The "SA-5" GRIFFON / GAMMON nomenclature from the 1960s is the source of considerable confusion.
The Soviets apparently formalized programs for defenses against ballistic missiles early in the 1950s, but Western understanding of some of these early programs is quite limited and subject to interpretation. Since the 1950s, the Soviets devoted considerable resources to ballistic missile defense and started deployment ABM systems before developmental testing was completed. There were differing Western assessments about whether the history of Soviet ABM research, development and deployments indicated two distinct overall programs — one for defenses at Moscow and another for a widespread defense — or whether the Soviets had been pursuing a single program with several potential applications. On 04 March 1961 an R-12 ballistic missile fitted with a mockup in the form of a 500-kg steel plate, simulating a standard warhead, was launched from the State proving ground at station Sary-Shagan. The target was detected by proving ground radars at a range of 1,500 km and destroyed by a V-1000 antimissile missile, outfitted with a high-explosive-payload.
In National Intelligence Estimate NIE 11-3-62, “Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1967” the US intelligence community reported 31 October 1962 that "We know that the Soviets have for more than five years been conducting a high priority and extensive program to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. At Sary Shagan, west of Lake Balkhash, they have created a heavily instrumental R&D center extending over some 8,500 square miles, with housing accommodations for at least 40,000 personnel. Since 1957 more than 200 missiles, of various ranges up to 1,050 n.m., have been launched into this center, thus providing much data on re-entry characteristics. It is almost certain that during the past two years [ed: ie, since 1960] attempts have been made to intercept incoming missiles by defensive missiles launched from Sary Shagan.
"The evidence available to us indicates that the Soviets are developing several different ABM systems to defend against missiles of various ranges. This evidence is insufficient, however, to support an estimate of the characteristics or effectiveness of any of these systems. In general, the complex problems involved in antimissile defense - detection, acquisition, discrimination, target tracking, and intercept - are as difficult for the USSR as for the US. We know that the Soviets are keenly aware of the countermeasures available to an attacking force, such as the use of decoys, the jamming of ABM system electronics, and the possible saturation of ABM complexes with multiple nose cones of varying characteristics, directions, and angles of descent."
In connection with the deployment of the first domestic stationary anti-aircraft missile system "Berkut" (later S-25) around Moscow, all the work on the missile defense project was postponed "indefinitely". After the completion of the state tests of the metro system of air defense, set up in KB-1, it became possible to redirect part of the design bureau forces to the solution of the problem of anti-missile defense.
In August 1953, a group of Soviet military commanders sent a note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the need to establish a missile defense system, and in September the first representative meeting on this problem was held at the Central Committee of the CPSU. On October 28 of the same year, an order was issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the Possibility of Creating ABM Systems", and on December 2, "On the Development of Methods for Combating Long-Range Missiles."
G.V. Kisun'ko The main provisions related to the development of an anti-ballistic missile defense system were developed by the leading specialists of the 31st Department of the KB-1 (since 1953 - SKB-30 KB-1) under the guidance of a scientist and designer in the field of radio electronics. Kisunko, after a lieutenant-general engineer, doctor of technical sciences, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences.
Later, teams from the engineering design bureau Fakel, the Scientific Research Institute of Long-distance Radio Communication, the Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Technology, the Moscow Research Radio Engineering Institute, the Central Research Institute of Communications were invited to this work. They were directed by prominent Soviet scientists: P. D. Grushin, V.I. Markov, S.A. Lebedev, F.P. Lipsman and S.A. Ajemov.
In the 4th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of the USSR, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General of the Air Force G.F. Bajdukov, for the purpose of general coordination of work, a special ordering management was created, headed by M.G. Mymrin, and subsequently - MI. Nenashev.
On July 30, 1956, in the Betpak-Dala Desert (Northern Hungry Steppe, Kazakh SSR), the construction of the State Research and Testing Test Site (GNIIP) of Air Defense Forces No. 10 (Sary-Shagan) was started with the subordination of 4 th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.
In October of the following year, the launching of the anti-missile system of the experimental ABM system was started and the deployment of its assets was started. By the autumn of 1960, autonomous and joint tests on the functional subsystems of the experimental "A" system were basically completed.
