaged in tests of "Dal". His story can be briefly summarized as follows: "After the closure of Dal our department for about six months did not do anything - the authorities did not know what to download. There was nothing to do, and by itself the idea arose now, not too slowly, to return to the decodings of telemetry, trajectory measurements and other working materials, fortunately, they were all at hand, and to try again to understand the possible causes of unsuccessful launches. After sitting and thinking about them, we came to a simple and startling conclusion: the missile was incorrectly aimed at the target, because the guidance program was confused with the channels of pitch and course control." At the November 1963 parade, despite the fact that no work was done on the Dal system, the ZUR "400" was transported for the first time on Red Square, after which it became one of the most popular parade participants. When she appeared, the announcer used to say: "And now high-speed interceptor missiles are being carried along Red Square by air and space targets." "Four hundred" even got a designation according to the western classification - "Griffon" SA-5. A few years later, apparently having understood that such a ZUR was not used for armament, the NATO experts assigned this index to the V-860 rocket of the S-200 complex.




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