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SS-N-10

The SS-N-10 missile designation was deleted due to the lack of definitive data supporting the existence of such a weapon system. This designation was assigned in 1969 to an assumed antisurface ship missile believed to be carried onboard the KRESTA II and KARA class cruisers, and KRIVAK class destroyers.

The SS-N-10 was postulated when the first KRESTA II appeared in 1969 with missile tubes that were inoompatible with any known missile system, It was assumed that the role of this missile was antisurface ship since the KRESTA II's immediate predecessor, the KRESTA I, carried this type of missile. The cbaracteristics of this new missile were derived from knowledge of KRESTA II electronics and the launch tube dimensions, as well as from known Soviet missile technology. It was further assumed that the SS-N-10's maximum range would be within the KRESTA U's radar horizon. The SS-N-10 was surmieed to be also onboard the KRIVAK and KARA when these units appeared in 1970 and 1971. The inner dimensions of the missile tubes on the KRIVAK are equivalent to those on the KRESTA II, while the KARA's tubes are identioal.

In December 1971 the Central Intelligence Agency reported ["Intelligence Report - The Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force: Development and Operiatonal Employment", SR IS 71-19] "In 1970 a new cruise missile system, the SS-N-10, appeared on a new cruiser, the Kresta II. The missile itself has not been seen. Estimates of the sizeand performance of the SS-N-10 are based on launchersize, associated equipment, and Soviet practice. Its size--about 25 feet long -- suggests a similarity to the SS-N-7 missile which in turn suggests that the SS-N-10 is propelled by a two-stage solid-fueled rocket engine. acquisition and guidance for the missile may limit the operational range to about 25 nm. It is most likely guided by a preprogramed autopilot and a missile-mounted radar for homing on the target. A passive infrared seeking device may provide backup homing guidance."

In April 1975, the United States Office of Naval Intelligence reported in "Understanding Soviet Naval Developments" that "The newest destroyer of the Soviet Navy is the KRIVAK class, described by a U.S. Chief of Naval Operations as “ton for ton the heaviest armed and most effective destroyer afloat." The first KRIVAK went to sea in 1970. The ship displaces 3,800 tons and has an overall length of 405 feet, and thus is smaller than recent U.S. ocean escort ships (which have considerably greater range). The KRIVAK is armed with both anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, having a four-tube launcher for the SS-N-10 missile and two launchers for the SA-N-4 missile, respectively. In addition, the ship has anti-submarine weapons, eight torpedo tubes, mine rails, and four 76-mm guns. This weaponry is complemented by advanced electronic systems including both hull-mounted and variable-depth sonars."

The existenee of the SS-N-10 was apparently supported by reports of KRESTA II and KRIVAK missile firings in the Baltic and the acquisition of missile debris. There was, however, no supporting telemetric data or photographic evidence, and the SS-N-10's existenee remained an assumption.

Telemetry intercepts from Black Sea missile launohes in 1971 confirmed the existenee of a surface launched torpedo carrying ASW missile. This missile, later designated SS-N-14, was thought to be in the early developrnental stage, yet its discovery prompted the reanalysis of previously acquired information.

The U.S. Naval Attaché to the Soviet Union, during a visit to Frunze Higher Naval School in Leningrad on 17 July 1970, observed a graphic display depicting the launch of a torpedo carrying ASW missile. The graphic portrayed a HORMONE A helicopter using dipping sonar to acquire a submarine, a Communications link from the helicopter to a MOSKVA CHG and an SÜW-N-1 launch of a missile delivering a parachute retarded torpedo. In 1970 this piece of information did not correlate with any known missile system; however, it took on additional meaning and importance in light of the Black Sea 1971 telemetry plus telemetry obtained in 1972.

ln late 1973 the SS-N-14 was assessed to be operational with the MOSKVA, KRESTA II, KARA and KRIVAK as the probable launch platforms. It was believed, at this time, that the KRESTA II, KARA and KRIYAK possibly carried a mixture of SS-N-10 and SS-N-14.

Meanwhile, evidence was continually being received supporting the existence of only the SS-N-14. During a Port Louis, Mauritius, port call in March 1974 the KRESTA II Class CG, MARSHALL VOROSEILOV, a senior rating remarked that all eight KRESTA II tubes contained ASW missiles. In September 1974, visitors to the Leningrad Naval Museum were told that the KRESTA II missile system was intended for antisubmarine warfare. Seven months later, in April 1975, KRESTA II Class GG KRONSTADT was sighted in the Barents Sea with burn marks on its port missile tubes. A POLÜCHAT torpedo retriever with two torpedoes on deck and a BRAVO target submarine were also sighted indicating the probability of the SS-N-14 launch. Visual confirmation of the SS-N-14 was obtained with the appearance on Soviet TV of a KRESTA II with its missile tubes open, displaying the torpedo carrying SS-N-14.

Although the SS-N-14 was not declared operational by U.S. intelligence until 1974, the missile system was almost certainly operational in 1969 when the first KRESTA II was completed. It ess inconceivable that the Soviets would deploy the KRESTA II without an operational missile system for the two quad launchers. The SS-N-14 design must have been in an advanced stage prior to MOSKVA CHG debut in 196?, since the SUW-N-1 launcher/magazine, initially employed on the MOSKVA, was designed to be compatible with the SS-N-14. The magazine doors for loading the SUW-N-1 are larger than necessary for the other weapon system fired from this launcher, the FRAS 1 Depth bomb carrying rocket. The SS-N-14 eystem need not have been ready at this early date, since the FRAS 1 was an operational system.

It is now believed that the initial KRESTA IIs and KRIVAKs, and all the KARAs carried out their SS-N-14 test firings in the Black Sea. All the non-Black Sea Constructed units transited to the Black Sea shortly after commissioning, probably to conduct their SS-N-14 missile tests. These units and the MOSKVA Class, though lacking an exclusive surface to surface missile, employ SAM systems which have a limited antisurface capability. While the SS-N-14 currently is assessed to have an ASV capability, there are indications of testing which could be for the development of an anti-surface ship version.

SACLANT emphasized that not all NATO nations concured with these conclusions, and were not prepared to accept the demise of the SS-N-10. SACLANT was in general agreement with this analysis. The SS-N-10 was officially retired by May 1977. The designator "SILEX" was approved for the SS-N-14 cruise missile, which was estimated to carry an ASV acoustic homing torpedo with a 198 pound (90 kl) warhead. The SILEX became operational in 1974 and is carried on KARA and KRESTA II CLGMs, KRIVAE DDGSP and possibly MOSKVA CHGs.

An article by Adm. Horacio Rivero, U.S. Navy (retired), entitled, "Why a U.S. Fleet in the Mediterranean," appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1, 1977. "It is noteworthy that the relatively longrange (200 miles) anti-ship missiles which appeared in the earlier missile ships are giving way in the newer classes of warships to the SS-N-10 missile, having a range of about 35 miles. This clearly reflects Soviet recognition of the limited operational effectiveness of the longer range types, which required the assist&.nce of a second platform (aircraft, surface ship, or submarine) for mid-course guidance and of their vulnerablllty to mod- ern aircraft, antiaircraft missiles, and rapidfiring guns."