On March 4, 1961, for the first time in the world, the interception of the head part (steel plate with a weight of 0.5 tons) of the R-12 ballistic missile and the destruction of its high-explosive warhead of the V-1000 anti-ballistic missile at an altitude of 25 km was carried out for the first time in the world. This happened in the process of testing the experimental ABM system. The technical facilities were located at the GNIIP-10 test range, the missile targets were launched from the Kapustin Yar test site, located in the north-western part of the Astrakhan region.
This event fully demonstrated the possibility of intercepting and destroying small-size targets at high altitude at a speed of flight close to the first space mission, and, as a consequence, the possibility of solving the task of defending targets against ballistic missile strikes based on the use of dueling weapons. Later, the date (March 4) was recognized as the unofficial birthday of the national missile defense system of the country.
In the summer of 1961, at the session of the United Nations, the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, NS. Khrushchev informed the world public that weapons were created in the USSR, which, in his words, can "hit a fly in space".
In the mid-1950s the USSR began to create the first domestic experimental ABM system, called "System A". The development of the anti-missile system was entrusted to a team led by Petr Grushin. To solve common fundamental issues of the anti-ballistic missile defense system in Design Bureau No. 1 (KB-1), a special unit of SKB-30 was created, headed by GV Kisunko, one of the most experienced specialists in electrodynamics. GK Zhukov, Minister of Defense of the USSR, and D. F. Ustinov, Minister of Defense Industry, rendered a great help in the deployment of anti-missile defense.
It was D.F. Ustinov invited the chief designer of OKB-2 (now MKB "Fakel") PD Grushin to a meeting of the board of the Ministry of Defense Industry, where GV Kisunko made a report on the impending missile defense.
It became obvious that the creation of anti-missiles would have to deal with extremely difficult problems. This should be a special kind of rocket. They have to work in the zatamosfernoy zone, like ballistic missiles. However, this, perhaps, ends their similarity to ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles (at that time) are not designed for maneuvering, nor for rapid acceleration when the warhead is deployed to a given trajectory (although their speed is measured in kilometers per second). Anti-missile, on the contrary, should be highly maneuverable and high-speed. And the point here is not only in the design of the antimissile system, as an aircraft, but also in the features of its control system. For an anti-ballistic missile, the altitude of the target's target will always be 25 kilometers or more, since the ballistic missile is usually equipped with a nuclear warhead.
In February 1956, the proposals for work on missile defense were formulated in the final form. It was possible to convincingly substantiate the reality of the solution to the ABM problem and obtain the appropriate permission to deploy full-scale works.
August 17, 1956 issued a decree on the development of an experimental missile defense complex, which received an index - system "A". The main designer of the experimental missile defense complex was GV Kisun'ko, chief designer of the anti-missile system was P.D.Grushin. The main purpose of system "A" was to establish the possibility of defeating the head parts of long-range ballistic missiles by anti-missiles with high-explosive warheads. To solve this problem, the system required the maximum speed and full automation of the work, as well as the minimum time required to conduct preparatory operations during combat use.
To solve the task, the development of a central computer station of the long-range detection system, three precision-guided radars (each consisting of radar channels for measuring the coordinates of the target and the coordinates of the anti-missile), a radar station for the withdrawal of anti-missiles, a main command and control center, installations.
A special missile range for full-scale testing of ABM was created near Lake Balkhash in the semi-desert Bet-Pak-Dala, near the railway station Saryshagan. In parallel with the creation of the experimental missile defense complex, experimental work was carried out to detect the head parts of ballistic missiles after separation from the accelerating stages at distances of up to thousands of kilometers.
Already in 1956, experimental radars were installed in the areas of the fall of the head parts of ballistic missiles launched from Kapustin Yar. At first, Kazakhstan was their place of installation, and by the autumn of 1957, after the testing of the R-7 ballistic missile began, they appeared in Kamchatka. The results obtained in the course of these experiments largely predetermined the further development of anti-missile work.
The creation of an experimental anti-missile, called the V-1000, was assigned to OKB-2, later to the Machine-Building Design Bureau "Fakel", which was headed by PD Grushin. In the designation of the V-1000 rocket, the numbers meant the average speed of the rocket.
The preliminary design for the anti-missile system was to be launched in January 1957. The first models of anti-missiles, known as active models, were issued in mid-1957. During 1958, the anti-missile system was to undergo an autonomous test.
