World Ocean Exercises 70
The massive world-wide Soviet naval exercise Okean 70 was by far the largest Soviet naval exercise to that date. Admiral Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, began to challenge western supremacy on the high seas. “Could the Soviet Union agree to the age-old dominance on seas and oceans of the world by western maritime powers, especially in conditions which allow the extension of these areas as nuclear launch platforms? Of course not!” wrote the Soviet Navy Commanderin-Chief. To demonstrate their developing naval capabilities, the Soviets conducted two massive global OKEAN naval exercises in 1970 and then in 1975.
The Soviet Navy conducted its first major exercise program in 1968 as a participant in the large-scale joint exercise "SEVER-68." Later, in the spring of 1970 and again in 1975, the Navy deployed its forces in two complex "OKEAN" exercises demonstrating capabilies to extend its combat operating areas. The "OKEAN" exercises featured warships conducting coordinated operations simultaneously in Atlantic, Caribbean, Mediterranean, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas. Over 200 submarines, surface combatants, and supporting auxiliaries participated in "OKEAN 70", while about 120 participated in "OKEAN 75." Operations included antisubmarine and anti-carrier warfare, SLOC interdiction, opposed forces, convoy escort, and amphibious landings. Aircraft participation was also a major part of both exercises and included strike aircraft from both the Soviet Naval Air Force and Soviet Air Force. The exercises signaled the arrival of the USSR as a globbal maritime power and afforded Soviet naval personnel excellent training opportunities under realistic conditions.
> One abiding problem for the Russians was the fact that they had such limited access to the open oceans. The 1970 Okean world-wide exercises showed that the Soviets had a tactic which they called the 'break-out'. This is a tactic of getting their submarines, not only their nuclear missile submarines, but their attack submarines and the cruise missile submarines, out into the open oceans through the various fleet areas, through the geographic restrictions that can be barriered by U.S. and NATO naval forces. An article by a Soviet writer describing this break-out tactic mentioned the great skill and even heroism that was required ol their officers to carry out this tactic. This demnstrated the need for giving support, as they call it sometimes, or "combat stability" to the submarine force with their shore-based air forces since they had no fixed-wing carrier-based aircraft, and with their surface ships. Here was one of the great reasons for having shore-based air and surface ships.
After 1970, Soviet warship new construction would still be insufficient to meet the replacement requirements of all four fleets and the growing commitment to distant deployment. If the Soviet Union wished to continue using her navy in peacetime to counter the West's nuclear strike capability, and to inhibit their projection of military power, she would have to provide the necessary ships. This would require a substantial and sustained increase in the construction of ocean-going surface ships, and the choice of whether to rely on base facilities in foreign states, or to be totally self-sufficient; the latter would require even more ships.
This was a very fundamental decision, both in terms of resource allocation and of basic foreign policy and military doctrine; and it was one which would have to be decided before the XXIV Party Congress in March 1971. It was probably with this in mind that Admiral Gorshkov staged the Okean demonstration in April 1970, which had the Soviet navy exer- cising in four distant seas, and then dispersing to visit ports around the seaboard. The Western press helped with the publicity and he had a bit of luck in the Indian Ocean, where the exercise detachment was available to lend the support of its military presence to the Government of Somalia, and produce an outcome favorable to Russia's interests.
In 1970, Exercise Okean provided the first realistic test of resupply in a large-scale Soviet exercise. Logistic forces including repair ships, submarine tenders, cargo ships, water carriers, and naval and merchant oilers supported surface combatant ships operating as far as 2,000 nautical miles from Soviet bases for up to three weeks. Support ships deployed with exercise task groups. Two naval oilers and two merchant tankers sailed from the Black Sea to the Atlantic with a task group of five warships. Nine additional naval oilers from the Northern and Baltic Fleets supplied fuel for combatant ships in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. Seven merchant tankers and three naval oilers from the Black Sea supported operations in the Mediterranean.
Once some support ships reached forward positions, such as areas near the Faroe and Shetland Islands, they remained in an anchorage and occasionally rendezvoused with the surface combatant ships. Enough oilers were deployed so that it was unnecessary to shuttle them to home ports for resupply. Combatant ships interrupted their activity every two to four days to meet supply ships for fuel and water near the anchorages. (During routine operations Soviet warships refuel almost every day.) In order to be flexible and responsive during a crisis or combat situation, Soviet warships almost certainly would try to maintain a larger reserve of fuel. Resupply of food and munitions was not a factor in Exercise Okean because of its short duration and the limited number of "live" firings. Repair capabilities, however, were somewhat limited.
Soviet writings reflected a certain displeasure with the capabilities of the navy's rear services. In 1970, one author noted that there was not enough underway replenishment during Exercise Okean, and he criticized theoreticians for not fully appreciating the problem of logistics. Soviet writings indicated in 1974 that the rear services had been reorganized to give more weight to mobile units, including complex supply and refrigerator ships. The need for better quality control over fuel also has been emphasized. Most calls for improvement or expansion come from officers in the rear services, but other authors as well highlighted the importance of naval logistics.
Gorshkov's luck then left him, and events began to run against the thesis that naval power would be a cost-effective instrument of Soviet policy. the Soviet navy's high visibility was strengthening the hands of those advocating a "Blue Water" foreign policy for America, over those who favored reduced U.S. commitments. e. The increasingly negative reaction among unaligned countries in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, to the introduction of super-power naval confrontation into those sea areas.
On the basis of Marshal Grechko's 1971 Navy Day article in Morskoi sbornik, which I assume stems from the XXIV Party Congress, it would seem that Gorshkov did not get the decision he sought. Grechko does not in any way play down the Soviet Union's very real requirement for a navy, or its vital role in the country's defense, and he mentions the role of securing state interests. But the initial discussion covers all branches of the armed forces, the nuclear submarines being bracketed with the Strategic Rocket Troops, and the navy as a whole comes last. The emphasis is on the navy in war and on deterring attack on Russia. Certain nuances may be significant.
a. Okean is described as demonstrating the navy's readiness to repel attacks on Russia, and to launch its own strikes.
b. Only three components of Okean receive special mention, (1) submarines, (2) naval aviation (3) the landings in the Arctic, with submarines singled out for a paragraph on their own.82 The non-mention of surface ships, by far the most numerous component in terms of individual units and personnel, would seem pointed. c. The reference to "U.S. imperialism" is limited to S. E. Asia, confidence being expressed that freedom-loving people will win out through their own efforts, Soviet support being limited to "fraternal air."83 This would seem to read very differently than the Gorshkov series.
The Soviet Okean 70 exercise demonstrated the potential for large concentrations of U.S. and Soviet maritime forces to operate in close proximity to each other. Starting with the Soviet navy’s Okean 70 exercise (the large-scale exercise involving over 200 Soviet vessels participating in simulated warfighting scenarios in multiple locations), harassment incidents, aggressive maneuvering, and intelligence-collection operations by both countries were once again on the rise. Rather unexpectedly, from the U.S. perspective, in late 1970 the Soviets finally relented to American desires to discuss these incidents at sea.
Tthe next big Soviet world-wide naval exercise was Okean 75.
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