Soviet Teletanks
| Teletanks | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| year | name | tons | gun | built |
| 1927 | TT-18 | 6 | 37mm | # |
| 193_ | TT-26 | mm | ||
| 193_ | TT-27 | mm | 5 | |
| 193_ | T-38 | mm | ||
| 193_ | BT-5 | mm | ||
| 193_ | TT-BT-7 | mm | ||
| 1937 | BT-SV | 25 | 45mm | 2 |
Remote controlled weapons were studied in England, in the USA and in other countries, but there they were conducted at the level of experiments. The unfinished products not only did not go into series, but were not even allowed to take part in military trials. In 1942, England began testing their own version of the "land torpedo". The vehicle, called the Scorpion, was remotely controlled. She moved with eight wheels and, interestingly, was floating. However, then the British did not go beyond experiments.
The Germans also, but more successfully used their radio-controlled tankettes. During the war in Germany, several types of teletanks were created, controlled by wire and radio. It was a light tank "Goliath" (B1) weighing 370 kg (2,600 copies were produced, according to other sources up to 8,000), a medium tank "Springer" ("Ghost") Sd. Kfz.304 weighing 2.4 tons (produced 50 copies), as well as B-IV (Sd. Kfz.301) Weighing 3.5-4.9 tons (produced 570, according to other sources 1000 copies).
The B-IV was equipped with an FKL-8 radio control system from Blaupunkt-Verne. The weight of the receiver and transmitter is 20 kg, plus the power supply is 18 kg. The operator could transmit 10 commands to the teletank in VHF mode at a distance of up to 4 km. A B-IV teletank equipped with a Tonie-R television camera was tested, but they failed to launch it into production.
In general, the use of teletanks by the Germans was not very successful. They, like the exploding boats "Linze", were used only in isolated cases - these are the weapons of saboteurs. By the end of the war, the Germans finally realized this, and they began to throw out telecontrol equipment from the B-IV teletanks, and instead plant a couple of fellows with a 10.5 cm recoilless gun. In this capacity, the B-IV could indeed pose a real threat to medium and heavy tanks.
The beginning was laid by tests in 1929-1930. remote-controlled captured French Renault tank, but it was controlled not by radio, but by cable. And in 1931-1932. the tank of the domestic design MS-1 was already tested. It was controlled by radio and, moving at a speed of up to 4 km / h, could carry out commands: forward, right, left, stop.
In the spring of 1932, the “Most-1” equipment, and later “Reka-1” and “Reka-2” equipment was equipped with a two-turret T-26 tank. In April 1932, this tank was tested at the Moscow Chemical Polygon. According to the test results, the production of four teletanks and two control tanks was ordered. Control equipment of the "Ostekhbyuro" system mod. 1932, installed in these tanks, it was already possible to carry out 16 commands.
In the summer of 1932, a special tank detachment No. 4 was formed in the Leningrad military district, the purpose of which was to study the combat capabilities of remotely controlled tanks. The tanks arrived at the detachment's location only at the end of 1932, but the control equipment did not work normally on all tanks. In January 1933, in the area of Krasnoe Selo began testing tanks on the ground.
In 1933, a remote-controlled tank under the symbol TT-18 (a modification of the MS-1 tank) was tested with control equipment located in the driver's seat. This tank could carry out 16 commands: turn, change speed, stop, start moving again, detonate the explosive charge, and when installing special equipment, put a smoke screen or release OV. The range of the TT-18 was no more than a few hundred meters. At least seven standard tanks were converted into the TT-18, but the system never entered service.
A new stage in the development of teletanks began in 1934. Thus, under the code "Titan", the TT-26 teletank was developed, equipped with devices for launching an OV, as well as a removable flamethrower (fire mixture capacity 200 liters, firing range up to 35 m). Tanks TT-26 in 1935-1936 were produced in small series, only 55 vehicles. The TT-26 teletanks were controlled from a conventional T-26 tank equipped with control devices. Later it was decided to install the TT-26 equipment on the T-46 tank, but it was not put into production.
At first, the designers learned how to control tanks without crews from the ground, using stationary consoles, but soon decided that the remote control equipment should also move and be protected from combat damage. This is how the principle of the so-called telemechanical groups was born, consisting of control tanks (they were assigned the TU index) and robotic tanks (the TT index or "teletank"), armed with a flamethrower and a DT machine gun. The crew of the TU tank included an operator who, using the remote control, could control the TT tank within a radius of up to one and a half kilometers. Such operators were trained in Ulyanovsk.
By the fall of 1936, Soviet industry had produced 33 telemechanical groups (33 TU tanks and 33 TT tanks), which entered the heavy tank brigades of the Reserve of the High Command. They were supposed to be used for reconnaissance of minefields, anti-tank obstacles and making passages in them, destroying bunkers, flamethrowing and setting smoke screens, as well as for removing crews from damaged tanks.
