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Czarist Navy in 1914

A paper estimate of Russian naval strength was calculated to support the belief that the Germans would be able to exercise an almost unrestricted command of the Baltic. Under the Russian ensign, there were only four pre-Dreadnought battleships, half a dozen large cruisers, mainly obsolescent, five light cruisers, eighty effective destroyers, and a few submarines. It was, perhaps, almost inevitable that a materially minded people like the Germans should underestimate Russia's real strength at sea, omitting to take account of all that had occurred in the naval service since the close of the war in the Far East.

The Russian Fleet had experienced a renaissance, the most active influence in which had been Admiral von Essen, who for several years before the opening of the war had been in command of the Baltic Fleet. Admiral Essen, who rendered conspicuous service during the war in the Far East, had since placed himself at the head of a new school of thought and action, and in a comparatively short time he effected a surprising change in the technical efficiency and tnorale of the Russian Fleet. When Russia entered the war in August, 1914, the Germans paid the Russian Fleet the high compliment of detailing for the Baltic a considerable force of ships-particularly small craft. They thought it wise, in view of the reports which had reached them, to take Admiral Essen's force seriously.

War found the Russian Navy comparatively weak in ships, but strong in its personal elements; officers and men had been accustomed to cruising in all weathers; the commanding officers had been encouraged to run risks, the Commander-in-Chief realising that war consists in accepting well-calculated hazards. Owing to the inferiority of Russian materiel, it was impossible to translate into action the policy which Admiral von Essen had preached and practised, at any rate so far as the small battle squadron was concerned.

A cautious policy was all the more essential, since four new battleships of the 'Gangut' class, displacing 23,000 tons, and each armed with twelve 12-inch and sixteen 4'7-inch guns, were in an advanced stage of construction at Petrograd under the supervision of leading British shipbuilders. In addition, four battle-cruisers, of 32,000 tons, and carrying a main armament of twelve 14-inch guns, were in course of construction at the Baltic and New Admiralty yards. Several small cruisers and a large number of destroyers and submarines were also in hand. In the circumstances, it would, therefore, have been an act of folly on the part of the Russians to risk the one efficient battle squadron of four ships in commission during the early stage of hostilities, since they had the assurance that, if the war proved a long one, they would be able to exercise a commanding influence on the course of naval events in these northern waters.

Admiral von Essen decided that he had no alternative but to adapt his policy to the conditions which confronted him. He determined on concentrating his main forces in the Gulf of Finland, allotting a number of older vessels for the defence of the Gulf of Riga. At the same time, reliance was placed on mines in both these waterways. These decisions involved the abandonment of the warm-water port of Libau, but at the same time set free a considerable force of destroyers to pursue offensive tactics in the Baltic. It cannot be doubted that to a man of Admiral von Essen's calibre the circumstances which constrained him were unwelcome and irritating, but events were to show that the course he adopted was a wise one.