• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Czarist Navy in the Great War

The Russian Navy proved a great source of embarrassment to the Germans. The Germans regarded the naval forces of the Tsar as of slight importance, and exhibited no little contempt for Russian seamen. This estimate was based upon the unfortunate series of incidents which occurred in the Far East during the war with Japan. From the very opening of hostilities in the summer of 1914, the Germans assumed the offensive ; the cruiser 'Augsburg,' in bombarding Russia's advanced naval base, Libau, fired the first shot to be discharged by any man-of-war in this struggle.

It need not be doubted that during the earlier period of the war, when Germany was confronted with a superior fleet in the North Sea and an inferior but considerable fleet in the Baltic, the recollection of Prussia's experience during the Seven Years' War constrained her to adopt a policy of caution in the Baltic. As soon as hostilities opened, the Germans assigned a section of their fleet, consisting mainly of older ships, to cooperate with the left wing of the German army, with a view to pressing back the Russian troops and seizing Riga. They were encouraged in this enterprise by the comparative ease with which Libau was captured; and preparations were begun forthwith for an attack on the Gulf of Riga. In the meantime, numerous incidents had occurred in the Baltic to convince the enemy that he was not to have things all his own way, in spite of the great preponderance of force at his disposal.

The first nine months through March 1915 of war in these northern waters were marked by activity on the part of both belligerents. As soon as the defensive arrangements of the Russian Fleet had been completed, Admiral von Essen concentrated a considerable force for offensive operations in the waters which the Germans had hastily assumed they would have under their control. The record of these earlier months is of interest as an indication of the anxiety exhibited by the Germans to avoid any losses in the Baltic calculated to reduce the strength of the fleet available for the North Sea.

The Russian scouting flotillas encountered on several occasions enemy light cruisers, which, however, refused action and, having the advantage of speed, were able to make their escape. Thus on 11 August 1914, a Russian scouting cruiser met, near Gothland, two German light cruisers accompanied by two torpedo boats, which, however, soon disappeared in the mist. On Sept. 2, the Russian cruisers " Oleg " and "Bogatyr " chased near Libau two light German cruisers, which, refusing battle, escaped southwards. In August, the enemy made an attempt to enter within the Russian line of defence. This he succeeded in doing, but in the mist the German cruiser " Magdeburg" went on the rocks and was destroyed by the Russians.'

During this period there were a few engagements with the enemy, but these were without results. In September, however, a large German squadron was sighted for the first time in the Northern Baltic by the cruiser ' Pallada.' This force comprised seven old battleships, three first-class and a few second-class cruisers, and two destroyers. The German's strength was thus superior to the four battleships and five cruisers which the Russians had at sea. These ships were sent to assist the 'Pallada,' but did not find the enemy, although they cruised in the vicinity for forty-eight hours. About this time the Russian submarine 'Akula' attacked the 'Augsburg,' but owing to the enemy's destroyers the attack proved unsuccessful. The Germans this time succeeded only in destroying the Bogsker Lighthouse and a passenger steamer. This incident brought the Germans a minor disaster. On being informed of the approach of the Russian ships, the Germans in the dark mistook a torpedo flotilla of their own for Russian vessels and shelled them vigorously, destroying eight of them. On Sept. 24, German operations, which appeared to foreshadow a landing from transports, began near Windau. The Russians sent a number of torpedo boats to the point where the landing was anticipated, but, when the boats arrived on the scene, the German's large ships had already disappeared without effecting a landing. The German torpedo boats, which the Russian flotilla met, avoided battle and steamed away in the dark.

After learning of the movements of the Russian Fleet in the Southern Baltic, the Germans relied upon submarines to attack the ships. During the two summer months the Germans made twenty attacks. In ten cases the torpedoes missed their mark, while in nine others the Germans were unable to use the torpedo at all. That left one successful attack-the 'Pallada' being sunk, but at a heavy cost to the enemy. One submarine was sunk by shells from the 'Bayan,' a second was rammed by the destroyer 'Letutschi.' On Oct. 11, a German torpedo boat was sunk by striking a Russian mine. It is also believed that two more of the enemy's submarines were destroyed in a similar way. While these unsuccessful attacks by the enemy were going on, the Russian Fleet, having finished its preparations for defending the Northern Baltic, took energetic steps to engage the enemy in his own waters, and the Germans found their radius of activity considerably restricted.

Nothing occurred during these months to encourage the Higher Command in Germany, but subsequent events suggested that active pressure was being exerted by the General Headquarter Staff. It may be fairly surmised that the soldiers demanded that the German Navy, since it was unable to take the offensive in the North Sea, should lend its aid to the Army, which had already made considerable progress along the Baltic littoral in the direction of Riga. That pressure, at last, proved effective.

In the meantime Admiral von Essen had died, to the unfeigned regret of the Russian Navy. Fortunately a worthy successor was found in Vice-Admiral Kanin, who was in thorough sympathy with von Essen's naval policy. Subsequently Admiral Nepenin took supreme command. The German offensive against the Gulf opened with much caution in June 1915, when a number of torpedo boats, the advanced guard of a considerable force, approached, but immediately retired when it became apparent that the Russians were prepared to maintain an active defence. Subsequently, the Germans again drew in and once more retired. These incidents were apparently in the nature of reconnaissances. At any rate, nothing of moment happened in the Baltic until later in the summer of 1915, when a determined effort was made to secure the command of the Gulf.