The transmitting equipment made it possible to control the teletanks in 16-24 parameters (start, gear change, reverse gear, turns of the tower and the tank itself, etc.). Veterans of the Ulyanovsk communications school later recalled that it was a tube, but in HF and VHF frequencies it worked flawlessly, but the on-board voltage generator often junked.
On the chassis of the T-26 tank in 1938, the TT-TU tank was created - a telemechanical tank that approached the enemy's fortifications and dropped an explosive charge. In February 1940, a telemechanical group "Demolitionist" was manufactured on the basis of T-26 tanks in a reckless version. Armament was available only on the control tank and consisted of a DT machine gun in a ball mount. The vehicles were equipped with additional 50-mm armor screens and a reinforced chassis. In the frontal part of the teletank, a device was mounted for transporting, dropping and detonating with a time delay special armored boxes with explosives. Tests of the group showed that a 300 kg charge dropped on a line of five rows of bunkers completely destroyed them and made a passage 8 meters wide, and a 700 kg charge dropped at the front wall of the bunker completely destroyed it.
On the basis of the BT-7 high-speed tank in 1938-1939. the remote-controlled tank A-7 was created. The A-7 control equipment weighed no more than 147 kg. The teletank was armed with a 7.62-mm machine gun of the Silin system. But the main weapon of the A-7 tank was the KS-60 poisonous substance launching devices manufactured by the Compressor plant. The OM itself was housed in two tanks 2550 mm long and 330 mm in diameter. This OM was enough for guaranteed infection of 7200 sq. m. In addition, the teletank could put a smoke gas with a length of 300-400 m, the duration of the curtain under normal weather conditions is 8-10 minutes. And, finally, a mine containing 1 kg of TNT was installed on the tank, so that in case of falling into the hands of the enemy, destroy the secret weapon.
The operator was stationed on a VT-7 linear tank with standard armament: one 45 mm cannon. The operator could send 17 commands to the teletank. The control range of the tank on level ground reached 4 km, the time of continuous control was 4–6 hours. Tests of the A-7 tank revealed many design flaws, ranging from numerous failures of the control system and to the complete uselessness of the Silin machine gun: it could not be remotely controlled, and there was no sense in firing "across areas".
Teletanks were also created on the basis of other machines. So, work was underway to create a telemechanical tank based on the T-27 tankette, a telemechanical tank "Wind" on the basis of the T-37-A amphibious tank and even a telemechanical breakthrough tank based on a huge five-turret T-35 tank.
In the late 1930s, could anyone say that Bekauri and Co. had been leading Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky, and others by the nose for many years. In the 1930s, everything was explained simply: the leadership of the research institute and the command staff of the army and navy were infiltrated by pests - agents of enemy intelligence. And let's honestly admit that if communication with the imperialists was wild nonsense, then objectively Bekauri and similar “inventors” harmed the USSR much more than agent 007 in the coolest action movie.
On July 20, 1937, the "Ostekhbyuro" of the NKOP was renamed the Special Technical Directorate of the NKOP and relocated to Moscow (leaving the branch in Leningrad). Bekauri remained its chief as before. On September 8, Bekauri was suddenly arrested in Leningrad by the NKVD and on the same day he was convoyed to Moscow.
On September 8, 1937, the People's Commissar of the USSR Defense Industry ML Rukhimovich proposes to divide the Special Technical Administration into three independent industrial institutes: NII-20, NII-22 and NII-36. Of these, NII-36 was engaged in naval affairs, and on September 19, 1937, the entire flotilla of the former Ostekhbyuro was transferred to it. NII-22 was entrusted with aviation affairs, and, accordingly, aircraft and airfields are transferred to it. And it was NII-20 that tackled land problems.
During the investigation, Bekauri gave several conflicting testimonies. According to one of them, he was recruited by German intelligence during his stay in Berlin in 1932, and according to other testimonies, his recruitment took place through Tukhachevsky and Yenukidze. Bekauri admitted that he was engaged in "fraud" and that his activities were covered by Tukhachevsky personally. On February 8, 1938, Bekauri was sentenced to death, and on the same day he was shot. The fundamental failures of the designers became the target of cartoonists, and their funding by the state stopped. On June 9, 1956, the Military Collegium overturned the court's verdict and the case was dropped for lack of corpus delicti. It is curious that E. N. Shoshkov in his book "The Repressed Ostekhbyuro" (St. Petersburg: Memorial, 1995) writes that since June 23, 1934, A.I. Berg regularly informed the OGPU (and later the NKVD ). In a letter dated July 21, 1936 to the special department of the NKVD of the Baltic Fleet, Berg called these works anti-Soviet.