The range of the V-1000 antimissile flight was determined to be 55 km with an average flight speed of 1000 m / s. Thus, the deadlines for the development of the anti-missile system seemed to be taken from the field of technical fiction, and the requirements for the new rocket also seemed defiant. However, the experience gained by the OKB-2 specialists during the development of the V-750 missile for the S-75 air defense missile system made it possible to count on success to some extent. Nevertheless, it was largely necessary to hope for the enthusiasm of the team.
One of the main problems immediately encountered by the V-1000 developers was the provision of a maximum missile flight speed of up to 1500 m / s (at an average speed of 1000 m / s). While moving in an atmosphere of such velocities, the rockets have not yet reached. According to modern terminology, this was already a region of hypersonic velocities, the study of which was only just beginning in those years. Another, no less serious problem, was the provision of high maneuverability in the area of ??its meeting with a ballistic target (altitudes from 23 to 28 km) - up to 2-3 side-transshipment units.
Of course, from the standpoint of today, such characteristics for missile experts have become familiar, but then these were truly revolutionary demands. A missile flying in an atmosphere with hypersonic speed, and even capable of maneuvering - this seemed to be the limit of technical capabilities. But without such a missile, which sets the final point in the entire operation of the anti-missile complex, locators and the latest in computer technology became useless.
It was necessary to solve the problems, not even tomorrow, but it seemed a distant prospect. It was necessary to achieve stability, controllability of the missile during its flight at the launch and march areas. Ensure its entry into the control beam of the radar. Moreover, the aerodynamics of the rocket by that time in the zone of hypersonic flight velocities had been studied quite a bit. It was the first in the world to solve such problems.
In addition to these problems, there were dozens of others, no less complex and significant. For example: how to turn off the rocket engine of a rocket almost instantaneously and not make any disturbances in its flight? There were problems and a thermal barrier. According to calculations, the surface temperature of some rocket compartments in flight could reach 400-550 degrees. Time to search for answers was taken a little - a year, from the strength of two.
As with the development of other missiles, work on the V-1000 began with consideration of various layout options. PD Grushin spent a lot of time discussing these issues with the leading specialists of the design bureau, technologists and production workers. Avoiding excessive originality in the design of the new missile is one of the main goals set by Grushin, and the movement to which he controlled constantly.
The V-1000 was very similar to the V-750. The latter became for the first anti-missile a kind of prototype. The same two-stage rocket of the normal aerodynamic scheme (the second-stage rudders are located in its tail part), with the solid-propellant accelerator and the march stage with the liquid rocket engine. The starting mass of the rocket was 8700 kg, the thrust of the accelerator was up to 200 tons, the time of its operation was 3.2-4.5 seconds, the acceleration rate of the missile was 630 m / s.
To ensure aerodynamic stability, a triple stabilizer was installed on the accelerator. After separating the accelerator, a second-stage liquid jet engine was activated. The missile was accelerated to 1500 m/s. The thrust of the LRE on the ground was 10,500 kg, and the operating time 36.5-42 s. The available overloads at the summit heights reached 2.5-3.0. The weight of the warhead was 500 kg.
For the first time in the world, a fragmentation version of the combat unit was created, containing 16 thousand active damaging elements, each of which is an explosive ball with a diameter of 24 mm, carrying a carbide-tungsten core with a diameter of 10 mm. When the warhead was blasted, the striking elements were ejected perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the antimissile. In this case, a circular damping field of the "veil" type with a diameter of 75 m was formed.
The missile stabilized and was controlled by an autopilot in accordance with commands from the ground coming through the on-board radio equipment. To determine the current coordinates of the interceptor in flight, the radio-visualization equipment operating on the requesting pulses of the radar sighting and precise guidance was introduced into the onboard equipment. On-board equipment also provided a one-time command to undermine the combat unit.
Control of the anti-missile system was provided from ground-based facilities, and from the point of view of control methods, the flight of the anti-missile system was divided into two stages: the stage of antimissile launching on the flat trajectory calculated before the start (at the same time, information was used about the current coordinates of the antimissile system, measured by the radar of the output station, which makes sight of the interceptor according to the transponder data); stage of accurate targeting of an antimissile missile on the target (with the command (as well as the team of the military unit undermining in the vicinity of the meeting point) was developed along the ranges to the target and the antimissile system, as measured by three precision-guided radars (according to the "three-range method").