An account of this movement, marked by extreme reserve, was issued by the German Naval Staff in Berlin on 21 August 1915. This communique, with its admission that 'a retreat took place,' is of interest in view of the claims made by the Russian naval authorities. It stated that ' Our Baltic naval forces penetrated the Gulf of Riga, after several days' difficult mine sweeping and clearing away net obstructions had opened a way into the gulf. In outpost engagements which developed upon our entrance into the gulf a Russian torpedo-boat of the " Emir Bucharsky " class was destroyed. Other torpedo boats, among them the " Novik," and also a large vessel, were heavily damaged. In the course of a retreat, on the evening of Aug. 19, in Moon Sund, the Russian gunboats " Sivutch " and " Koreiets " were sunk, after brave fighting, by artillery fire and attacks by torpedo-boats. Forty men of the crews, among them two officers, severely wounded, were rescued by our torpedo-boats. Three of our torpedo-boats were damaged by mines. One of them sank, one was able to run ashore, and one was escorted to port. Our loss of life was small.'

What actually happened has later revealed. Early in August 1915, a German force, consisting of nine battleships, twelve cruisers, and a large number of torpedo craft, approached the Gulf in order to cover sweeping operations intended to make a passage through the mine barrier laid by the Russians. The attack was concentrated on the Rirben channel, the only practicable means of approach for large ships. The first effort was made on Aug. 10 and met with poor success, although the Germans claimed that their ships ' suffered neither damage nor loss.' Six days later the effort was renewed. A heavy mist facilitated the German mine-sweeping operations, and on the 17th enemy men-of-war, under cover of a thick fog, penetrated into the Gulf. 'Our vessels,' a Petrograd message stated, 'fell back, while continuing to resist the enemy, without losing touch with him.' The partial success of the Germans was followed by a series of engagements of a detached character, which continued until Aug. 21, when ' the enemy, in view of the losses he had sustained, and considering the barrenness of his efforts, apparently evacuated the Gulf.' The Russians admitted the loss of the obsolescent gunboat ' Sivoutch,' ' which perished gloriously in an unequal action with an enemy cruiser.' It was announced from Petrograd that this little vessel of 875 tons, ' wrapt in flames, and on fire fore and aft, continued to answer shot for shot until she went down, having previously sunk an enemy torpedo-boat.' It was established, to the satisfaction of the Russian Naval Staff, that the Germans lost in these fruitless efforts at least two cruisers, and that about half a dozen torpedo craft were either sunk or put out of action.

Simultaneously with this attack, the Germans attempted to effect a landing at Pernau, on Pernau Bight, in the north-east corner of the Gulf. Four large barges, of unusually large size, crowded with soldiers, were employed. The operation proved a costly failure, ' the Germans being exterminated and the barges captured.' But these statements do not exhaust the catalogue of misfortunes which the Germans suffered. Apparently a force of larger and more modern ships had been held in reserve, it being confidently anticipated that the course of events would enable the Germans to dominate the Gulf. At any rate, on the day when the enemy retreated, Commander N. F. Lawrence, operating in the Baltic, fell in with the battle cruiser 'Moltke.' A torpedo struck the ship, and it was believed that she sank, but there is now little doubt that the vessel, badly damaged, managed to return to port. It is established beyond question that, whatever the exact losses suffered by the Germans, their experiences during this determined effort to obtain control of the Gulf of Riga, and thus assist the army in opening the road to Petrograd, were disastrous. The attack has not, so far, been resumed-a fact which constitutes high testimony to the opinion formed by the enemy of the tenacity, courage, and seamanlike skill of the officers and men in command of the detached forces in this limited area of the naval war.

In 1915, the combined Anglo-French fleet tried to break through the Black Sea straits. It was necessary to save the Allies, who were deprived of all deliveries. But to no avail. Russia could do nothing to help, and even then, not having naval features that had been sought. Having lost all hope for a breakthrough Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the Allies in 1916, established the supply of all necessary materials through the northern ports, mainly through the Archangel. To do this in a hurry had to build a railway to St. Petersburg. It is with great difficulty, but still coping with the enormous flow of goods.

The Germans, having been repulsed in the Gulf of Riga, subsequently decided - after many months' consideration - to make an attack on the main base of the Russian Fleet. Early in November 1916 the Germans, with characteristic modesty, announced that 'a torpedo squadron on a reconnoitring expedition advanced into the Gulf of Finland and at short range effectively shelled the harbour buildings of Baltic Port.' The Russian official communique intimated that the enemy flotilla comprised a number of modern, swift destroyers, which, taking advantage of the thick fog, managed to enter the Gulf. Nearly a hundred shells were fired hurriedly on Baltic Port, which lies westward of Reval, five children and two soldiers being killed. There is some doubt as to how the German vessels fared in beating a hasty retreat. At the time a number of explosions were heard, and Russian scouting vessels subsequently picked up a quantity of debris and floating articles, which, it was claimed, supported the belief that the Germans lost at least six mosquito craft, either owing to the gunfire of pursuing vessels or by mines. The reception which the Germans met was, at any rate, of such a character that no further attack on the Gulf has since been made.

By the end of 1916 no account of events in the Baltic would be complete which ignored the work done by British and Russian submarines. These vessels have been employed with skill and daring; and not only have heavy losses been inflicted on the Germans, but their communications with Sweden have been repeatedly interrupted. The Germans formed a new conception of Russian sea power owing to their experiences in the Baltic. As Sir Robert Buchanan pointed out, in presenting the Tsar with the Grand Cross of the Bath, 'In spite of the great numerical superiority of the German Fleet, the Russian Baltic Fleet has repulsed with loss all its attacks on Riga, has carried out successful raids, and barred its entrance to the Gulf of Finland.' In conveying to the Tsar King George's 'lively appreciation' of the services rendered by the Russian Fleet, the British Ambassador at Petrograd gave expression to the feelings of admiration in all the Allied countries which have been excited by the successful resistance of the Russian Navy, thus making a valuable contribution to the united efforts to maintain communications in northern waters.