After the abolition of "Ostekhbyuro", his heirs from NII-20 took over the design of radio tanks. They created a "telemechanical tankette" as part of the T-38 amphibious tank (weighing 3.34 tons) and the T-38-TT teletanket (weighing 3.37 tons). The teletanket was armed with a 7.62-mm DT machine gun in the turret (63 rounds of ammunition) and a KS-61-T flamethrower, and was also supplied with a 45 liter chemical balloon and equipment for setting up a smoke screen. The flamethrower could fire 15-16 fire shots at a distance of 28 m. The length of the obscure smoke screen under normal weather conditions reached 175 m. The teletanket also had an explosive charge. The control platform had the same armament, but the ammunition load of its machine gun was 1512 rounds. The crew of the control tankette was 2 people.
They released an experimental series of T-38-TT teletankets, but they were not accepted into service. On the eve of World War II, teletanks were manufactured on the basis of the T-38 line, however, neither these machines nor their predecessors were used for the purposes intended by the designers. One of the battalions, located near Rivne, was completely destroyed by a German air raid in the first months of the war. The war found another battalion on maneuvers near Gorky. For some time, the command took care of it, but when the Nazis approached Moscow, the secret equipment was removed from the teletanks, and the vehicles themselves were thrown into battle as part of the 10th Army of the Western Front.
The first case of the combat use of Soviet teletanks took place on February 28, 1940 in the Vyborg region during the Winter War with Finland. TT-26 teletanks were launched in front of the advancing line tanks. However, they all quickly got stuck in shell craters and were shot by Finnish Bofors anti-tank guns.
The second and, apparently, the last case of the use of Teletan-KOv was in 1942 near Sevastopol. On 27 February, Soviet troops used remote-controlled tankettes. These were old machines of the T-27 type, withdrawn by that time from the combat units and remaining only in training units. The armament was removed from the tankettes, and a powerful charge of TNT was placed in its place. The tanks were controlled by wire. Remote control equipment was created in Moscow at plant No. 627 of the People's Commissariat of the Electrical Industry under the leadership of a military engineer of the 3rd rank A.P. Kazantsev. Later Kazantsev became a famous science fiction writer. 6 of these tankettes were delivered to Crimea. On the morning of February 27, the tankettes were launched into German positions. 2 tankettes exploded in enemy positions, 2 more were blown up before approaching the target, and 2 were destroyed by German artillery fire.
The failures with the use of teletanks in the Great Patriotic War did not teach the Soviet leadership anything, and immediately after the war, experiments began, but this time with a new T-34-85 tank. They followed the example of the grandfather Krylov quartet. Like, it's not the idea itself that is vicious, but the details. They say that earlier teletanks were bad because of thin armor, low maneuverability, and also "blindness", that is, the operator could not see obstacles directly in front of the tank. And now "the armor is strong, and our tanks" are maneuverable, and in 1947 a TV camera was installed on the T-34-85. The new teletank was intended to be used as shell tanks (to undermine important objects and fortifications); reconnaissance of enemy fire weapons by invoking enemy fire; making passages in minefields; reconnaissance and action in the area contaminated with toxic substances.
In the absence of the best, a TOS-8 television camera of 1938 release was installed on the OT-34-85 flamethrower tank at the NIIBT test site. TOS-8 receivers were installed on the T-26-2 control tank. This tank was created on the basis of the 1939 T-26 and differed from it in that it did not have a turret, and its suspension was replaced with a 3-PA suspension (Skoda firm). The operator could give 7 commands to the teletank at a distance of up to 5 km in line of sight: engine start; inclusion and gear shifting; braking and stopping the tank; sharp turns of the tank to the right and left; smooth turns of the tank to the right and left; turns of the tower to the right and left; flamethrower. During the tests, the OT-34–85 teletank covered over 20 km.
But lovers of radio toys did not stop, and a new surge of "games" occurred under the unforgettable and dear Nikita Sergeevich. With the light hand of Nikita Sergeevich, the "creative intelligentsia" made fun of the fool Stalin, who declared cybernetics a pseudoscience and thereby hindered the development of Soviet science. In the late 1940s, taking advantage of the fantastic advances in computing technology, a number of Western scientists began to spread the idea that these advances would lead to the creation of robots that would de work for humans. Thanks to them, poverty, class struggle, national strife and wars between states will disappear. And if there is a war, it will be between people and robots, when, due to their enormous intelligence, robots decide to take over the world. Many in the West began to call these nonsense cybernetics. In the first 4 years, Stalin and the Soviet government were able to restore the national economy destroyed by the war and at the same time find huge funds for the creation of numerous research institutes and factories dealing with automation and computer technology. But they could not allow the spread of pseudoscientific ideas of "cybernetics" among the Soviet people. It is this kind of "cybernetics" that had been declared a pseudoscience.