In the design of the V-1000, aluminum alloys were most widely used. This made it possible to create a single-type design for most rocket compartments and minimize the variety of technological methods used in their manufacture. To protect the design of the rocket from heating (arising from the flight of a rocket with hypersonic speed), special heat resistant coatings were used.
On the eve of 1957, a month ahead of schedule, OKB-2 presented a draft V-1000. In it, as far as knowledge, experience, results of existing research and flight tests of the missile predecessors were allowed, answers were given to most of the questions that arose. But the V-1000 still represented a task with many unknowns - both in flight dynamics, and in controllability, and in on-board equipment (semiconductors were used for the first time, and not the usual electronic tubes).
In order to accelerate the work on the experimental verification of the characteristics of the V-1000 rocket, to study the issues of its launch and the separation of stages, a decision was taken to expedite the design and, accordingly, to produce another version of the missile, an intermediate version (it was called autonomous).
In fact, the OKB-2 was to build a missile, which is a full-scale flying model V-1000, within several months. At the second stage of this model, a special software mechanism was to be installed, specifying the necessary deviation of the rudders during its flight. However, it was not easy to quickly make a model corresponding to all the requirements - the developers of the midship LPRE and the solid fuel starter engine did not have time for the required dates for the commencement of flight tests (autumn 1957).
It was impossible to shift the start dates for flight tests. The choice was not great - either start the first launches in Kazakhstan in winter with its snows and snowstorms, or wait another six months to spring, losing the typed pace of work. In order to get out of this situation, it was decided to install a 17 tonne liquid rocket engine developed at the OKB-3 Research Institute-88 (at a lowering of its thrust to the required value of 10.5 tons) at the march stage of the flying model. He had a slightly worse weight than the standard version, but for the model it was quite suitable.
The same was done with the starting engine. Instead of the developed VD-33, for the first launches of the V-1000 model, a bunch of four V-750 rocket accelerators was used. Autopilot was also taken from it. Such an approach made it possible to start flight tests before the development and development of these elements are fully completed. In addition, for the first launches, a simplified complex of ground equipment, developed in OKB-2, was used.
There was no regular launcher, which was developed in Leningrad at the Bolshevik plant. In these circumstances PD Grushin took the only possible solution: to design and build a temporary PU with OKB-2. And such a problem was solved in a short time. This allowed in October 1957 to make the first launch of the V-1000 in the so-called throw variant: the second stage of the missile was a weight-and-weight model with no internal filling and with zippers stuck in the zero position.
Temporary PU was a structure 12 meters high, with a cylindrical diameter of 6 meters, weighing 25 tons (not counting the cross on which it should stand). For its manufacture in the pilot production of OKB-2, a team was created and intense work began (as usual, overtime and without days off). After four and a half months, the construction of the PU was completed.
In July 1957, at night, a train departed from the railway gate OKB-2: three freight cars, two platforms with dismantled PU, and in the middle a passenger car in which a team of pickers and security guards were traveling. All the way the train went to the test site almost along the "green street".
In September 1957 the first flying model of the V-1000 was delivered to Saryshagan. By that time, the launcher was already mounted. Those autumn months for work at the training ground were almost the most suitable time. Gone with the summer and 50-degree heat, and sandstorms, and another exotic stony semi-desert. Since that time for engineers and testers OKB-2 began the development of a new test site.
In the period 1956-1957 the Saryshagan test site was one of the most grandiose construction projects in the country. However, newspapers did not report about it, radio and television were silent. The name "Saryshagan" was pronounced only between the initiates (and even then quietly). And, as a rule, in conversations this place was encrypted with "Flounder", "Beluga", "Thorn", "Lake". Conditions of life there the first years were heavy - staff lived in wooden barracks, 10-15 beds in one room. All the "convenience" is on the street.
In October 1957, the first launch of the flying model was carried out. The flight of the rocket was short-lived. Stabilizers collapsed from the action of gas jets of accelerators. The rocket crumbled in the air. After the completion of the design of the missile (the stabilizers were moved forward more than a meter so as not to expose them to gas jets), in December 1957 the second launch of the flying model was carried out. The block of accelerators worked out the time, but did not separate because of the unsuccessful design of the decoupling nodes. New launches of the flying model were postponed until the spring.
