Object 150 T-62 IT-1

The Rocket Tank "Object 150" was designed in CB UZ from 1957 to 1965 on the basis of units and aggregates of the tank T-62. The Development of missile weapons was commissioned by the OKB-16, led by A.E. Nu-Delman. A Consultant on the management system invited A.A. Raspletina, head of the CB-1 State Committee of the radio-electronic industry, In the future this team together with CCB-14 commissioned work to create the whole complex. Preliminary draft of the rocket tank prepared the plant #183 in 1958 initially on the basis of the tank T-54, but then the project adjusted, taking as a base tank T-62.

The Machine had a welded case borrowed from a serial tank T-62. The turret is a cast, semi-spherical, flattened form, with a retractable set of rocket-controlled weapons 2X4 "Dragon" and a loading mechanism, which housed 12 guided rockets. Three More rockets were stationed in a non-mechanized warhead. As an auxiliary armament on the "Object 150" was installed 7.62-mm machine gun PKT with a ammunition of 2,000 cartridges. The Combat weight of the machine was 34.5 T. Crew-Three persons (commander, mechanic-driver, operator).

Missiles, loading and starting systems, day and night scopes, 2EZ Stabilizer, guidance and control stations were included In the missile-guided armament complex. Control of the rocket-radio command, semi-automatic, on any combination of seven frequencies and two codes, which allowed simultaneous firing of several fighter tanks. Effectiveness of Target defeat: from the first-second shot.

Launcher automatic Loading. Automatic operation was carried out by pressing the button on the day sight. Lupka PU together with field of view of day and night sights, antenna, machine gun PKT and illuminator of night sight stabilized in a vertical plane, and the turret-in horizontal.

Before the launch of the rocket determined the range to the target and this characteristic was introduced into sight. The Operator, holding the crosshairs on the target, pressed the Start button. The Direction of the missile's vanishing was different from the line of sight in the vertical plane at 3 ° 20 ', in the horizontal-taking into account wind velocity. After The vanishing of the rocket PU was automatically removed inside the turret. At the Same time the pre-emptive taking into account the wind was filmed, and the turret turned towards the target. At the moment of launch before the entrance window of the sight automatically during 1.5 with the air curtain was installed (during the tests in 1965, when the rocket began to descend from the PU, the gases from its nozzle lifted from the nose of the tank hull Snow, which pored the entrance window of the sight, in resulting in the missile control becoming impossible). The First 0.5 with a rocket flew uncontrollable. During this time, the lateral component of the wind (due to the sail of the rocket) and the gravity of the rocket have deduced it on the line of sight. From that moment the coordinates of the flying rocket were determined automatically, the encrypted radio commands were produced and the rockets were emitted in the direction of the rocket on which they were taken, and were made to the steering wheel of the turn. The positioning of the missile position relative to the aiming line was made by means of a light spot from the tracer, which was projecting on the optical system of the sight on the photocatodes, which caused the appearance of electrical impulses necessary for Development of radio commands in the missile control system.

In 25.5, the system returned to its original position after the launch of the rocket, and it was possible to make another loading and start-up. Range of firing during the day ranged from 300 to 3300 m, at night-from 400 to 600 m, Armor Penetration at an angle of 601: was 250 mm.

With the development and testing of the rocket tank linked several curious episodes involving Khrushchev.

At the end of June 1960 from Moscow to the UZ came an instruction to send urgently not yet completed (by car was not installed missile guidance system) prototype tank fighter on the Kapustin Yar test range. July 22 was preparing a large display of military equipment to the leadership of the country led by N.S.Khrushchev. The Reports on each machine were to last no more than five minutes according to the regulations, the texts were repeatedly heard, timed and adjusted. According to the "object 150" the deputy head of the armored polygon I. k. Kobmarriages reported. The Chief Designer of L. N. Kartsev had to stand nearby. It was Planned that immediately after the performance of Kobrakov inside the car designer O. A. Dobri-Sov "will give out the launcher with a rocket layout, the wings of which will open, and shakes it up and down. What came out of all this, told in his Memoirs of L. N. Kartsev: "Colonel Kobrakov made a report, designer Dobsov" gave out "from inside the tank launcher, the wings of the rocket opened and the installation began to wiggle. Everything worked out right. But then Khrushchev asked Colonel Kopetov the question: "And it is impossible to make wings open in flight?" Seeing that the reporter could not answer it, I came forward and said:

-No, Nikita Sergeevich, you can not-does not allow the control system. The Rocket will fall.

"I say you can!

-And I repeat-it is impossible!

-Did You see what was done at Chelomomya?

No.

-Of course, we did not see. If you wanted to see, you wouldn't be shown anyway.

The designer Chelomey stood behind Khrushchev and said: "Let's Show Nikita Sergeevich".

During this conversation, Kobrakov began to sneak me behind his shirt, making it clear that I was not arguing, but I was no longer a jerk. And when, making circles by hand, Khrushchev said: "Inside the tank should be a drum with rockets", I, no longer restrained, objected: "The Drum is not good!"-And I say-the drum!

-And I repeat: the drum here is not good! He's forcing the crew out of the tank. And Then, what difference is the drum or rectangular styling? It is Important that everything is automated.

After that, Khrushchev got up from his chair, came out of the canopy, approached me, stretched out his hand and said, "Congrats," to which I answered: "Thank you, Nikita Sergeevich", I still do not understand what he congratulated me, because the conversation was in high tones on both sides."

On September 14, 1964 the next demonstration of military equipment to the highest leadership of the country took place at the tank site. At this time, the "object of 150" passed the testing. Active participation in the management of the control system was received by the officer of the polygon G. Blistannak. For a Long time he was the only one who could effectively shoot a tank rocket. During the show in front of N. S. Khrushchev with three rockets from the distance of 3000 m he struck one after another three moving tank targets. Khrushchev immediately concluded that if the tanks are so easily struck by missiles, there is no point in the tanks themselves!

Seeing that Khrushchev no one objects, L. N. Kartsev said: "It will not be so In battle. Now He shot a perfectly trained, perfectly knowledgeable engineer. Tanks are still needed. "

The next day, speaking in the Kremlin, Khrushchev said: "Yesterday I saw how effectively destroyed tanks are already on the approaches. In the presence of such anti-tank missiles, tanks are unnecessary! "

Exactly one month later, on October 14, 1964, Khrushchev was not necessary.

Well and "Object 150" was adopted by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR #703-261 of September 3 and the order of the Minister of defense Ns 0269 of November 6, 1968 under the designation of IT-1 (IT-fighter tanks). It was Produced serially on Uralwagons-water from 1968 to 1970.

However, in service of the Soviet Army IT-1 was short-lived. According to the plan of the military, separate battalions of fighter tanks were to be completed motorized rifle divisions deployed on the tank-dangerous directions. Only two such battalions Were formed: one in the Belarusian and the other in the Carpathian military districts. During the testing and Operation The missile complex showed high reliability – up to 96.7%. However, its structural disadvantages: large dimensions and mass, outdated elemental base, large dead zone, no gun on the tank, etc., caused the removal of IT-1 from the armament. These vehicles were not involved in hostilities and were not supplied for export.