The opinion of the famous tank designer Yu.P.Kostenko about the “robotic tanks” was : “Consider a hypothetical unmanned tank. The armament of this tank in terms of fire capabilities must correspond to a crew tank, but the loading process must be fully automated, and fire must also be provided by radio commands coming from outside ... Armor protection of an unmanned tank should be equivalent to that of a crewed one, and the chassis in all maneuverability and maneuverability indicators should correspond to a serial tank, provided that all these indicators will be provided when controlling movement from the outside by radio. Experience shows that in order to carry out marches in an unmanned tank, the driver's workplace must be preserved, since when moving in a convoy to hide the movement of troops, radio communication is not allowed, that is, the driver who is in the car must drive the car. Thus, the chassis of a non-equipping tank should almost completely preserve the design of a crew tank....
“Thus, in order to maintain combat readiness for each robotic tank, a certain crew of at least three people must be assigned with the theoretical knowledge and practical skills necessary to carry out maintenance and repair of the tank and its automatic systems. These three people should almost always be with the tank, with the exception of the time spent in combat or using in exercises. To do this, each robotic tank must be assigned a special vehicle on a tracked chassis with at least anti-bullet protection and anti-personnel weapons. In this case, the repair crew must have constant automatic radio communication with the robotic tank in order to receive information about the current coordinates of the position of the tank and its technical condition.
Another, more complicated, side of the issue is the control of the tank in battle. Two problems are interconnected here: one is technical (automation of tank control), the other is ergonomic (interaction of the man-tank system), each of which has its own characteristics. So, for example, control automation can be carried out in two ways:
1. The control system of the robotic tank is autonomous, fully automated, with artificial intelligence. It independently collects information about the state of the battlefield (about the terrain for developing a route, about the nature and location of enemy fire weapons to defeat them or cover from their impact), determines the most tank-hazardous targets and coordinates the distribution and procedure for hitting these targets between tanks at least in platoon scale. The latter is explained by the fact that a platoon of tanks, as a rule, is assigned a single combat mission, and if all robotic tanks have the same automatic control systems with the same artificial intelligence, then each tank of a platoon from a dozen different targets on the battlefield will choose the same one for the first destruction. Kostenko was of the view that at present, “it is fundamentally impossible to create artificial intelligence, equivalent to the intelligence of a tank crew, to control even a single tank in battle.
2. The control system of the robotic tank is remote, via radio and TV channel by operators at the command post (CP). At the same time, the characteristics of the VHF radio station and television are such that reliable communication is provided only within the line of sight, that is, the command post can be located from the controlled tank, depending on the terrain conditions, at a distance of two to five kilometers. Consequently, the following requirements can be imposed on the command post: the command post must be self-propelled (SP) (tank combat operations in depth, as a rule, significantly exceed 5 km); The UPC must have armor and mine protection, as well as protection against weapons of mass destruction not lower than that of a tank. During offensive battles, the UPC, accompanying tanks, will have to overcome partially suppressed enemy defense points with separate active centers of resistance, therefore, the UPC should have at least a complex of anti-personnel weapons. Due to the fact that the structure of the UPC units must fully correspond to the structure of tank subunits, during operation and combat use, there must be one UPC for each remotely controlled tank.
There cannot be less than three people (driver, gunner and vehicle commander). The same number of tank control operators should be. Thus, the number of jobs in the UPC should be at least six: three crew jobs for managing the UPC and three for managing an unmanned tank. Thus, the “unmanned tank” concept is implemented in the form of two vehicles with a crew of 6 people. Moreover, each of these vehicles individually is much more complicated and more expensive than a conventional crew tank. Maintenance personnel for these vehicles require 2 times more, respectively, fuel consumption and the need for spare parts also increase 2 times, but the combat effectiveness of such a complex will be significantly lower than the effectiveness of a conventional tank with a crew of three, since ergonomic issues are satisfactorily resolved in the All-Union Communist Party, the way they are solved in an ordinary crew tank is impossible. Moreover (according to foreign data), the perception of the outside world through television systems leads to spatial disorientation, especially in a real combat situation, and this problem is still insoluble.
Kostenko noted "In the T-64B tank, at the crew's workplaces, there are 267 controls and information display facilities and about 50 more automatic circuit protection devices. All of this turns on, off and functions under the influence of operators. In a "unmanned" tank, human influence should be replaced by automatic devices acting on radio commands from the outside with a reliability corresponding to human capabilities. Taking into account the specifics of the production, operation and combat use of tanks, it will not be possible to implement such a technical solution in the foreseeable future. In accordance with the above, it is necessary to consider in the future the possibility of using robotic machines only of limited purpose for performing special tasks.”
The concept of guided tanks was a product of trench warfare. However, the Second World War showed that modern combat operations are rather maneuverable, for which the speed of reaction and the capabilities of teletanks turned out to be insufficient. Until the end of the 20th century, the only, although the most prominent representatives of teletanks were the Soviet lunar rovers.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