In the spring of 1958 flight tests of the flying model were resumed. In start-up No. 4, the engine for the first time worked. Starting with the launch of No. 5, tests began with a regular accelerator, the PRD-33. In this launch the maximum speed of 1500 m / s was achieved for the first time. The missile first reached its calculated range.
In total in 1957-1958 in the pilot production of OKB-2, 8 copies of flying models were manufactured, whose flight tests made it possible to practically pass in May 1958 to flight tests of the standard version of the V-1000 antimissile. The autonomous flight tests of the V-1000 anti-missile were completed in February 1960. In total, 25 launches took place at the stage of autonomous tests (including 8 launches of the flying model).
At the stage of autonomous testing the following tasks were set: check the basic ballistic and aerodynamic characteristics of the missile; checking the operation of the powder accelerator and propulsion system of the second stage; verification of the autopilot operation APV-1000; checking the functioning of the sighting and control radiolines.
To determine the parameters of the trajectory of an anti-missile system and to control its on-board equipment, the radiotelemetric equipment RTS-8A was installed on the anti-racket.
Thus, the design decision of P.D. Grushin was completely justified - by the time the main radio-technical means of the "A" system were put into operation, the V-1000 antimissile was to be tested. This allowed during the period from February to May 1960 to test the V-1000 anti-missile system in the system A system complex under program control from the central computer station. In total, 10 launches of telemetric variants of anti-missiles were conducted at this stage, the main tasks of which were: clarification of the ballistic and aerodynamic characteristics of the missile system based on typical guidance trajectories; investigation of the motion of an anti-missile system on trajectories with small start angles; working out the interaction of the CVS and the shooting complex of the starting position when controlling the anti-racket according to the program specified by the CVS.
In May-November 1960, 23 V-1000 anti-ballistic missile launches were carried out in the system A system complex while controlling the missile in a closed control loop when firing at a conventional target.
The purpose of the tests for the conditional target was: the development of the antimissile defense in a closed control loop when firing at conventional targets of type P-2, P-5 and P-12; investigation of the antimissile movement in the vicinity of the conditional meeting point when operating in a closed loop, using for the data commands of the radar station an anti-missile sighting.
Starts on the conditional target were also carried out in the intervals between launches for real purposes to check the changes introduced into the equipment and the combat algorithm of the system. All these works were completed in October 1960.
From September 1960 to March 1961 the "A" system launched V-1000 anti-missile missiles based on real targets P-5 and P-12. In total, 38 launches of anti-missiles (of which 12 launches with high-explosive warheads) were conducted during this period.
In total, since the beginning of the tests of system "A", 84 launches of V-1000 anti-missiles were carried out in various trim levels. In the launch No. 80, conducted on March 4, 1961, on an R-12 rocket with inert equipment, radio-technical means and anti-missile systems functioned normally. One-time command to undermine the combat unit was issued for 43.3 seconds. The gap was 31.8 m to the left and 2.2 m to the top.
The target (missile R-12) was hit (completely destroyed). On the ground, only the most massive parts of the target were found: the cargo model of the special charge, the ring frame and the bow of the hull.
This result was not accidental. Three weeks later, success was repeated. On March 26, 1961, the anti-missile system was launched using a standard R-5 missile with high-explosive equipment. At an altitude of about 25 km, the warhead of the anti-missile system worked, and then another explosion exploded - a detonation of the combat part of the R-5 missile took place. That is, the high-explosive warhead of the ballistic missile was undermined by the striking elements of the V-1000 anti-missile warhead.
Thus, the task of historical importance was solved - the possibility of intercepting and destroying a ballistic target flying at a speed of more than 3 km / s, that is, the creation of a missile defense system, was proved. In the US, they managed to repeat this result only after 23 years.
In the course of further work on the system "A" in the period to the end of 1961, several more successful launches of the V-1000 anti-missile were carried out for real P-5 and P-12 targets.
Successful tests of the experimental system "A" with the V-1000 anti-ballistic missile made it possible in June 1961 to issue a draft design of the combat anti-echelon system A-35.
Its development was carried out by the team of the OKB "Vympel" (later the Research Institute of Radio Industry), which was separated from the KB-1, under the leadership of the general designer G. V. Kisunko, and at the stage of its modernization - under the leadership of the chief designer I. D. Omelchenko. The development of the anti-missile system was carried out in OKB-2 under the supervision of the general designer P. D. Grushin.
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